

Uredil/ed.: Dušan Nećak

**Meje v jugovzhodni Evropi:
Kultura in politika od XVIII.
do XXI. stoletja**

**Borders in Southeastern
Europe: Culture and Politics
between the 18th and 21th
Century**

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do XXI. stoletja**
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Uredil/ed.: Dušan Nećak

Ljubljana 2004

MEJE V JUGOVZHODNI EVROPI: KULTURA IN POLITIKA OD XVIII.
DO XXI. STOLETJA
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BETWEEN THE 18TH AND 21TH CENTURY

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PREGOVOR

V dneh od 4. do 6. septembra 2003 sta Oddelek za zgodovino, Filozofske fakultete, Univerze v Ljubljani in Oddelek za zgodovino, Fakultete za humanistične študije, Univerze na Primorskem iz Kopra, kot glavna organizatorja, ob soorganizaciji Austrian Science and Research, Liaison Office Ljubljana in sodelovanju CNRS, Universite de Paris, Paris I, Pantheon Sorbonne in Odsjeka za povijest, Filozofskog fakulteta, Sveučilišta u Zagrebu ter podpori Turistika – Visoka šola za turizem, Portorož, Univerze na Primorskem in Ministrstva za šolstvo, znanost in šport republike Slovenije, v Portorožu pripravila mednarodno konferenco z naslovom "Meje v JV Evropi: kultura in politika med 18. in 21. stoletjem/Borders in Southeastern Europe: Culture and Politics between the 18th and 21st Century". Konferenca je sodila v kontekst mednarodnega znanstveno-raziskovalnega projekta "Tripleks Confinium", ki ga vodijo kolegi – zgodovinarji iz omenjenih, pariške in zagrebške univerze.

Cilje in namene portoroške konference smo zapisali v njene propozicije in v "Vabilo k sodelovanju/Call for Papers":

"Problem meja, tako fizičnih, kot mentalnih ali namišljenih je eden najpomembnejših v sodobnem svetu. Pravzaprav smo ujetniki meja: med državami, narodi, prostori, religijami, civilizacijami, kulturami, družbenimi sloji, spoli, jeziki... Meje so obenem tiste, ki ločujejo in tiste ki združujejo. Nema lokrat povzročajo hude strese in spore. Življenje ob mejah ali na družbenih stičiščih je drugačno, pogojeno z njimi. Meje neposredno vplivajo na vsakdanje življenje posameznika in družbe. Politika obmejna območja obravnava drugače. Za napor, da v glavi emocionalno plat dojemanja meja, zamenjamo za racionalno in da izničimo ali vsaj relativiziramo negativno konotacijo pojma meja, sta potrebna velik napor in mnogo znanja. Zaradi meja je življenje lahko oteženo, komunikacija prekinjena. Meje so osnova za oblikovanje stereotipov, ki praviloma vodijo v konflikt. Lahko pa tudi, kljub različnosti politične, mentalne in družbene realnosti na obeh straneh meja, te zblížujejo in vplivajo na tesnejše sodelovanje.

Problem meja ima seveda svojo diahrono in sinhrono razsežnost. O obeh bi se radi pogovorili na znanstvenem sestanku, ki ga pripravljamo še posebej na območju jugovzhodne Evrope, kjer najdemo vse elemente mejnega problema, ki smo ga poskušali skicirati. Za oblikovanje političnih meja so se na tem območju bile krvave vojne. Tu se stikajo vsaj tri velike religije, katoliška, pravoslavna in islamska. Pomešano in brez pravih meja so živeli in živijo tudi mnogi narodi, ki si med seboj niso v sorodu in so nosilci različnih kultur. To območje je bilo razdeljeno med različne imperije, države, pa tudi med različne ideološke bloke. Ponekod je bila fizična in mentalna meja med njimi trdno zaprta in je strogo ločevala, drugod je kljub siceršnji "železni zavesi" delovala nenavadno odprto in zblížujoče. Tudi danes, v najnovjšem času, evropske integracije in jasne tendence po ukinjanju vseh mogočih meja v okviru EU, so prav meje tiste, ki v JV Evropi povzročajo ne malo težav, še posebej med domala vsemi državami nastalimi iz bivše Jugoslavije.

Seveda pa bomo veseli prispevkov tudi iz drugih območji s podobnim zgodovinskih ali sodobnim dogajanjem – npr. Ciper, Izrael, Nemčija, Poljska...

Tematski sklopi

Mentalne meje (med religijami, etnijami, jeziki, kulturami...)

Meje, ki so bile ali so še sporne (srbsko-hrvaška, hrvaško-slovenska, avstrijsko-slovenska, makedonsko-grška, albansko-srbska...)

Meje, ki zблиžujejo (italijansko-jugoslovanska od šestdesetih let dalje, sodobna poljsko-nemška meja, šengenska meja...)

Nacionalna vamost in stroški za meje (realpolitični sklop problematike varovanja mej in stroškov zanjo od Vojne krajine do šengenskih meja...)

Cilji

Zagotoviti forum za preučevanje tistih političnih meja, ki so bile in/ali bodo tudi v prihodnje tema razprav, prednostno v jugovzhodni Evropi (in v Evropi na splošno);

Ponovno pregledati stare in razviti ter opredeliti nove koncepte in ideje, ki se nanašajo na psihološke, zgodovinske, etnične in politične meje v jugovzhodni Evropi (med religijami, etničnimi skupinami, jeziki, med kulturami);

Preučiti meje, ki zблиžujejo (primer: Italija–Slovenija/Hrvaška) in vzpodbujati študije in prakso na primeru "Schengenskih meja".

Predloge tem, s kratko utemeljitvijo, smo pričakovali na E-mail naslov:

dusan.necak@guest.arnes.si a

li po pošti na naslov:

prof. dr. Dušan Nečak, Filozofska fakulteta, 1000 LJUBLJANA, Aškerčeva 2, Slovenija."

Konferenca je bila od začetka zamišljena kot znanstvena delavnica, na kateri bi svoja spoznanja izmenjali zlasti njeni aktivni udeleženci. Rezultate teh razprav pa naj bi predstavili širši zainteresirani javnosti, v zborniku, ki je sedaj pred nami. Na poziv za sodelovanje se je odzvalo veliko število uglednih strokovnjakov iz Francije, Avstrije, Nemčije, ZDA, Velike Britanije, Rusije, Bolgarije, Romunije, Srbije in Črne gore in Slovenije. Organizacijski odbor v sestavi prof. dr. Dušan Nečak, Filozofska fakulteta, Univerze v Ljubljani, kot predsednik in člani prof.dr. Anton Gosar in doc. dr. Darko Darovec, Fakulteta za humanistične študije, Koper, Univerze na Primorskem, dr. Miroslav Polzer, Austrian Science and Research, Liaison Office Ljubljana, doc. dr. Catherine Horel, Pantheon Sorbonne, Université, Paris I., prof. dr. Drago Roksandić, Sveučilište u Zagrebu, je sprejel predlog ožjega organizacijskega odbora v sestavi Nečak, Gosar, Polzer, da v program konference uvrsti le sledečih 24 referentov in njihovih tem:

Darko Darovec / Anton Gosar, Koper - Capodistria: *Meje v Istri: Zgodovinski pregled – sodoben problem.*

Božo Repe, Ljubljana: *Problemi slovenske meje leta 1991.*

- Franc Rozman, Maribor: *Avstrijska socialna demokracija in problem meje od konca 19. stoletja do 1918.*
- Dušan Nečak, Ljubljana: *Rupnikova obrambna linija – utrjena slovenska zahodna meja.*
- Jean-Christophe Romer, Paris: *Meje in vojaška zgodovina – teorija in metodologija.*
- Catherine Horel, Paris: *Razčlemba vojaške meje: vprašanje nacionalne obrambe, 1872-1881.*
- Brian A. Hodson, Lafayette: *Vormauer, meja, glacis: meje in vojaška zgodovina – teorija in metodologija.*
- Emilian Kavalski, Loughborough: *Od polkroga do kroga varnosti? Določanje Evroatlantske meje na Balkanu.*
- Svetozar A. Andreev, Firenze: *Skrb za varnost v evropski periferiji po širitvi EU: narava meja v Jugovzhodni Evropi.*
- Nadine Lange-Akhund, New York: *Makedonija in njene meje: mit in realnost.*
- Tobias K. Vogel, New York: *Meje, prebivalstvo in iskanje stabilnosti na Balkanu.*
- Silviu Hariton, Bukarešta: *Romunija in Balkan kot mentalni zemljevidi. Predstava o mejah v Romuniji 19. stoletja.*
- Delia Despina Dumitrica, Bukarešta: *Definiranje Romuncev. Konstrukcija kolektivne identitete.*
- Dimitar Bechev, Oxford: *Izpričana teritorialna identiteta, preverjene meje: primer regionalizma v Jugovzhodni Evropi.*
- Jeremy Faro, Cambridge: *Prispevek k integraciji slovensko-italijanskega obmejnega prostora.*
- Nathalie Clayer, Pariz: *Politične meje, etnične meje in nacionalna država. Vzorec albansko-grške meje v medvojnem obdobju.*
- Čedomir Antić, Beograd: *Meje moderne Srbije (1804-1999).*
- Erwin Schmidl, Dunaj: *Frontiers, borders and boundaries.*
- Arnold Suppan, Dunaj: *Oblikovanje meja po prvi in drugi svetovni vojni v Jugovzhodni Evropi – principi in problemi.*
- Drago Roksandić, Zagreb: *Meje, obmejne regije in krajine, vojaške krajine.*

Kerstin Tomenendal, Ankara: *Zgodovinske in sodobne meje iz turške perspektive*.

Karin Taylor, Graz: *Sporočilo miru v jeziku vojne: Mladinski festival, Sofia 1968*.

Klaus Koch: *Svobodna trgovina in protekcionizem v 19. stoletju v Srednji in Jugovzhodni Evropi (1878-1919)*

Na žalost se zaradi različnih, večinoma tehničnih, razlogov konference niso udeležili vsi referenti, zato pa sta bila nanjo uvrščena še kolega dr. Rašid Durić iz Univerze v Bochumu ZRN s temo: *Zloraba dela srbske nacionalno-nacionalistične književnosti objavljene v času od 1985-1995 v vojni agresiji i v času popravljanja mej v bivši Jugoslaviji* in prof. dr. Karl Stuhlpfarrer iz Univerze v Celovcu s temo: *Vindišarji*.

Od sodelujočih na konferenci je do, za dva meseca podaljšanega, roka oddaje rokopisov svoje prispevke poslalo petnajst referentov, ki jih tu objavljamo. Del slovenskih prispevkov je zaradi finančnih težav objavljen v slovenskem jeziku.

Organizatorji konference smo prepričani, da je konferenca dosegla svoj namen. Bolj široko, kot doslej je odprla vrata razmisleku o problematiki vseh vrst meja ne samo na področju JV Evrope, kjer je ta problematika še posebej vroča. Zdi se najpomembnejše, da smo dosegli drugega od zapisanih ciljev: "Ponovno pregledati stare in razviti ter opredeliti nove koncepte in ideje, ki se nanašajo na psihološke, zgodovinske, etnične in politične meje v jugovzhodni Evropi (med religijami, etničnimi skupinami, jeziki, med kulturami)."

Škoda bi bilo če se na konferenci začeta razprava in v zborniku objavljena spoznanja, ne bi nadaljevala in dopolnjevala.

Da je konferenca tako v vsebinskem, kot tudi v organizacijskem pogledu v celoti uspela, so zaslužni mnogi, zato vsem, ki so k temu pripevali, tudi na tem mestu, hvala. Posebna zahvala pa gre gospe Sandri Kranjec s Fakultete za humanistične študije, ki je bila organizacijsko srce konference v kraju samem, ter Turistiki-Visoki šoli za turizem, ki je nam nudila udobno gostoljubje.

Ljubljana in Koper-Capodistria, april 2004

Dušan Nećak

Anton Gosar

EDITORIAL

With the assistance of the Austrian Science and Research Liaison Office in Ljubljana, the CNRS of the University of Paris, Paris I (Pantheon/Sorbonne), the Department of History of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Zagreb, TURISTICA – College of Tourism Portorož at the University of Primorska and the Ministry of Education, Science and Sports have the Department of History, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana and the Department of History, Faculty of Humanities, University of Primorska, Koper, co-organized the international conference entitled "Borders in Southeastern Europe: Culture and Politics between the 18th and 21st Century". The conference was held in Portorož/Portorose, Slovenia, September 4. - 6., 2004. The conference was the continuation of previous meetings dedicated to the topics of the international science and research project called "Triplex Confinium" in which historians of the above named institutions participate.

The outline for the Portorož/Portorose meeting was set in the following manner:

The question of borders - the physical, the psychological, the political and the imaginary borders - is among the most prominent problems of the contemporary society and the world. In fact we are prisoners of borders, those between countries, nations, places, religions, civilizations, cultures, social classes, genders and languages. At the same time, borders divide and bring us together, often causing serious tensions and conflicts. Life at the border or in a social contact area is different and is influenced by it. Borders have an impact on the daily routine of individuals as well as on the larger society. In border areas the political agenda is approached differently. A huge effort and much knowledge are needed to shift our emotional attitude towards frontiers and thus eliminating the negative connotations of the concept "border", or at least make us reconsider our attitudes. Due to borders life can be strenuous and communication interrupted. Stereotypes, which erupt, often lead to conflicts. Nevertheless, borders can also bring people together, impact a better communication, in spite of political, psychological and social differences.

Problems related to borders have a diachronic and a synchronic dimension. At the meeting we wish to discuss both aspects and frame topics with the area of South-Eastern Europe. Here several border dilemmas can be observed and traced through history. Political borders in this area of Europe have often been marked with blood. The three wide-spread world religions, Roman-Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim intermingle here. Throughout history this area was settled with disparate peoples, members of culturally unrelated cultures, that in sequence intermingled without setting firm borders. In the past the area was divided between various empires, states and ideological blocs. Certain parts of these physical and psychological borders were tightly closed forming a real divide; other parts were marked by considerable openness and closeness despite of the existence of the Iron Curtain. Even nowadays, in an era of European integration, characterized by

the tendency to abolishing borders within the European Union, borders in South-Eastern Europe are causing numerous problems, especially those traced between the various states on the territory of former Yugoslavia. Contributions dealing with other areas marked by similar historical and current events, such as Cyprus, Israel, Germany, Poland and similar, will also be welcomed.

The following thematic frame for the participants of the conference were set:

Mental borders (among/between religious worlds, ethnic communities, language groups, cultures, and other);

Borders which are or were disputed (the Croato-Serbian, the Croato-Slovenian, the Austro-Slovenian, the Greco-Macedonian, the Serbo-Albanian, and other);

Borders which connect economies and people (the Italo-Yugoslav since 1960's, the present-day Polish-German border, the "Schengen border" and other);

National security and costs of maintaining borders (from the time of the *Vojna krajina* borders until the present-day "Schengen borders")

Goals of the conference were:

- to provide a forum for examining the political borders that were and continue to be a matter of dispute in SE Europe (and Europe in general);
- to re-visit old and develop and share new concepts and ideas regarding psychological, historical, ethnical and political borders in SE Europe (between religions, ethnic groups, languages, and cultures);
- to examine borders that have brought nations nearer (example: Italy - Slovenia/Croatia) and to foster study and practice of the "Schengen border").

All participants should have contribute to the success of the conference. All conference participants were invited to submit papers related to the main themes of the conference to the E-mail address dusan.necak@guest.ames.si or/and via snail mail to Prof. Dr. Dušan Nećak, Filozofska fakulteta, Aškerčeva cesta 2, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia. The conference meant to be a scientific panel at which the participating scientists would exchange their expertise and knowledge. The results of the conference should have been presented in the proceedings of the conference. Participants from 10 countries: Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Romania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States have promised to deliver articles. The organizers are proud to present here-with the Proceedings of the conference "Borders in Southeastern Europe: Culture and Politics between the 18th and 21st Century". The organizing committee of the conference and the editorial board of the proceedings has been constituted by Prof. Dušan Nećak of the Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana, being president/editor; and by members: Prof. Anton Gosar and Ass. Prof. Darko Darovec of the Faculty of Humanities, University of Primorska, Dr. Miroslav Polzer of the Austrian Science and Research Liaison Office Ljubljana, Ass. Prof. Catherine Horel of the CNRS, University of Paris (Sorbonne) and Prof. Drago Roksandić of the Faculty of Arts, University of Zagreb. The program of the conference was enriched by the following topics:

- Darko Darovec and Anton Gosar, Koper/Capodistria: Borders in Istria: Historical Review – Contemporary Problem;
- Božo Repe, Ljubljana: Problems of Slovenian Borders in 1991;
- Franc Rozman, Maribor: Austrian Social Democracy and the Border Issue from the End of the 19th Century until 1918;
- Dušan Nečak, Ljubljana: The Rupnik Defence Line – A Fortified Slovenian Western Border;
- Jean-Christophe Romer, Paris: Borders and Military History: Theory and Methodology;
- Catherine Horel, Paris: The Dismantling of the Military Border: the Hungarian National Defense at Stake, 1872-1881;
- Brian A. Hodson, Lafayette: Vormauer, Frontier, Glacis: Borders of Integration in Hungary and Transylvania;
- Emilian Kavalski, Loughborough: From the Crescent to the Circle of Security? Defining the Euro-Atlantic Border in the Balkans;
- Svetozar A. Andreev, Firenze: Security Concerns in the New European Periphery after the Enlargement: the Natural Borders in Southeastern Europe;
- Nadine Lange-Akhund, New York: Macedonian Borders: Myths and Realities;
- Tobias K. Vogel, New York: Borders, Nations and the Question of Stability in the Balkans;
- Silviu Hariton, Bucharest: Romania and the Balkans as Mental Maps. Imagining Borders during the 19th Century Romania;
- Delia Despina Dumitrica, Bucharest: Defining Romanians: A Construction of Collective Identity;
- Dimitar Bechev, Oxford: Contested Identity, Contested Borders: the Case of Regionalism in South-Eastern Europe;
- Jeremy Faro, Cambridge: A Contribution to the Integration of the Italo-Slovenian Border Space;
- Čedomir Antić, Beograd: The Borders of Modern Serbia (1804-1999);
- Nathalie Clayer, Paris: Political Border, Ethnical Border and the Nation State: the Pattern of the Albanian – Greek Border in the Interwar Period;

Erwin Schmidl, Wien: Borders, Boundaries and Frontiers;

Arnold Suppan, Vienna: Border Making after WWI and WWII in Southeastern Europe – Principles and Problems;

Drago Roksandić, Zagreb: Borders, Frontiers, Border Landscapes and Settings (Granice, Meće, Kotari, Krajine);

Kerstin Tomenendal, Ankara: Historical and Present Day Borders from the Turkish Perspective;

Karin Taylor, Graz: Message of Peace in the Language of War: Borders at the 1968 Sofia Youth Festival;

Klaus Koch, Vienna: Free-Trade versus Protectionism in the 19th Century Central and South-Eastern Europe;

Rašid Durić, Bochum: The Misuse of Serbian Literature in the War 199-1995;

Karl Stuhlpfarrer, Klagenfurt: The Issue of the "Vindišarji" in Carinthia, Austria.

From the above topics 15 are herewith included in the proceedings of the conference. Slovenian participants have, in part, contributed to this volume of *Historia* articles in the Slovenian language. Longer abstracts in English accompany named contributions. The organizers are convinced that the conference has set pace in the discussion on the issue of several types of borders. Several borders issues have been thoroughly discussed. As it seem, the most important goal of the conference "to re-visit old and develop and share new concepts and ideas regarding psychological, historical, ethnical and political borders in South-Eastern Europe (between religions, ethnic groups, languages, and cultures) was observed from several angles. It would be a pity if the discussion which started at the conference, and has been continued throughout this volume of *Historia*, would not continue.

For the professional and organizational success of the conference a number of people were responsible. Therefore we would like to thank all of them, in particular the paper presenters. But, our warmest "thank you" goes to Mrs. Sandra Kranjec from the Faculty of Humanities, University of Primorska, as she was the organizational heart of the conference in its preparing and applying stage. We would like to thank *Turistica* – College of Tourism for their generosity of providing their premises for the conference, as well.

Ljubljana and Koper/Capodistria, in April, 2004.

Dušan Nećak

Anton Gosar

Dimitrij RUPEL
minister za zunanje zadeve RS

Pozdravni nagovor

Slovenija je srednjeevropska država, ki živi na meji Jugovzhodne Evrope.

Zgodovina Jugovzhodne Evrope je zgodovina prepletanja različnih kultur, ki so prispevale vsaka svoj delež v mozaik raznolikosti in kulturnega bogastva regije. Zal so del zgodovine tudi etnični konflikti, kar še zlasti velja za 20. stoletje, ko so se v tem delu Evrope zvrstile številne vojne. Jugovzhodna Evropa je bila dolgo prizorišče ostrih mednarodnih konfliktov, krvavih sporov in celo etničnih čiščenj, ki jim ni bilo videti konca.

Danes imajo vse države Jugovzhodne Evrope bolj ali manj demokratično ureditev. Prostor za agresivno delovanje ekstremistov se je občutno zožil.

Etnične spopade so nadomestili pogovori. Namesto z orožjem narodi Jugovzhodne Evrope odprta vprašanja večinoma rešujejo z argumenti in s pogajanjem. Ponekod so demokratične spremembe po padcu Berlinskega zidu razumeli kot priložnost za potenciranje razlik in celo za poračunavanje starih računov in frustracij.

Positivni razvoj dogodkov je posledica dolgoletnih prizadevanj mednarodne skupnosti, da vzpostavi mir in stabilnost tudi v tem delu Evrope. Šele usklajen nastop mednarodne skupnosti je uspel prekiniti spopade na področju bivše Jugoslavije in tako preprečiti izbruh novih etničnih konfliktov. Mednarodna skupnost je dosegla pomembne rezultate pri stabilizaciji razmer v državah Zahodnega Balkana, vendar je njena prisotnost zaradi težkih postkonfliktnih razmer (vmitev beguncev in razseljenih oseb, gospodarska stagnacija, razmah kriminala in korupcije), še vedno potrebna. Regija namreč ostaja šibka in ranljiva.

Noben napor in noben čas, ki ga namenimo urejanju medetničnih oz. meddržavnih odnosov v JVE, ni odveč. Stabilnost Jugovzhodne Evrope je v interesu celotne mednarodne skupnosti, eden od glavnih pogojev za ohranitev stabilnosti pa je politična, gospodarska in varnostna integracija postkonfliktnih družb v širše okolje. Integracijski procesi namreč dokazujejo, da je z vključevanjem nestabilnega obrobja v center stabilnosti in razvoja možno preseči nestabilnost, ki hromi gospodarski, družbeni in kulturni razvoj.

Naloga politike (tudi slovenske) je zagotoviti mir in stabilnost v tej regiji. Poglavitni princip moderne zunanje politike je povezovanje med narodi, zagotavljanje in usklajevanje nacionalnih interesov z dogovarjanjem, in ohranjanje miru. Pri tem ne gre pozabiti, da kulturne vezi med državami in narodi pomembno pripomorejo k tkanju političnih vezi. Spoštovanje in obvladovanje kulturne različnosti torej predstavlja pomemben izziv, multikulturno sožitje pa cilj. Enega od glavnih izzivov mednarodne varnosti v Jugovzhodni Evropi predstavlja "upravljanje z različnostmi". Za vzgled lahko vzamemo EU, ki svojo identifikacijo črpa iz multikulturnosti in različnosti, ki sta tako postali neke vrste nosilki moderne evropske identitete. Evropska identiteta nastaja kot rezultat sožitja razlik, kot privlačni element v sodobnem pluralizmu identitet.

V naporih mednarodne skupnosti pri vzpostavitvi stabilnosti in utrjevanju demokratičnih struktur v Jugovzhodni Evropi aktivno sodeluje tudi Slovenija, ki je zainteresirana za mir, varnost, politično stabilnost in gospodarsko trdnost držav Zahodnega Balkana. Slovenija zaradi skupne preteklosti in izkušenj s sožitjem z državami Zahodnega Balkana vidi svojo vlogo kot most za sodelovanje in prenos izkušenj pri vključevanju držav Jugovzhodne Evrope v evro-atlantski integraciji, ki predstavljata zagotovilo za stabilizacijo razmer v regiji. Izključevanje ne bi bilo v interesu Republike Slovenije. Enako kot velja za Slovenijo, velja tudi za druge. Važno je biti zraven.

Slovenija meni, da lahko v prizadevanjih za stabilizacijo in trajnostni razvoj držav Zahodnega Balkana pomembno prispeva zlasti na področju utrjevanja in izgradnje demokratičnih institucij, vključno s pravosodnim sistemom, na področju razvoja investicijskih možnosti v državah JVE in vzpodbujanju sodelovanja med državami v regiji.

Regionalno sodelovanje predstavlja kritično točko pri vzpostavljanju stabilnosti v regiji. Tako na primer EU truda in napredka držav Zahodnega Balkana ne ocenjuje samo po individualnih kriterijih, temveč tudi na osnovi regionalnega sodelovanja. Pri krepitvi evropske perspektive v okviru regionalnega sodelovanja je pomembno predvsem razvijanje takšnega političnega dialoga, v katerem se države članice pobud, ki še niso članice EU, ne bodo čutile odrinjene. Regionalno sodelovanje pa je pomembno tudi v luči boja in preprečevanja nekaterih "sodobnih pojavov ogrožanja", ki imajo močno regijsko dimenzijo, kot sta npr. organiziran kriminal in korupcija.

Slovenija med ostalim konstruktivno deluje v različnih regionalnih pobudah, ki zadevajo tudi države Jugovzhodne Evrope, kot so Pakt stabilnosti za JVE, SECI, Jadransko-Jonska pobuda. Slovenska diplomacija si prizadeva za ohranitev visoke ravni sodelovanja z državami Jugovzhodne Evrope in aktivno podpira njihovo integracijo v mednarodne povezave, saj smo prepričani, da lahko prevzem mednarodnih obveznosti pomembno prispeva k stabilizaciji držav v regiji. V teh povezavah (kot sta EU in NATO) ni prostora za sebičnost in enostranske korake, kot so zanikanje pravic drugih, različne izključne cone Širitev območja varnosti in stabilnosti predstavlja skupni cilj. Perspektiva JVE ni v večnem redefiniranju odnosov med etničnimi skupnostmi na Balkanu, ampak v vključitvi vseh narodov Balkana v EU, to pa je vizija, ki usmerja države stabilizacijsko-asociacijskega procesa v izpolnjevanje evropskih standardov. Na zasedanju Evropskega sveta v Solunu konec meseca junija je EU ponovno izrazila svojo odločenost podpreti evropsko perspektivo držav Zahodnega Balkana, ki se bodo priključile evropski družini, ko bodo izpolnjevale predvidene zastavljene pogoje. Pri tem pridružitve desetih novih članic predstavlja vzpodbudo in motivacijo za integracijska prizadevanja držav regije. Širitev, ki je nepovraten proces, ne sme in ne bo pomenila oblikovanja "trdnjave Evrope" in s tem oblikovanja takšnih meja, ki bi razdvajale evropske narode.

Tu nas čaka veliko izzivov, predvsem pa slovo od arhaičnih pojmov in ekskluzivnih nacionalističnih politik. Meje med nami bodo izginjale hitreje, če se bomo zavedali škodljivosti omejenosti in omejevanja.

Dimitrij RUPEL
Minister of Foreign Affairs RS

Welcome address

Slovenia is a Central European country bordering South-Eastern Europe.

Over course of the history of South-Eastern Europe (SEE) different cultures have intertwined, each of them contributing its part to the patchwork of diversity and cultural wealth of the region. Unfortunately, ethnic conflicts are also part of this history. This particularly holds true for the 20th century, in which numerous wars were waged in that part of the European continent. South-Eastern Europe has long been the scene of seemingly endless and severe international conflicts, bloody disputes and even ethnic cleansing. Today, each of the countries of South-Eastern Europe has a more or less democratic system. The scope for aggressive action by extremists has narrowed considerably. Ethnic conflicts have been replaced by discussions. South European nations no longer settle unresolved issues by armed conflict but (mostly) by debate and negotiation. In some regions, however, the democratic developments after the fall of the Berlin wall have been interpreted as an opportunity to accentuate the differences and even to reawaken past disputes and vent old frustrations.

Positive developments are also the result of the long-term endeavours of the international community to establish peace and stability in this part of Europe. It was only by the concerted action of the international community that armed conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia were put to an end, thus preventing the outbreak of new ethnic conflicts. The international community achieved significant results in stabilising the situation in the countries of the Western Balkans. Its presence, however, remains necessary due to a difficult post-conflict situation (the return of refugees and displaced persons, economic stagnation, the spread of crime and corruption). The region has remained weak and vulnerable.

No effort or time devoted to the settlement of inter-ethnic and international disputes in SEE are wasted. The stability of South-Eastern Europe is in the interest of the entire international community. One of the main prerequisites for the preservation of stability is the political, economic and security integration of post-conflict societies into the wider environment. Integration processes prove that instability, which paralyses economic, social and cultural development, may be overcome by integrating unstable regions into the centre of stability and development.

The task of international politics (including that of Slovenia) is to ensure peace and stability in the region. The overriding principle of modern foreign policy is to establish links between nations, defend and coordinate national interests through mutual dialogue, and to preserve peace. One should not forget that cultural links between countries and peoples contribute significantly to creating political ties. Respect for, and the management of, cultural diversity therefore represent a great challenge, the aim being multicultural co-existence. One of the main challenges to

international security in South-Eastern Europe is diversity management. The European Union may serve as an example of how to establish one's identity by drawing on the multicultural character and diversity that have thus become the main elements of modern European identity, an identity which is the result of the coexistence of differences and an element of attraction in the modern plurality of identities.

Slovenia takes an active part in the efforts of the international community to establish stability and consolidate democratic structures in South-Eastern Europe. Our country is in favour of peace, security, political stability and economic soundness of the Western Balkan countries. In view of the common past and the experiences of coexistence with these countries, Slovenia considers its role to be that of a bridge for cooperation and for the transfer of experiences in the integration of SEE countries into the Euro-Atlantic structures, which give an assurance that the situation in the region will be stabilised. Any kind of exclusion is not in the interest of the Republic of Slovenia. Whatever holds true for Slovenia also holds true for the others. The vital factor is to participate.

With the aim of ensuring the stability and sustainable development of the Western Balkan countries, Slovenia is of the opinion that it can significantly contribute to the strengthening and building of democratic institutions and legal systems, to developing investment opportunities in SEE countries, as well as promoting cooperation between the countries in the region.


Regional cooperation is of crucial importance in restoring stability in the region. When assessing the efforts and progress of the Western Balkan countries, the EU does not take into account only individual criteria but also the level of regional cooperation achieved. In the process of strengthening the European perspective within the framework of regional cooperation, the most important goal should be to develop such a political dialogue in which the countries, non-EU members of different regional initiatives, will not feel marginalised to the sidelines. Furthermore, regional cooperation is also important in the context of the prevention of, and the fight against, certain current "threatening phenomena" with a strong regional dimension, such as organised crime and corruption.

Among others, Slovenia participates constructively in different regional initiatives involving the countries of South-Eastern Europe, e.g. the Stability Pact for SEE, the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) and the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative. Slovenian diplomacy strives to preserve the high level of cooperation with the countries of South-Eastern Europe and actively supports their integration into the international structures. Slovenia believes that assuming international responsibilities can contribute significantly to the stability of the countries in the region. In these structures (e.g. the EU and NATO), there is no room for selfishness and unilateral moves such as the denial of rights of others, declaring different exclusive zones, etc.

The common goal is to extend the area of security and stability. The prospects for SEE lie not in the never ending redefinition of relations between ethnic communities in the Balkans, but rather in the integration of all Balkan nations into the EU. This is the vision that compels the countries involved in the stabilisation and association process to adhere to European standards. At the Thessaloniki European Council meeting at the end of June 2003, the EU reiterated its deter-

mination to uphold the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries, which will join the European family when they fulfil the set requirements. The impending accession of the ten new members is an incentive and motivation for the aspirations to integration of the countries in the SEE region. As an irreversible process, the enlargement must not, and will not, result in the creation of a "European fortress" and the establishment of borders that would divide European peoples.

Many a new challenge lies ahead. Above all, we will have to abandon archaic concepts and exclusionary nationalist policies. The borders between SEE countries will begin to disappear more quickly as soon as we are aware of how damaging it can be to be restricted, and, indeed, to impose restrictions.



Lucija ČOK

Rektorica Univerze na Primorskem – Università della Primorska /
Rector of University of Primorska

Pozdravni nagovor/Welcome address

Spoštovani gostje, dragi kolegi!

Pozdravljeni v slovenski Istri na konferenci, ki je po tematiki, času in prostoru tako aktualna, da bolj ne bi mogla biti. Meje: na zemljevidu, v prepoznavanju in iskanju resnic, meje v naravni danosti in v glavah je mogoče preseči le takrat, kadar sta človek in svet okoli njega v harmoničnem razmerju med strpnostjo in odločnostjo, med določenostjo in spremenljivostjo.

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen, dear colleagues!

As a representative of the newly established university, let me welcome in the first place our guest from abroad, then our colleagues from the Universities of Ljubljana and Maribor, our partners in common education missions and our friends. Their support and the political will of the Slovenian state, which reflected the need for intellectual potential in this border area, have created the grounds for the establishment of a new university in Slovenia.

The University of Primorska was established on 29 January 2003, with the government decree enacted by the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia. Situated between Croatia and Italy, linking the geo-political areas of Western Europe and the Mediterranean, the mission of this new institution is based on the culture and tradition of this border area, whereas its vision is to participate in the Common European Higher Education Area. The University of Primorska is a project of national importance. Slovenia is joining the EU at the time when centres of knowledge, economy and social influence are crucial factors for an equal integration of all Slovene regions with parallel centres across the European continent, which is aiming at becoming the most competitive and dynamic continent by 2010 by basing its economic and social development on new knowledge.

I am especially pleased that this numerous participation at the conference will offer a platform for in-depth discussions, exchange of opinions and views focused on the borders, culture and policies of how to manage them. Democratic systems in Europe are currently facing new challenges. Innovation and scientific progress are accelerating, providing great opportunities for economic and social development. Decision-making is thus becoming more and more difficult and requires a great amount of expertise. This situation poses a tremendous challenge to democracy in general and research-based policies in particular. History and what it teaches are of great help to decision-making strategies. What I would like to stress in this connection is that problems and challenges that Europe will have to face in coming years are social in their nature. Therefore the contribution of

social sciences and humanities in these domains is of great relevance.

For the last ten years, Europe has been experiencing instability in its South - East part. The conflicts (and instability) could be very dangerous for the stability of the whole continent. Europe on the whole, and the EU in particular, should therefore continue to do its best to improve the safety situation in that region. I'm challenged to read you some words, written to me in a private correspondence by my friend *Jean Louis Schefer*, a French writer, historian of art critique, philosopher.

La mémoire, le passé (l'histoire) est un matériau de construction et un ensemble d'outils spécifiques irremplaçables: elles ne sont pas destinées au musée mais à la vie.

La Slovénie a, en Europe, et à la charnière de plusieurs civilisations, une histoire extrêmement riche; la solution n'est pas de l'oublier pour devenir modernes ou plus européens, elle est de l'écrire. Et l'écrire, ce n'est pas s'enfermer dans des particularismes, ni dans une fierté nationale, c'est s'assurer d'une force symbolique, intellectuelle considérable. Or l'Europe n'est faite que de cas semblables : elle peut-être une chance pour chaque pays (qui souffre de troubles de mémoire) d'accéder à une identité réelle. Nous vivons tous ensemble depuis la fin de l'empire romain, notre histoire est donc commune, et c'est notre première richesse intellectuelle, politique, artistique, humaine. Encore une fois, je crois qu'il n'y a rien à sauvegarder (comme si nous étions menacés d'un déluge!): il faut être suffisamment bon pour donner, seule façon de se construire. On n'a jamais rien à perdre à des échanges et, surtout, dans ce genre de choses on perd toujours ce que l'on veut préserver. Notre chance à tous est d'avoir eu un passé européen, et uniquement, il a été conflictuel, il sera maintenant d'une autre nature.¹

Besede, ki bi nam lahko služile v razmišljanju, ko se pripravljamo na čas, ko naj Evropa ne bi več poznala meja. Strah pred izgubami – identitet, materialnih dobrin, pridobljenih pravic, ozemelj, političnih in ekonomskih privilegijev – je upravičen? Če ponovim za Scheferjem: "Nič nimamo izgubiti, če smo dovolj dobri, da lahko dajemo. To je edini način, s katerim se lahko zgradimo. Srečna okoliščina za nas vse je dejstvo, da imamo evropsko preteklost, in čeprav je bila kdaj konfliktna, je razlika le v tem, da bo sedaj drugačne narave".

Cari colleghi, onorati ospiti!

La vostra ricca esperienza, il sapere acquisito e quello da scoprire, dialoghi e dibattiti non servono molto se non volgono la loro essenza in azione. Qui e ora si offre a noi un'occasione unica per arrivare a progetti di collaborazione che non conoscono frontiere limitative se non in noi stessi.

Vi auguro una fruttuosa conferenza, un soggiorno piacevole e invito tutti a ritornare in Istria tra noi. Grazie della vostra attenzione!

Lepo pozdravljeni in veliko uspeha na tej konferenci!



¹ Pisma 8.05.2003

Darko DAROVEC, Anton GOSAR

BORDERS IN ISTRIA

Introduction

In the course of the centuries, the borders between the Italians, Slovenes and the Croats in Istria took shape as a result of various historical, geographical, economic, demographic, administrative, political and even military-defensive factors. While it is the gradual and mostly spontaneous as well as organised migrations of the Slavic people to Istria (mostly ancestors of the Slovenes from the north and the Croats from the east) that is characteristic until the end of the Middle Ages, it is the demographic crises from the 15th to the 17th centuries, which broke out due to various wars, epidemics and economic retrogression, that led the central Venetian (and Austrian) authorities to organise some major migrations of predominantly Slavic populations to Istria from the Balkans (Darovec, 1995).


The diverse ethnic community that developed in the Middle Ages with a supremacy of the Romanic population over the Slavs gradually changed in favour of the Slavic population during the period of new migrations and population crises from the 15th to the 17th centuries, when the foundations of the final ethnic structures were also made. The dividing line between the Slovene and Croatian inhabitants was not very clear at that time as yet, and although it is true that under the influence of various factors it changed only gradually until the national awakening in the second half of the 19th century and in the early 20th century, the conditions that came into existence after the population crises may be considered as vital in the ethnic demarcation of these two Slavic national communities. While on the one hand the new population of predominantly Croatian origin occupied, under the influence of administrative regulations, the space up to the Dragonja river, the newcomers in the area north of this river that was largely in command of the Koper Commune, were particularly in the provinces on the other hand integrated in at that time already predominating ethnic element. Quite an important role in this demarcation was also played by the Romanic population, which due to larger densely packed settlements or little towns in the very area between the Dragonja and Mirna rivers reached furthestmost into the interior of the Istrian peninsula, while it otherwise colonised mainly the coastal Istrian towns and the area around them. Such area along the Dragonja river shows a very variegated ethnic picture of the interaction of the Italian-Slovene-Croatian speaking inhabitants (Darovec, 2002).

The Origin of the Present Borders

Because of the controversial creation of the Italian-Yugoslav border after World War I (on the basis of the Treaty of London of 1915 and great diplomatic pressure to yield to Italian demands exerted by Great Britain and France on the government of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), the explicitly Slovene and Cro-

atian ethnic character of almost the entire Slovene Littoral and Istrian territory that was ceded to Italy, and because the negotiations failed to reach a conclusion at the peace conference in Paris in 1919, but were only closed by a bilateral pact signed in Rapallo (12th November, 1920), after the end of World War II in 1945 when the question had the opportunity to raise itself again it was agreed that the issue of borders in this area must be resolved. The first meeting of the foreign ministers of the four great powers (11th September – 2nd October, 1945), aiming to devise a plan for a peace treaty with Italy, produced two principle standpoints in relation to the issue of borders in this area: that the border should run as close as possible to the ethnic border and that the principle of parity should prevail, meaning that the number of 'Yugoslavs' who would remain in Italy should be approximately equal to the number of Italians who would stay in Yugoslavia. These numbers significantly oscillated both in terms of the territory taken into consideration (Italy did not consent to the inclusion of the Venetian Slovenes while Yugoslavia refused to take into account the Italian enclaves in Zadar and Rijeka; the latter had been claimed by Italy against all international agreements and could not be counted as Italian territory) and the data provided by different censuses (Austrian in 1910, Italian in 1921, a Yugoslav survey for Istria conducted under Croatian leadership by Roglič in 1945 (Cadastre, 1946); see also Pelikan, 2000). Finally, a commission consisting of international experts determined that the Austrian census from 1910 should be considered the most reliable.

According to the 'French proposal' for demarcation (along the so-called 'Wolf-ram Line', named after the official author of the proposal that was later used as the starting point for the final regulation of the border), including the Free Territory of Trieste (FTT) and excluding the Venetian Slovenes, and according to the Austrian census of 1910, approximately 114,000 Yugoslavs would remain under Italian rule (109,000 Slovenes, 5,000 Croats). Including the number of the Venetian Slovenes, however, the number of Yugoslavs in Italy rose by 35,000 to a total of 149,000. According to the data provided by the same census and including Rijeka and Zadar, 125,000 Italian and Austrian citizens (foreign citizens were not included in the language census) would remain under Yugoslav rule, but the number decreased to 95,000 if Zadar and Rijeka were excluded. According to the data provided by Roglič, 56,650 Italians lived in the would-be Yugoslav parts of Istria, and approximately a further 1,000 (by the 1910 census) in the Posočje area. After the exclusion of the FTT as a specific state unit outside Italy, the number of Italians in Yugoslavia remained constant while the number of Yugoslavs in Italy (only Slovenes remained) fell to 56,193 (19,445 in the Gorizia region, 1,948 in Val Canale, 34,800 in Venetian Slovenia). The final outcomes of the Paris negotiations of 1946 may lead us to assume that the Yugoslav negotiators, supported by the Soviet Union, succeeded in excluding Rijeka and Zadar from the calculation of the 'ethnic balance', including a number of the Venetian Slovenes, and using the data provided by Roglič instead of that of the 1910 census as the basis for the negotiations.




Cut Out of Istria from the Ethnic Map of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
(K.F. Von Czoernig, Vienna 1855)

Izrez za Istro iz Etnične karte avstrijske monarhije K. F. von Czoerniga, Dunaj 1855.

The negotiations resulted in the final demarcation compromise – the ‘French proposal’ – adopted by the council of the foreign ministers of the four great powers that was later confirmed by the Paris peace treaty in the autumn of 1946. It has to be underlined, however, that due to the geographic position of Slovenia, it was the Slovenes remaining on the Italian side of the border (after the partition, according to the census data from 1910, 1,078 Italians lived in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia) who paid the price for the ethnic balance (along with the Italian minority in the Croatian part of Istria). According to the data provided by Roglič, the number of members of the Italian minority in Slovene Istria represented only 1.86% of the Slovenes in Venezia Giulia and only 1.13% of the total number according to the 1910 census. In 1910, almost no Italians lived in the territory that was given to Slovenia in 1947 (none in the Notranjska region, 7 in Istria and only 1,071 in the Gorizia region) (Grafenauer, 1993, 41).


After the partition of the FIT in accord with the London Memorandum of 1954, compared to the data provided by the 1910 census, the number of Italians living in the Republic of Slovenia increased by 30,000 (to a total of 31,061), and by approximately 20,000 in Croatia (by 14,000 if compared to the Roglič data), while the number of Slovenes living in Italy increased to approximately 125,000, in addition to the 2,400 citizens belonging to the Serbo-Croatian speaking community (in Trieste some certainly were Serbian, although the majority were Croatian). Neither of these changes significantly altered the relation between the Slovene loss and the benefit to today’s Republic of Croatia. The Treaty of Osimo established the final Italo-Yugoslav border that had already been defined as a demarcation line between Zone A and Zone B of the FIT with the London Memorandum of 1954. After the final act – the partition of the FIT – the ‘ethnic balance’ turned out relatively well for Italy (by the 1910 census, 145,000 Italians remained on Yugoslav soil; Zadar and Rijeka were excluded) against a lower, though not significantly, number of (predominantly) Slovenes within its borders. Each of the possible calculations of ‘ethnic balance’ required only a negligible price to be paid by the Croats: according to the Roglič survey, 71,000 Italians remained in Croatian Istria and therefore speakers of Croatian living in Trieste in 1910 only represented 3.38% of this number; if the data of the 1910 census is used as the basis, the number of Italians increased to 115,000 and the share of Croatian speakers in Trieste in relation to this total fell to 2%; including the population of Zadar and Rijeka, the number of Italians increased by approximately 30,000 and the share of the Croatian ‘balance’ declined further to 1.65%. Unquestionably, the price for the ‘ethnic balance’ was paid by the bitter sacrifice Slovenia made for Yugoslavia that, however, was probably absolutely necessary for the liberation of the majority of the Slovene Littoral (Grafenauer, 1993, 42).

In no way was the Slovene-Croatian border discussed at the international negotiations where Yugoslavia was considered as a unit, neither at the 1919 negotiations nor the 1945-1954 negotiations, which was undoubtedly more favourable for all Yugoslav republics than a division into individual units would have been. The Croats and Slovenes together, for example, held the absolute majority of the population in Istria while the Croats alone only had the relative majority (43.5%) despite the fact that their share was higher than that of the Italians. In addition, the common Yugoslav state represented the essential framework for the alteration of borders as defined by the London Memorandum.



Cut Out from the Map of Slovenian Provinces and Regions, 1853, produced by P. Kozler (the Croato-Slovene ethnic border is drawn).

Izrez iz Zemljovida slovenske dežele in pokrajine P. Kozlerja z visano slovensko-hrvaško etnično mejo, 1853.



Cout Out of Istria from the Map of Nationalities in the Julian Region, 1946, produced by C. Schiffrer (the author combined results of censuses in 1910 and 1921).

Izrez za Istro iz Narodnostne karte Julijske krajine, ki jo je leta 1946 sestavil C. Schiffrer. Pri njeni izdelavi je kombiniral štetja iz let 1910 in 1921.

The Slovene-Croatian Republic border, too, was founded in accordance with the principle of national borders ('the ethnographic principle') that had already been unanimously accepted by experts of the border commission of the Liberation Front (at the end of December, 1941) and participants at the conference on issues related to the Slovene border that was organized by the Scientific Institute on 20th March, 1944, in the liberated territory of Semič. The Slovene-Croatian border was not subject to special discussion because to the Slovene scientific circles it had never been controversial, as is clear from the conference documentation. Fran Zwitter's speech 'on borders' so briefly touched upon the "Slovene-Croatian border along the Dragonja" and the demand that "the entire coast up to the Dragonja should belong to Slovenia" (certainly starting along the sea south of the Sečovlje salt pans as a single area of financial monopoly to continue along the line Topolovec-Pregara-Črnica; Ostanek, 1991, 218) that obviously there was no discord among the participants in relation to this question. The military regional agreement between both sides represented the foundations for the creation of the administrative border that was consolidated as early as 1945 (in the period of the military administration of the area), when it ran along the northern boundaries of the cadastral communes of Savudrija and Kaštel, separating them from the administrative district of Piran to which they had belonged up to that moment (see the attached map of the administrative partition of Istria in 1910 and 1945, in Cadastre, 1946). In addition, as early as 1946 the Dragonja was deviated into the channel of St. Odoric (Savnik, 1951, 146).

Demarcation Problems along the Slovene-Croatian Border in Istria

Controversies over the Slovene-Croatian border in Istria began after the capitulation of Italy when Croatian partisan units started the mobilisation of the population from the entire Istrian peninsula and when the Croatian National Liberation Committee for Istria proclaimed the unification of Croatian Istria with the motherland Croatia (and not Yugoslavia) in Pazin on 13th September, 1943, which was confirmed one week later by the Croatian Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation on 20th September, 1943.

In the meantime, the plenary session of the Slovene Liberation Front (16th September, 1943) announced the unification of the Slovene Littoral with Slovenia. Without doubt it was the lack of clarity of these geographical terms used that led to subsequent demarcation problems. Already during the war (February, 1944), this process represented the foundations for the Istrians themselves (representatives of the Liberation Front in Slovene Istria and representatives of the liberation movement in Croatian Istria) to determine that the course of the border would run along the Dragonja to Topolovec, Pregara and Črnica, and in the northeast along the line Obrov - Rupa (Ostanek, 1991, 218). This frontier was used as the borderline between administrative districts as early as 1945 (Cadastre, 1946). Sources reveal that the Croatian representatives aimed at a border along dialectal boundaries so that their territory would also encompass the villages in the mixed-language areas. The population, however, asserted their Slovene national awareness (Ostanek, 1991, 218). It was this partition that defined the present border between the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia. The riverbed of the Dragonja had already been

mentioned as a possible border between Slovenia and Croatia at a meeting organized by the Partisan Scientific Institute in Semič in March, 1944 (paper delivered by F. Zwitter). It was not in opposition to the traditional views of the Slovene geographical, historical and linguistic science and therefore did not call for subsequent political negotiations (Grafenauer, 1993, 44). These were only necessary for alterations requested by the population for economic reasons (cadastral communes of Črnica near Buzet, Pasjak, Šapjane, and Rupa north of Rijeka).

We should not be surprised by the fact that the course of the Slovene-Croatian ethnic border did not raise any doubts. It had been predetermined by the Austrian censuses before 1910 (see Special-orts-repertoire, 1910) and the Roglić survey from 1945. In addition, it is certainly not coincidental that C. Schifferer also agreed with their findings.

Cadastral Borders of Piran

The conclusions presented in the previous paragraphs reveal that in 1947, after the incorporation of the Istrian territory into Yugoslavia in accordance with the Paris Treaty, the course of the Slovene-Croatian republic border starting east of Pregara and reaching the former Rapallo border was only confirmed along the same demarcation line that had already existed between Slovene and Croatian areas of the liberation struggle at the beginning of 1944. The same conclusion can be applied to the ten-year old partition of the administrative district of Piran in 1944 after the London Memorandum in 1954 only confirmed its borders. According to Article 7 of the 'Special Status' of the FIT, alterations of borders of fundamental administrative units that could endanger the ethnic structure of these units were strictly forbidden. Undoubtedly, the border was officially recognized after it had already been consolidated. It is impossible that modifications of the territory covered by the administrative district of Piran in this period only could have been enforced without leaving any traces in the Piran archives. However, after the year 1945 not all offices were immediately moved from Piran. Therefore, the cadastral office of Piran remained in charge of the regulation of ownership changes (during the agrarian reform) in both cadastral communes which after the partisan division of 1944 became parts of the district of Buje. The cadastre, however, does not invalidate the administrative division.

These findings are also confirmed by the Cadastre National, which accompanies the description of each settlement with its administrative division according to the censuses of 1910 and 1945 (for individual settlements, see Cadastre, 1946). It also reveals the division of settlements between the administrative districts of Koper and Buje, accepted immediately after the war. Hence, the border between the two districts ran along the present Slovene-Croatian border. Further evidence for the same course of the border is provided by the "Decree of the Division of the Province of Istria into Districts and Communes" (*Odlok o razdelitvi Istrskega okrožja na okraje in občine*), issued by the Istrian Provincial Popular Committee (IPPC) on 16th September, 1947 (a day after the peace treaty with Italy came into force and the FIT was established), and published in the Official Gazette of the IPPC (Ul. IOLO) in 1952 (No. 6, 26, 74-78). Article 4 of the Decree precisely defines the city communes, cadastral communes and settlements that belong to ei-

ther the district of Koper or the district of Buje – the district of Buje covered Kaštel (in the commune of Buje) and Savudrija (in the commune of Umag), and the cadastral commune of Kaštel also comprised the villages of Bužini and Škudelini. Both were also parts of the cadastral commune of Kaštel according to the statistical data based on the Roglić survey made in 1945. Although on 1st October both cadastral communes were still listed under the 'administrative district' of Piran (Cadastre, 1946, 582-585), the attached map shows that the cadastral communes of Savudrija and Kaštel already were constituent parts of the district of Buje. These publications do not mention the other two controversial small villages, Mlini and Škrile. Of the small villages along the Dragonja that today are a stumbling block between Slovenia and Croatia, the 1910 census only mentions Škudelini (Škodellini), where 18 people lived in two houses (one had a mill) and all spoke Slavic. The heads of both families were born in Padna.

The data presented bear witness to the fact that the border between the two districts was not drawn along the borders between the cadastral communes of Piran III and Kaštel, which is also clear from examining the cadastral map from the year 1940, valid since the Austrian geodetical measurements (c.f. Marin, 1991, 143), listing both Bužini (some houses only) and the area of the small village of Mlini as constituent parts of the cadastral commune of Piran III, and the area of Škudelini and Škrile as constituent parts of the cadastral commune of Kaštel (c.f. Arhiv GUK, 1940, Nos. 33 and 34). In 1958, the cadastral map of the cadastral commune of Sečovelje, heir to the former cadastral commune of Piran III, also included the areas of Škudelini and Škrile (Arhiv GUK, 1958, Nos. 17-19), apparently as a result of an appeal made by the population. Nevertheless, no official document proving the reciprocal recognition of the alteration of the border of the cadastral commune of Sečovelje exists. Nonetheless, the modified border was drawn into the Comprehensive Map of the Communes of Koper, Izola, Piran (*Pregledna karta občin Koper, Izola, Piran*), published by the Geodesy Institute of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia (1985), and in the Atlas of Slovenia (1985).


Excepting the sections described above, all details drawn in the cadastral maps of the cadastral communes of Piran III (Sečovelje) and Kaštel overlap, and the border between them from the border with the cadastral commune of Sv. Peter (Raven) entirely follows a public path running parallel (for several hundred metres) south of the present course of the Dragonja river to its estuary in the Piran Bay.

Land delimitation among independent nation-states Slovenia and Croatia

The basic criteria principles, on which Croat and Slovene negotiators (scientists and diplomats) in autumn of 1994 agreed upon – namely that borders of cadastral communes should become nation-state's borders – were implemented instantly by Slovenia, and – in Croatian view misused – as the Slovenian parliament (politicians) annexed four hamlets (Bužini/Bužin, Mlini, Škodelin/Škudelini and Škrile/Škrilje) on the banks of the Dragonja river, all but one to the south of the 1991 demarcation line, located in the river bed. Croats opposed sharply to the Slove-

nian move stressing that the "cadastre" of 1946 lists three out of four hamlets in the Croatian cadastral commune Kašteli, later in the commune of Buje and Croatia (Klemenčič and Schofield, 1995). Further investigations of the post WW 2 situation showed a rather confusing picture: settlers were called up to vote in the commune (občina) Koper in Slovenia and had to pay taxes in the commune (opština) Buje in Croatia. Further more: four telephones used the Slovene telecommunication net, two the Croatian; electricity was of Croatian origin, water use had to be settled with the Slovenes; identity cards and licence plates were issued in Buje (Croatia), children visited elementary schools in Slovenia. The land-lease by a farmer (Virgilio Babič) was reboked by Buje stating that the land to the south of Dragonja is Piran's property. As he approached Slovene administrators (Piran) they've stated that the land, he is interested in, is Croatian.

The envisioned Slovenian exclave, encompassing 0.92 Km² and settled by 24 families, has not been put into territorial realisation. The Slovenian parliament voted through a special amendment by which "Slovenian authority was frozen for the hamlets Škudelin, Škilje and Bužin because they are territorially disputed". Namely, two days after the act was voted in the Slovenian parliament, the Croatian parliament responded with a declaration in which he sharply condemned the act, stating its invalidity by international law and stressing that the "Croatian Parliament expects that the Croatian government will take the steps needed to secure and protect the state's integrity. For the sake of good relations so far and in the future, we expect that the Slovenian Parliament will do due to our clams." This citation is significant as it officially stated that both sides have territorial claims and are not pleased with the demarcation line. The sovereignty on the territory of the nation-state remains for both democracies a case of primary importance.




The land based delineation and the future border in the Northern Adriatic (Istria) is under heavy pressure of Croatian and Slovenian claims. In negotiations, the Commission agreed to eliminate outspoken nationalistic claims and decided to consider exclusively claims based on common law and international principles. *Slovenian party leaders have presented a dozen of proposals based on merely historical relevant principles. The Slovene National Party envisions the border on the river Mirna, about 20 kilometres to the south of the provisional demarcation line, as this was the only ever border (of the Free Territory of Trieste) being internationally recognised (1945-1947). The Social Democrats of Slovenia claim the overall Savudrian peninsula, arguing that the autochthonous population at the beginning of the 20. century here was almost completely Slovene. In the "Four Hamlets" case (also: "Upper Dragonja" or "Territory Under Double Evidence") Slovenia claimed also a boundary line on the southern limits of the third cadastral commune of Piran, lawfully registered in 1910 (The Savudrija Watershed). From the Slovenian standpoint the juridical annexation can be viewed (1) as an answer to the official claim by Croatia in regard to the Old Dragonja river bed; (2) as a legal step towards the announcement of the claim on the territory of Northern Savudrija (and therewith strengthen the negotiating position/.*

Taking this into account, only two claims must be mentioned:

- the Croatian claim to implement the border line on the (old) base river flow, and
- the Slovenian claim to implement the basic criteria, based on divisions in 1910.

Croatia claims the "de facto" boundary on the Dragonja river. Initially, this statement could be understood by Slovenian side as "not precise". Croatian scientist and politicians expressed namely occasionally diverse views on the "river case", not specifying which of the six channels are meant (Klemencic and Schofield, 1995). Slovenes could regard this as a threat as long as Croatian claim could be understood as the northern most river bed, to include and take away almost 5 sq. km of the land, including the airport of Portorož. The fact is that at present several natural and man-made channels form the Dragonja's mouth. The pre-WW 2 river major bed, the St. Jemej's Canal runs toward NW, having the delta on its left bank - to the south. Croatia might find grounds to claim the boundary on the St. Jemej's Canal as, for example, in time of the formation of the Ex-Yugoslav republics the St. Odonko Canal was not operational yet. The water-rich St. Odoriko Canal, where the provisional Croato-Slovene border is placed upon, is the southern most channel of all six. In the delta a natural park was proclaimed, in the 1960's the airport was constructed and salt-beds continue the tradition of salt-mining. However, during 1995 and 1996 Croatian officials stated very clearly that Croatian claims refers to St. Odorick's Canal which is in accord with Mutual agreement, which is that the provisional demarcation line should remain in place where the republic's jurisdiction ended on June 25, 1991 (on the St. Odorick's Canal).



The vigorously insisting of Slovenia on the 1910 cadastral commune (those days Koper-Capodistria district communes: Kaštel and Savudrija) land-based delineation and future border settlement has something to do with the Slovenian main interest – namely, the border free passage towards international waters. The boundary line south of the Dragonja river, possibly using the Savudrija watershed, would not only provide a favourable base to claim sovereignty over the (majority) Pirano Bay but would also support the most often used delineation method in seas and therewith enable Slovenia an outlet (door/window) to the desired oceans. Some other motives prevail as well: such a solution would enable landing and take-off to and from the air-strip of Portorož – Portorose without de facto entering into Croatian airspace, several hundred second homes in Slovenian ownership could be reached by land and sea without crossing the boundary (not reporting it in harbours Piran/Umag previously, and therewith making a detour of several miles), Slovene fishermen would be able to continue the use of favourable waters (a mixture of sweet and salt waters) for their mari-cultures in the bay.

On the other side, Croatia will surely refuse talks on any territorial concessions to Slovenia, which makes Slovenian claims and expectations not realistic. Croatia's jurisdiction over Savudrija peninsula is unlikely to be questioned by any really effective basis. Borders, territory and integrity are highly sensitive issues even among really stable and 'old' nations. Croatia's firm position and defensive reaction reflects this fact and was not motivated in part by the significance of the area concerned but precisely because of the Croatia's traumatic experience on its eastern boundaries. As a consequence Croatia is very unwilling to concede part of what is internationally recognised to be its territory, however apparently small and insignificant.

The land area in question is relatively insignificant to either state purely in terms of area. Therefore the Dragonja border disagreements between Croatia and

Slovenia should not be categorised under the term "major territorial disputes". Nevertheless, the parties involved are at the moment further from resolution than they were at independence.

The maritime delimitation in the Bay of Piran

The border issue on the Dragonja mouth – St. Jernej's or St. channel (and the cadastral communal border of Piran III) – will necessarily have a major impact on the Croato – Slovene maritime boundary. It could be disregarded as a problem if the proposed watershed solution on the Savudrija peninsula, 2 kilometres to the south of the Dragonja river, would become a base for discussion and final resolution. In that case the Bay of Piran would remain under Slovene jurisdiction (would not be divided by border into a Croatian and Slovenian part), Slovenia may even gain an access to the international waters.


There never was a maritime boundary between Croatia and Slovenia. Ex-Yugoslavia declared a closing line of the Bay of Piran as part of its straight baseline claim of 1965. The consequence of this action was to give the Bay the status of internal waters. Thus, the land based Croato-Slovene republican boundary was not extended offshore and the bay remained undivided. The bay and coast was for centuries Piran's (Venetian's) major economic source. Continuing the tradition, it was in times of Ex-Yugoslavia that the Slovenian side controlled the integral Bay. The Croatian and the Slovenian police signed "hours" before (February 26, 1991) the devolution of Ex-Yugoslavia a memorandum stating the sole Slovenian presence in the Bay.

If the present, provisional land based boundary would remain in effect and would become the starting point for the maritime boundary, Slovenia would regard itself as a geographically disadvantaged state with limited access to the sea. The geographic position of the Piran Bay (open towards NW) is such that the future maritime delineation, based on Article 15 of the LOS (baseline principle), would cut of one third of the area under its jurisdiction. In that case the Croato-Slovene maritime boundary is likely to consist of a territorial sea boundary extending 8 nautical miles as far as to the former Italo-Yugoslavian boundary in the Gulf of Trieste. If the base line principle would be put into effect, Croatia would extend its territorial waters just to a couple of miles away from the harbours of Trieste and Koper.

The article 15 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea states that "where the coasts of two states are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither one of the two states is entitled, **failing agreement between them to the contrary**, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two states is measured. The same article does, however, include a "de-route" as it states "The above provision (i.e. a median line) does not apply, however, **where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances** to delimit the territorial sea of the two states in a way which is at variance therewith."


It should be stated that during negotiations Croatia's representatives expressed willingness to accept a line within the Bay which would be more favourable for Slovenia. It would divide the Bay roughly in proportion 2:1 in favour of Slovenia.

Slovenian side had not been attracted very much because such delimitation does not meet main Slovenian claim – territorial waters as far as international waters.



In addition to the above, the future of the "Joint fishing zone" (Italy and Ex-Yugoslavia) in the Northern Adriatic could become a future tri-state's primary concern. Namely, in 1987 Italy and Ex-Yugoslavia concluded an agreement to establish a joint fishing zone in the Gulf of Trieste. A restricted number of vessels are entitled to fish in an area which extends across the maritime boundary into Italian and into Ex-Yugoslavian territorial waters. In the event of a Croato-Slovenian agreement on the maritime delimitation on the base line principle (with the base at the St. Odoriko channel), it is likely that the portion of the zone on the former Yugoslav side of the border will be divided between Croatia and Slovenia.

At present, it appears that the Croato-Slovene maritime boundary in the Pirano Bay is the biggest obstacle to complete delimitation between two states. Meanwhile, disputed maritime boundary does not cause any problems in reality. All ships passing through Croatian territorial waters on their route to the Slovenian commercial port of Koper (to the north of the Pirano Bay) enjoy the right to "innocent passage". No obstacles from Croatia have been recorded. There is also lively tourist transboundary activity within the bay during summer. The rare presence of Croatian navy vessels in the Pirano Bay, during the heights of their confrontation with the Serbs was, despite mutual understanding of the situation, met with anger and fear by the Slovene media and public.




Meanwhile the former Croatian and Slovenian prime-ministers Račan and Drnovšek signed an agreement in 2000 on the Bay of Piran dispute by which the 2 : 1 principle in favour of Slovenia would be placed into effect. In addition to it, Slovenia would be allowed to stretch its territorial waters through Croatia to the point where they could meet international waters of the Adriatic sea. The provisional land border on Dragonja would remain in place and become official land-based border line. Croatian media and civic societies started immediately a vigorous campaign against the "Agreement Drnovšek-Račan", claiming that the Croatian sovereignty is threatened. The agreement was in generally welcomed by the members of the Slovene parliament and government, but never came to be discussed in the Croatian parliament. The Croatian prime minister subsequently distanced himself from the agreement. At present both governments (foreign ministers) claim that a arbitrary decision of the neutral court could be acceptable for both. On the address of the court no decision was made yet. The situation is weird in particular due to the fact that the outer EU border (Schengen Space) is not defined yet (it should be defended/protected). The optimistic view of the present Croatian prime minister Sanader states that Croatia could enter the European Union by 2007, along with Romania and Bulgaria, and that therewith the problem of the Bay of Piran would eliminate itself automatically.

Still, some solution has been found. Member states of the EU have their sovereignty space largely defined. What is the mutually satisfactory solution? Both sides threatened each other by international arbitration. On the other hand both sides are aware that bilateral solution is much better solution than very costly and

drawn out alternatives like arbitration or particularly referring the case to the International Court of Justice in the Hague or recently established International Court of the Law of the Sea in Hamburg. A negotiated settlement appears to be most attractive option giving the best chance of a swift resolution to the dispute and improving the position of the both states within the international community.

If two sides cannot find satisfactory division after which none of the sides will feel itself handicapped, they do not need to quarrel over any division. They may establish a joint maritime zone, which would encompass the Bay of Piran and contiguous maritime area as far as the limit of Italian territorial waters. They would share the sovereignty over the zone. They can jointly develop tourism and other activities of economic importance. Slovenia would have an access to the international waters through the Slovene territorial waters, while Croatia would not make any 'territorial' concession. The implementation of the joint zones is already known and recently widely recommended mode of the resolution of potentially stressed situations.



The best known examples are to be found on the northern maritime boundaries of Australia (Glassner, 1996). Australia and Indonesia agreed in late 1988 a provisional settlement of the Timor gap issue. A Zone of Co-operation was established in which revenues from exploitation of petroleum and natural gas would be shared in different proportions in the three areas of the zone. In the Torres Strait Australia and Papua New Guinea agreed to respect ancestral fishing rights for the Torres Strait islanders regardless of the international maritime boundary. As a creative solution it is also to be mentioned that Argentina and the United Kingdom recently signed the Joint Declaration on co-operation concerning offshore activities in the south-west Atlantic. The two sides avoided the issues of sovereignty and conflicting claims in

order to push co-operation encompassing Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas. Of course, above mentioned cases cannot be transplanted into the Northern Adriatic, but they may serve as examples how once difficult problems can be resolved creatively and peacefully. We can imagine Croatia and Slovenia co-operating in the Bay of Piran.

Conclusion

With Slovenia's full membership in the European Union, the Slovene-Italian boundary will of course acquire a totally different character. Giving the word its strictest meaning, only the Slovene-Croatian boundary will be in fact left. Here we can conclude that the Slovene-Croatian ethnic border on the Dragonja river had been specified, with some minor deviations, from the mid-19th century until World War I by numerous linguists, geographers, historians, and other humanists. They were of Austrian (Czoemig), Slovene (Kozler), Italian (Benussi), Croatian (Ribarič) and other origins (e.g. Polish - Malecki), which means that it was not difficult to scientifically prove this phenomenon not even during World War II, when the Slovene and Croatian partisans drew, after Italy's surrender, a border between their units on this river, which has been respected not only in the post-war period but until the independence attained by both republics in 1991. If there is any disputable territory, then this may be only the southern boundary of the C.C. Sečovlje, which runs entirely along a public road a couple of hundred metres or perhaps a kilometre south from the present course of the Dragonja river to its estuary in the Piran Bay.

The emergence of new nation-states out of former Yugoslavia complicated in the 1990's the situation of the maritime delimitation in the Adriatic Basin. Although the former Italy-Yugoslavia boundaries remain in place throughout much of the length of the Adriatic Sea, a number of fresh maritime boundary disputes emerged. Croatia and Slovenia, two successor states of Yugoslavia readily inherited already existing offshore boundaries, but faced difficulties to delimit what previously was considered to be part of Yugoslav territorial waters or even internal waters. The dispute remains unresolved for more than ten years even though the political, strategic and economic stakes are not particularly high. The existing dispute over maritime delimitation is just a part of the complex politico-geographical relationship between two states. Other issues include completion of the territorial delimitation, rivalry regarding transportation routes, property ownership, etc.

The authors do believe and suggest that the policy of cross-border co-operation is clearly more fruitful and therefore preferable to confrontation. They also believe that the main political powers of the both sides are also aware of the fact and that the dispute over maritime delimitation would not reach the level of the international conflict. Once, hopefully soon, when the solution of the dispute is reached, the Northern Adriatic will be a zone of peaceful co-operation between three coastal states. Nevertheless, even now, their main challenge in the long-term perspective does not lie in the political delimitation. Environmental issues, particularly large quantity of industrial and domestic liquid wastes which enter the sea from rivers, especially from Italy's River Po, are surely more serious threats. In order to successfully resolve subsequent ecological problems, settled maritime boundaries are needed.

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Povzetek

Meja med Italijani, Slovenci in Hrvati v Istri se je tekom stoletij oblikovala kot posledica zgodovinskih, geografskih, gospodarskih, demografskih, upravnih, političnih in nenazadnje vojaškoobrambnih dejavnikov. Medtem ko je do konca srednjega veka značilna postopna in pretežno samoiniciativna pa tudi organizirana kolonizacija oz. priseljevanje slovanskega prebivalstva v Istro, s severa v glavnem prednikov Slovencev, z vzhoda pa Hrvatov, pa je zaradi demografskih kriz od 15. do 17. stoletja, ki so nastale kot posledica raznih vojn, epidemij boleznih in gospodarskega nazadovanja, prihajalo pod taktirko osrednjih beneških (pa tudi avstrijskih) oblasti do večjih organiziranih priseljevanj pretežno slovanskega prebivalstva iz Balkana.

V srednjem veku oblikovano pestro etnično skupnost, s prevlado romanskega nad slovanskim prebivalstvom, je obdobje populacijskih kriz od 15. do 17. stoletja s tedanjimi novimi migracijami pričelo postopno spreminjati v korist slovanskega prebivalstva, ko so nastali tudi temelji končnih istrskih etničnih struktur. Čeprav ločnica med slovenskim in hrvaškim življem tedaj še ni bila tako jasna in se je pod vplivom raznih dejavnikov do začetka narodne prebuje v drugi polovici 19. in v začetku 20. stoletja šele postopno oblikovala, pa kljub temu lahko štejemo prav nastale razmere po populacijski krizi za bistvene pri etnični razmejitvi teh dveh slovanskih narodnih skupnosti. Na eni strani je namreč novo prebivalstvo, pretežno hrvaškega porekla, tudi pod vplivom upravne ureditve zasedlo prostor do reke Dragonje, na drugi strani je območje severno od te reke, ki ga je obvladoval predvsem koprski komun, novodošle zlasti na podeželju integriral v tedaj že prevladujočem slovenskem etničnem elementu. Nemajhno vlogo pri tej razmejitvi pa je odigralo tudi romansko prebivalstvo, ki je zaradi strmjenih večjih naselij oz. mestec prav na območju med rekama Dragonjo in Mimo še najgloblje segalo v notranjost istrskega polotoka, medtem ko je sicer poseljevalo pretežno prostor v in ob obalnih istrskih mestih. Tako območje ob reki Dragonji prikazuje pestro etnično sliko prepletenosti italijansko-slovensko-hrvaško govorečega življa.

Sicer pa so tako jezikoslovci kot geografi in zgodovinarji ter drugi humanisti in entuziasti že od srede 19. stoletja pa vse do prve svetovne vojne, tako avstrijskega (Czoernig) kot slovenskega (Kozler), italijanskega (Benussi), hrvaškega (Ribarič) in še kakega drugega porekla (npr. Poljak Malecki), z manjšimi odstopanji opredeljevali slovensko-hrvaško etnično mejo na reki Dragonji, zato ni bilo težko znanstveno dokazati tega pojava niti med drugo svetovno vojno, ko so po kapitulaciji Italije slovenski in hrvaški partizani postavili mejo med svojimi enotami prav na tej reki, kar so spoštovali še v obdobju po vojni vse do osamosvojitve obeh republik leta 1991. V kolikor gre za sporno ozemlje je to morda le južna meja k. o. Sečovlje, ki poteka vseskozi po javni poti nekaj sto metrov oziroma kak kilometer južno od sedanjega toka reke Dragonje vse do izteka v Piranski zaliv.

V mediteranski Istri in v morskem, jadranskem sosedstvu so diskusije, dogovori in sporazumi o mejah stalnica 20. stoletja. Italijansko-slovenska meja je rezultat dogovarjanj zmogovitih zavezniških sil po II. svetovni vojni. V večini primerov se ta mejna črta ne sklada z etnično ločnico ali enovito kulturno dediščino, prav tako ne upošteva historično pogojenih funkcionalnih območij, obenem pa ni niti fiziografsko utemeljena ali geometrijsko določena. Je rezultat številnih kompromisov in interesov takratnih regionalnih in svetovnih političnih razmer in interesov. Tod imamo lep primer kako meja ne bi smela potekati. To so doumeli že kmalu po njeni postavitvi zaradi česar so že v petdesetih letih 20. stoletja in sosedno pričevali parcialno lotevati problema (Videmski dogovor, Osimski dogovori, Ribiška cona). V letu 2004 je omenjena meja notranja meja Evropske zveze (EU) in na mnogih

področjih, predvsem ekonomskem, ne pomeni več ovire za sodelovanju in posledično za regionalno prosperiteto.

Navkljub poprej drugačnim načrtom (trgovska zveza) sta se po razpadu Jugoslavije novi, suvereni državi Slovenija in Hrvaška leta 1991 odločili, da medse potegneta državno mejo, ki bo suverenost lastne države dodobra dokazovala. Nekdanja meja med dvema sorodnima "socialističnima republikama" je postala meja – ločnica v političnem, ekonomskem, finančnem in funkcijskem pogledu. Šele dobrih deset let kasneje jo je do neke mere omilil dvostranski obmejni sporazum (SOPS), obenem pa jo je ponovno utrdil vstop Slovenije v Evropsko zvezo (Schengenska meja). Ta, 637 km dolga meja, navkljub vsemu, pravno-veljavno še ni določena, niti obojestransko priznana. Poseben problem predstavljata določitev meje na območju izliva reke Dragonje v Istri in dogovor o mejni črti v Piranskem in, sosledno, Beneškem zalivu.

V ta namen je bila leta 1994 ustanovljena dvostranska komisija strokovnjakov, ki se je dokaj kmalu zedinila naj se kot mejno črto upošteva meje katastrskih občin, ki jih je začrtala Avstro-Ogrska v 19. stoletju. Slovenija je ta princip takoj udejanila s pnključitvijo štirih naselij iz leve brega Dragonje, torej iz ozemlja, ki naj bi po dogovoru ob osamosvojitvi pripadal Hrvaški (jundistrikcija republike). Status tega ozemlja je, zaradi protesta hrvaškega parlamenta in internacionalizacije problema, po videnju Slovenije, "zamrznjen". Povsem drugačen pa je z akvatorijem v Piranskem zalivu. Ta nikoli poprej ni bil upravno-pravno deljen in je tak še danes. Sredinska mejna črta, ki običajno ločuje ozemli držav ob zalivih, v tem primeru ne prihaja v poštev iz geografskega (hrvaške teritorialne vode le 4 milje pred Trstom in Koprom!), zgodovinskega (Piranski zaliv in obala zaliva sta bila v ekonomski domeni piranskih meščanov), ekonomskega (v akvatoriju so bila do 1991 izključno ribiška gojišča piranskih ribičev), političnega (upravni in policijski nadzor je v Piranskem zalivu opravljala dosledno Slovenija) in mednarodnega (skupna ribiška cona v osredju Beneškega zaliva – dogovor Italija – Jugoslavija 1992, ki bi ga tako začrtana meja "razčetrnila") razloga. Hrvaški pogajalci so se tega izhodišča zavedali in na vsem začetku pristajali na delitev zaliva po principu 2:1 v korist Slovenije. Problem pa je nastajal, ko je Slovenija zahtevala neposreden vstop svojih tentionalnih voda v mednarodne morske širjave Jadrana. Predsednika obeh držav sta leta 2000 podpisala sporazum, ki je dajal Sloveniji pravico do vstopa v mednarodne iz svojih ozemeljskih voda tako, da so bile le-te potegnjene v obliki dimnika skozi hrvaške tentionalne vode (kar je bil tudi zadnji predlog dvostranske strokovne komisije). Zaradi ostrega nasprotovanja domače javnosti je Hrvaška odstopila od dogovora še pred ratifikacijo v parlamentu. Kot rešitev se ponuja odločanje mednarodnega arbitražnega sodišča – bodisi v Hamburgu, Haagu – ali druge institucije za katero bosta obe stranki soglasni, da bosta odločitev (kakršnakoli že bo) upoštevali. Omenjeni članek pa izpostavlja kot možnost, po vzoru številnih po svetu, tudi dvostranski dogovor o skupni ekonomski coni na območju Severnega Jadrana, brez ostro definiranih ozemeljskih voda.

Božo REPE

PROBLEMI SLOVENSKE MEJE V LUČI OSAMOSVOJITVE

Protifašistično partizansko gibanje med drugo svetovno vojno je omogočilo, da je bila po drugi svetovni vojni meja proti Italiji popravljena, medtem ko sta meji z Avstrijo in Madžarsko ostali nespremenjeni. Razmejitev s sosednjima državama Italijo in Avstrijo je bila za Slovenijo in Jugoslavijo dolgotrajen in mukotrpen proces, ki se je razrešil šele sredi petdesetih.¹

Jugoslovanska zasedba slovenskega in hrvaškega ozemlja, ki ga je Italija dobila po prvi svetovni vojni, predvsem pa Trsta in Julijske krajine maja 1945, je sprožila ostro reakcijo Britancev in Američanov ter grožnjo z napadom, ki bi lahko pripeljala do vojne med zavezniki, še preden bi se druga svetovna sploh končala. Jugoslavija je zato popustila in 9. junija 1945 je bila sprejeta ultimativna zahteva za umik jugoslovanskih enot iz Trsta, kar se je zgodilo tri dni kasneje. 20. junija je bila z devinskim sporazumom Julijska krajina razdeljena po t. i. Morganovi liniji na cono A (pod angloameriško vojaško upravo) in cono B (pod upravo Jugoslovanske armade). V coni A Julijske krajine sta ostala Trst in Gorica z obsežnim zaledjem ter Pula, ki je bila s tem odrezana od ostale Istre. Cona A pa kljub jugoslovanskim zahtevam ni zajemala Beneške Slovenije, Režije in Kanalske doline s čimer je bilo to ozemlje, tedaj pretežno poseljeno s Slovenci, izločeno iz mirovnih pogajanj. Trst je – v nasprotju s slovenskim zaledjem – imel italijansko večino, zato je Jugoslavija na pariški mirovni konferenci zanj predlagala poseben položaj: postal naj bi sedma jugoslovanska republika, medtem ko so Francozi predlagali, naj bi postal posebna tamponska državnica pod pristojnostjo Organizacije združenih narodov.

Z mirovno pogodbo, ki je bila podpisana 10. februarja 1947, pravnomočna pa je postala 15. septembra, je Jugoslavija dobila celotno cono B Julijske krajine, iz cone A Julijske krajine pa še Kras, del Vipavske doline do Gorice, Soško dolino do Bovca in Predila, Brda in Breginjski kot.²

Glede rešitve tržaškega vprašanja je prevladala francoska rešitev. Z začetkom veljavnosti mirovne pogodbe z Italijo 15. 9. 1947 je nastalo Svobodno tržaško ozemlje (STO), ki je bilo tako kot Julijska krajina razdeljeno na dve coni: Cono A STO in Cono B STO. i dve coni sta še upravljali vojaški upravi, kar pa naj bi trajalo le do imenovanja skupnega guvernerja, o katerem pa se niso mogli sporazumeti. Zato STO kot celotna oz. enotna upravna enota nikoli ni zaživela.

¹ Več o tem: Gombač Boris: *Od preziranja do priznanja*, Ljubljana 1996; *Prispevki z mednarodne konference Pariška mirovna pogodba, nova jugoslovansko-italijanska meja in priključitev Primorske k Sloveniji*, Acta Histriae VI, Koper 1998; Nevenka Troha: *Komun Trst*, Ljubljana 1999; *Slovensko-italijanski odnosi 1880-1956*. Poročilo slovensko-italijanske komisije, Ljubljana 2001; Dušan Nečak, Božo Repe: *oris sodobne obče in slovenske zgodovine*, Ljubljana 2003, Božo Repe: *Les Slovènes et la question des frontières européennes*, v: *Penser les frontières de l'Europe de XIX au X^e siècle*, Ecole normale supérieure, Paris 2004 (v tisku).

² *Pariška mirovna pogodba*, Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve republike Slovenije, Ljubljana 1997.

Zaradi meje so bile v naslednjih letih med Jugoslavijo in Italijo, pa tudi med Jugoslavijo in zahodnimi zavezniki, večkrat večje ali manjše napetosti. 9. maja 1952 so zahodne sile s t. i. londonskim sporazumom (na podlagi tripartitne deklaracije iz leta 1948 s podobno vsebino) hotele prepustiti cono A STO Italiji, čemur se je Jugoslavija uprla. 8. oktobra 1953 sta vladi Velike Britanije in ZDA objavili, da bosta ukinili vojaško upravo nad cono A STO in jo prepustile Italiji. Italija je za uresničitev tega sklepa osredotočila vojaške enote na mejah cone (že prej je sicer prihajalo do posamičnih provokacij). Enako je storila tudi Jugoslavija in prišlo je do t. i. tržaške krize, ki je znova grozila z vojno. Po vsej Sloveniji in Jugoslaviji so se začele množične manifestacije, najbolj učinkovit argument pa je bil vpoklic dela rezervistov in vojaški tanki na italijanski meji (kot odgovor na italijanske okrepitev in priprave za prevzem oblasti od zaveznikov). Tito je dal jasno vedeti, da misli zares in da tržaškega vprašanja brez sodelovanja Jugoslavije ne bodo rešili, kar je povedal v dveh govorih (oktobra 1953 na Okroglici ob obletnici ustanovitve primorskih brigad in nekaj dni kasneje v Skopju).³ Čeprav Jugoslavija tedaj ni imela velike mednarodne podpore, pa sta bila moč njene armade in pripravljenost na boj za meje dovolj velika psihološka dejavnika. Velike sile so ocenile, da se ne splača zaostrovati konflikta in so si zaplet prizadevale rešiti po diplomatski poti. Po dolgotrajnih pogajanjih je bil 5. oktobra 1954 podpisan (drugi) londonski memorandum, oz. Spomenica o soglasju, s katerim je cona A STO pripadla Italiji, cona B STO pa Jugoslaviji.

Oba mednarodna sporazuma, mirovna pogodba z Italijo in londonski memorandum, sta priznavala pravico do izbire državljanstva in v skladu s tem so se prebivalci lahko svobodno opredelili za jugoslovansko ali italijansko državljanstvo. Prebivalci jugoslovanskega ozemlja (s stalnim prebivališčem do 10. junija 1940 in njihovi otroci) so izgubili italijansko in dobili jugoslovansko državljanstvo. Lahko pa so zaprosili (optirali) za italijansko. Ta ponudba je veljala za eno leto od uveljavitve mirovne pogodbe, po odločitvi pa so se morali izseliti v Italijo. Optiralo je 21.323 ljudi. Razlogi za izselitev so bili politične in ekonomske narave, Italija pa je k izseljevanju svoje državljanke na različne načine načrtno vzpodbujala in njihovo izselitev predstavljala kot množični beg, čeprav je kasneje to obžalovala, saj je ocenila, da bi ji številčno močna manjšina v Sloveniji bolj ustrezala.⁴

Po hudih povojnih napetostih zaradi meje, dokončni razdelitvi in potem, ko sta obe državi na spornih področjih prevzeli oblast, so se italijansko-jugoslovanski odnosi po letu 1954 močno izboljšali in kljub občasnim krizam je meja med obema državama v povojnih desetletjih veljala za najbolj odprto mejo med socialističnimi in kapitalističnimi državami. Sredi petdesetih let sta je bilo z dvema sporazumoma (videmski in goriški) urejeno vprašanje maloobmejnega prometa. Korak naprej v urejanju medsebojnih odnosov so pomenili osmimski sporazumi, ki so bili podpisani sredi sedemdesetih let, 10. novembra 1975 v mestu Osimo di San Pietro (v

³ Slovenska kronika 20. stoletja, Nova revija, Ljubljana 1996. Glej tudi: Božo Repe, Slovensko-italijanski odnosi 1914-1997. Zgodovina v šoli, 1997, 6, št. 4, str. 3-7.

⁴ Več o tem: Nevenka Troha Preselitve v Julijski krajini po drugi svetovni vojni, Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino 2000, 1. 40. št. 1, str. 2255-268. Glej tudi Raoul Pupo: Med zgodovino in geografijo. Razmišljanja o italijanski vzhodni meji, Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino (zbornik Milice Kacin Wohinz), letnik 40, št. 1.

bližini Ancone). Bili so prvi pomemben evropski dokument, podpisan na načelih helsinške listine. Z začetkom njihove veljavnosti (3. april 1977, ko sta državi v Beogradu izmenjali ratifikacijske listine) je prenehal veljati londonski Memorandum o soglasju z dne 5. oktobra 1954 med SFRJ in Republiko Italijo. Z osimskimi sporazumi (Pogodba med socialistično federativno republiko Jugoslavijo in republiko Italijo, Sporazum o pospeševanju gospodarskega sodelovanja, Protokol o skupni prosti coni in šestnajst prilog) je bila potrjena oz. sporazumno določena (v tistih delih, ki jih mirovna pogodba z Italijo z 10. februarja 1947 ni eksaktno označevala) meja med obema državama (fizična označitev meje na terenu je bila končana 27. septembra 1979). Obe strani sta sta z Osimskimi sporazumi prevzeli obveznost za maksimalno zaščito manjšin v svojih državah, sporazumi pa so med drugim tudi obvezovali k izboljšavi življenjskih pogojev v obmejnem pasu in predvidevali dolgoročno industrijsko sodelovanje, skupna vlaganja in izmenjavo tehnologije.

„Mejno vprašanje, ki je pravzaprav pogojevalo vsa ostala vprašanja, je z Osimskimi sporazumi dokončno rešeno. V praksi je bila v celoti obeležena državna meja, razrešeno vprašanje državljanstva za osebe, katerih status je bil po koncu druge svetovne vojne zaradi nedefinirane meje med državama na območju bivšega STO, sporen, razrešeno vprašanje odškodnine za italijansko nacionalizirano imovino, vračanje nepremičnin, podpisan Sporazum o priznavanju visokošolskih diplom in Sporazum o skupni obrambi pred točo. Zgrajeni sta bili cesti na Kolovratu in pod Sabotinom ter predani uporabnikom, noveliran pa je bil tudi Videmski sporazum“, ugotavlja Viljenka škorjanec, ki je detaljno preučila večletna tajna pogajanja pred podpisom Osimskih sporazumov.⁵ Ni pa bil uresničen sporazum o skupni gospodarski coni na področju Sežane, deloma zaradi italijanskih trenj v obmejnem tržaškem pasu, morda še v večji meri pa zaradi nasprotovanja Hrvaške, ki je ljubosumno menila, da bi Slovenija s tem pridobila preveč neposrednih gospodarskih koristi. Dokazljivo je, da si je jugoslovanski zunanji minister, Hrvat Josip Vrhovec, močno prizadeval za to, da do uresničitve gospodarske cone ne bi prišlo. Neuresničeni so ostali tudi nekateri drugi projekti (o vračanju kulturnih dobrin, ki so bile v času fašizma prenesene v Italijo, o kanalu Soča – Sava, projektu ocenjenem na približno 12 milijard dolarjev) ali pa so ostali zgolj na papirju (npr. podpisani dogovor o medsebojnem priznavanju diplom). Z Rimskim sporazumom iz leta 1983 je bila ugotovljena tudi višina škode za nacionalizirano premoženje (110 milijonov \$), ki ga je Jugoslavija in nato Slovenija v celoti izplačala, Italija pa ga ni dvignila. Zaščitni zakon o slovenski manjšini je bil sprejet šele leta 2001.⁶

Kar zadeva notranji položaj Slovenije v Jugoslaviji in s tem povezano vprašanje meja, so Slovenci v novi, socialistični Jugoslaviji dobili status republike in pravico do samoodločbe vključno s pravico do odcepitve (na to pravico so se sklicevali tudi ob osamosvojitvi leta 1991). Na kateri osnovi in po kakšnih načelih so bile

⁵ Viljenka Škorjanec: Tajna pogajanja o sporazumni določitvi meddržavne meje – analiza priprav. Specialistično delo iz mednarodnih odnosov FDV, Ljubljana 2000, ista avtorica: Neuspeh jugoslovansko-italijanskih pogajanj v letu 1973, zgodovinski časopis, leto 2003, št. 1-2, letnik 57 str. 147-162; ista avtorica: Jugoslovansko-italijanski odnosi v luči dubrovniškega srečanja zunanjih ministrov 1973, zgodovinski časopis, leto 2001, številka 3-4, letnik 55, str. 465-487.

⁶ Več o položaju slovenske manjšine v Italiji: glej Kacin-Wohinz Milica, Pirjevec Jože: Zgodovina Slovencev v Italiji 1866-2000, Nova revija, Ljubljana 2000.

določene meje med novonastalimi republikami po drugi svetovni vojni, ostaja eno najtežjih zgodovinskih vprašanj. Pomembno vlogo je igrala tedanja razdelitev KPJ po teritorialnih enotah, najpomembnejše pa je bilo prepričanje, da meje niso pomembne, ker bo socializem – izvedba revolucije – rešil nacionalno vprašanje v Jugoslaviji in na Balkanu enkrat za vselej. Toda tudi med jugoslovanskimi komunisti so bili nacionalisti, zato so posredno ali nepsoredno med njimi občasno izbruhnili hudi spori glede razmejitve. Na drugem zasedanju AVNOJ ali ob v razpravah ob njem – na katerega so se ob razmejitvah največ sklicevali so bile v razpravi številne dileme: vprašanje avtonomije Sandžaka, Vojvodine, Kosova, Metohije, Krajine, Dalmacije, Istre, Dubrovnika in tudi Koroške in Štajerske, seveda v primeru, če bi prišlo do uresničitve slovenskih oz. jugoslovanskih zahtev po spremembi meje. Kakšne so bile nato rešitve je znano: za konflikt ali Jugoslavija kot država regij – departmajev – kot v Franciji – ali država republik po nacionalnem principu je bila razrešena v korist republik (tudi po sovjetskem vzoru), vendar z določenimi žrtvami na račun avtonomij (Sandžaka, Srbov na Hrvaškem, tudi statusa Dubrovnika kot samostojne avtonomne enote).⁷ Ta nedorečenost problema je potem postala glavni argument za srbsko tezo, da so meje med republikami zgolj administrativne, ne pa meddržavne meje.

Kakšni so bili interni dogovori, zgodovinarji žal ne vemo (mejo med Srbijo in Makedonijo so menda tedanjemu najvplivnejšemu makednoskemu funkcionarju Lazarju Koliševskemu iz Beograda narekovali kar po telefonu in Makedonija je tako izgubila ne samo samostan Prohor Pčinjski, kjer je bili ustanovljen makednoski protifašistični svet, ampak tudi nekaj vasi na območju General Jankovići.⁸ če sledimo tistemu, kar naj bi bilo uradni dokumenti – se pravi v dokumenti zvezne skupščine in vlade lahko rečemo naslednje: meje med republikami nikoli niso dobile uradne skupne potrditve oz določitve. Od konca vojne do leta 1947 so vse federalne enote sprejele zakone, ki so zadevale teritorialno organiziranost (in s tem tudi "zunanje" meje – torej meje z drugimi republikami. Zvezna ustavna komisija je leta 1946 ugotovila, da meje med republikami niso legalizirane s pravnim aktom in da je to treba storiti čimprej. Vplivni jugoslovanski politik Moša Pijade jih je označeval za "naravne", brez oznake, kaj naj bi to pomenilo. Do uradne zvezne razmejitve ni prišlo tudi zato, ker se vodstvo ni bilo pripravljeno soočiti s številnimi problemi, ki bi jib to prineslo v mednacionalnih odnosih. Prvi zemljevid z razmejitvami je bil objavljen leta 1945, vendar brez argumentacije, na kakšni osnovi so bile meje določene in brez medsebojnega soglasja med "sprtimi" stranmi.

⁷ Več o tem glej: Rodoljub Čolaković: Tako je rođena nova Jugoslavija I, Beograd 1963, isti avtor: Pravi odgovor na pitanje: Čija je Bosna i Hercegovina, v AVNOJ i narodnooslobodilačka borba u Bosni i Hercegovini, Beograd 1974; Branko Petranović, Slobodan Nešović: AVNOJ i revolucija, Beograd 1983; Branko Petranović, Momčilo Zečević: Jugoslavija 1918-1984 (zbirka dokumentov), Beograd 1984; Branko Petranović, Momčilo Zečević, Jugoslavija 1918-1988, Beograd 1988; Milovan Đilas: revolucionarni rat, Beograd 1990; Branko Petranović: Srbija u drugom svetskom ratu 1939-1945, Beograd 1991; Branko Petranović: Jugoslavensko izkustvo srpske naciobalne integracije, Beograd 1993.

⁸ O makedonsko-srbskih odnosih glej: Novica Veljanovski: Makedonija 1945-1991. Državnost i nezavisnost, Institut za nacionalna istorija, Skopje 2002; in Makedonija vo dvaesettiot vek (zbornik), Institut za nacionalna istorija, Skopje 2003.

Kar zadeva mejo med Slovenijo in Hrvaško, je bilo predsedstvo začasne narodne skupščine 22. septembra 1945 obveščeno, da razmejitev med obema federalnima enotama ni rešena.⁹ Kot glavni problem je bil naveden problem štrigove, ki je bil med leti 1918 in 1922 del oblasti čakovec. Po letu 1922 je Medimurje postalo del mariborske oblasti, leta 1929, z razdelitvijo na banovine pa znova del Hrvaške. Z uvedbo banovin je znova prišlo v okrožje Ljutomer in v Dravsko banovino. Po drugi svetovni vojni je vprašanje štrigove reševala posebna slovensko-hrvaška komisija, ki je štrigovo z okolico razdelila. En del z Razkrižjem je pripadel Sloveniji, štrigova z drugim delom pa Hrvaški, vendar so se domačini tej rešitvi uprli in na slovenski strani nagnali hrvaške uradnike in policiste. Leta 1946 je bila imenovana nova komisija. Težo problema kaže tudi to, kdo so bili člani komisije: s slovenske strani je bil Ivan Maček-Matija, s Hrvaške Stevo Krajačić, oba tedanja notranja ministra. Odločitev je bila, da naj občina štrigova pripade Hrvaški oz. Čakovcu, kar je povzročilo hude napetosti med Slovenijo in Hrvaško. Vrsta pritožb in rekacij s strani Slovenije, naslovljene na Zvezno kontrolno komisijo, so imele za posledico, da je bilo Razkrižje priključeno k Sloveniji – Ljutomerskemu okraju. O tem je odločila junija 1946 nova komisija, ki jo je imenovala zvezna kontrolna komisija. Tak predlog je posredovala zvezni skupščini, ki bi morala o tem sprejeti zakon, vendar ta nikoli ni bil sprejet, tako, da je rešitev ostala "začasna." So se pa hrvaški učitelji, policaji umaknili iz Razkrižja, kot vemo pa je ves čas ostal problem cerkvene delitve oblasti. V zveznih arhivih lahko še zasledimo odlok, s katerim je prezidij zvezne skupščine sprejel vključitev kraja Banfje v Ljutomersko okrožje.

Nove – in vsaj kar zadeva dostopne arhive – zadnje razprave med Slovenijo in Hrvaško – v zvezi z mejami so bile leta 1956, zadevale pa so naselja Abitanti, Belvedur, Brezovica, Gradin, Koromači, Baškini, Močingi, Pregara in Sirči v Bujski občini, tedanji okraj Pula, ki so postali del ozemlja Republike Slovenije. V zvezi z mejo v Istri sicer obstajata dve osnovni tezi: po prvi gre za sklicevanje na katastrske meje občin, ki so nekje v korist Hrvaški, drugje Sloveniji in etnične meje, ki se sklicujejo na razna zgodovinska obdobja. Na slovenski strani (zlasti kar zadeva izhod na morje), obstaja tudi teza o moralnem dolgu, ki ga je Slovenija ob določanju današnje meje na pariški mirovni konferenci po načelu "etničnega ravnotežja") plačala za to, da je Istra pripadla Jugoslaviji, saj so izven Jugoslavije večinoma ostali Slovenci, v Jugoslavijo pa je prišel večinski del istre s hrvaškim prebivalstvom.

Slovensko – hrvaško mejo so kot mejo ob Dragonji s popolnim soglasjem zagovarjali v Znanstvenem inštitutu OF 20. 3. 1944 (vsa obala do Dragonje spada nujno k Sloveniji). Že pred tem so po drugem zasedanju AVNOJA zastopniki OF in hrvaškega osvobodilnega gibanja v Istri prav tako določili mejo na Dragonji in to po severni meji katastrskih občin Savudrije in Kašteli (s čimer sta bili ločeni od

⁹ Miodrag Zečević, Bogdan Lekić: *Državne granice u unutrašnja teritorialna podela Jugoslavije*, Beograd 1991 (glej tudi: Miodrag Zečević: *Frontiers and Internal Teritorial Division in Yugoslavia*, The Ministry of Information of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade 1991); Zdenko Čepič: *Oris nastajanja slovensko-hrvaške meje po drugi svetovni vojni*, Mikužev zbornik, *Historia* 4, Oddelek za zgodovino Filozofske fakultete 1999, str. 201-215.

piranske upravne občin), vendar je bila leta 1946 Dragonja speljana po novi strugi v kanalu Sv. Odorika.¹⁰

Vendar se vprašanje dokončne razmejitve v času socialistične Jugoslavije ni zdelo ključno, prav tako ne delitve Piranskega zaliva oziroma prostega izhoda na morje, saj je šlo za morje skupne države Jugoslavije.

Z nastajanjem slovenskih nacionalnih programov in zahtevami po ureditvi konfederativnega statusa Slovenije v Jugoslaviji in (ali) v perspektivi neodvisnosti, je v ospredje prišlo tudi vprašanje meja. Ta razprava se je v javnosti začela ob objavi 57. številke Nove revije leta 1987, ko je prišlo do posamičnih opozoril, da v primeru odcepitve Italija ne bo priznala obstoječe meje, pač pa bo zahtevala rapalsko mejo (na to je pisce prispevkov opozarjal dr. Janko Pleterški, ki je bil nato zaradi pomislekov v zvezi s posameznimi članki močno kritiziran). Prvo analizo mejnega vprašanja so vladne službe opravile marca 1990, ko je po naročilu skupščine tedanja še socialistična vlada Dušana Šinigoja pripravila konfederalni koncept. Predvidevanje je bilo, da naj Avstrija in Madžarska pravnega nasledstva v zvezi z mejami ne bi problematizirali, medtem, ko v primeru Italije to ne bi bilo gotovo. Podobne ocene so bile tudi leto kasneje, ko je Demosova vlada v okviru štirinajstih projektov za osamosvojitve natančno analizirala tudi vprašanje meja.¹¹ Navznoter, v Jugoslaviji, se je Slovenija soočala z načelnim vprašanjem definicije meja; z vprašanjem, kdo bo kontroliral mejne prehode (slovenski ali jugoslovanski organi); in z vprašanjem določitve meja s Hrvaško. V medrepubliških pogajanjih sta Srbija in Črna gora zastopali stališče, da so meje v Jugoslaviji zgolj administrativne in ne državne in jih je treba v primeru odcepitve posameznih republik na novo določiti. Zvezna vlada je do konca vztrajala pri stališču, da je meja v Sloveniji jugoslovanska meja in da so mejni prehodi v Sloveniji pod jugoslovansko jurisdikcijo, ne pa pod slovensko (slovenske oblasti so nameravale prevzeti kontrolo nad mejnimi prehodi in carinami, Jugoslaviji pa plačevati dajatve le v obliki kotizacije).¹² Meje in carine so tako postale tudi neposredni povod za intervencijo JLA v Sloveniji. EU, ZDA in mednarodna skupnost je v večini podpirala stališče

¹⁰ O vprašanju slovensko-hrvaške meje in etničnem stanju na tem področju je bilo napisanih veliko študij in vseh v tem prispevku ni mogoče navajati. Opozarjam zgolj na nekatere, po subjektivnem izboru zanimivejše: Zwitter Fran: Etnički karakter Slobodne Teritorije Trsta. Mednarodna politika 1951, št. 6, str. 12-14.; isti avtor: Bibliografija o problemu Julijske krajine in Trsta : 1942-1947 Ljubljana, 1979; Grafenauer Bogo: Miti o "Istri" in resnica istrskega polotoka: izvori različni, pa vsi enako "bosi"; Svobodna misel (Ljubljana), 7. 2. 1992 - 10. 4. 1992, let. 30, št. 3-7; Mihelič Darja: Mestna občina Piran v diplomatskih pogajanjih glede meje v Istri. Slovenske brazde, 3. IX. 1998, let. 8, št. 35, str. 5; Bukič Vera: O Slovincih v narodnostni sestavi prebivalstva po naseljih v obmejnih hrvaških občinah pred razpadom Jugoslavije (v Slovinci v Hrvaški, zbornik, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana 1995, Bukič Vera: Narodnostna sestava prebivalstva v obmejnem prostoru med Slovenijo in Hrvaško: statistični kazalci narodnostnega (samo)opredeljevanja in materne jezika po popisu prebivalstva iz leta 1991 s posebnim poudarkom na Slovincih in Hrvatih; Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana, 1997; Slovensko-hrvaška meja v Istri in na morju : pogovor z Vero Kržišnik-Bukič. Nova revija, 2002, letnik 21, št. 237-238.

¹¹ Več o tem glej: Božo Repe: Slovinci v osemdesetih letih, Zveza zgodovinskih društev, Ljubljana 2001; Jutri je nov dan. Slovinci in razpad Jugoslavije, Modrijan, Ljubljana 2002; Viri o demokratizaciji in osamosvojitvi Slovenije št. 17, 18 in 19, Arhivsko društvo, Ljubljana 2002-2004.

¹² Več o tem: Božo Repe: Jutri je nov dan in Viri št. 18 (Slovinci in federacija).

jugoslovanske vlade o integriteti Jugoslavije in nasprotovala slovenski osamosvojitvi. Razmejitve s Hrvaško se v procesu osamosvajanja ni zdelo ključnega pomena, saj sta bili Slovenija in Hrvaška zaveznici. Kljub temu je bila med njima bistvena razlika: slovenska stran je na hrvaški meji želela vzpostaviti pravo državno mejo, medtem ko je hrvaška (tudi v kontekstu pogovorov o morebitni skupni državni zvezi), menila da to ni potrebno in da bi morala "prava" meja biti na jugu s Srbijo.

Problem vprašanja meja je bil na načelni ravni rešen z mednarodnim priznanjem v začetku leta 1992 (15. 1. 1992 jo je priznala EU). Vprašanje meje z Avstrijo in Madžarsko, kot je bilo pričakovati, ni bilo problematično. Tudi z Italijo Slovenija – presenetljivo – ni imela večjih težav. Osimske sporazume – in s tem obstoječo razmejitve – je Italija priznala. 31. julija 1992 je bila v Rimu opravljena izmenjava not s katero sta republika Slovenija in Republika Italija potrdili veljavnost tistih bilateralnih sporazumov med Italijo in Jugoslavijo, ki so zadevali Slovenijo (skupaj jih je bilo 49), med njimi pa so bili tudi Osimski sporazumi v celoti. V veljavo je sporazum stopil 1. avgusta 1992, v Uradnem listu republike Italije pa je bil objavljen 8. septembra 1992. Ozadje presenetljive italijanske potrditve ni znano, morda ga lahko razložimo s tedanjimi kriznimi notranjimi razmerami, ko so bila v ospredju druga vprašanja, ki so v temeljih spremenila italijansko politično sceno. Morda tudi s časom poletnih počitnic, ko je bila politična pozornost zmanjšana. Vsekakor je Slovenija imela veliko politično srečo, saj je bila v glede tega osamosvojitve, kot še v marsikaterem pogledu tvegan "skok v neznano." Seveda pa tudi v odnosu z Italijo ni šlo brez zapletov. Leta 1991 je slovenski zunanji minister dr. Dimitrij Rupel za koprsko televizijo neprevidno izjavil, da se lahko z Italijo pogajamo o vsem, razen o meji (doma močno kritizirano izjavo tako s strani strokovnjakov kot medijev, je kasneje zanikal). Italijanska stran se je na izjavo "obesila" in zahtevala spremembo osimskih sporazumov. Za ureditev odnosov z Italijo je bila na slovenskem ministrstvu za zunanje zadeve oblikovana tričlanska komisija.¹³ Z zahtevami je začela neofašistična desnica v Trstu, sledil ji je velik del italijanskega tiska, pa tudi vplivni politiki krščanske demokracije in socialistov. Italijanske zahteve so bile pogojevane s privolitvijo Italije za podpis pridružitvenega sporazuma z Evropsko unijo. Obnovile so se trditve o neveljavnosti Osimskih sporazumov, zahteve po vračanju nepremičnin beguncev iz nekdanje cone B ali o odškodnini za nacionalizirano lastnino. Je pa vsaj uradna italijanska politika (zunanji minister Colombo) ostala zvesta načelu o nespremenljivosti državne meje, kar je utemeljevala z načeli Evropske konference o varnosti in sodelovanju o nedotakljivosti in nesprejemljivosti meja. V letu 1993 so se v tisku pojavile novice o tajnih pogajanjih med Italijo in Slovenijo o spremembi Osimskih sporazumov, vendar jih je slovenska stran zanikala. Do dogovora, neugodnega za slovensko stran je prišlo s t.i. oglejskim sporazumom, ki ga je podpisal tedanji zunanji minister Lojze Peterle, vendar sta ga slovenski parlament in javnost zavrnila. Po navedbah italijanskega tajnika levih demokratov Pierra

¹³ Zabeležka sestanka o problematiki Osimskih sporazumov dne 15. januarja 1993, zabeležila Eva Tomič, Arhiv ministrstva za zunanje zadeve republike Slovenije.

Fassina v knjigi *S* prednostjo naj bi italijansko pogojevanje Sloveniji pred vstopom v Evropsko unijo ustavil ameriški predsednik Bill Clinton, ki je predsedujočemu Evropske unije, Italijanu Romanu Prodiu naročil, da mora končati konflikt s Slovenijo.¹⁴ Prodi naj bi, kot je povedal v intervjuju za radio Koper, še pred zmago na volitvah med obiskom v ZDA v Beli hiši obljubil, da bo, če bo zmagal, v nekaj mesecih uredil odnose s Slovenijo. Iz te usmeritve je po tajnih pogajanjih na Bledu v letu 1996 nastal t.i. španski kompromis, po katerem so dobili optanti prednost pri nakupu nepremičnin (formulacija je bila sicer bolj splošna, povezana z bivanjsko dobo na slovenskem ozemlju). Italija potem Slovenije ni več ovirala, Slovenija je postala najprej pridružena in sedaj stalna članica EU. Po sklenitvi španskega kompromisa si je za podoben sporazum začela prizadevati tudi Avstrija in je v tem smislu izvajala različne pritiske na Slovenijo, vendar se jim je slovenska diplomacija (tedaj pod vodstvom Zorana Thalerja) presenetljivo odločno uprla.

Kot najbolj pereč mejni problem tako za Slovenijo ostaja nerešena morska (in delno kopenska) meja s Hrvaško v Piranskem zalivu, kjer sta sicer obe vladi sporazum že parafirali, ratifikacijo pa, kot je znano, zavrača hrvaški parlament, nasprotuje pa ji tudi večina hrvaške javnosti. Nerešeno mejno vprašanje s Hrvaško je sicer treba umestiti v kontekst celotnih hrvaško – slovenskih odnosov, ki imajo tudi zgodovinsko konotacijo.¹⁵ "Hrvaška ne želi niti kvadratnega metra tujega morja, a tudi sama ne bo dala niti kvadratnega metra svojega morja." Citat bi brez težav lahko pripisali preminulemu hrvaškemu poglavarju Franju Tuđmanu. In skomignili z rameni, saj je bil Tuđman znan po obsedenosti s samim sabo in z veličino hrvaštva ("kvadratne metre hrvaškega morja" je celo pripisoval kopenski površini, da bi bila Hrvaška videti večja). Vendar izjave ni dal Tuđman v najbolj nacionalističnih in za Hrvaško najtežjih vojnih časih, tam nekje na začetku devetdesetih let, pač pa pred enim letom dr. Zdravko Tomac, tedaj predsednik komisije za mednarodne odnose v hrvaškem saboru. Tomac je že desetletje in pol drugi človek Račanovih prenovljenih komunistov. Z dr. Cinlom Ribičičem sta ob koncu osemdesetih let pisala koncepte federativne ureditve Jugoslavije "po meri prihodnosti." Zelo pogosto je (bil) v Sloveniji in velja za njenega velikega prijatelja. In pred skoraj natanko devetimi leti je imel diametralno nasprotno stališče od današnjega: tedaj je (resda v opoziciji) svaril, da zaostrovanje odnosov v Istri in do Slovenije pelje Hrvaško v katastrofo, nazaj na Balkan, ne pa v evropske integracije, ki se jim Slovenija približuje. Slovence danes na Hrvaškem praktično vse stranke obtožujejo, da si lastijo hrvaško morje, parafirani sporazum pa imajo za "mrtvega". Ali pa je nerešeno mejno vprašanje na morju res tak problem, da se mora po vsakem poletju, ko Hrvati poberejo devize od slovenskih turistov, vsa slovenska javnost in politika ukvarjati z njim, pa naj gre za "ribiške vojne" ali trenutno aktualne "gospodarske cone"?

Hrvati so od vseh slovanskih narodov Slovincem najbližji, tako po jeziku in kulturi, kot tudi po skupni zgodovini. So sorodniki ("bratrance", kot bi rekel Cankar)

¹⁴ Clintonovo posredovanje, Delo 29. avgusta 2003, str. 20.

¹⁵ Več o tem: Božo Repe: *Vrnitev Tuđmanovega sindroma?: Naporni odnosi s Hrvaško*. Delo, Ljubljana 17. avg. 2002, leto 44, št. 188.

in hkrati sosedi. Če za posameznika velja, da si sorodnikov ne more izbirati, sosede pa lahko, je slednje pri narodu mnogo težje. Eden drugemu se torej ne moremo izogniti, tudi če bi želeli.

Hrvaško – slovenski politični odnosi, so se, izhajajoč iz narodnega gibanja, začeli z ilirizmom v 19. stoletju. Skupna zgodovina naj bi bila po nekaterih bolj ali manj mitičnih teorijah še mnogo starejša, segla naj bi do Karantanije, to je do obstoja "koroške Hrvaške" ali "velike", "oz. "bele" Hrvaške. Zgodovinsko dokazljiva pa je skupna obramba pred Turki, slovensko- hrvaški kmečki upori, pa tudi neprikrita podpora slovenskih dežel in prebivalstva banu Jelačiću v času upora proti madžarsko – avstrijski nadvladi. Skupni hrvaško-slovenski državni koncepti so nastajali od marčne revolucije dalje, potem pa, ko je leta 1867 prišlo do dualizma v Avstro-Ogrski in je večina Hrvatov prišla pod Ogrsko, se je sodelovanje omejilo predvsem na avstrijski del monarhije, kjer so Hrvati predstavljali le 2,8% prebivalstva (Slovenci 4,7%). Prednost Hrvatov je bila, da so se – v nasprotju s Slovenci – v političnih zahtevah lahko sklicevali na srednjeveško državno tradicijo, oboje pa je družila predvsem jugoslovanska ideja. Ta je zbujala tudi nasprotovanja in pomisleke: Slovenci pač niso hoteli biti le "planinski Hrvati", Hrvati so jezno vzrojili ob teorijah da so hrvaški kajkavci Slovenci, štokavci pa Srbi. Občasno so se pojavljale tudi zahteve, da se del tega ali onega ozemlja vrne hrvaškim oz. slovenskim deželam (npr. Kranjski Žumberak).¹⁶ Po aneksiji Bosne in Hercegovine leta 1908 so tako Hrvati kot Slovenci videli skupno možnost v t.i. dualizmu – tretji državni enoti, ki naj bi jo sestavljali avstroogrski južni Slovani. Kljub temu da je najmočnejša strankarska skupina na Hrvaškem pred prvo svetovno vojno (Hrvaško-srbska koalicija) Slovence sprva izpuščala iz takih kombinacij (ker se avstrijski Nemci niso bili pripravljene odreči slovenskemu ozemlju do Trsta), so trilateralne prizadevanja postala osrednji del hrvaško-slovensko- srbske politike med vojno. Višek so dosegla z združitvijo slovenskih, hrvaških in srbskih poslancev v Jugoslovanski klub v dunajskem parlamentu, z Majniško deklaracijo leta 1917 in z ustanovitvijo enomesečne Države Slovencev, Hrvatov in Srbov oktobra 1918 s sedežem v Zagrebu.

V kraljevini Jugoslaviji je bilo politično sodelovanje bolj občasno, slovenski avtonomistični programi so bili sicer blizu hrvaškim zahtevam, ki so bile še bolj radikalne, a v političnem vsakdanjiku so slovenski politiki pragmatično igrali jeziček na tehtnici v sporih med Srbi in Hrvati, kar so jim slednji večkrat zamerili. Narodni problem Slovencev od preloma 19. do začetka dvajsetih let 20. stoletja je bil, ali se s Hrvati (in Srbi) združiti tudi jezikovno in kulturno, ali pa zgolj politično. V dvajsetih letih teh dilem ni bilo več. Hrvaška je med vojnama postala pomemben migracijski center za Slovence. Samo v Zagrebu, ki je sprejel veliko slovenskih študentov, je živelo več kot 25.000 Slovencev, (veliko se jih je tudi pohrvatilo). Izjemno vzajemno solidarnost so pokazali Hrvati in Slovenci, ki so z rapalsko pogodbo prišli pod Italijo in se skupaj borili proti fašizmu. Skupaj so tudi

¹⁶ Več o problemu Žumberka glej: Marko Zajc: Žumberak kot pozabljen regija. Ali kako lahko obnežno področje zmede slovenske politike. Zgodovinski časopis, leto 2003, št. 3-4, letnik 57, str. 261-267.

nastopali na volitvah (dokler so jim dovolili). Tako goriški nadškof Francišek Borgia Sedej, pod čigar upravo so bile tudi hrvaške župnije, kot slovenski duhovniki v Julijski krajini, so veliko storili za ohranitev hrvaškega jezika in hrvaške kulture, saj so bili hrvaški duhovniki večinoma izgnani.

Tudi med drugo svetovno vojno je bilo na partizanski strani sodelovanje, tako vojaško kot politično, dobro. Pri nasprotnih političnih silah je na hrvaško pobudo prišlo do dogovarjanj o državni zvezi med ustaško Neodvisno državo Hrvaško in Slovenijo, ki pa je slovenski meščanski politiki niso sprejemali ravno z navdušenjem. Že v času med obema vojnama so namreč obstajali ustaški načrti, ki so vključevali Slovenijo v NDH ("alpski Hrvati" naj bi sicer imeli pravico do samoodločbe in neke vrste avtonomijo).

Rezultati druge svetovne vojne so bili tako za Hrvate kot za Slovence ugodni. Uspeli so pridobiti Slovensko primorje, Istro in Dalmacijo. Na pariški mirovni konferenci je bilo v pogajanjih o razmejitvi upoštevano načelo nacionalnega ravnotežja med italijanskim in jugoslovanskim prebivalstvom, ki pa ni ločevalo med Slovenci in Hrvati. Na ta račun je v Jugoslavijo prišlo več hrvaškega prebivalstva in ozemlja kot slovenskega, vendar tovrstni "moralni dolg" hrvaške strani ni imel posebnega vpliva na dogovore o meji po osamosvojitvi obeh držav. Kot tudi ne dokazovanja o tem, kam je sodila Istra v času Avstro-ogrske, ali kje so bile zgodovinske meje katastrskih občin.

Meja med Slovenijo in hrvaško je bila po drugi svetovni vojni pač notranja meja, administrativna, kot smo že omenili. Z nekaj daljnovidnosti tedanjih politikov bi problem tedaj bistveno lažje rešili kot danes. Na terenu je življenje reševalo probleme po svoje: ljudje iz obmejnih krajev so hodili v šole in zdravstvene domove tja, kjer jim je bolj ustrezalo, ribiči so lovili tam, kjer so bile ribe, Piranski zaliv so upravljali slovenski organi, ker je bilo (z izjemnimi posegi iz Umaga) to najbolj logično, Slovenci so kupovali zemljo in gradili vikende v Savudriji, ker jim je bilo najbližje, in ne iz načrtnih nacionalnih razlogov (kot je to razglašal Tuđman pred volitvami leta 1992). Nova meja je v življenje na obeh straneh zarezala zelo boleče. Ne dosti manj boleče kot meja med Italijo in Jugoslavijo po drugi svetovni vojni, ki je na pol presekala pokopališče v Mirni, zaradi česar so morali sorodniki krsto s pokojnikom ob navzočnosti graničarjev potiskati iz ene države v drugo, da so se od njega lahko poslovili.

Kje iskati vzroke za hrvaško-slovenske spore v zadnjem desetletju? V času socialistične Jugoslavije so imeli podobne interese in so se medsebojno podpirali. Ni se ponovila politika "jezička na tehtnici" iz časa med obema vojnama. Hrvati so se na gospodarskem področju v prvi polovici šestdesetih let prvi začeli upirati centralizmu, a so potem omagali. V času "liberalnih" gibanj konec šestdesetih let so imeli Hrvati in Slovenci enak cilj (čim večjo republiško samostojnost), vendar so Stane Kavčič in slovenski "liberalci" na nebrzdano naraščanje hrvaškega nacionalizma (spodbujenega zlasti iz opozicijskih vrst) gledali z nezaupanjem. Obračun s t.i. množičnim gibanjem ("maspokom") je Hrvate naredil za previdne in v sedemdesetih si niso upali kaj dosti. V drugi polovici osemdesetih let so začeli podpirati slovenske zahteve, a zelo plaho, bolj med odmori sej, kot na sejah. "Hrvati so se pripravljene boriti do zadnjega Slovenca" je po enem od številnih dramatičnih sestankov resignirano ugotovil Milan Kučan. No, na koncu so Račan in njegovi odhod slovenskih komunistov s 14. kongresa ZKJ v začetku leta 1990 podprli, v

tem času pa so se na Otočcu že začeli sestajati predstavniki nastajajoče hrvaške opozicije in Demosa. Tedaj so (po pričevanju Franceta Bučarja) tudi podpisali "zgodovinski" sporazum o usklajenem delovanju, v raznih kalkulacijah pa je bila tudi opcija o razdelitvi Jugoslavije na dva dela, pri čemer bi Slovenija, Hrvaška in Bosna in Hercegovina sestavljali eno konfederalno državo. Idejo je pokopal Alija Izetbegović, ki je verjel, da bo JLA rešila Bosno in Jugoslavijo.

Po volitvah leta 1990, zmagi HDZ in Demosa, so se stiki formalizirali. Različne delegacije ene in druge strani so bile skoraj dnevno na poti, Kučan in Tuđman sta se, če ne drugače, po telefonu slišala skoraj vsak dan. Hrvaško-slovenski predlog za konfederacijo, ki naj bi rešil Jugoslavijo, so Hrvati vzeli mnogo bolj zares kot Slovenci (čeprav si intimno samostojnosti niso želeli nič manj), saj realnih možnosti za osamosvojitve, na katero niso bili niti najmanj pripravljeni, skorajda niso videli.¹⁷ Tuđman je leta 1993 celo očital Sloveniji, da ga je potisnila v vojno z JLA, in da se je ob internacionalizaciji jugoslovanske krize od Hrvaške oddaljila, da je solirala v mednarodnih odnosih in si sebično sama prizadevala za lastno, ne pa za skupno mednarodno priznanje. Slednje je bilo res, ob zapletenosti Hrvaške v vojno in nerešenem vprašanju srbske manjšine, se je slovenska zunanja politika pragmatično odrekla položaju "siamskih dvojkov", ki jo je blokiral (čeprav sta bili potem obe priznani skupaj in je tudi Slovenija imela korist od močne nemške podpore Hrvaški). Vendar je bilo zavezništva konec že prej. Sporazum o skupni obrambi, ki sta ga 20. januarja 1991 podpisala zunanja in notranja ministra obeh republik, ni bil uresničen. Po njem naj bi obe republik v primeru intervencije JLA razglasili popolno samostojnost, odpoklicali predstavnike iz federacije in uskladili obrambo. Že slovensko predsedstvo, ki se je balo, da bi tak sporazum potegnil Slovenijo v hrvaško-srbsko vojno, ga je spremenilo v splošno in neobvezujočo izjavo, Tuđman pa je vojaško sodelovanje sploh blokiral in na koncu celo prepovedal.

Po osamosvojitvi je sledilo desetletje bolj in manj znanih sporov od hlodovine iz snežniških gozdov, Unionove pivovarne v Buzetu, počitniških domov, Trdinovega vrha, hrvaške cerkvene jursidicije nad Razkrižjem, graditve mejnih prehodov, štirih spornih obmejnih zaselkov, Elana, izbrisa slovenske manjšine iz hrvaške ustave, dolgov Ljubljanske banke hrvaškim varčevalcem, tja do jedrske elektrane in meje v Piranskem zalivu, ter še česa. Precej problemov je bilo tako ali drugače rešenih, nekateri ključni pač ne. Februarja 1993 je bil z veliko odmevnostjo podpisan prvi meddržavni sporazum o gospodarskem in finančnem sodelovanju, po katerem naj bi bili vsi obmejni problemi le tehnične narave. Hrvaški sabor ga je, potem ko se je Tuđman premislil, zavrnil, ker naj bi slovenskemu gospodarstvu "omogočal nekdanje jugoslovanske ugodnosti." Slovenci naj bi s svojimi naložbami in posegi v hrvaški prostor s pomočjo Beograda že sicer desetletja slabili hrvaško gospodarstvo. Nekaj mesecev kasneje je tudi slovenski parlament zavrnil drug sporazum, nekakšen načelen dogovor o prijateljstvu Slovenije s Hrvaško. Zmago Jelinčič, ki je bil takrat simbol za slovensko nacionalistično desnico, je izjavil, da z njim "Peterle uresničuje papeževo politiko: ustvarja konfederacijo

¹⁷ Božo Repe: Jutri je nov dan, isti avtor: Viri št. 18 (Slovenci in federacija).

Slovenije in Hrvaške proti islamu in pravoslavju." Hkrati je nasprotoval, da Slovenija postane "odvetnik Hrvaške v svetu." Tedanji hrvaški premier Nikica Valentić je čustveno reagiral s stališčem, da "Hrvaška nikogar, niti Slovenije ne bo prosila za prijateljstvo." Napovedal je povračilne ukrepe, med njimi tudi zaostritev vprašanja Piranskega zaliva. Dimitrij Rupel, tedaj v opoziciji, pa je za hrvaške časopise ugotavljal, da je (žal) za Slovence Hrvaška postala največji sovražnik. Slovenski parlament je opozoril, da Hrvaška, neposredno zapletena v vojno v Bosni, lahko ob predlaganih tesnih povezavah vanjo potegne tudi Slovenijo.¹⁸

Ob uspešnih hrvaških vojaških akcijah v Slavoniji in po operaciji "Nevihta", je bilo sredi devetdesetih let v hrvaških medijih zaznati evforično prepričanje, da hrvaška kot "regionalna vojaška sila" lahko Slovenijo prisili v marsikaj. "Hrvaška bi s Slovenijo opravila prej, kot je s Srbi v zahodni Slavoniji", je tedaj za naslovne strani hrvaških časopisov izjavljal eden od hrvaških nacionalistov dr. Petar Vučić. EU je hrvaško militaristično vzhičenost z odlogom in nato spremembo pridruženega sporazuma in z vrsto drugih blokad hitro ublažila. Tudi Slovenija je ob prizadevanjih Hrvaške, da vstopi v WTO leta 1998 pokazala, da politika ni vedno povezana z relativno vojaško premočjo ene strani in da so lahko učinkoviti tudi drugi mehanizmi. No, kljub sporom, je bilo kar nekaj pomembnih bilateralnih sporazumov med Slovenijo in Hrvaško v preteklem desetletju uresničenih. Ključni neuresničen in za Hrvaško najbolj problematičen pa je eden prvih po osamosvojitvi. To je dogovor o obstoječih administrativnih mejah pred 25. junijem 1991. Parafirani sporazum obeh vlad (Drnovšek-Račan) o meji, ki ga sicer na Hrvaškem razglajajo "za mrtvega" je določil kriterij, mimo katerega nobena arbitražna ne bo mogla iti, saj smiselno sledi tudi sicer neuradnemu mnenju admirala Williama Perrya. Vstop Slovenije v EU in italijanski pritiski na Hrvaško zaradi enostranske razglasitve gospodarsko-ribolovne cone Hrvaško postavlja v slabši položaj od Slovenije, vendar je ta hkrati ujeta v past načelnega podpiranja svoje južne sosede pri vstopu v EU. Ker pa se lahko celo zgodi, da bo Hrvaška kot članica umetno skonstruiranega "zahodnega Balkana" zaradi drugih razlogov (slabega sodelovanja s haaškim sodiščem, notranjih problemov v EU in nejasnih perspektiv glede nadaljnjih širitve) še dalj časa ostala v negotovem položaju, realno ni mogoče pričakovati, da bo meja v Piranskem zalivu rešena v bližnji prihodnosti. Če pa bo s hrvaškim vstopom v EU šlo vse gladko, bo razmejitev v Piranskem zalivu imela podoben pomen, kot v času Jugoslavije. Morebitna rešitev mejnega problema bo gotovo znak zrelosti obeh držav, sicer pa bo pač življenje teklo dalje tudi brez tega. Slovenija je svojo zrelost dokazala in se ne glede na reakcije javnosti mora držati doseženi ravni bontona, ali recimo temu, "evropskih" standardov. Pot Zagreba v Bruselj vodi (tudi) preko Slovenije, naj si to želi ali ne. Vendar ne v obliki koridorja do šentilja, kakršnega si je leta 1993 zaželel Tuđman v zameno za prosto plovo slovenskih ladij po Piranskem zalivu (vrhovnikova megalomanska diplomacija je pač temeljila na prizadevanju, da bi se izognil "drobcnemu, nadležnemu narodu, ki neprestano sitnari" in ki je na poti Hrvaški do neposrednih povezav z zahodom).

¹⁸ Božo Repe: Vrnitev Tuđmanovega sindroma?: Naporni odnosi s Hrvaško. *Delo, Ljubljana* 17. avg. 2002, leto 44, št. 188.

Res je, da pot Hrvaške na zahod preko Slovenije ni edina. Je pa najkrajša. In najbolj racionalna. Tudi najlažja in – čeprav se danes sliši neverjetno – morda celo najbolj prijateljska. V končni posledici pa je za hrvatsko politično elito odločitev zanjo tudi izbira med balkanskim in evropskim načinom reševanja problemov.

Gledano v celoti, se je mejno vprašanje ob osamosvojitvi Slovenije kljub nekaterim negotovostim in dvomom izšlo srečno. Včlanitev v EU vprašanje meje postavlja v drugačen kontekst: na eni strani meje z zahodnimi, severnimi in vzhodnimi s sosedi postajajo "notranje" in dobivajo bolj administrativen in manj državni pomen, kar pomeni novo možnost za tesnejše povezovanje Slovencev z manjšinami, seveda pa ne tudi uresničitve programa Zedinjene Slovenije iz leta 1848, saj bodo še naprej živeli v različnih državnih in administrativnih enotah. Na drugi strani bo do vključitve Hrvaške v EU južna slovenska meja, ki je bila v času obstoja Jugoslavije "notranja" meja, sedaj postala prava zunanja meja EU po t.i. "schengenskih kriterijih." Oboje pa prinaša nov premislek o sosedskih odnosih, nov izziv in novo ravnanje.

Summary

Due to the anti-fascist partisan movement, the border with Italy was changed after the Second World War. Although it was not changed to the extent the Slovenians wanted, the Paris Peace Treaty from 1947 and after that London agreement were much more favourable to them than the agreements from the time after World War I. Due to the decisions of the allied forces according to which Austria was to be preserved within the borders from the time before the Anschluss, Slovenia didn't get Carinthia and nor did Trieste become the seventh Yugoslav republic, or as suggested by the French, the liberated Trieste region – a small buffer state under the jurisdiction of the United Nations. The new border in places where it did not exist before, led to a series of tragicomic situations: in the village Miren near Gorica, for example, the border divided the local cemetery into two halves. When a burial took place the relatives took leave of the deceased in the presence of the border guards by pushing the coffin from one state into the other.

Slovenians did get the status of a republic in the new, federal Yugoslav state and along with it the right of self-determination, including the right of separation from Yugoslavia. The border with Croatia was never officially confirmed in Yugoslav parliament and sea border in Piran bay was even not defined because it was of internal nature.

Attainment of independence in 1991 in the neighbouring Italy led to a wish for revision of the borders, however, the idea fortunately did not predominate. Another problem is the question of the border with Croatia – particularly at the sea – which still remains unsolved although both premiers of both countries signed an agreement, according to which Slovenia was to get a free access to the open sea and majority of the problems on boundary line were solved too (so called Dmovšek-Račan agreement). For the time being the Croatian parliament rejects this agreement.

As regards the border, Slovenia is presenting now the southern border of the EU until Croatia becomes a member too. This is a territory, which was physically not divided by a border in the former Yugoslavia. When the border was finally set, it was – by agreement of both countries – a soft one; now it will become the hard Schengen border. By abolishing

other borders, it will be much easier to maintain contact with the national minorities, but at the same time the Slovenians will be confronted with the dilemmas they already faced at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century: namely, how to survive squeezed between the Germanic and the Romanic world and how to harmonize the regional identity, which will become increasingly important, with the national one and how to provide long term survival of the nation.

Franc ROZMAN

DIE ÖSTERREICHISCHE SOZIALDEMOKRATIE UND DAS GRENZPROBLEM SEIT DEM ENDE DES 19. JAHRHUNDERTS BIS 1918

Für die Sozialdemokratie haben die Grenzen prinzipiell kein besonderes Problem beziehungsweise keinen besonderen Wert dargestellt, da die Lehre glaubte, mit dem Sieg des Sozialismus gäbe es keine Grenzen mehr. Mit der Verschärfung der nationalen Frage gewannen auch die Grenzen an Bedeutung, insbesondere in den Staaten, die keine Nationalstaaten waren. Die Habsburger Monarchie war national gesehen ein sehr verschiedenartiger Staat und die Nationalproblematik des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts hat auch die Sozialdemokratie immer mehr beschäftigt und bereits in der Mitte der neunziger Jahre ging es so weit, dass sich die Partei in sechs Parteien teilte, die in der Spitze nur noch durch die gemeinsame Parteileitung verbunden waren.¹ Das Problem der territorialen Abgrenzung wurde somit immer sichtbarer, obwohl natürlich niemandem in den Sinn kam, die Monarchie könnte zerfallen, weshalb alle Bemühungen der Partei dem Gedanken gewidmet waren, wie die Monarchie in einen moderneren Staat umzubilden sei, ohne dabei zu zerfallen.² Das Nationalitätenprogramm von Brünn nahm das Territorialprinzip an, das aber prinzipiell nicht in die Kronländer eingriff, was das Beispiel der Untersteiermark schön zeigt, wo die sozialdemokratische Landesleitung in Graz trotz des Beschlusses der Gesamtparteileitung nicht zuließ, dass nördlich von Celje (Cilli) slowenische sozialdemokratische Organisationen gegründet worden wären, und zumindest verdeckt den deutschnationalen Slogan "Horuck bis Steinbruck, halte fest bis Triest" unterstützte.³ Noch schlimmere Gegensätze gab es in Böhmen, um nicht das Problem zwischen den Polen und den Ukrainern zu erwähnen. Jedoch änderte die Partei das Programm von Brünn nicht, obwohl sich langsam auch die Idee von der Personalautonomie und der Einführung der Nationalkataster zu etablieren begann, eine Idee, die bereits in Brno (Brünn) von Ebin Kristan, dem Führer der slowenischen Sozialdemokraten, vertreten wurde, der aber 1899 mit dieser Idee unterging und sie zuletzt auf dem Kongress allein unterstützte, obwohl er letztlich eigentlich nie darauf verzichtete und es erscheint, dass es womöglich sogar die Idee war, die unter anderen Umständen vielleicht sogar die Lösung gewesen wäre.

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- ¹ Ludwig Brügel: Geschichte der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie, 1-5, Wien 1920-25; Klaus Berchtold: Österreichische Parteiprogramme 1868-1966, Wien 1967.
 - ² Hans Mommsen: Die Sozialdemokratie und die Nationalitätenfrage im habsburgischen Vielvölkerstaat, Wien 1963; Raimund Löw: Der Zerfall der "Kleinen Internationale". Nationalitätenkonflikte in der Arbeiterbewegung des alten Österreich (1889-1914), Wien 1984.
 - ³ Franz Rozman: Die Sozialdemokratie in der Untersteiermark und das Problem der nationalen Aufteilung, in Geschichte der Deutschen im Bereich des heutigen Slowenien 1848-1941, Wien 1988, S. 126-128.

Die Grenzfrage stellte sich auch für die Sozialdemokratie in aller Schärfe im Ersten Weltkrieg und drehte sich mit dem sich nähernden Ende des Krieges um die großen Grenzverschiebungen, die sich ankündigten.⁴ In der ersten Hälfte von 1917 wurde eine besondere Konferenz der sozialdemokratischen Parteien der Zentral- und Koalitionsmächte, die in Stockholm zusammentreffen und sich um eine möglichst schnelle Friedensschließung bemühen sollten. Zur Konferenz ist es aus verschiedenen Gründen nicht gekommen, nicht zuletzt auch deswegen, weil die Koalitionsregierungen den Delegaten aus ihren Staaten keine Visa ausstellen wollten. Für die geplante Konferenz haben eine Reihe von sozialdemokratischen Parteien Elaborate vorbereitet, die aufgrund eines Fragebogens erstellt wurden, der im Namen des internationalen sozialistischen Büros vom skandinavischen Komitee vorbereitet wurde, und diese Elaborate wurden auf der so genannten Vorkonferenz behandelt.⁵ Für die slowenischen Sozialdemokraten wurde Dr. Henrik Tuma, der damals einer der Führer der JSDS und einer der theoretisch meistgebildeten und informierten Köpfe unter den slowenischen Sozialdemokraten, unter denen es nicht viele Intellektuelle gab, mit der Ausarbeitung des Elaborats beauftragt. In diesem Referat möchte ich mich nur dem Elaborat von Tuma widmen, da es bisher eher am Rande bekannt wurde, es wurde noch nicht zur Gänze veröffentlicht, teilweise 1925, als es von Tuma selbst im Blatt *Socialist* (*Der Sozialist*) veröffentlicht wurde, dessen Herausgabe eingestellt wurde, bevor das ganze Elaborat veröffentlicht werden konnte. Alle Elaborate befinden sich heute im Archiv der sozialdemokratischen Partei in Stockholm, nur das von Tuma nicht und auch Ludwig Brügel erwähnt es in seiner Standardgeschichte der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie nicht einmal. Es ist eine Tatsache, dass Tuma am Treffen einiger Führer der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie Ende August 1917 in Wien teilgenommen hat, das Elaborat schloss er im Juni 1917 ab, er berichtete aber nicht darüber, ob er es in Wien verlesen hat, ob es von der Gesamtparteispitze angenommen wurde oder nicht. Jedenfalls waren so manche Standpunkte Tumas auch die Standpunkte der österreichisch-deutschen sozialdemokratischen Partei, aber einige Weichen von den Standpunkten aller bekannten Elaborate ab.⁶

Tuma betont in seinem Elaborat zuerst, das die Selbstbestimmungsrecht das suchende Ideal der internationalen Sozialdemokratie, und ihr politisches Programm aber der Zusammenschluss der staatlichen, wirtschaftlichen und der Verkehrseinheiten. Die Änderung der bestehenden Grenzen war nur einvernehmlich



⁴ Franc Rozman: *Etbin Kristan und seine Idee der Personalautonomie*, in Helmut Konrad: *Arbeiterbewegung und Nationale Frage in den Nachfolgestaaten der Habsburgermonarchie*, Wien 1993, S. 93-109.

⁵ Ludwig Brügel, l.c., 5. Band, S. 290-309; Julius Braunthal: *Geschichte der Internationale*, 2. Teil, Berlin-Bonn 1978, S. 78-110.

⁶ Henrik Tuma: *Iz mojega življenja (Aus meinem Leben)*, Ljubljana 1937, S. 357-366. Referat von Tuma befindet sich im Nachlass Henrik Tuma in Raziskovalna enota Zgodovinskega inštituta ZRC SAZU (Forschungsabteilung des Historischen Instituts des Wissenschaftlichen Forschungszentrums bei der Slowenischen Akademie der Wissenschaften und Künste) Nova Gorica. Ihr Leiter dr. Branko Marušič hat mir sehr freundlich den Einsicht ermöglicht und dafür bedanke ich ihm auf dieser Stelle.

und unter Berücksichtigung des Rechts auf Selbstbestimmung und Autonomie der Völker möglich, wobei die wirtschaftlichen und die Verkehrseinheiten gesichert werden. Als er danach mit der Analyse der europäischen ethnischen Strukturen beginnt, startet er zunächst mit Österreich-Ungarn, für das er feststellte, dass nur fünf Völker davon zur Gänze in diesem Staat lebten: die Slowenen, die Slowaken, die Tschechen, die Kroaten und Ungarn. Von den Ungarn erzählt er, sie könnten sich nicht anders erhalten, als dass sie die anderen entvölkern. Ihre geschichtlichen Erinnerungen führen sie als Anwärter um die Vorherrschaft über den gesamten Donaustaaten und der oberen Balkanländer. Der Titel des Königs von Ungarn als Herrscher über Dalmatien, Kroatien, Bosnien, Serbien, Bulgarien und Rumänien drücke die nationalen Expansionsgrenzen der Ungarn aus. Den Italienern gehöre ethnographisch Südtirol, Trentino, Friaul an der unteren Isonzo bis zum Karst. Würden aber die 40.000 Slowenen in Venetien abgespaltet, wäre die nationale Einheit der Italiener abgeschlossen. In Istrien seien nur die städtischen Sprachinseln italienisch, untereinander seien sie nicht geballt verbunden. Von Triest meinte Tuma, es gehöre der geografischen und wirtschaftlichen Lage nach nicht zu Italien, sondern tendiere nur ein Teil seiner Bevölkerung, die meisten Intellektuellen, und zwar aus geschichtlichen Erinnerungen und der kulturellen Wünsche wegen, zu Italien. Geografisch gehöre Triest als österreichisches Emporium zum Donau- und Balkanstaat, auch ethnografisch bilde es nur eine gemischtsprachige Insel, die von allen Seiten von Slawen umgeben sei und sich den Slowenen nicht lange widersetzen könne. Für den ethnografischen Charakter eines Landes seien nicht die städtischen Sprachinseln entscheidend, sondern die kompakte Bevölkerung des Hinterlandes. Deshalb muss dieses Prinzip auch für Triest, Görz, Capodistria, Muggia und Pirano gelten, die von slowenischem, und für Rovigno, Parenzo und Pola, die von kroatischem Leben umgeben sind. Aus diesen Prämissen heraus stellt Tuma fest, dass die Tschechen, die Slowaken, die Alpendeutschen, die Ungarn, die Rumänen und die Jugoslawen eine wirtschaftliche und eine Verkehrseinheit bilden, die für das Gleichgewicht und den Frieden in Europa von entscheidender Bedeutung seien. Die gegenseitige Beziehung der Bevölkerung dieser Gruppen, die 10 bis 12 Millionen Einwohner zählten, gäben längerfristig eine Garantie für den Nationalstaat, der zwischen die großen Staaten Russland, Deutschland und Italien eingeschoben würde. Also sei der Adria-Donau-Balkanstaat das richtige Ideal, da er eine Wirtschafts- und Verkehrsganzheit darstelle.

Im Namen der endgültigen Regelung nach dem Prinzip der Nationalautonomie und der Errichtung eines kräftigen neutralen Territoriums sei es nötig, dass der französisch-valonische Teil Belgiens von Belgien getrennt und Frankreich angegliedert werde, und der flämische Teil den Niederlanden. Die Anerkennung der Autonomie der Flamen in den Niederlanden sei viel leichter zu erreichen, wie zwischen den Flamen und den Valonen, die national verschieden seien. Damit würde die Stärkung und die Sicherung des Zentralmassiv zwischen den europäischen Hauptmächten erreicht, Frankreich gewänne 3,8 Millionen Einwohner, die Niederlande 4,16 Millionen.

Serbien müsse im gesamten früheren Umfang errichtet und mit Montenegro vereint werden. Es müsse auch die Verbindung mit dem adriatischen und dem ägäischen Meer erhalten. Die Regelung der mazedonischen Frage sei eine Über-

lebensfrage für Serbien und Bulgarien. Das starke Serbien stelle eine Iredente dar und so werde die serbische Frage zur Frage für ganz Europa, die dauerhafte Lösung des Friedens sei nur mit der Vereinigung aller Jugoslawen in einem demokratischen, entwicklungsfähigen Staatsverband im Rahmen der wirtschaftlich-verkehrstechnischen Einheit Adria-Donau-Balkan möglich. Die jugoslawische Frage verlange die ethnografischen Einheiten der Slowenen, Kroaten und Serben, die bis nach Isonzo, dem gesamten österreichischen Küstenland bis zur Mündung der Timau im Norden der Adria bis zur Mündung der Bojana im Süden von Montenegro reichen sollten, sie sollten die Flussgebiete der Drau, der Save und der Donau umfassen, wo die Slawen lebten, dann das überwiegend serbisch bewohnte untere Teil der Theis, das Timoktal und Altserbien mit Skopje. Dieses Territorium, in dem 14 - 15 Millionen Menschen lebten, bildet nicht nur geografisch-kulturelle Einheiten, sondern Serbien stelle darin auch ein vereinigendes Element dar. Mit dem Anschluss der reichen Landwirtschaftsgebiete mit der weit entwickelten Adriaküste und mit der Gründung des Nationalstaates wären alle Garantien für einen selbständigen Staat gegeben, der weder militärisch, noch wirtschaftlich ein Anhängsel Deutschlands, Russlands und Italiens sei. Wenn sich dieser Staat in die große Wirtschaftseinheit Adria-Donau-Balkan einschließen würde, würde eine neue Macht geschaffen, die das Gleichgewicht in Europa endgültig gewährleisten würde, gleichzeitig wäre es auch der erste Schritt zum vereinigten Europa.

Der östliche Teil Mazedoniens am linken Vardarufer bis zur Morava tendiere ethnografisch, geografisch und wirtschaftlich zu Bulgarien, das rechte Vardarufer zu Serbien. Saloniki gehöre weder geografisch, noch ethnografisch zu Griechenland. Das gesamte Hinterland sei slawisch, Saloniki aber sei das Tor des Balkans zum ägäischen Meer. Serbien sei mit dem Morava- und der Vardartal über Saloniki auf natürlichem Wege mit dem ägäischen Meer verbunden, und diese beiden Täler teilten die Balkanhalbinsel in zwei Verkehrshälften mit Saloniki und Konstantinopel (Istanbul). Die Verbindung Serbiens mit der Adria sei zwar möglich, jedoch sei sie für Serbien weniger vorteilhaft. Für die selbständige wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Serbiens sei Saloniki von lebenswichtiger Bedeutung, für Bulgarien nur nebensächlich. Auch wenn Serbien Bosnien und Herzegowina und Spalato erhalte, bliebe Saloniki für Serbien viel wichtiger als ganz Nordalbanien mit Skutari und Durazzo.

Zu Bulgarien gehöre die gesamte Küste des ägäischen Meeres von Halkidika, Trakien mit Adrianopel bis Enos, es müssten Dobrudž und der östliche Teil Mazedoniens angeschlossen werden, damit es so eine geografische, ethnografische und wirtschaftliche Ganzheit werde. Andererseits solle Serbien Westmazedonien mit Saloniki und Altserbien erhalten. Konstantinopel (Istanbul) müsse für die Bulgaren offen sein, so wie Saloniki für die Serben. Konstantinopel (Istanbul) solle eine freie Handelsstadt unter der Garantie der europäischen Staaten sein. Griechenland solle mit den ägäischen Inseln und demjenigen Teil der kleinasiatischen Küste entschädigt werden, der ethnografisch zu den Griechen gehöre. Es müsse aber Drama und Kavala den Bulgaren geben.

Rumänien solle Bessarabien und Siebenbürgen erhalten und sich dem Staat Adria-Donau-Balkan anschließen.

Die Nordgrenze Griechenlands solle von der Aulonbucht bis zur Mündung

des Karas bei Saloniki reichen. Auch Zypern solle an Griechenland angeschlossen werden.

Albanien solle als autonomer Staat erneuert werden, jedoch ohne die Teile von Altserbien und Mazedonien. Vielleicht sollte es einfach zwischen Serbien und Griechenland aufgeteilt werden.

Polen sei im Westen mit deutschen Inseln besät, jedoch sei es gerecht, die Territorien, wo eine entscheidende polnische Mehrheit lebt, dem unabhängigen Polen anzuschließen, welchem auch der Zugang zum Meer ermöglicht werden sollte. Sollte kein gemeinsames Polen errichtet werden können, wäre es vielleicht angebracht, wegen der dichten deutschen Sprachinseln und Ostpreußen Polen Deutschland anzuschließen. Im deutschen Rahmen wäre die polnische Entwicklung sicherlich besser gesichert, als wenn bei einer dreifachen Teilung ein selbständiges Polen entstünde, da das ehemalige Kongresspolen ohne das österreichische Galizien und Posen nur wenig lebensfähig wäre. Ein selbständiges, autonomes und geografisches Polen in Deutschland hätte sicherlich eine Garantie für die künftige natürliche und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung.

Finnland müsste eine autonome Einheit darstellen, die in der geografischen und der Verkehrseinheit Russland vereint werden sollte.

Bereits die bisherige Entwicklung der Armenier unter Russland zeigt, dass für die weitere Entwicklung der Armenier der Anschluss an die große Wirtschaftseinheit Russland am besten wäre. Mit der Gründung der armenischen Einheit würde auch die armenische Diaspora beendet und die Armenier würden in die Heimat zurückkehren.

Ebenso sollten die autonomen Bundeseinheiten Litauen, Lettland und Estland unter Russland gegründet werden. Keine dieser Nationalitäten habe eine richtige Fähigkeit des selbständigen Staatslebens, darüber hinaus schneiden sie Russland vom Meer ab.

Die Frage der Ukrainer sei leicht lösbar, da die Russen, Weißrussen und Ukrainer tatsächlich eine große Volkseinheit seien, die gleichzeitig auch eine große gemeinsame geografische, wirtschaftliche und Verkehrseinheit bildeten. Die separatistischen Neigungen seien nur ein Produkt der Zarenpolitik. Es sei nicht im Interesse der Sozialdemokratie und des dauerhaften Friedens, nationale separatistische Neigungen, die sich nicht auf die verschiedenen kulturellen oder nicht vereinbaren Wirtschaftsgebiete beziehen, zu unterstützen. Für die Sozialdemokratie sei letztlich nur der demokratische Staatsgedanke entscheidend, und für den Umfang der Staaten nur die Wirtschafts- und Verkehrseinheit, welche die größte Garantie für die Entwicklung einer einheitlichen Landesbevölkerung gäbe, aber andererseits wegen der Regelung des Verkehrs und der Wirtschaft keine Spannungen gegenüber den Nachbarstaaten verursacht. Der Nationalstaat selbst gebe viel weniger Garantien für die längerfristige friedliche Entwicklung, als der demokratische Nationalstaat, denn der erste müsse sich auf natürlichem Wege in die imperialistische Richtung entwickeln. Deutschland mit Polen und Russland seien somit zwei natürlich gegebene Verkehrseinheiten. Mit der Erweiterung dieser besonderen Frage wird auch die Frage Russlands gelöst. Mit dem Anschluss des gesamten ukrainischen Territoriums und Armeniens würde Russland auch für den Verlust von Polen und Bessarabien entschädigt.

Konstantinopel (Istanbul) solle eine freie Handelsstadt mit voller Gleich-

berechtigung der Griechen, Bulgaren und Türken werden. Das Schwarze Meer müsste für Russland, Rumänien, Bulgarien und die Türkei ein geschlossenes Meer sein, der Bosphorus und die Dardanellen sollten unter dem gemeinsamen Schutz dieser Staaten stehen.


Das dänische Schleswig sollte Deutschland angeschlossen werden. Lothringen sollte an Frankreich angegliedert werden, das Elsass an Deutschland. Für den Verlust des Elsass sollte Frankreich Lotharingen und das Valonische Belgien erhalten. Die Errichtung des freien Polens und des starken Adria-Donau-Balkan-Staats würde den Zerfall der deutschen Macht bedeuten, weshalb Deutschland das gesamte Rheintal an beiden Ufern gehören sollte. Irland, Wales und Nordschottland müssten die volle Autonomie erhalten. Die englische Verwaltung Ägyptens könne als Vorbild der Landesautonomie gelten und könne allen Völkern, die der Zahl und der geografischen Lage nach und im politischen Sinne nicht fähig sind, selbständige Einheiten zu bilden, als Vorbild dienen. Diese Autonomie sei die einzig mögliche erste Stufe bei der Entstehung von Staaten, die später einen Bund größerer Wirtschafts- und Verkehrseinheiten bilden könnten. Nach dem ägyptischen Vorbild sollten die burischen Länder, Marokko und Tripolis geregelt werden, Malta solle zu Italien gehören, jedoch solle dort ein Plebiszit durchgeführt werden.

Die Vereinigung der Juden in einem Staat sei geografisch ausgeschlossen, ethnografisch aber schwer möglich, es sei denn die zionistische Besiedlung in Palästina könne zu einem Ergebnis führen. Die Frage der Kolonien sei nur eine wirtschaftliche Frage. Da Asien bereits eingeteilt sei, käme eigentlich nur Afrika in Frage. Frankreich solle Nordwestafrika, Italien Tunesien und Tripolis, Deutschland den Kongo und Angola, England Südafrika bis nach Ägypten erhalten. Frankreich solle die Autonomie Marokkos, England die der Buren in Südafrika bewahren. Das Kolonialterritorium der kleinen Staaten müsse den Großmächten gegeben werden.

Tumas Elaborat ist natürlich ein interessantes Dokument über die Ansichten einer politischen Partei, obgleich es die kleinste slowenische politische Partei war, über die eventuelle Umverteilung der europäischen politischen Landkarte nach dem Krieg. Keine andere politische Partei hat bei uns die Vorstellungen soweit in die Welt hinaus entwickelt. Wie sich nach dem Ende des Krieges erwies, sind nur wenige von Tumas Vorschlägen verwirklicht worden. Natürlich ist sicherlich wichtig, dass auch die anderen Elaborate, die von der österreichisch-deutschen, italienischen, ukrainischen, polnischen, ungarischen sozialdemokratischen Partei und den tschechischen Zentralisten und Separatisten erarbeitet wurden, in der späteren Entwicklung der Ereignisse in der Habsburger Monarchie keine besondere Rolle gespielt haben, nicht zuletzt auch deswegen, weil sie nur die Vorschläge der Opposition enthielten, nicht aber die der bürgerlichen Regierungsparteien. Die Idee vom einheitlichen und abgeschlossenen Wirtschaftsraum hat Tuma noch später vertreten und sie war einige Zeit auch auf der Tagesordnung der Gedanken der Dritten Internationale, man könnte bestimmt auch heute noch Berührungspunkte finden, mit Rücksicht auf die völlig veränderten Verhältnisse in der Welt sowohl nach dem ersten, als auch nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg.

Povzetek

Razprava se ukvarja s spomenico, ki jo je voditelj slovenske socialne demokracije dr. Henrik Tuma leta 1917 pripravil v imenu JSDS za stockholmsko konferenco socialdemokratskih strank, ki je potem ni bilo. Obsežen elaborat na skoraj 80 straneh je predstavljal stališče JSDS do evropske ureditve po koncu prve svetovne vojne. Elaborata v arhivu stockholmske konference ni, v slovenščini pa ga je Tuma sam objavil v socialističnem listu *Socialist*, vendar ne v celoti. Tuma se je v elaboratu posvetil ureditvi v Evropi zelo na široko in tako predstavlja elaborat njegovo vizijo povojne svetovne ureditve in ne samo vprašanja Slovencev. V elaboratu je veliko zelo zanimivih observacij in gledanj, ki pa jih kasnejši razvoj ni potrdil, ena osnovnih tez pa je Tumovo zavzemanje za zaokroženo preureditev habsburške monarhije, ki naj bi upoštevala pravice narodov do samoodločbe, pri čemer pa je vztrajal pri smiselnosti zaokroženega gospodarskega prostora, ki bi omogočal gospodarsko uspešnost. Pri tem že anticipira idejo, ki jo je potem še večkrat zagovarjal, tuja pa ni bila tudi nekaterim drugim mislecem, namreč idejo države sudetsko-podonavsko-balkanskega prostora. Razmišljanja o preureditvi tako širokega prostora, praktično govori skoraj o vsem svetu, ne zasledimo pri nobenem drugem slovenskem politiku in je za nas še toliko bolj zanimiv, ne glede na možnost uresničitve in marsikaterih spornih stališč.



Dušan NEČAK

RUPNIK'S DEFENCE LINE – A FORTIFIED SLOVENIAN WEST BORDER¹

Time and place

At least since the year 568, when the Lombards left the current territory of Slovenia, moved into the neighbouring Friuli and thus made space for the Slav tribes, coming from the south-east, the border between the Slav and Romance world played an important role in history. Many lives were lost because of it, primarily because of its military-strategic importance, namely only a few kilometres west of it the lowest passage from the Adriatic Sea to the Central and East Europe – the Postojna Gate is situated. When in the 19th century national countries were shaped and political nations were formed this border got State/national connotation, connotation of territorial division on the Italian and Slovenian inhabited space. At the beginning of the 20th century, when the Habsburg monarchy fell apart, this border became the strategic border for the Italian side. It was named "sacro confine orientale" and was supposed to protect Italy from the Slavs on the other side of the border. For the Slovenian side it meant a bulwark against the advancing Italian danger. The fear was justified: because of this danger Slovenia lost a third of its territory, and about 500,000 Slovenians and Croatians remained on the west side of the border.

Ever since the beginning of the first Yugoslavian country the west Slovenian border was not drawn to the satisfaction of both sides and that neither side would put forward no more or less intensive demands for its change. After the appearance and swing of the irredentist fascist regime in Italy after the year 1922, the fear grew especially on the Slovenian/Yugoslavian side that sooner or later there will be demands or even realization of the change of border to the Italian benefit. Relations between Italy and the first Yugoslavia during both wars were for many reasons never exactly good.

When in the year 1926 Italy got a protectorate over Albania the tensions only increased. Slovenian and Yugoslavian fear of the Italian danger and mistrust with regard to the neighbour's intentions especially deepened in the 1930s, when with an agreement of cooperation and friendship all three Slovenian neighbours – fascist Italy, Austria of states or cleric-fascist Austria and revanchist Hungary of Gömbösi – linked up. Fear and mistrust of Slovenians and Yugoslavia was aggravated by the 1934 unsuccessful Nazi putsch in Austria and the murder of its chancellor Engelbert Dolfuss. All this time Mussolini, who was already sending his troops to Brenner, which Yugoslavia understood as a direct threat, stood closely by Austria.

¹ My colleague prof. Zvezdan Marković kindly helped me prepare this seminar by giving me the material for it and allowing me to use his diploma thesis and I thank him deeply for it.

Organization of the border fortification



The Rapallo border and fortification of the Rupnik's line.
 Rapalska meja in utrdbe Rupnikove linije.

In such circumstances Yugoslavia started preparing for the fortification of its west borders. Its intention coincided with the intention of the European countries to replace their defence system against a potential attacker with a new one. In some areas these countries replaced the system of defence with a system of fortified posts of the type of permanent fortification. Already by the year 1937 Yugoslavia started experimentally building individual fortifications. But in such a short time they could build only some of such constructions in the mountainous part by the border. For a more systematic building there was hardly any money and the army did not plan a team to do it. After the forming of the axis Rome-Berlin in 1937, when war reality became more tangible, Yugoslavia seriously started with

the construction of the fortified line. In 1937 the Yugoslavian army leadership therefore decided that "with the fortification of the state borders it will enable a successful defence of the Yugoslavian territory. Thus, in the spirit of its war plans, it started with extensive fortification and building of barriers on the state borders. The length of borders was about 3000 km on land and around 1400 km on sea. In the same year a staff for fortification was established which should control the fortification construction."² General Leon Rupnik became the chief of the staff for fortification on November 3rd 1938. However, by the beginning of the April war he became the chief of the staff of the 1. army group. A special plan for the building of bigger fortifications was made, and for the construction of the fortification at first four sectors were formed, and in 1938 another was opened. The command staff of the first sector was located in Vrhnika, of the second in Kamenjak (Croatia), of the third in Gorenja vas in the Poljanščica Valley (Poljanska dolina), of the fourth in Železniki in the Selščica Valley (Selška dolina) and of the fifth in Cerknica.³ In the year 1940 the situation – according to the data available to us – changed slightly. At that time there were five sectors for fortification operating on the territory of Slovenia/Dravska banovina. Command staffs for the border with Italy were located in Vrhnika, Škofja Loka, Železniki and Cerknica, and for the border with Germany in Maribor.⁴ Of all the fortifications built between both wars in Yugoslavia, the fortification of the west border on the Slovenian territory, – which was named Rupnik's Line after the aforementioned general, responsible for the execution of the construction, Leon Rupnik, – was the most important one, both for its extensiveness as well as for its fighting power.

Apparently not everybody in the army leadership was convinced of the urgency of border fortification or the change of defence strategy. In spite of that the fortification continued, with continual stressing of the fact that the building of fortifications on the west border should not be under any circumstances brought to a stop. However, the fact remains that about a year later the north-east border with Germany and Hungary was brought into focus of fortification plans. Hence, in 1939 the headquarters of border fortification also moved from Ljubljana to Subotica.⁵

In the years 1939 and 1940 the fortification activities of the west border continued especially with the building of stronger concrete bunkers. But in 1940 the priority was transferred from the fortification of the west border to a different place. At first, as I mentioned before, to the borders with Germany and Hungary and after the Italian occupation of Albania to the Yugoslavian-Albanian border, and in the second half of the same year also to the borders with Romania and Bulgaria. Simultaneously the fortification of the border with Italy began also in the



² Denkschrift über die jugoslawische Landesbefestigung (Nur für den Dienstgebrauch!). Oberkommando des Herres, Berlin, 1. 10. 1942. Gliederung der jugoslawischen Landesbefestigung, 1. Gegen Italien (Landesgrenze), str. 107-117 (see: Denkschrift...) and Zvezdan Marković, *Vojška kraljevine Jugoslavije in utrjevanje zahodne meje na Slovenskem: 1937-1941*, Diploma work at Department of History at Faculty of Arts, Ljubljana University, p. 105 (see: Marković...)

³ Ibid. and Dušan Škrlep, *Rupnikova linija* (manuscript), (author's archive), p. 1.

⁴ Marković... p. 115.

⁵ Ibid., and p. 107.

area of Zadar. Mostly small bunkers were built there, with antitank and infantry barriers. At the same time a system of obstruction in directions of Split-Klis, Ploče-Metković, Herzeg-Novi – Trebinje, Tivat – Budva, Budva – Cetinje, Budva – Bar and Bar – Virpazar was established. At the beginning of 1941 the fortification of borders with Italy was almost concluded. But it was still unfinished, because the fortification activities had to be concentrated on the southeast borders with Romania and Bulgaria.⁶ For those fortifications that were finished by the year 1940 the Yugoslavian army formed special garrison units. Just before the beginning of the war 15 battalions with garrison batteries were formed. But their armament was out-of-date, mobility utterly limited, since these units were strictly bound to fortifications. Moreover, there were no antitank nor anti-aircraft weapons in the artillery and machine-gun fortifications.⁷

Rupnik's Line was officially named the West front by the General Staff of the Yugoslave Army. Since the border with the country that Yugoslavia considered the most untrustworthy and dangerous neighbour was at stake very early along with decision to fortify the border with permanent fortifications, two commissions for researching the West front were established in 1926 with an order of the Head General staff of the Royal Army:

- a commission for the evaluation of the operative and tactical significance of the west front,
- a commission for technical-fortification planning to strengthen defence of the west front.

I have already mentioned that the Yugoslavian sensitivity to the Italian danger highly increased in 1926, when Italy got a protectorate over Albania. That was certainly the most important reason that the commissions were set up in that very year and began working immediately. This is also an argument for a statement that the fortification of the west Yugoslavian / Slovenian border began in the same year already or a year later. The commissions reported about preparations and estimations for the fortification of the west border to the Head General Staff in the years 1926, 1927 and 1928. The reports reveal that in fact the first steps were uncertain, they were not taken as the preparations for the fortification of the front line in view of the war danger and can hardly be considered as the beginning of the systematic work on the system of fortifications of the later Rupnik's Line. My colleague Zvezdan Marković, one of the rare authorities on the title topic, believes that the first real proposition for the fortification of the west border probably came from the army general Ljubomir Marić as late as in 1935, and according to the financial plan from the year 1938 the system was supposed to be completed in 1947, or in 1944 according to some other data.⁸ For the building of fortifications needed for the successful defence, weapons and other military not included, the army at first received 5 billions of the then dinars, which was a huge sum of money. There are no precise data on how much money was actually spent for the

⁶ Marković... pp. 107/108.

⁷ Ibid., p. 108.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 109, 111 and 114.

construction; evidently, however, many of the army authorities were against this plan.

The important general, head of the General staff of the Royal Army, commander of the Yugoslavian air force, the leader of the putsch in March of 1941, Dušan Simović opposed to this "extravagant and wasteful protection" and the building of the "dead constructions" in the year 1937 already. He strived for transfer of this money for the training of soldiers for manoeuvre warfare. These soldiers could then be appointed into any dangerous situation.. As an aircraft officer he of course also appealed to the War Minister to spend the money on modernization of the Air Force, on the purchase of the up-to-date means for the anti-tank battle, on perfecting the army with modern fighting vehicles and on forming tank and motorised units. He pleaded for the modernization of the army, which was not in accordance with the prevailing European military doctrine of the time. General Dušan Simović was therefore more of an advocate of financing the armament of the Yugoslavian army and supplementing its equipment than border fortification. At the end of 1938 (in December) he publicly, in an army conference, again proposed that the money, assigned to the fortification of the border with Italy, should rather be assigned to the armament of soldiers and supplementing their equipment.

The army summit did not yield to such criticism and that is why we can say that the work on the fortification of the west border continued more or less without disturbance up to the year 1937. Planners (schemers) of the fortification rejected the criticism especially on the basis of two important arguments:

1. that Yugoslavia does not have a more dangerous neighbour than Italy and
2. that the weapons and equipment for the army will be bought with the money that will be available later on.⁹ When in 1938 Nazi Germany came to the north Yugoslavian / Slovenian border, Simović was even more vigorously critical. He criticized large expenditure, arguing that for the building of the fortifications too much time was needed. Therefore, he claimed, it may well happen they would not be finished by the critical moment, or there would be no money to provide the weapons for these constructions, which would make the whole project pointless, because in such circumstances the garrison units will need enormous funds for their own maintenance. Simović also doubted the efficiency of such units, and he explicitly pointed to the fact that at the moment the most dangerous neighbour was Nazi Germany. In case of attack it could protrude from behind of the Rupnik's Line, reducing its function to zero.¹⁰ All his warnings came true a good three years later.


The fortification of the west border went on in different forms along the entire border. The Yugoslavian army authorities had clear ideas about west directions from which the Italian war danger threatened. With the fortification they wanted to protect five such directions: the Logatec, Cerknica, Bloke, Gerovo and Soča-Sava directions.¹¹ Definitely the most important was the so-called Soča-Sava direction,

⁹ Ibid., p. 110.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 113-114.

¹¹ For more details, *ibid.* p. 110.

for which the staff for fortification estimated that it was actually the only operative direction on which the decisive army operations would develop. Their estimation proved completely correct at the beginning of the war. One of the proofs for the accuracy of such estimation was also the fact that the Italian side highly fortified the border exactly in this area with the so-called Alpine wall, the remains of which can still be seen at Lepena, Polog, on Lajnar, Petrovo Brdo and on Porezen.¹² The Soča-Sava direction is almost entirely a direction of the stream of Slovenian rivers. On the Slovenian territory the most important directions, which they wanted to secure with fortifications, were the valleys of the rivers Ziljica, Lepena, Tolminka, Sava Bohinjka, Selška Sora, Poljanska Sora, and also the direction Idrija – Rovte – Vrhnika Ljubljana, the direction Ilirska Bistrica – Mašun – the Loka Valley – Sočražica – Ribnica and some others. Among these there were only two that enabled a quick breakthrough with the use of bigger military forces and modern, especially tank vehicles: a) through the Vrhnika Gate to Ljubljana and b) through the Loka Valley to Ribnica. Only through these two directions a relatively quick access to Ljubljana would be possible and Ljubljana was considered the strategic target of the attackers from the West. They were aware of the fact that in the case of occupation of Ljubljana Rupnik's Line would have no importance at all. In spite of Simović's warnings, in spite of the justified criticism and their own considerations, and in spite of the changed military-political situation (the annexation – anschluss of Austria) the building on the Rupnik's Line continued.



A section of the Rupnik's line Hlavče njive – Žirovski vrh.
Del Rupnikove linije Hlavče njive – Žirovski vrh.


¹² Delo, 13. 5. 03, p. 9.

At the end of 1939 there were around 30.000 people working on the fortification, the next year this number increased to 60.000. On the entire land border in Slovenia there were 52 working battalions formed. Until the beginning of the war on April 4th, 1941 the building was more or less finished on the fortification of that part of Rupnik's Line that is in the centre of our attention, i.e. on the line Žirovnica – Ratitovec – Blegoš – Žirovski vrh – Ljubljanski vrh – Cerknica – Črni vrh – Plase.¹³


Fortifications of the Rupnik's line

The Yugoslavian army leadership did not have any experience as far as the building of such fortifications is concerned, but a treaty of friendship and close military cooperation with France led to the fact that it tried to build a defence line following the model of Maginot Line by the west border. An accelerated building of the so-called "nests" and "reinforced field fortifications" and also other fortifications began. The fortification system on the border with Italy was made of three different formats of fortifications or systems of fortification:

1. individual big fortifications or groups of fortifications on the most important strategic locations by the border, which were similar to the fortifications on the Maginot Line. The construction of these fortifications was never finished;



Plan of a typical pillbox.
Načrt tipičnega mitraljeznega gnezda.




A typical machine-gun fort on Javorč.
Tipična mitraljezna utrba na Javorču.

2. individual combat positions, reinforced with pillbox;
3. reinforced field positions in the interspaces between big fortifications – the so-called kazemate.¹⁴

¹³ Ibid., pp. 113-117.

¹⁴ Denkschrift... pp. 107/108.



The strongest fort on Goli vrh.
Najmočnejša utrdba na Golem vrhu.

The fortifications on the line were mostly of iron and concrete. Kranjska industrijska družba supplied them with iron under special conditions and in confidence. According to the French suggestions the line ran on the slopes where an enemy attack was to be expected. They were partly criss-crossed with ditches / trenches and different systems of barriers, but the strongest fortification was the iron-concrete machinegun and some time later also artillery bunkers. The line we are most interested in – from Ratitovec over Blegoš to Žirovski vrh and then on towards Sv. Trije Kralji – was an example of such building. An order for the building for a part of the section between Gorenja vas in the Poljanščica Valley – Srednja vas – Hotavlje and Hlavčeve njive under Blegoš was given to a known engineer Dukić from Ljubljana immediately at the beginning of the building in the year 1937. The building of Rupnik's Line meant a big profit for the local population, as it was for many the only source of income. This was especially true for physical workers, as a lot of building material, according to the testimonies, had to be transported to the inaccessible mountain gorges of the Škofja Loka hills. Daily individuals had to carry up to three bags of building sand or cement on the 900-metre-high summit of the Žirovski vrh – Javorč or on the 1562-metre-high summit of Blegoš. There were several hundred fortified positions and bunkers on the line, according to today's estimations.¹⁵ Different tradesmen made considerable profit out of this as well.

¹⁵ Dušan Škrlep, Rupnikova linija (Rupnik's Line), manuscript in the author's archive, p. 1.




Entrance into the supply tunnel Žirovski vrh.
Vhod v prislon Žirovski vrh.


For this part a so-called group system with supporting spots and individual constructions between them was used. When fortifying the border with Italy in 1939 here and also in some other places, mostly strong concrete bunkers in depth were built on the tactically more important support spots, which were called also supply tunnels – "oslonac". These were several ten metres long concrete tunnels drilled into a hill, which were supposed to be used as commander-observation posts, barracks as well as storehouses for ammunition and supply. They were meant to be as comfortably and thoroughly equipped as possible.¹⁶ Therefore this was not a serried concrete fortified line. On the other parts of Rupnik's Line it was decided to construct independent defence posts, the most inaccessible directions were secured with the building of a system of obstructions (e.g. the Selška Sora Valley). In the sections where a breakthrough of armoured units was expected they put up the antitank tunnels, shaped obstacles on terrain and prepared barricades for the shutting of communication. Attentive experts and researchers of the fortification of the Slovenian west border noticed, however, that in the system of fortification no large mine fields were envisaged. On the other hand there were fortification constructions built on those parts of Rupnik's Line which were hardly passable and were highly wooded, e.g. on Jelovica, and also in the hinterland of the main fortification line no heavy fortifications were built.¹⁷

¹⁶ Picture of the supply tunnel (oslonac) Žirovski vrh, and description of a supply tunnel from 1. 9. 1939, Arhiv Vojnoistorijskog instituta Beograd (Archive of the Institute for Military History), (in the author's archive).

¹⁷ Denkschrift... p. 110 in Marković... p. 117.



Dragon's teeth in the Poljanska
Sora valley
Protitankovske ovire v dolini
Poljanske Sore.



Barbed-wire entanglement on the road
Ljubljana Trieste.
Ovire na meji proti cesti Ljubljana.

One of the important fortification posts on the Rupnik's Line was the hill Blegoš. From there, a wide view opens toward Italy and on its foothills Hlavče njive, Žirovski vrh and Goli vrh. Fairy tales were told about the fortification constructions on Blegoš. However, when the German army came to this area and made a thorough analysis of the fortification on the Rupnik's Line and published it in the above quoted book in the year 1942, it turned out that from Škofja Loka to the saddle under the Blegoš summit there led a 29-kilometre-long army road, and from there on an army railway to the Blegoš summit (cca 1.5 km). On the Blegoš summit itself there were 7 machine gun bunkers, and on the slopes in the vicinity another 12 battle positions were situated. There were no staff bunkers there, observation posts or barracks for the soldiers. A road and a railway bear witness – or that's what the German Wehrmacht believed – that the further construction of fortifications was planned. On the basis of documentation they found they believed that strong armoured positions should have been built. But this did not happen.¹⁸

However, intensive fortification continued on the line south of Blegoš, which led across the Poljanščica Valley and Trata (Gorenja vas) onto Žirovski vrh, which controlled the Žirovski basin. A fortified line ran on the ridge of the Žirovski vrh, and from there on the elevation called Goli vrh. It was here that the strongest fortifications were built. About 220-metre-long access, cut in a rock, led to two magnificent concrete, machinegun bunkers, and in each bunker there were 30-metre-deep staircases, which led to several ten differently shaped spaces underground, with which both bunkers were connected. The work was not completely finished, according to the German opinion a group of bunkers (Werkgruppe) should have been built the-

¹⁸ Denkschrift . . p. 111.

re.¹⁹ It is definitely possible to claim with quite a lot of certainty that the part of the Rupnik's Line from Blegoš across the Poljanska Sora (Trata – Gorenja vas) – Žirovski vrh to Goli vrh was the most elaborated and the best fortified one.



Forts on the ridge Žirovski vrh – Goli vrh.
Slemenske utrdbe Žirovski vrh – Goli vrh.



"Bishop's bunker" above the road Žiri – Gorenja vas.
"Škofov bunker" na cesti Žiri – Gorenja vas.

¹⁹ Denkschrift... 114.

Similar plans of strong fortifications existed also for the section south of Goli vrh in the direction of Sv. Trije Kralji and Logatec. They were also based on the French suggestions, but they were never finalized. On this part of the front only shafts for the stairs were made, but not the fortifications themselves. However, the original French plans were not strictly followed. Especially the underground spaces of the unfinished bunkers were much smaller and in a completely different shape. Further on, south of Logatec, a fortification line was made only of the barriers against armoured vehicles and barbed-wire entanglements.²⁰ Further on the Rupnik's Line on an unsurveyable and thickly overgrown mountain range, south of Cerknica (Javomik) only a few fortifications were built, but not so vigorously branched in depth as north of there. For example on the Blegoš area the line was several kilometres wide. South of there the fortified line was on several places unconnected and interrupted. Only in the vicinity of towns Reka and Sušak it strengthened again and was more depth branched. North of Reka by the main road Reka - Zagreb the main battle line of the Rupnik's Line ascended on the peak Kamenjak, and from there, south of Reka, in a shape of mountain fortifications (barracks cut in a rock) on the slopes of Karst descended to the coast town Novi. The building of this coastal fortification started only at the beginning of the war.²¹

Facit

The Rupnik's Line did not justify its purpose and the warnings of critics of construction of this line proved to be true. The Italian army conquered Ljubljana on April 11th, 1941 already, and on April 7th and 8th there was some stronger resistance only in the area of Blegoš. In other places the attitude of the Yugoslavian army was as a rule passive. After the capitulation of the Yugoslavian army on April 17th, 1941 the command of the Italian 2. army demanded the destruction of the fortified constructions, which was done on the Italian side of the division line of occupation of Slovenia. The German army, however, disabled only some fortifications (e.g. Goli vrh, 961 m), and thus most of them remained until today.²² However, they were left without the wainscot and the iron parts, which local population used for the construction of their own houses. Today the fortifications of the Rupnik's Line, especially on the Blegoš area, are being arranged into a tourist attraction and mountain track. A track along the material remnants of bad policy. Had been a good one, there would have been neither Rupnik's Line nor wars. As far as policy is concerned, Yugoslavia/Slovenia was no exception. It was precisely due to policy, that even countries whose borders were supposedly protected by Maginot, Siegfried's or Manerheim's Lines were not safe from the horrors of war. No fortified border can protect against the consequences of improper policy.

²⁰ Denkschrift...p. 115-117.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Miha Naglič, Za pol milijona ton kruha utrdl (Fortifications, worth half a milion tons of bread), Delo, Sobotna priloga (Saturday supplement), 30. 8. 2003, p. 27.

Povzetek

Vse od nastanka prve jugoslovanske države zahodna slovenska meja ni bila potegnjena tako, da bi zadovoljevala obe strani in da bi na nobeni strani ne bilo opazita bolj ali manj intenzivnih zahtev po njeni spremembi. Po nastopu in razmahu iredentističnega fašističnega režima v Italiji po letu 1922, se je posebej na slovenski/jugoslovanski strani vedno bolj utrjeval strah, da bo prej ali slej prišlo do zahtev ali celo realizacije spremembe meje v italijansko korist.

Takrat se je Jugoslavija začela pripravljati na fortifikacijo svojih zahodnih meja. Njena namera je sovpadla namenom evropskih držav obrambo pred morebitnim napadalcem zamenjajo z novim obrambnim sistemom evropskih držav. Sistem obrambe v določenem pasu so te države zamenjale s sistemom utrjenih položajev tipa stalne fortifikacije. Že do leta 1937 je jugoslovanska začela poskusno izgrajevati posamezne utrdbe. Toda v tem času so mogli postaviti le nekaj objektov v goratem svetu ob meji. Za kakšno bolj sistematično gradnjo pa ni bilo sredstev, pa tudi moštva, ki bi jo izvajalo vojska ni organizacijsko predvidela. Šele po ustvaritvi osi Rim-Berlin leta 1937, ko se je vojna realnost postala vse bolj otipljiva, je Jugoslavija resno pristopila k izgradnji utrdbene linije. Jugoslovansko vojaško vodstvo se je leta 1937 zato odločilo, da bo z utrjevanjem državnih meja omogočilo uspešno obrambo jugoslovanskega ozemlja. Zato je v duhu svojih obrambnih načrtov začelo z obsežnimi utrjevalnimi deli in postavljanjem ovir na državnih mejah.

Utrjevanje zahodne meje na slovenskih tleh, je po slovenskem generalu odgovornem za izvedbo del Leonu Rupniku dobilo ime Rupnikova linija. Ta je bil ob vseh utrdbe postavljenih med obema vojnoma v Jugoslaviji najpomembnejša, tako po obširnosti kot tudi po bojni moči. V vrhovih vojske niso bili vsi popolnoma prepričani o nujnosti utrjevanja meje oz. spremembi obrambne strategije toda kljub temu se je utrjevanje nadaljeval.

Utrjevanje zahodne meje je potekalo v različnih oblikah potekalo vzdolž vse meje. Konec leta 1939 je na utrjevanju delalo okoli 30.000 ljudi, naslednje leto že 60.000. Na celotni kopenski meji v Sloveniji so oblikovali 52 delavskih bataljonov. Do začetka vojne 6. 4. 1941 je bilo kolikor toliko zaključeno dela na utrjevanju tistega dela Rupnikove linije, ki je v središču naše pozornosti t.j. na črti Žirovnica – Ratitovec – Blegoš – Žirovski vrh – Ljubljani vrh – Cerknica – Črni vrh – Plase.

Jugoslovansko vojaško vodstvo sicer ni imelo nikakršnih izkušenj pri gradnji takih utrdbe, toda pogodba o prijateljstvu in tesno vojaško sodelovanje s Francijo so pripeljale do tega, da je poskušala ob zahodni meji zgraditi obrambno črto po vzoru Maginotove linije. Začela se je pospešena gradnja tako imenovanih "gnezd" in "okrepljenih poljskih utrdbe", pa tudi drugih utrdbe. Utrdbeni sistem na meji z Italijo je sestavljen iz treh različnih oblik utrdbe oz. načinov utrjevanja:

- iz posameznih velikih utrdbe ali skupin utrdbe, na najpomembnejših strateških lokacijah ob meji, ki so bile podobne utrdbam na Maginotovi liniji. Gradnja teh utrdbe nikoli ni bila dokončana;
- iz posameznih bojnih položajev okrepljenih z "gnezdi";
- iz utrjenih poljskih položajev v medprostorih med velikimi utrdbami – t. i. kazemate;

Rupnikova linija ni opravičila svojega namena in povsem so se uresničila opozorila kritikov izgradnje te črte. Italijanska vojska je že 11. aprila 1941 osvojila Ljubljano, nekaj močnejšega odpora je bilo 7. in 8. aprila le na področju Blegoša. Drugod je bilo zadržanje jugoslovanske vojske praviloma pasivno. Poveljstvo italijanske 2. armade je po kapitulaciji jugoslovanske vojske 17. 4. 1941 zahtevalo uničenje utrjenih objektov, kar se je na njeni

strani razdelitvene okupacijske črte Slovenije tudi zgodilo. Nemška vojska je onespobila le nekatere (npr. Goli vrh, 961 m), zato jih je večina ostala vse do danes.

Danes se utrdbe Rupnikove linije posebej na Blegoškem področju urejajo v turistično atrakcijo in planinsko pohodno pot.

Catherine HOREL

LA DISSOLUTION DE LA FRONTIÈRE MILITAIRE: UN ENJEU POUR LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE HONGROISE 1869-1881

Les premières mesures prises en vue de la dissolution de la frontière militaire ont été prises au lendemain de la révolution de 1848: le soulèvement de la Transylvanie, qui vit s'affronter les régiments frontaliers hongrois (Sicules) et leurs homologues roumains, alarma sérieusement l'administration militaire autrichienne. De plus, cette confrontation des nationalités à l'intérieur de la frontière était interprété comme un facteur potentiel de déstabilisation.

Durant la révolution de 1848, l'unité territoriale de la monarchie des Habsbourg fut ébranlée de l'intérieur: les revendications nationales concernaient non seulement la liberté individuelle mais aussi territoriale. À l'origine des tensions survenues en Transylvanie se trouvait l'acceptation par la Cour de l'union de la Hongrie et de la Transylvanie, ce qui eut pour conséquence un affrontement entre les régiments frontaliers roumains et hongrois. Les unités frontalières jouèrent un rôle important durant toute la période révolutionnaire: en Transylvanie les Roumains s'opposèrent aux Sicules, en Croatie les régiments frontaliers s'engagèrent massivement aux côtés du ban Josip Jelačić. Là aussi, la question territoriale était cruciale: les Croates demandaient la réunification du royaume triunitaire et l'incorporation de la frontière militaire; les *Grenzer* exigeaient un allègement de leurs charges et la possibilité de dissoudre les *zadruga*. La population serbe, de même que les *Grenzer* voulait de son côté l'union d'une Vod'vodine autonome au yaume triunitaire.¹ Mais les unités roumaines et croato-serbes demeurèrent *kaisertreu*. Parallèlement, le gouvernement hongrois était persuadé de la nécessité de placer les régiments frontaliers sous sa juridiction.

Les années 1848-1849 ont créé une situation de chaos dans les régions frontalières, particulièrement en Transylvanie, ravagée par l'intervention russe, qui fit exploser les cadres de la frontière militaire. La Cour de Vienne ne pouvait prendre le risque de voir un regain de la rébellion sicule et décida en conséquence de désarmer ces unités et de démilitariser la région dès la fin de l'année 1849.² Le démembrement de la frontière fut ordonné par un décret du 22 janvier 1851 et marqua la fin des cinq régiments frontaliers de Transylvanie. La méthode mise en oeuvre pour son application allait faire jurisprudence.

À cette époque, les considérations internes furent plus importantes que les préoccupations de politique étrangère: la Russie venait de se montrer un allié fiable en contribuant à mettre fin à la guerre d'indépendance hongroise et ne représentait pas dans l'immédiat une menace à l'Est. Plus inquiétant était en

¹ Amstadt Jakob, *Die k.k. Militärgrenze 1522-1881*, Würzburg (thèse de doctorat), 1969 p. 221-222.

² *Ibid.*, p. 229.

revanche un renouveau des vellétés hongroises. L'empire Ottoman était quant à lui toujours considéré comme un danger permanent et les décideurs autrichiens, politiques et militaires, n'étaient pas encore prêts à admettre que la frontière militaire croate pouvait être démantelée. De tels arguments ne se firent pas entendre avant la fin des années 1850 et furent alors prudemment enrobés par l'idéologie josephiste de "Volkswirtschaft",³ il fallut donc patienter encore une décennie pour voir les militaires y réfléchir dans la foulée des défaites en Italie et contre la Prusse. En 1866, la situation est en effet différente et la Hongrie apparaît alors comme un allié incontournable: la frontière militaire venait en outre de faire la preuve de son inutilité et ses soldats ne manifestaient plus la même valeur, les espoirs déçus de 1848 en ayant fait en outre un instrument moins fiable pour la monarchie.

Les négociations conduisant au Compromis austro-hongrois vont également prendre en compte la frontière militaire, pour diverses raisons: la recomposition territoriale de la Hongrie intègre la frontière transylvaine qui se trouve alors en voie de démembrement, la création d'une armée nationale hongroise ainsi que d'un ministère de la défense introduit un niveau de décision supplémentaire sur le terrain, enfin le démantèlement global de la frontière militaire croate entraîne des bouleversements territoriaux, militaires et sociaux.

1. Le débat autour de la dissolution de la frontière militaire

- *Le Compromis austro-hongrois*

L'inefficacité relative des régiments de *Grenzer* et le recul progressif de la menace ottomane conduisent les experts militaires à la conclusion que le système de la frontière est devenu obsolète. Ils sont en outre préoccupés par de possibles éruptions du sentiment national dans ces les confins, aggravés par l'agitation politique qui règne en Croatie. Comme on pourra le voir plus tard, les dirigeants hongrois ne vont pas hésiter à dramatiser la "menace slave" en vue d'obtenir le contrôle entier de la frontière. Il est pourtant difficile de déterminer si le manque d'ardeur au combat des *Grenzer* lors des derniers engagements était dû à la pénétration dans leurs rangs des idées nationales ou bien à un commandement et des méthodes inadéquates.⁴ Le gouvernement impérial prit néanmoins des précautions pour éviter un soulèvement des Slaves du Sud et concéda davantage de libertés politiques à partir de 1859, ce qui eut pour principal résultat de rapprocher encore plus les *Grenzer* des politiciens. Lorsqu'en 1866 les régiments de la frontière sont mobilisés pour la dernière fois, des rumeurs de conspiration et de désertion se font jour, le moment paraissant propice au déclenchement d'une rébellion des régions slaves du Sud. La mobilisation fut cependant menée à bien, mais Vienne dut se résoudre à admettre que la légendaire fidélité *Grenzer* était en déclin. Cette constatation allait peser de tout son poids lors des pourparlers entre les dirigeants autrichiens et hongrois menant à l'élaboration du Compromis de 1867.

³ Preradovich Nikolaus von, *Des Kaisers Grenzer. 300 Jahre Türkenabwehr*, Vienne, 1970 p. 291.

⁴ Rothenberg Günther E., *The Military Border in Croatia 1740-1881*, University of Chicago Press, 1966 p. 161.

Les discussions touchant à l'avenir de la frontière étaient déjà présentes au début des négociations, de même que la question de la création d'une armée hongroise indépendante (*Honvédség*), mais elles vont trouver un prolongement dans les réunions entre Hongrois et Croates préalables à la conclusion de la *Nagodba* de 1868. L'avenir de la frontière et surtout son attribution posait déjà problème en 1867, ainsi que le formulait l'archiduc Rainier. Soit elle devait être purement et simplement incorporée à la Hongrie, ce que les Hongrois souhaitaient, soit maintenue sous l'autorité du gouvernement impérial, soit enfin être démantelée et adjointe à la Croatie selon les vœux du *Sabor*. François-Joseph remet sa décision après la mise en oeuvre des structures du Compromis.⁵

Dès son entrée en fonctions, le gouvernement hongrois prend l'initiative, mais des tensions naissent rapidement entre le ministre des Finances Menyhért Lónyay et l'armée dès lors que la Hongrie prétend avoir ses propres forces armées, au sein desquelles elle veut intégrer les unités frontalières. Le conflit se précise entre Gyula Andrassy le chancelier autrichien Beust, mais ce dernier a besoin du soutien des Hongrois pour sa politique étrangère et se cesse donc de s'opposer à la dissolution de la frontière.

Fort de ce résultat, Andrassy relance son action en 1869 et le souverain, contrairement aux militaires qui continuent de se méfier des Hongrois, admet que l'instauration du Compromis et l'introduction de la conscription font de la frontière militaire une institution obsolète. Andrassy pensait que la sécurité de la Hongrie ne serait jamais complète tant que survivrait la frontière sous administration impériale, dont il considérait les régiments comme l'instrument d'une intervention potentielle de la Cour dans les affaires hongroises.⁶ Dans le même temps, il s'ingéniait à représenter à François-Joseph les dangers du nationalisme des Slaves du Sud. Le cabinet impérial et les militaires insistaient de leur côté sur la nécessité de préserver la frontière pour la sécurité de la monarchie, à l'intérieur comme à l'extérieur. Les Hongrois emportèrent la décision lors de la réunion des délégations censées voter une augmentation du budget de l'armée commune: les Hongrois refusèrent de voter quoi que ce soit tant que la question de la dissolution de la frontière ne serait pas réglée.⁷ On décida en définitive que le démantèlement serait graduel: la première étape devant être constituée par la "provincialisation" de la frontière de Varasd (Varaždin) (régiments de Kreuz et St. Georg), que suivraient le régiment de Slunj et l'enclave de Sichelburg.

Ce processus de décision provoqua l'émoi des députés croates et ils demandèrent non seulement la démilitarisation et l'intégration de la frontière à la Croatie-Slavonie, mais espéraient obtenir dans la foulée la réunification du royaume triunitaire avec la Dalmatie et Fiume (Rijeka). La situation créée par la démilitarisation allait être cependant temporairement gelée par les opérations en Bosnie-Herzégovine.⁸

5 Wagner Walter, *Geschichte des k.k. Kriegsministerium*, vol. 2 1866-1888, Vienne, Böhlau, 1971 p. 112.

6 Rothenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 172.

8 Gross Mirjana, *Die Anfänge des modernen Kroatiens. Gesellschaft, Politik und Kultur in Zivil-Kroatien und Slawonien in den ersten dreißig Jahren nach 1848*, Vienne, Böhlau, 1993, p. 194.

Entamée en 1871,⁹ la démilitarisation permit d'emblée l'adjonction de huit bataillons d'infanterie à la *Honvédség*. La loi II/1872 porte création, en plus des deux régiments de Varasd (*határőrvideki ezred*), de deux bataillons d'infanterie (83e et 84e); puis la loi XVIII/1872 transforme de même les trois régiments de frontière du Banat et leur ajoute aussi deux bataillons d'infanterie (85 et 86). Enfin, la loi XXXVI/1873 fait naître six bataillons d'infanterie des frontières (87e à 92e) en plus des onze bataillons déjà existants en Croatie-Slavonie.¹⁰

- *Le Compromis hungaro-croate*

Du côté croate, chacun s'accorde à souhaiter la dissolution, mais les trois courants politiques majeurs divergent sur les termes. Le parlement croate qui se réunit en avril 1861 les vit s'opposer: l'aristocratie pro-hongroise du parti constitutionnel suit les directives de Budapest exprimées par le ban, le baron Levin Rauch (1869-1871); l'intelligentsia rassemblée dans le parti national-libéral (*Narodna liberalna stranka*) et représentée par l'évêque Strossmayer, se méfie autant de Budapest que de Vienne; le troisième groupe est formé par les nationalistes, conduits par Ante Starčević, qui prône la reconstruction du royaume triunitaire et au-delà l'union de tous les Slaves du Sud. Pour la première fois depuis les négociations avec Vienne, 52 délégués des quatorze régiments frontaliers assistent aux sessions.¹¹ Ils se rendent ensuite auprès du souverain, mais reviennent les mains vides. Lors de la diète suivante, en 1865-1866, ces délégués de la frontière se déplacent à nouveau à Zagreb, mais leur présence se révèle inutile puisque les Unionistes dominent l'assemblée et que les opposants se déchirent entre eux. Ces mêmes Unionistes obtinrent la majorité dans la "diète octroyée" de 1868 qui adopta le Compromis hungaro-croate (*Nagodba*).

Le paragraphe 65 de la loi XXX:1868 traitait de la frontière et stipulait que la Hongrie reconnaissait l'intégrité de la Croatie-Slavonie et s'efforcerait d'élargir son territoire, ce qui pouvait vouloir dire que le gouvernement hongrois allait prôner la réunification du royaume triunitaire; au-delà, la loi mettait l'accent sur l'appartenance de la frontière à la Croatie-Slavonie et que ses populations seraient administrées, pour le législatif comme pour le judiciaire, par le gouvernement autonome de Croatie-Slavonie.¹² La *Nagodba* permettait donc à la Hongrie d'arriver à ses fins en ce qui concerne la frontière militaire: le gouvernement était bien entendu davantage préoccupé par les questions de sécurité que soucieux d'oeuvrer à l'expansion territoriale au bénéfice de la Croatie, il parvenait ainsi à une nouvelle étape dans son accession à l'indépendance. Cette victoire était remportée à la fois vis-à-vis de Vienne que de la frontière militaire potentiellement rebelle.

L'agitation croate suivant l'instauration du Compromis et la décision de démanteler la frontière au profit de la Hongrie dualiste fut essentiellement l'oeuvre

⁹ Rothenberg Günther, "The Military Compromise of 1868 and Hungary", Király, *The Crucial Decade*, p. 527.

¹⁰ Szurmay, Sándor, *A honvédség fejlődésének története annak felállításától napjainkig 1868-1898* (Histoire de la *Honvédség* de sa création à nos jours), Budapest, Ludovika Akadémia, 1898, p. 25.

¹¹ Amstadt, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 239.

du parti de Starčević qui obtint le départ de Rauch. La création d'un royaume slave du Sud composé non seulement du royaume médiéval croate, mais augmenté par l'Istrie, la Carniole, la Styrie du sud, la Bosnie-Herzégovine, la Serbie et le Monténégro faisait figure de cauchemar pour Vienne autant que pour Budapest.

Le débat à propos de la frontière se concentre surtout sur le droit que s'arroge la Hongrie d'intégrer celle-ci dans les pays de la couronne de Saint Étienne. Si l'on considère l'union personnelle qui régit les rapports entre l'ancien royaume croate et la Hongrie, il semble logique d'unir les territoires constituant la frontière avec la Croatie-Slavonie, mais aux yeux des Croates, l'administration de l'ancienne frontière militaire devrait alors incomber au gouvernement autonome croate selon les termes de la *Nagodba*.¹³ Il faut en effet rappeler que durant la période néo-absolutiste, la couronne hongroise a été privée à la fois de la principauté de Transylvanie et de la Croatie-Slavonie, placées directement sous la juridiction autrichienne. Les arguments financiers jouent également un rôle important, puisque ses opposants suspectent la Hongrie de vouloir exploiter à son profit les nouveaux territoires de même que l'ensemble de la Croatie-Slavonie. Ce fut en partie exact, notamment en ce qui concerne la vente des forêts, surtout dans les plaines de la Save (régiments de Brod et de Peterwardein), dont le gouvernement hongrois voulait d'assurer l'exclusivité, en prétendant que les gains qui en résulteraient seraient consacrés au développement du chemin de fer et des routes. Le commerce du sel faisait aussi l'objet de discussions car on soupçonnait les *Grenzer* de faire de la contrebande de sel. Plus tard les Croates ne cesseront pas d'accuser la Hongrie d'exploitation de leur territoire sans en transférer aucun des bénéfices au gouvernement croate.

2. Les débuts de l'administration hongroise de la frontière militaire

- *Le modèle du Banat*

La dissolution de la frontière transylvaine avait été entreprise par l'Autriche absolutiste au début des années 1850: dans un premier temps dans le but de désarmer les Sicules, secundo pour éliminer tout risque de soulèvement des Roumains. Les choses se passèrent dans calme: les Sicules ne montraient de toute façon aucun désir de continuer à servir l'empire et les Roumains, pourtant favorables à l'origine au maintien de la frontière, ne s'opposèrent pas à la disso-

¹³ "Die Magyaren betrachten das Land wie eine Waare, über die sie nach Laune verfügen können; sie sprechen von ihren Waldungen in Kroatien und Slavonien, als wenn die Länder ungarische Komitate wären, die eine einfache Fortsetzung des Rakos bilden, und als ob der liebe Herrgott die kroatischen Bäume für den ungarischen Herrn Finanzminister wachsen ließe.(...) Das Magyarenreich hat daher auf die kroatische Militärgrenze weder ein historisches noch ein politisches Recht, und die ungarischen Minister haben hier keine Kompetenz. (...)

Die Militärgrenze ist ein ausschließlich kaiserliches Land; sie darf unmöglich zum Schemel für die magyrische Großmachtspolitik oder für die magyaronische Volksbeglückungstheorie mißbraucht werden". "Gegenwart und Zukunft der Militärgrenze", *Zukunft. Organ für nationale, konstitutionell und volkswirtschaftliche Interessen*, Wien (Wieden) Nr. 133 VI Jahrgang, 16. Juni 1869 [von einem Grenzer]

lution.¹⁴ Toutefois, un morceau de l'ancien système restait encore à abattre puisque les régiments du Banat étaient écartés à la fois du démantèlement en Transylvanie et en Croatie. François-Joseph prit sa décision lors de la réunion des ministres communs en juillet 1871.

Parmi les nationalités de la frontière, ce sont les Serbes qui sont le plus hostiles à l'incorporation à la Hongrie (les Roumains quant à eux veulent l'égalité et le respect de leur langue ainsi qu'une large autonomie, tout comme les Allemands qui exigent surtout la fin de la "Sabelherrschaft" et la démilitarisation). Les Serbes voudraient que la frontière devienne un *Kronland* avec une administration distincte. Les Croates du Banat prônent le rattachement à la Croatie-Slavonie.¹⁵

La question de la dissolution de la frontière devient réelle en juillet 1869 lorsque la Diète hongroise met à l'ordre du jour la provincialisation de la frontière tout en souhaitant un règlement progressif. L'exacerbation du sentiment national s'en mêle et les Serbes rejoignent les Roumains dans leur demande d'autonomie pour la province. Les Croates à leur tour mettent de l'huile sur le feu: le *Sabor* décide le 11 octobre 1869 que la langue croate et l'alphabet latin seront introduits dans le comitat de Syrmie où vivent en majorité des Serbes. Les diverses communautés envoient des adresses au souverain et se rendent à Vienne, mais sans succès.¹⁶

La mise en place des administrations hongroises se fait à partir de 1871 mais la langue de ces organes reste temporairement l'allemand. La réorganisation militaire passe par l'introduction de la conscription et sa mise en conformité avec le système hongrois, dans la foulée les villes et les communautés rurales sont également réorganisées.¹⁷ La frontière militaire du Banat ainsi que le bataillon de Titel tombe directement sous l'administration hongroise, ce qui a principale conséquence une séparation entre affaires civiles et militaires.¹⁸ Les compagnies sont réorganisées en districts administratifs (*Verwaltungsbezirke*) et se chargent du civil. Du côté militaire, on crée la 23e division des troupes de la frontière à Temesvár (Timișoara), avant une réorganisation totale des troupes. Jusque là, c'est un commissariat royal sous autorité hongroise qui gère les affaires militaires à Temesvár. La réforme définitive et donc la démilitarisation entre en vigueur le 1er janvier 1872, les villes élisent des maires civils. La dernière étape de la démilitarisation et la campagne pour les élections municipales se déroulent dans un climat d'effervescence où se distingue l'agitation serbe, favorisée par liberté d'expression jamais connu auparavant.¹⁹

Durant l'été 1872, François-Joseph effectue un voyage dans la région pour faciliter l'intégration, il est accompagné par le président du conseil hongrois Lónyay et les ministres Lajos Tisza (Transports), Béla Wenckheim (Intérieur), Károly Kerkápoly (Finances) et József Szlávy (Commerce). À cette occasion, les Roumains

14 Göllner Carl, *Die Siebenbürgische Militärgrenze. Ein Beitrag zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 1762-1851*, Munich, 1974 p 122

15 Milleker Felix, *Geschichte der Banater-Militärgrenze 1764-1873*, Pančevo 1925 p 256.

16 *Ibid.*, p. 259

17 *Ibid.*, p. 261.

18 Wolf Josef, *Die Banater Militärgrenze, ihre Auflösung und Einverleibung in das Königreich Ungarn*, Innsbruck (thèse de doctorat), 1947 p. 253.

19 Milleker, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

demandent l'élévation de leur régiment du Banat en comitat et l'octroi du statut de ville royale libre à Karansebes. À tous, François-Joseph fait la même réponse: il faut en rester là pour le moment et soutenir les efforts du gouvernement hongrois. Les Hongrois accusent alors les Serbes de profiter de leurs nouvelles libertés pour mener une campagne d'agitation en faveur d'un royaume slave du Sud.²⁰

En novembre 1872, l'ensemble de la frontière du Banat est passé sous l'autorité du gouvernement hongrois, les régiments ont été dispersés dans l'armée nationale et dans l'armée commune, ce qui provoque des émeutes qui visent à empêcher le désarmement des compagnies: le 17 janvier 1873 à Petrovoselo, des manifestants tentent de bloquer l'entrée en fonction de l'administration civile, le gouvernement dépêche un commissaire sur place et les choses rentrent dans l'ordre. Mais le gouvernement hongrois peine à faire admettre ses fonctionnaires. Les députés de la région se rassemblent et fondent un peu partout dans la région des "clubs Deák" pour faire passer les réformes et convaincre les populations. Les communautés rurales s'opposent à la provincialisation et à la création de nouveaux comitats, mais toutes les protestations trouvent porte close chez François-Joseph.²¹

L'été 1873 se passe en pourparlers avec les préfets du Banat pour définir l'organisation électorale des comitats concernés par l'intégration de la frontière: Torontal obtient 55 députés, Temes 18, Krassó 12 et Szörény 45. Les élections sont prévues pour l'automne. Entre août et septembre, l'administration se met en place, les activités du commissariat de Temesvár sont officiellement terminées mais il ne sera vraiment supprimé qu'en 1880.²² Le système éducatif est entièrement réorganisé, les écoles sont soit reprises par l'État (*Hauptschulen* de Pancsova et de Weisskirchen), soit fermées pour faire place à nouvelles *Bürgerschulen* à huit classes dans lesquelles sont partiellement recyclés (après concours) les enseignants des anciennes écoles.²³

L'incorporation de la frontière continue à agiter les esprits: la solidarité serbo-roumaine se maintient et pétitions et rassemblements sont organisés en commun. Les dirigeants prévoient la création d'un parti national serbo-roumain. Les trois députés élus dans les trois circonscriptions sont plus ou moins nationalistes. Dès leur élection, les députés du Banat entrent en action à la diète. L'agitation est particulièrement forte dans le comitat de Szörény qui ne veut pas se laisser incorporer: à tel point que fin 1875, le gouvernement doit y suspendre le droit de vote et envoyer un commissaire, les fonctionnaires locaux sont mis à la retraite et des Hongrois arrivent à leur place. Les troubles durent jusqu'en 1880 et ne cessent que lorsque Szörény est finalement uni à Krassó. En 1880, la frontière militaire du Banat est vraiment effacée de la carte. Mais le mécontentement continue à se faire entendre par voix de presse, même si les journaux sont parfois interdits et certains dirigeants arrêtés.²⁴

Les troubles balkaniques agitent les Serbes à partir de 1876, ils organisent des rassemblements et envoient des volontaires. En réponse, le gouvernement envoie

20 Ibid., p. 267.

21 Ibid., p. 272.

22 Ibid., p. 277.

23 Ibid., p. 280.

24 Ibid., p. 285.

des détachements de l'armée nationale en provenance de Szeged. Les dirigeants serbes sont arrêtés, notamment Svetozar Miletić, accusé d'avoir levé une milice de 20 à 30 000 volontaires avec Svetozar Kasapinović. Durant l'été 1876, les Serbes se réunissent à Nagy-Kikinda un congrès national dont les décisions se rapprochent plutôt du gouvernement hongrois: ce dernier fait de son côté un pas dans leur direction et les préfets des comitats concernés sont convoqués par Kálmán Tisza avec quelques personnalités locales, le but est de faire progresser l'idée d'État hongroise et la langue magyare. En 1884, la plupart des Serbes se rangeront derrière le parti libéral, entre temps le hongrois se sera imposé presque partout en tout cas dans toutes les administrations et écoles.²⁵

Couronnement de cette époque de bouleversements, le système de la *zadruga* est également aboli, mais plus lentement: la décision est prise en 1885 pour une application dans les deux ans qui suivent. Ce sont les autorités administratives et non judiciaires qui doivent s'en occuper, une commission est instaurée à cet effet par le comitat, que coiffe un comité ministériel. Une dernière régulation concernant la *zadruga* sera promulguée en 1898, mais le système ne semble avoir vraiment disparu qu'en 1905.²⁶

- La Croatie et le facteur bosniaque

- L'un des épisodes les plus marquants des difficultés d'intégration de la frontière militaire se déroule au tout début du processus de démilitarisation. L'agitation consécutive à la décision de démanteler la frontière au profit de la Hongrie dualiste émanait surtout, on l'a vu, du parti de Starčević. Les mouvements de mécontentement étaient sensibles chez les nationalistes croates et c'est dans ce climat que se produisit la mutinerie de Rakovica. Contrairement à ce qui a pu être dit par la suite, la révolte n'était pas une manipulation hongroise mais bel et bien un soulèvement croate qui a cependant bien servi la politique d'Andrássy hostile à toute concession en faveur des Slaves, il se fit ainsi fort de présenter un tableau apocalyptique des masses slaves révoltées et convainquit une fois de plus François-Joseph d'en rester au dualisme.

Dès le début d'octobre 1871, le régiment frontalier d'Ogulin, alors stationné à Rakovica, était la proie du mécontentement. Le 9 octobre, deux membres du Parti du droit d'Ante Starčević, Eugen Kvatemik et Ljudevit Bach, ce dernier étant de surcroît l'éditeur du journal du parti, *Hrvatska* (Croatie), s'emparent de l'arsenal du régiment avec l'aide du sergent Rade Cuić et proclament l'indépendance de la Croatie avec un gouvernement provisoire et une armée nationale qu'ils espèrent constituer en ralliant à leur cause les autres bataillons croates. Mais la mutinerie tourne rapidement court, non sans avoir sérieusement alerté Budapest et Vienne. Aucun officier ne suit les meneurs qui ne rencontrent par ailleurs aucun soutien significatif. Vienne, en la personne du général Mollinary, commandant du XIII^e corps d'armée impériale de Zagreb, décrète la loi martiale et met en état d'alerte tous les autres

²⁵ Ibid., p. 291.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 294.

régiments frontaliers.²⁷ Quelques jours plus tard, les troupes restées fidèles du régiment d'Ogulin et celles du régiment d'Otočac soumettent les émeutiers: Kvaternik et Bach sont tués, onze soldats seront exécutés par la suite. Si la mutinerie est entièrement matée par les troupes frontalières, la *Honvédség* montre sa vigilance comme le confirme une lettre du comte Friedrich Kulmer, colonel commandant en chef du VIIe district adressée à l'archiduc Joseph en date du 10 octobre 1871.²⁸

En 1875, au moment des premiers troubles en Bosnie, le gouvernement hongrois avait mis en état d'alerte tout le VIIe district et plus particulièrement les 90e, 91e et 92e bataillons, les plus proches de la frontière.²⁹ En 1876, le commandant du 92e (Mitrovica), le chef de bataillon Pintér, adresse des rapports sur les troubles au district.³⁰ Après l'intervention de l'armée commune en 1878, on décide l'envoi de la sixième compagnie du 83e bataillon, ainsi que des 3e, 65e et 66e bataillons, qui se placent sur la ligne Duna-Drave et gardent les forteresses. Ensuite, tout le 83e est mis à la disposition du VIIe district puis de l'armée commune et se rend en Bosnie de août à novembre 1878 pour garder la frontière et assurer la sécurité intérieure,³¹ conformément au terme de la loi XLI/1868 qui précisait que la *Honvédség* devait défendre les pays de la couronne de Hongrie aussi à l'extérieur. Mais en fait les bataillons vont rester à l'intérieur des frontières, même si tous sont mis à contribution en définitive (79, 80 et 83e, puis les 87, 88 et 89e), le 87e est utilisé pour surveillance de la Krajina et les deux autres n'auront pas à tirer un coup de feu.³² Pour les remplacer sur leurs lieux de cantonnements, à savoir Pétervárad, Eszék et Zimony, on détache les 65e (Székesfehérvár), 66e (Paks) et 3e (Szeged) bataillons.³³

Par ailleurs, des incidents se sont produits dans les troupes bien avant les opérations de 1878 et l'on découvre que des soldats *honvéd*, donc majoritairement des Slaves du Sud, ont dès 1875 déserté leurs bataillons et sont passés avec armes et bagages du côté des insurgés en abandonnant leurs uniformes. Mais les services de renseignements militaires hongrois semblent dépassés par les événements et le ministère de la Défense est alerté directement par Vienne. Les districts militaires concernés, à savoir Zagreb et Szeged, sont alertés et des mesures sont prises pour arrêter les déserteurs dont les commandants sont tenus de fournir les noms dans un bref délai. Béla Szende s'adresse aux commandants par lettre du 24 septembre 1875, chaque territoire recevant des directives précises.³⁴

²⁷ Anton Freiherr v. Mollinary, *Sechsvierzig Jahre im österreich-ungarischen Heere*, Zurich 1905 vol. 2 p. 235

²⁸ Hadtörténelmi Levéltár (Archives militaires). Magyar kir. Honvéd Főparancsnokság 1869-1918 (Haut commandement de l'armée nationale hongroise royale), fond I. 75. Doboz 3 liasse 363. "Az ogulini határonvidéken kitört lazangas" (La mutinerie du régiment frontalier d'Ogulin).

²⁹ Papp, Tibor, "A magyar honvédség megalakulása a kiegyezés után" (Le développement de la *Honvédség* près le Compromis), *Hadtörténelmi közlemények* 1967/4, p. 705.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 706.

³¹ Illésfalvi Papp Mihály, *A m. kir. honvédség fejlődése 1869-1899* (Le développement de l'armée nationale hongroise), Budapest, 1899 p. 151

³² Papp Tibor, "A magyar honvédség megalakulása a kiegyezés után" (Le développement de la *Honvédség* près le Compromis), *Hadtörténelmi közlemények* 1967/4 p. 708.

³³ Móric Pál, *A magyar királyi honvéd*, Budapest 1929 p. 63.

³⁴ HL. HFP. fond I. 75. Doboz 23 liasse 1509.

Après le retour au calme qui suit la crise de Bosnie, l'avenir de la frontière est définitivement scellé, c'est pourquoi j'ai choisi d'arrêter mon étude en 1881, qui est aussi la date généralement admise pour marquer la fin de l'institution frontalière. Mais ceci ne signifie pas cependant la fin du sujet car le système de la frontière militaire reste fortement présent dans les esprits de ses habitants et il n'est pas surprenant de voir le nombre élevé d'anciens officiers ou de fils d'officiers rejoindre les rangs de l'armée nationale hongroise en Croatie, non selon une démarche nationale, mais comme *Landespatrioten* prêts à servir leur pays et leur souverain.

À première vue, le succès de la Hongrie dans la démilitarisation de la frontière peut sembler complet: mis à part l'incident de Rakovica et les troubles en Bosnie, la Hongrie n'a pas eu à faire face à une rébellion ouverte sur son sol, les unités de *Grenzer* ont été largement intégrées dans l'armée nationale hongroise sans autre forme de procès. La sécurité que la Hongrie espérait obtenir suite à la démilitarisation et à l'incorporation de la frontière a été totale. L'armée n'a pas été pénétrée par le nationalisme avant la toute fin de la Première guerre mondiale. Néanmoins la Hongrie a dû gérer une double confrontation: avec le sentiment national croate d'une part et vis-à-vis de l'Autriche et de l'armée commune d'autre part. Son obsession de la sécurité l'a conduite à combattre le premier et à entrer en concurrence avec la seconde, en essayant de donner à la *Honvédség* une importance toujours plus grande et d'imposer sa présence militaire partout où l'armée impériale était déjà établie, elle se protégeait ainsi d'un côté en mettant en avant sa puissance potentielle de l'autre. Ce double objectif a présidé à l'intégration puis à la gestion de l'ancienne frontière militaire, de ce point de vue, il a été parfaitement réalisé.

Résumé

Ma contribution est consacrée à la période durant laquelle le ministère de la Défense hongrois, devenu un organe autonome en vertu du Compromis austro-hongrois, eut à charge de démanteler la frontière militaire. La dissolution commença en vérité dès les lendemains de la Révolution de 1848 par la frontière de Transylvanie. Par la suite le débat se déplaça en Croatie-Slavonie. La disparition progressive de la menace ottomane et l'inefficacité relative du système de même que le mécontentement général à son propos contribuèrent à prouver que la frontière était devenue une institution obsolète. L'évolution du sentiment national des populations locales faisait également craindre l'éruption de troubles, que les hommes politiques hongrois n'hésitèrent pas à exagérer pour la dissolution de la frontière à leur profit. L'attribution territoriale posait problème: elle devait être soit incorporée à la Hongrie, rester sous autorité impériale ou bien être réunie à la Croatie-Slavonie. La démilitarisation commença en 1871 mais fut interrompue par les opérations en Bosnie-Herzégovine. La défense nationale hongroise est mise en jeu par ces événements, de même que par l'opposition croate, elle est ainsi devant un risque de déstabilisation interne. À l'issue de la crise de Bosnie, l'avenir de la frontière est scellé, mais cela ne veut pas dire pour autant qu'il est résolu, d'autant que les structures mentales héritées du système des confins continuent à prédominer chez ses habitants.

Emil KAVALSKI

FROM THE CRESCENT TO THE CIRCLE OF SECURITY? DEFINING THE EURO-ATLANTIC BORDER IN THE BALKANS

Introduction

This study deals with the notion of security in the Balkans as part of the larger Euro-Atlantic dynamics initiated after the end of the Cold War. It should be mentioned at the outset that the underlining presumptions of this research is that the Balkans/Southeast Europe is region not because of its own awareness as such, but because of its external perception. Therefore, the research focuses on the external/Euro-Atlantic perspective on the regional framework of interstate relations. In particular it focuses on the EU promotion of its type of order to the region. Basically, it suggests that the failures (as well as successes) of most of the EU initiatives are the result of the EU's institutionalisation of its own foreign policy identity, rather than indifference.

Nevertheless, one can distinguish that the more self-conscious the organization becomes the more its widening involvement in the Balkans translates into a deeper understanding of regional processes. As a result the very environment of this relationship has changed, which has led to a re-conceptualisation of the borders of stability and security in Europe, per se. The differentiation of Southeastern Europe in the early 1990s into two groups: (i) the Western Balkans; and (ii) Bulgaria-Romania (as part of the East Central European states), emphasises the exclusion of the former from the security arrangements made available for the latter. However, the current pattern of relations has led to the inclusion of the whole of the region to the inner circle of Europe, as opposed to the outer one – the 'Wider Europe'.

This is a reflection of the current foreign policy attitudes both of the EU as well as regional actors. In spite of its positive connotations, such development, however, still bears some of the problematic undercurrents dominant in the early period of extra-regional involvement in the Balkans. Since they are outside the framework of this exploration, they are only indicated as the involvement of mainly Southeast European state-elites in these processes, which is expected to spill over into regional societies (and is yet to be seen). Nevertheless, this study believes that the so-called Euro-Atlantic organizations (i.e. the EU and NATO) are equipped to address the Balkan sources of conflict and encourage inter-state cooperation. The prospect and conditionality of membership provides them with significant influence in the region. As a result a gradual socialization occurs in terms of altering domestic practices through compliance and learning, which leads to a change of external behaviour according externally-maintained standards of appropriateness (Kavalski 2003). These processes, in turn facilitate regional cooperation and thus, the emergence of a nascent stage of the EU promoted framework of order.

The Crescent of Security:

The crescent of security (or what also has been termed the 'arc of stability' [Pantev 2000: 3]) reflects the dominant dynamic of EU involvement in the region, which emerged in the early 1990s. In a nutshell, it represents the above-mentioned (un)awareness of the EU in that period of initial encounter with regional problems that led to the division of the Balkans into two groups of states. Thus, the line that went through Slovenia-Hungary-Romania-Bulgaria-Greece was perceived as the 'natural' boundary, if not membrane, of the organization. It could be argued that it reflected EU's inability/unwillingness to promote its pattern of relations in this early period to the whole of the region and, thence, adopting the approach of keeping regional problems away from its responsibility.

Because of such differentiation, the implications of EC/EU involvement were different for the two tiers of countries: (a) Bulgaria and Romania, which were recognized as candidates and could apply for association and accession assistance and funds; and (b) the 'Western Balkans' which were generally excluded from such programs and rely mainly on humanitarian assistance and aid in response to crisis situations.

As a result there are separate 'EUropeanization' dynamics (understood as patterns for promotion of the EC/EU model of inter- and intra-state relations) in the Balkans. In spite of the largely reactive measures of the EC/EU in the early 1990s, their different domestic effects in Bulgaria and Romania, on the one hand, and in the 'Western Balkans', on the other, indicate to their different adaptational potential. In the case of the former group the EC/EU political, social and economic arrangements began to be introduced at a different pace and with different implications than in the latter one. Thus, Bulgaria and Romania managed to *initiate* the development of stable institutions of governance (and, thus, at a fairly early stage of their transition, decrease the simmering tensions stemming from the potentially disruptive 'Dobruđja' issue, for instance), while this was not the case in the countries from the Western Balkans (where social, economic and political mismanagement were incorporated into the rhetoric of ethno-nationalism). Thus, as it became apparent quite early on, the conditions that fostered insecurity in the Balkans 'were not amenable... to control from within the region', but required 'outside frameworks and processes' to promote stability (Nelson 1993: 174).

However, the majority of initiatives that the EC/EU embarked upon in the Western Balkans at this stage were within the context of 'emergency aid' (EC 1992: 0001) through the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), founded on 6 November 1991. In fact, the EC's response did not target the Balkan issues specifically, but put them in the context of 'administering humanitarian operations to aid people in *any* non-member country who have been victims of natural disasters or *exceptional events* in cases calling for a swift response and/or implementation of expedited procedures' (EC 1997: 0003. Emphasis added). The very ambiguity of the term *exceptional events* and the problematic definition of what exactly qualifies as one, as well as the 'discussions' among Member States as to whether they need to *respond* or *implement an expedited procedure* meant that by 1993 ECHO's programmatic specification were much more clearly defined, but also limited – namely, the provision of 'food aid' (EC 1993: 0044).

Such deficiency of a comprehensive approach to the issues posed by the region was most indicative of EC's lack of common foreign policy instruments, which allowed the different *national* contingencies of Member States to prevent the EC from adopting a common strategy for a comprehensive preventive action to the situation in Yugoslavia. It also indicated the outside-of-area dimension, which the Western Balkans had been conferred at the time. Thus, it is as a result of these contradictory policies as well as the 'bifurcation' of the Balkans into two groups of states that the EC/EU had different transformative effects on regional policy-making elites in this period (which in itself questions the possibility for establishing a comprehensive Southeast European framework of relations). Moreover it underlined the prevailing awareness that the Western Balkans does not represent an area for potential enlargement. Therefore, the boundary of accession was surreptitiously driven through the region and the crescent/arc of security outlined the outer frontier of what was beginning to be perceived as 'Fortress Europe'.

Therefore, owing to the EC's/EU's own institution-building concerns, the measures that it undertook were more or less on an *ad hoc* basis, responding to particular situations and reflecting EC's 'vocation... to deal with aspects of foreign and security policy in accordance with a *sustained evolutionary process*' (EC 1990: 5. Emphasis added). The reactive approach to Southeastern Europe underlines both the lack of EC/EU instruments to deal with the issues posed by the region, as well as a lack of vision and understanding of the problems in the Balkans (since it was more or less perceived as distant from the EC/EU's near (or rather, *immediate*) abroad - CEE states - and, also, not as threatening as the fate of the disintegrating Soviet Union and the fledgling Russian state). The *ad hoc* arrangements were perceived by Balkan actors as a lack of commitment (and also concern) by the EC to deal with Balkan issues. As Daniel N. Nelson (1993 172-73) had made it clear at the time, the Euro-Atlantic attention to the 'northern tier' of the former Soviet Bloc countries, reflected the 'perceived strategic interests of the West' as well as its 'more negative reaction to post-communist wars and policies in the Balkans'. This perspective can be deciphered in the proposition to endorse Greece (rather than the EU itself) as a *regional power* to keep the lid on Balkan problems in the face of different attempts by other actors (i.e. the US, Turkey, Islamic fundamentalism, crime-networks) to fill the post-communist power vacuum in the region:

The second adverse effect of the present strategic framework is that the entry onto the scene of Turkey (*the aspirant regional power*) not only impinges on a role which could have fallen to Greece (as the only EU member in the region, and in view of its economic development level)...An EU presence, with its own strategy, *would enable Greece to play the active role which is its due, as authorized for Bulgaria and Romania.* (EC 1995: 0065. Emphasis added).

Such lack of EU commitment (as well as strategic vision) in the early 1990s denied the proportionate consideration and assistance to Balkan states as compared with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland at the time. For instance, when the Commission was asked 'what prospects can the European Community offer the people of Yugoslavia with regard to closer and more speedy integration into the Community', the reply was that 'the development of future relations... will depend largely on the way the republics themselves decide to work towards a comprehensive settlement of their differences' (Langer and Aglietta 1991: 0035). At the same

time, however, the EC had already signed in December 1991 far-reaching and comprehensive Europe Agreements with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, which (in the words of an MEP) sent a clear 'signal that [they] *belong to Europe*' (Randzio-Plath 1991: 0404. Emphasis added).

This logic can be deciphered in the post-Essen European Council (December 1994) statements of the EU when only Bulgaria and Romania (from the Southeast European region) were included in the strategy for the preparation of the accession countries, consisting of the implementation of the Europe Agreements, finance assistance under PHARE and a structured dialogue. This was an indication of the further marginalization of the Western Balkans, which hampered the prospect for regional cooperation. The only response that the EU could muster at the time was 'to *study* the problems caused by the flood of refugees with a view to finding an effective arrangement *for future sharing of the burden of humanitarian assistance*' (EC 1994: 3. Emphasis added). Such policy attitude does not seem to suggest a strategy for constructive engagement with the non-candidate countries of the region. The only allusion to possible policy-relations with these states is the encouragement of 'intra-regional cooperation between the associated countries themselves and *their* immediate neighbours' (EC 1994: 5. Emphasis added). Therefore, virtually institutionalising that the areas outside the crescent line of accession activities were shunned away from the security/stability of the inner core of the EU.

The Circle of Security

The notion of circle of security has to indicate the broadening and, at the same time, deepening engagement of the EU in the region. Basically it refers to the new understanding that the whole region (including the Western Balkans) is an area that is to become an *internal* part of the circle of accession. This awareness was prodded by the Kosovo crisis. It also reflected the fact that the EU became the dominant extra-regional actor in the Balkans (something which was expected to happen in the early 1990s) as a result of the 'fatigue', which urged the other external actors (the US/NATO, UN, OSCE, etc) to redirect their attention to other areas/issues. Thus, the EU became more aware of the implications and dangers posed by the region and as Chris Pattern (2002: 5), stated 'either we [the EU] export stability to the Balkans, or the Balkans exports instability to us. I know which I would prefer'. In other words, moving the external boundary to encompass the whole region indicates that the promotion of appropriate decision-making in the region is beneficial for the EU, as well.

Therefore, the main concern for the EU's involvement in the region is to find the means to achieve the application of its instruments developed in its relations with other East European states to the Western Balkans. The rationale seems to derive from the experience of developing a path-dependent political process, where Balkan decision-making elites, more often than not justify their policies within the context of 'accession requirements' and 'EU conditions'; even if (initially) just for the instrumental benefits from 'trade preferences, then for the access to community assistance and finally for contractual relations' (Reply to Habsburg 1998: 0083).

The early indication for such a development can be deciphered in the period following the Amsterdam European Council (June 1994). In this period, the EU builds upon its experience of working in the region, but mostly it relies on its increased and distinct position in international affairs deriving from the recognition that 'the *legitimacy* of the European unification depends crucially on the European Union's ability to *accept responsibility* in and for the continent, prevent aggression and safeguard peace' (EC 1999d: 0076. Emphasis added). This led to a substantial revision of the CFSP in the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was signed in October 1997 and came into effect in May 1999. It attempted to focus the work of the EU in the field of international diplomacy (with the creation of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit) and to develop a *united* EUropean voice in foreign affairs (with the establishment of a 'High Representative' of the CFSP). Javier Solana (2000), the first High Representative of the CFSP, remarked that the 'future credibility of our CFSP depends largely on success in the Balkans'.

At the same time, the EU's experience of working with (and mainly socializing the Central and East European states) has indicated that economic, political and military insecurity require the active support and coordinated assistance of extra-regional actors could help induce Balkan elites to develop the appropriate political skills and resources, instead of playing on popular fears (Harvey 2000: 56). That is, the EU's 'sticks and carrots' (as exemplified by the relative stability of Bulgaria and Romania) could provide the incentives to tackle Balkan issues by following certain principles and procedures. This process is initiated and maintained by the guidance and monitoring of EU institutions and/or inter-governmental arrangements, as well as by the *power of attraction* of the accession process, itself. As a European Parliament resolution suggests, 'the EU must... develop cooperation, both political and economic, with the Central and East European countries which have not yet applied to join the Union, *notably with the countries of South-East Europe*' (EC 1999c: 0218. Emphasis added).

In other words, the EU has come not only to realize its order-promotion role in the region, but has also decided to exert the required influence to draw 'it closer to the perspective of full integration into its structures, and... confirm that the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Albania have the ultimate vocation to become members of the European Union' (EC 1999f: 37). Recognising the shortcomings of its previous initiatives largely due to their 'multiplicity... [which] has created confusion... [and] has also denied the influence of the EU in the region' (EC 1999f: 37) – the EU has acknowledged that a peace-framework can be promoted in the region 'provided everybody knows exactly who is in charge. *Too many actors is a recipe for failure*. Stabilising the Balkans requires a range of political and administrative authority and accountability, and *the European Union can offer this*' (EC 2000a: 4. Emphasis added). Such acknowledgement of the exigency for a coordinated '*driving force*' (EC 2000a: 6. Emphasis original) to encourage and maintain a required pattern of acceptable relations in Southeastern Europe suggests the potential for initiating the development of the nascent stage of a security community. The EU, thus, becomes the conditioning model, whose policy-making procedures are to be implemented in the region through the contractual relations for possible accession that it has established.

As it had already been mentioned, it was the 1999 Kosovo crisis and the de-

velopments that it triggered, which indicated (i) a more certain and definite prospect for the enlargement, *per se*, and its reach into the region; as well as (ii) a more focused and convinced (as well as convincing) approach to Southeastern Europe. Therefore, what subsequently came to be perceived as a major shift in EU policy was again (ironically) reactive: the EU developed an explicitly pro-active stance in its relation to the region (as well as external relations, generally) *in reaction* to the Kosovo crisis.

As it has been suggested, it was the developments in Kosovo in the beginning of 1999, which gave a tangible perspective for the accession of Bulgaria and Romania. Despite their inclusion in the initiatives relating for Central and East European states (under the PHARE programme), both countries were not on the agenda for opening accession negotiations according to the conclusions of the Vienna European Council in December 1998 (EC 1998: 6). This decision was underlined by the perception that Bulgaria and Romania were too slow to adopt and adapt to the accession criteria. However, the volatility of the Western Balkans underlined the need to recognise their efforts in order to ensure (i) the continued attractiveness of EU membership and (ii) support for the sanctions (and military campaign) against Serbia/Montenegro. At first, this recognition came in the form of a very explicit 'Statement of the EU on Bulgaria and Romania' on April 26, 1999 (EC 1999a: point 1.4.14). On the one hand, this Statement, 'highlights the contribution of Romania and Bulgaria, two associate States, to stability in the wider region'. On the other, it recognises that this situation imposes heavy burdens on these countries'. Therefore, their 'governments are to be commended for their positive responses' by underlying 'the *special relationship* [the EU] enjoys with Romania and Bulgaria' (Emphasis added). The initial endorsement was the establishment of an Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA) on 21 June 1999. According to the division of ISPA funds, Romania and Bulgaria were earmarked as the second and third largest beneficiaries - 23, 98% and 10,43%, respectively (EC 2001b: 9). Simultaneously, they were also granted access to SAPARD (agricultural aid) funds. The next step, which the EU undertook was to upgrade the *special relationship* it had with the Bulgaria and Romania, by taking responsibility for their 'transition from Communist oppression to the market economy' (Muscardini et al. 1997: 0040). In October 1999, the European Commission recommended 'opening of negotiations with all countries, which meet the Copenhagen *political criteria*' (EC 1999f: 29. Emphasis added). As the same document indicates, 'this option has the advantage of recognising the widely felt need for momentum in the enlargement process taking account of the dramatic changes in European political landscape, *mainly as a consequence of the crisis in the Balkan region*' (Emphasis added). Thus, the Kosovo crisis made the EU aware of the socialising effectiveness of the prospect of accession for Bulgaria and Romania by rewarding their efforts in that direction, and at the same time allowing it to maintain their commitment to (and compliance with) the process. As Romano Prodi (1999: 2. Emphasis added), the President of the European Commission suggested at the time, this *softening* of the Copenhagen criteria towards Bulgaria and Romania is to prevent

the countries concerned, having already made great efforts and sacrifices [from becoming] disillusioned and turn their backs on us. Their economic policies will

begin to diverge an historic opportunity will have been lost – perhaps forever. In the changed political landscape, *especially in the Balkan region*, some countries may also let slip the progress they have made towards democracy and human rights, and the European Union will have seriously failed the people of those countries.

The Kosovo issue also came at the end of a decade of EU (and other international agencies) involvement in the Balkans and its response had to indicate a maturity as well as commitment to finding lasting solutions to the Yugoslav crisis. If prior to 1999, the EU and other international actors were involved in a more or less *ad hoc*/humanitarian aid-type of measures, in its wake it became apparent that the Western Balkans need to be given an attainable (yet distant) vision for accession into the EU, so that the norms and standards of appropriate behaviour could take root in these states. For instance, within weeks of the beginning of the Milosevic's campaign in Kosovo, the European Commission 'was able to overcome the constraints imposed by administrative procedures', which encumbered its earlier efforts in Croatia and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina and react rapidly to prevent the destabilisation of neighbouring countries (Albania and Macedonia, as well as Montenegro) by granting their governments '€100 million for refugee related costs and €150 million in direct humanitarian aid' (EC 2001a: 21). Understanding the wider implications of the situation, the EU declares that 'a political solution to the Kosovo crisis must be embedded in a determined effort geared towards stabilising the region as a whole' (EC 1999b: 0002). To this end, the EU found itself involved into (depending on the interpretation) two mutually contradictory or complementing programs: the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SP) and the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP).

The SP is a brainchild of the regional approach to the Balkans (although preconditioned on fulfilling certain criteria), evidenced by the incorporation into its framework of the Royaumont Process (see EC 2000c: 0035). The adoption of the SP at the EU Ministerial Summit in Cologne (10 June 1999) and its 'official' launch with the first SP summit in Sarajevo (July 1999) was hailed as the first genuine attempt to 'Europeanize' and 'de-Balkanize' the Balkans (Pierre 1999: 2). The SP asserts itself as different from other projects for the region (i.e. the Dayton Peace Accords) by its comprehensive approach to the problems of Southeastern Europe. Essentially, it is an attempt to rectify the 'mistakes' of both the CFSP and the haphazard involvement of other extra-regional actors in the Balkans. Its framework suggests a viable pattern for Southeast European socialization into the norms and values of Euro-Atlantic accession by providing: (i) a body for intra-regional dialogue on social, political and economic issues; (ii) a coordinating forum for extra-regional involvement in the Balkans; (iii) a strategy for functional cooperation between regional and extra-regional actors. However, it is also intended as 'the fast track to full EU membership' (Busek 2001: 5) through which,

the European Union will draw the region closer to the perspective of full integration of these countries into its structures through a new kind of contractual relationship, tacking into account the individual situation of each country, with a perspective of European Union membership on the basis of the Treaty of Amsterdam and once the Copenhagen criteria have been met. (EC 1999b: 0001)

Such make-up of the SP reflects a hope that it can promote a set of processes,

which would make the Euro-Atlantic political, social and economic dynamics part of the logic of Balkan domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies (Demetropoulou 2001).

The SAP, on the other hand, is a further elaboration of the conditionality principle and the bilateral contractual relations between the EU and individual Balkan states. It builds upon EU's experience from the enlargement process by attempting 'to replicate the successful transition by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe' (EC 2002a: 6) through the promotion of 'democratic, economic and institutional reforms' (EC 2000e: 8) in the Western Balkans. Therefore, SAP has to reflect EU's readiness 'to improve *radically* the speed, quality and visibility of external aid' as well as the 'efficiency of the assistance' (EC 2000e: 2. Emphasis added). To that end, it consolidated all its initiatives and funding for the region under the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) programme (EC 2000g: 0006). At the same time, the EU also set up the European Agency for Reconstruction (EC 2000b: 13) with the particular aim of targeting the implementation of the CARDS projects. With these measures, the prospect of membership is outlined for the Western Balkans, through the provision of 'means, based on European practice and standards, to maintain stable democratic institutions, to ensure the rule of law prevails and to sustain open, prosperous economies' (EC 2002a: 6). Following the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002, the EU underscored that the SAP,

remains *the* policy framework to help the [Western Balkan] countries along the way [of moving closer to the EU] and is recognised and supported by the whole of the international community and by the countries of the region. It is an entry strategy – introducing European values, principles and standards in the region, *which in due course will gain them entry into the European Union.* (EC 2003b: 3. Emphasis added).

Therefore, the 'carrot' of accession provides the incentives for following the 'sticks' of appropriate policy-behaviour, one of which is that the Western Balkan countries 'establish *normal* relationships between themselves' (European Commission, 2002: 4. Emphasis added). To facilitate the introduction of *normality*, the SAP employs two mechanisms for conditioning the Western Balkan states: bilateral and regional. The latter, encourages regional cooperation as a precondition to the development of the former – the development of closer ties/contractual relationships (SAA) with the EU. The reasoning for this strategy is that 'EU's own experience of the benefits of regional cooperation lead it to believe that the Western Balkans will benefit significantly from closer co-operation' (EC 2002a: 6).

Both the SP and the SAP are premised on a certain degree of conditionality and both focus predominantly on the region of the Western Balkans (although, both of them – especially the SP – have the objective of initiating a broader Southeast European cooperation). Both, also, perpetuate (i) the differentiation of the Balkans into accession countries and prospective candidates; and, thus, continue – mainly in the first two years of their existence; and (ii) the ambiguity of EU policies towards the region. The latter is evidenced by the supposed complementarity of the two initiatives. As Erhard Busek (2002: 5. Emphasis original), the Special Coordinator of the SP declared at the EU-General Affairs Council that 'the SP's initiatives will focus on *achieving* complementarity with the *EU accession*

(Bulgaria and Romania) and *the SAP process* (Albania, BiH, Croatia, FYRMacedonia, FRYugoslavia). However, the *achievement* of complementarity quickly became one of competition between the SP and the SAP as to which project would have the ultimate authority of steering the processes in the Balkans. As late as December 2001, the SP maintained that the EU's main contribution to the SP was the European Commission's designation of 'the SAP for the Western Balkans', and that the countries of the region view the SP as 'the "primary instrument of political and institutional support for the EU integration of Southeast European countries"' (Busek 2001: 5). However, as early as October 2000, the EU had made it explicit that 'financial assistance' aimed at 'building up an institutional, legislative, economic and social framework directed at the values and models subscribed to by the EU... should be expanded and *redirected... particularly* to ensure that it contributes to SAP' (EC 2000e: 5. Emphasis added). Therefore, it is not surprising that by 2002, the SAP is declared 'the centrepiece of the EU's policy towards the region' (European Commission, 2002: 4) and its '*only, rigorous, long term and sustainable policy approach*' (EC 2002a: 13. Emphasis original). In the face of this, the SP was forced 'to streamline and *downsize* its activities' (EC 2003b: 15. Emphasis added).

In this way, it would seem that rather than repairing the fault-lines between Southeast European neighbours, new lines of division are drawn among them through the recognition that the stability of Europe can be achieved 'not only by *enlarging* the Union but also by building a coordinated foreign and security policy and *developing a coherent policy of cooperation with our neighbours*' (EC 2000a: 4. Emphasis added). However, the post-2001 developments suggest two significant implications for the Balkans.

The first one is, clearly, the reiteration of the two-tier model for engaging Balkan states: (i) enlargement of the EU in the region (i.e. Bulgaria and Romania) and (ii) ever-closer cooperation with the Western Balkan states (with the *distant*, but arguably *possible* accession into the EU). However, the issue this time is as to how *probable* is it going to be for the latter group to be invited, especially in the light of Günter Verheugen's remark that 'enlargement will not be *over* until we have Bulgaria and Romania in this chamber' (quoted in Dempsey 2002. Emphasis added). Said otherwise, the long term priority of the EU to 'make *success* of enlargement and to *build* a real policy of cooperation with *our* new neighbours' (EC 2000a: 5. Emphasis added) clashes with the objective of promoting broad regional cooperation (under the SAP's second mechanism) in the Southeast European region. It is undermined not only from the attraction of direct relations with the EU, but also from the EU's own recognition that the regionality approach is to be preferred over direct contractual relationships 'only... where there is a *clear comparative advantage to be gained*' (EC 2002b: 22. Emphasis added). The *probability* dynamic (rather than the *possibility* one, evident in the earlier involvement of the EU in the region) reflects the changed political conditions. Whereas earlier, the EU was not ready to recognise the whole of the Southeast European region as a potential area for its enlargement, currently it has already done so; at the same time, however, it has also made some qualifications as to the timeline for such a *probability*.

The EU is going through one of the most challenging periods of its develop-

ment as it prepared for the biggest enlargement in its history. *It will take time to absorb new Member States and to develop new ways of working in an enlarged Union.* The Western Balkan countries are facing an equally daunting challenge of political and economic reform, involving extensive nation and institution building efforts. *This process will also take time to bear fruit.* (EC 2002a: 14. Emphasis added).

The second implication, however, is that both the SP and (especially) the SAP indicate the qualitatively different perception of the region. It is now being perceived as *our* neighbourhood (i.e. the EU's) rather than *their* neighbourhood (of the accession countries), which dominated the EU policy-formulation in earlier periods. In other words (to return to the previous implication), the EU has not only indicated a *possibility* for 'the fullest possible *integration* of the countries of the Western Balkans region into the political and economic mainstream of Europe' (EC 2000d: 4. Emphasis added), but also that it is committed to increase the *probability* for such *integration* by 'encouraging, in all the countries of that region the promotion of the values and models on which [the EU] is founded: in particular, democracy, respect for human rights and minorities, the rule of law and the market economy' (EC 2000f: 0054). Thus, the '*conditions for assistance and for integration are closely linked therefore*' (EC 1999e: 5. Emphasis original). In fact the *probability* of the Western Balkans membership, becomes *certainty* by 2003. In a document defining the scope of the term 'Wider Europe', the EU declares that refers to the countries who will find themselves on the external border [of the EU], namely Russia, Western NIS (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine) and the Southern Mediterranean... it does not, therefore, apply to the Union's relations with the remaining candidate countries - Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria - *or the Western Balkans.* (EC 2003a: 3-4. Emphasis added)

Thus, the recognition of the future enlargement into the region, allows the EU to influence the relations between Western Balkan states through its *power of attraction*. It is in this context that the EU places its emphasis on *contractual conditionality* (learning from its experience with CEE states) rather than regionality:

The speed with which each country moves through the different stages of the SAP, taking ownership of the process, depends on the increasing ability to take on the obligations from an ever closer association with the EU as well as compliance with the conditionality policy. (EC 2003b: 5).

Conclusion

The failure of post-Dayton regionality approaches to deliver on their objectives (not least because of the ambiguity of external agency) led the EU to institutionalise its relations with the states in the Western Balkans mainly under the bilateral mechanism of the SAP, as an 'integrated, long-term approach' (EC 2001a: 10), and, thus, offering a conditional commitment of enlarging into the region. Such, strategy rather than attempting the impossible task to solve all the problems of Western Balkan states, provides them with the decision-making tools and patterns that contribute 'to helping these countries help themselves' (EC 2002a: 9) within the prospect of accession. Thus, from the point of instrumental rationality, states (i.e. state elites) comply because of the prospects from maximising their chances for

accession. This has initiated a prescribed framework of intra-regional relations that facilitate the accession process. For instance, the 2001 Memorandum of Understanding on Trade Liberalisation and Facilitation signed by the SAP countries plus Bulgaria and Romania, followed by a series of bilateral free trade agreements attest to the strategic conditioning exerted by the EU. Therefore, despite its initial ambiguity, the SAP is suggesting a clear policy for the stabilisation of the region through the conditionality of prospective membership. This suggests the possibility for policy-transformation (in the Western Balkans) on a similar platform as in the Central and East European states. The added-value from the 2004 enlargement is not merely the fact that it is going to bring the EU closer to Southeastern Europe, but that it is going to bring home to the region the message that appropriate behaviour is not only *encouraged*, but also *rewarded*.

The 2004 Enlargement will bring the EU physically closer, indeed to the very doorstep of the Western Balkans... It should contribute to making their own perspective real and visible and reinforce the message that hard work, and the sometimes painful reforms and adjustments required to get there, will pay off. (EC 2003b: 4).

In this way, the post-1999 EU policies towards the Balkans emphasises a shift from hard security to soft security issues: failing states and economies, and mal-/non- functioning systems of law and order (as for instance the November 2002 Conference on Defeating Organised Crime in Southeastern Europe). Moreover, it underlines EU's evolution since 1990 and its increasing confidence and capabilities to deal with crisis situations and prevent them from escalating into outright military conflicts, as the case of the Ohrid Peace Agreement attests. This indicates a shift of perception on behalf of the EU that the Balkans no longer represents a 'distant' abroad, but rather an immediate neighbourhood, whose instability affects the stability and security of the EU itself.

Within this context the EU plays a substantial role for introducing the normative and material basis for order in Southeastern Europe. The post-1999 approach further entrenches the functional differentiation of the Balkans into two tiers: (a) advanced: Bulgaria and Romania; (b) prospective candidates: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia/Montenegro/Kosovo. However, this differentiation takes into account the existing instruments of regionality and conditionality (van Meurs, 2000: 25) and aims at exporting the EU's zone of peace into the Southeastern corner of Europe by engaging regional governments in its initiatives. The EU objectives are: (i) 'to project stability... beyond its own borders' (EC 2001a: 5); and (ii) by engaging Balkan state elites 'give a clear public signal of the special and inclusive nature of the privileged relationship' with the EU (EC 2002a: 13).

Thereby, the suggestion of this article is that in its post-1999 involvement, the EU initiates relatively stable and predictable relations in the Balkans among decision-making elites. The acknowledgement of its *normative power* allows the EU to introduce its 'code of peace' (Adler 1998: 183) in the Balkans – the *acquis communautaire*. Consequently, the practice of its rules and standards facilitates the development of *weness* – an 'encompassing social identity' (Adler 1998: 170) – among regional elites. This triple-dynamic operationalizes the functional differentiation of the Balkans.

Such transformation of Balkan decision-making initiated and maintained by EU's post-1999 programmes is transforming regional policy-making by establishing institutions of governance, the rudiments of democratic accountability and the transparency of the electoral process. Moreover, as some have argued, it has facilitated the initiation of a domestic, Balkan perception of a Balkan region (see Bechev 2004). In other words, such path-dependency (facilitated by the lack of any viable normative and material alternatives) ensures elite-compliance with promoted standards. This development is also maintained by the institutional culture introduced through the socialization process, which ensures the belief of elites in the appropriateness of the promoted norms.

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Zusammenfassung

Dieser Artikel untersucht den Begriff der "Sicherheit im Balkan" als Teil der aus dem Ende des Kalten Krieges resultierenden Euro-atlantischen Dynamik. Eine essentielle Grundannahme dieser Untersuchung ist dass der Balkan/Suedosteuropa nicht als Region anzusehen ist, weil er sich selbst als solche empfindet oder definiert, sondern weil er von aussen als solche wahrgenommen wird. Dementsprechend werden die regionalen, interstaatlichen Beziehungen in diesem Artikel aus einer externen/Euro-atlantischen Perspektive analysiert. Ein spezieller Schwerpunkt wird auf die Strategie der EU gelegt, eine der EU aehnliche Ordnung in der Region zu foerdern. Die Ergebnisse der Untersuchung legen nahe, dass das Versagen der Mehrheit der EU Initiativen bis 1999 eher auf die gleichzeitig stattfindende Institutionalisierung der EU Aussenpolitik zurueckzufuehren sind, als dass sie aus einer Gleichgueltigkeit der EU resultieren.

Svetozar A. ANDREEV

**LEGITIMACY PROBLEMS OF BORDERS AND
STATES IN SEE ON THE EVE OF THE EU FIFTH
ENLARGEMENT**

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Nadine LANGE-AKHUND

LA MACÉDOINE ET SES FRONTIÈRES: MYTHES ET RÉALITÉS (1878-1991)

"La Macédoine doit demeurer un État unique, indivisible et indépendant dans le cadre de ses frontières géographiques, ethnographiques, historiques, économiques et politiques". Ces lignes ont été écrites en 1913 par Dimitar Chupovski (1878-1940). Membre des cercles de l'émigration macédonienne à St Pétersbourg, il a été un des premiers "Macédoniens" à concevoir une carte géopolitique de l'État macédonien incluant un tracé défini de ses frontières.¹ Ce document ainsi qu'un mémorandum furent envoyés à Londres où les grandes puissances s'apprêtaient à redessiner une nouvelle fois la carte des Balkans.

Entre 1878 et 1991, le nom même de Macédoine ne cesse d'apparaître et de disparaître de la scène politique balkanique. Aucun autre État ou région des Balkans n'a été aussi souvent divisé, partagé, morcelé, l'objet de rivalités territoriales ou tout simplement ignoré. Trois éléments sont ici à prendre en considération pour essayer de présenter le caractère particulier de la Macédoine: la Macédoine est tout d'abord une réalité plurielle. Il n'existe pas une seule Macédoine mais plusieurs: La Macédoine géographique, la Macédoine politique qui est aussi multiple: les trois vilayets ottomans, les "trois" Macédoines de l'entre-deux-guerres, la Macédoine religieuse divisée en deux ou trois églises orthodoxes, sans oublier la ligne de partage entre les chrétiens et les musulmans. Ensuite la perception même de la Macédoine est aussi une réalité plurielle dans la mesure où dans le passé les habitants de la région ont affirmé et défendu leur identité nationale en rejetant une triple réalité régionale: "nous ne sommes ni Grecs, ni Serbes, ni Bulgares". De nos jours, à l'extérieur de la Macédoine, une active et parfois virulente diaspora installée en Australie, au Canada et aux États-Unis continue à défendre le concept d'une Macédoine "idéale" dont les limites rappellent celles de la carte de Dimitar Chupovski. Enfin, définir les contours de la Macédoine s'est révélé une tentative vouée à l'échec du moins jusqu'en 1991. Pendant plus d'un siècle, de 1878 à 1991, la Macédoine demeure une région historique, une expression géographique vague, un concept politique mouvant dont les limites administratives sont constamment remaniées. Au cours de ces évolutions diverses, une constante s'affirme: les populations n'ont presque jamais été consultées sur la nature ou la légitimité de ces modifications et par conséquent, ont toujours été déçues par ces décisions imposées pour la plupart de l'extérieur.

Entre 1878 et 1991 les frontières de la Macédoine demeurent un mythe dans la mesure où un État macédonien indépendant n'existe pas. Dans le même temps,

¹ "Macedonia should remain a single, indivisible, an independent Balkan state within its geographical, ethnographical, historical, economic and political borders." Documents on the Struggle of Macedonian People for Independence and a Nation-State, Skopje, 1985 vol. I p. 597-598, document 365.

ces frontières constituent aussi une réalité ne serait-ce que par leur caractère multiforme: politique, religieux ou culturel. En suivant le cours des événements majeurs, nous allons étudier comment la Macédoine n'a pu concrétiser certaines opportunités autour de 1900, comment ces échecs ont conduit à la création de frontières mythiques et comment d'une façon quelque peu inattendue le XXe siècle s'est achevé avec la reconnaissance internationale d'un État Macédonien aux frontières définies.

1. 1878-1913: Une série de "rendez-vous manqués"

Le tracé des frontières a toujours été complexe dans les Balkans mais le cas de la Macédoine se révèle particulièrement délicat car l'existence même du pays a été tout simplement ignorée à une époque où la plupart des peuples balkaniques accédaient à l'indépendance.

Comment définir la Macédoine vers 1870? Dans le cadre de l'empire Ottoman, le nom même de Macédoine ne figure pas sur les cartes officielles. La région regroupe trois des sept districts administratifs ou vilayets (Salonique, Monastir, Kosovo) qui forment le domaine européen de l'empire Ottoman.² La population, un peu plus de deux millions d'habitants est hétérogène, comprenant des Bulgares, des Grecques, des Serbes, Des Valaques, des Turcs, des Albanais et des Tsiganes. Aucun de ces groupes n'est majoritaire. En 1878, lors du congrès de Berlin, les représentants des grandes puissances ignorent totalement la question macédonienne et les trois vilayets qui avaient été brièvement intégrés dans la "Grande Bulgarie" sont à nouveau placés sous l'autorité du sultan.

Le processus de l'édification des frontières macédoniennes est étroitement lié à la question de l'existence de la conscience nationale macédonienne. Celle-ci apparaît tardivement au cours du XIXe siècle en comparaison des autres nations balkaniques et reste un concept limité. Le mouvement national macédonien est créé par un groupe de six jeunes intellectuels qui fondent en 1893 l'Organisation Révolutionnaire Intérieure de la Macédoine et de la région d'Andrinople (ORIMA). Le but de l'organisation est d'obtenir au moins un statut d'autonomie en vue d'une future indépendance. Idéalistes et ambitieux, les fondateurs de l'ORIMA, tous originaires de la région (quatre d'entre eux sont des instituteurs) ont décidé de se dévouer entièrement au service de leur cause. Le premier objectif est d'éveiller par l'éducation une conscience nationale macédonienne chez ces populations entremêlées et ensuite de commencer une lutte armée pour la libération du territoire du "joug" ottoman.

Les deux principaux chefs Damian Gruev (1871-1906) et Goce Delčev (1872-1906), nationalistes et socio-révolutionnaires partagent les mêmes vues: la libération doit s'accomplir à partir du territoire macédonien par une organisation macédonienne. Delčev a présenté ainsi ses vues: "J'ai l'âme d'un anarchiste, les convictions d'un social-démocrate et j'agis comme un révolutionnaire".³

² Appellation utilisée par l'administration ottomane et les diplomates jusqu'à la Première guerre mondiale.

³ Andonov-Poljanski Hristo, Gotze Delcev and his views. The Epic of Illinden, Skopje, 1973 p. 80.

La délimitation des frontières se semble pas avoir fait l'objet de débats approfondis parmi les fondateurs de l'ORIMA. Rappelons que dans le contexte de l'après-1848, le concept de l'État-nation rassemblant tous les "nationaux" au sein d'un même territoire prime sur la question des limites qui de toute façon sont censées être celles naturellement imposées par la géographie. Les activités de l'ORIMA sont orientées dans deux directions: d'une part une intense activité de propagande dirigée par les instituteurs révolutionnaires a pour but d'éveiller une conscience identitaire macédonienne et de susciter une insurrection. D'autre part, les comités révolutionnaires et bandes armées, les comitadjis organisés en réseau mènent une lutte armée contre les intérêts du sultan. L'impact de l'ORIMA est indéniable car ses dirigeants réussissent à établir un climat d'insécurité et d'agitation permanente. Les sources diplomatiques font état de nombreux combats, incidents, engagements, massacres etc. Cependant l'influence de l'ORIMA reste limitée car la majorité de la population largement illettrée redoute les risques liés à un changement radical.

Le mouvement macédonien a laissé son empreinte dans l'histoire de la région en organisant, pendant l'été 1903, l'insurrection d'Ilinden (le jour de la fête de Saint Elie, le 2 août) qui est à la fois une défaite militaire et un demi-succès diplomatique. Après plus de trois mois d'affrontements incessants (d'août à octobre), les soldats du sultan écrasent les forces révolutionnaires: quelque trente mille combattants de l'ORIMA se battent contre environ 300000 soldats ottomans. D'une façon générale, les chefs de l'ORIMA ont fait preuve d'un certain manque de cohérence, fait aggravé par la mort brutale et soudaine d'un des principaux dirigeants, Goce Delčev tué dans un combat quelques semaines avant le début de la révolte.⁴

Il faut cependant souligner le succès diplomatique résultant de l'action menée par l'ORIMA: après l'insurrection d'Ilinden, la Macédoine devient une question internationale. Le 25 novembre 1903, le sultan Abdul Hamid II est contraint d'accepter un plan de réformes, l'accord de Mürzsteg selon lequel les trois vilayets sont placés sous le contrôle international des grandes puissances (Autriche-Hongrie, Russie, France, Grande-Bretagne, Allemagne et Italie). L'idée principale est de mettre en place une série de réformes permettant aux chrétiens de participer au fonctionnement des institutions avec les mêmes droits que les musulmans. Le plan de Mürzsteg présente deux aspects: d'une part, deux agents civils, un Austro-Hongrois et un Russe assistent un Inspecteur général ottoman chargé de rétablir l'ordre et la sécurité dans la région. D'autre part, un contrôle militaire est établi. Jusqu'en 1908, les trois vilayets sont divisés en cinq secteurs militaires placés sous l'autorité de l'une des grandes puissances.⁵ Dans chaque secteur un détachement militaire réorganise la gendarmerie locale tout en recrutant des éléments chrétiens.⁶

Durant les quatre années de l'application du programme de Mürzsteg, de 1904 à 1908, la notion de frontière en Macédoine est dédoublée: d'un côté les limites



⁴ Goce Delčev meurt le 4 mai 1903 à Banica.

⁵ Seule l'Allemagne ne contrôle aucun secteur.

⁶ Les deux autres volets du programme de Mürzsteg: les réformes financières et judiciaires restent inachevés.

ottomanes, c'est-à-dire les limites administratives des vilayets, ne sont pas modifiées. De l'autre, le contrôle international impose la superposition d'une seconde délimitation décidée en fonction des intérêts politiques, stratégiques et économiques de chaque puissance: l'Autriche-Hongrie contrôle le secteur autour d'Uskub (Skopje) pour mieux surveiller les activités des populations serbes, l'Italie supervise la partie ouest du vilayet de Monastir (Bitola) en liaison avec son influence déjà présente dans les vilayets albanais.

C'est à cette période qu'une "seconde" carte de la Macédoine apparaît, une carte des frontières mentales, voire religieuses. La région est alors en proie à un conflit tant civil que religieux parfois très violent. À partir de 1904, les deux églises orthodoxes, le patriarcat grec et l'exarchat bulgare lancent une campagne pour convaincre, de force si nécessaire, les populations de se déclarer grecque ou bulgare. Ce mouvement est soutenu par les gouvernements d'Athènes et de Sofia. Ce conflit a une double origine: tout d'abord lors de la création de l'exarchat en 1870, l'article 10 du firman prévoyait que si les deux tiers des habitants d'une localité désiraient joindre les rangs de l'exarchat, ils y étaient autorisés. Le territoire placé sous la juridiction de l'exarchat s'étendait au-delà de la Bulgarie même en incluant une partie de la Macédoine. Dès 1870, l'exarchat développe une stratégie pour convaincre les habitants des vilayets de devenir membres de l'église bulgare. Secundo, l'article 3 du programme de Mürzsteg stipule "qu'une nouvelle délimitation administrative sera envisagée en vue d'un meilleur regroupement des nationalités".⁷ Comme les Ottomans ne font qu'une distinction entre les chrétiens et les musulmans et que la notion d'identité macédonienne est limitée, les mouvements grec, bulgare, serbe et l'ORIMA anticipant les décisions des autorités ottomanes estiment que le critère retenu pour la future délimitation territoriale pourrait être l'appartenance à telle ou telle église au lieu de la nationalité.

La nature de la lutte menée par les églises et celle des mouvements de nationalités crée un lien étroit contre l'appartenance confessionnelle et la nationalité. Se déclarer "grec" signifie être partisan voir membre du patriarcat, "bulgare" être membre de l'exarchat. Ainsi qu'un diplomate français l'écrit en 1907: "c'est une guerre civile, une guerre ouverte entre chrétiens".⁸ La Macédoine tout en demeurant un territoire faisant partie de l'empire Ottoman est alors divisée entre les limites administratives ottomanes, les limites fixées par le programme de Mürzsteg et la division mentale et religieuse née du conflit entre les églises orthodoxes et les mouvements révolutionnaires. Les limites politiques et administratives ne coïncident pas avec la division religieuse ou mentale.

Entre 1878 et 1913 la notion d'identité nationale macédonienne demeurant limitée, le concept de frontière semble presque hors de propos. Les cartes de l'époque illustrent plutôt les ambitions territoriales de la Grèce, de la Bulgarie ou de la Serbie qui souhaitent se partager les trois vilayets tout en étant incapables de s'entendre sur un découpage harmonieux du territoire macédonien. Le port et la

⁷ Extrait de l'article 3 du programme de Mürzsteg: Shopoff Alexandre, *Les réformes et la protection des Chrétiens en Turquie 1673-1904*, Paris, 1904. Texte 88.

⁸ Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères Correspondance Politique Turquie, vol. 52. Boulière à Stephen Pichon, Athènes, 10 mai 1907

région de Salonique demeurent le point d'achoppement des négociations et l'objet de rivalités entre les trois gouvernements.

En 1913, la question de la Macédoine est une nouvelle fois enterrée car les trois vilayets sont divisés entre la Grèce, la Serbie et la Bulgarie. Comme en 1878, la Macédoine n'est pas reconnue comme un État viable aux frontières définies. Durant la Première guerre mondiale la ligne de front divise une nouvelle fois la région: le Nord est occupé par les puissances centrales et la Bulgarie tandis que le Sud est sous le contrôle des alliés et de la Grèce.

L'ORIMA porte-t-elle une responsabilité dans cet échec? Le groupe de 1893 n'a pas réussi à créer un sentiment d'identité nationale suffisamment fort pour susciter une insurrection décisive. Le problème de l'adoption d'une langue commune n'est pas résolu.⁹ Les chefs de l'ORIMA ont maintenu des relations parfois ambiguës avec la Bulgarie afin de pouvoir se procurer des fonds et des armes. Ils y jouissaient d'un certain soutien en raison de l'existence d'une importante communauté d'origine macédonienne.¹⁰ À ces éléments s'ajoute une autre explication, le manque de temps. Il semble évident que le mouvement macédonien était encore un peu "jeune" et insuffisamment préparé pour affronter les autorités ottomanes. L'ORIMA a-t-elle créé un sentiment national macédonien? On peut en douter. Si le mouvement a réussi à mettre sur pied un réseau dense de comités, il a échoué à susciter un élan pourtant indispensable parmi les populations "macédoniennes". Une Macédoine autonome ou indépendante était-elle possible? Le groupe de 1893 en était convaincu, mais quinze ans plus tard en 1908, il était clair que l'ORIMA avait surestimé la volonté des populations à changer leurs existences et modes de vie.

Une seconde raison doit être ici évoquée, aucune des grandes puissances n'était prête à s'engager à soutenir les ambitions macédoniennes et encore moins à déclarer la guerre au sultan pour libérer la Macédoine. Aucune comparaison n'est ici possible avec le cas de la Grèce en 1830 ou de la Bulgarie en 1877-1878. La politique des puissances dans la région est double et contradictoire. Les gouvernements supportent depuis 1848 le droit des peuples à l'autodétermination, mais hésitent constamment entre une politique d'intervention, inspirée par des idéaux religieux, humanitaires et le pragmatisme qui consiste à maintenir l'intégrité de l'empire Ottoman vue comme une garantie de la paix dans les Balkans. Par ailleurs, en 1903, les deux puissances principalement intéressées par la Macédoine, l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie refusent d'envisager des changements. Vienne et Saint Pétersbourg veulent maintenir le *statu quo* dans la région. Au moment de la révolte d'Ilinden, le ministre autrichien des Affaires étrangères, le comte Agenor Goluchowski, écrit à son ambassadeur en Russie, le comte Alois Aehrenthal, qu'il est hostile à l'ingérence des autres puissances dans un domaine qu'il estime relever de l'influence austro-russe.¹¹ Par ailleurs, Lamsdorff et Golu-

⁹ La langue macédonienne sera uniformisée en 1945.

¹⁰ 33% des officiers de l'armée bulgare étaient d'origine macédonienne ainsi que 43% des fonctionnaires de l'administration. A Sofia 18000 à 20000 habitants sur environ 70000 étaient également d'origine macédonienne. Perry Duncan, *The Politics of Terror*, London, 1988, p. 35.

¹¹ Haus-Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv 12 Türkei vol. 316, Goluchowski à Aehrenthal, Vienne, le 4 septembre 1903.

chowski sont opposés au principe d'une conférence internationale pour régler le problème macédonien.

Enfin, aucun dirigeant, aucun chef charismatique, capable de conduire la lutte de libération nationale, n'a émergé du mouvement macédonien. Ici encore la comparaison avec le mouvement serbe dirigé par les Karadjordjević et les Obrenović n'est pas valide. De même, la non-existence du patriarcat d'Ohrid a privé les Macédoniens d'un support qui s'est révélé crucial dans les cas grec ou bulgare.¹²

2. 1918-1991: Les frontières de la Macédoine, une réalité?

La Conférence de la paix confirme la partition de la Macédoine telle qu'elle a été décidée en 1913.¹³ La situation est alors d'autant plus figée que la délégation française rejette catégoriquement les propositions italienne et britannique concernant d'éventuelles formes d'autonomie pour la partie de la Macédoine attribuée au nouveau royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes. Les nouvelles frontières sont le résultat de décisions politiques prises par les alliés au lendemain des deux guerres balkaniques et de la Première guerre mondiale. Elles ne correspondent aucunement à des délimitations géographiques naturelles. Néanmoins ces frontières consacrant le découpage de la Macédoine resteront pratiquement inchangées jusqu'en 1991. Le nom même de Macédoine disparaît une nouvelle fois et une politique d'intégration et d'assimilation parfois forcée est mise en place dans les trois États concernés (Grèce, Bulgarie, Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes) assortie d'échanges de populations réalisés dans des conditions souvent dramatiques.

Le concept d'un État macédonien doté de frontières définies réapparaît durant l'entre-deux-guerres en raison des ambitions d'une nouvelle force politique qui apparaît sur la scène européenne: le parti communiste. L'idéologie et le mouvement communistes vont exercer une influence essentielle sur le destin de la Macédoine dite du Vardar c'est-à-dire la partie de la Macédoine intégrée dans la Yougoslavie. À l'origine, le Komintern décide d'apporter son soutien aux minorités de Yougoslavie avec l'objectif d'y établir un régime communiste. Ses dirigeants brandissent le principe du droit des peuples à l'autodétermination. Le nouvel État yougoslave est alors jugé comme une création des "forces impérialistes et bourgeoises" et le mécontentement des groupes minoritaires (Macédoniens, Croates ou autres) constitue une tendance potentiellement utile pour les dirigeants de la Troisième internationale. En 1920, à l'occasion du deuxième congrès du Komintern, Zinoviev fait voter une résolution qui vise à encourager les mouvements d'indépendance dans les Balkans dans la mesure où ils représentent des "courants révolutionnaires" susceptibles de favoriser l'établissement de régimes communistes.¹⁴ Le Komintern est partisan d'une révolution pour obtenir la révi-

¹² Le patriarcat d'Ohrid avait été supprimé en 1767, un an après le patriarcat serbe de Peč.

¹³ Une modification mineure est à noter Strunica et ses alentours (environ 60000 habitants) sont intégrés dans le royaume des Serbes, des Croates et des Slovènes en vertu du traité de Neuilly.

¹⁴ Kofos Evangelos., *Nationalism and communism in Macedonia*, 1964, p. 68-69.

sion des frontières yougoslaves. En 1922, à Moscou, la Fédération communiste des Balkans¹⁵ défend le projet d'une fédération balkanique incluant la Macédoine.

Entre 1924 et 1934, le concept d'État macédonien progresse en dépit des rivalités et luttes de factions entre les deux communistes yougoslave et bulgare pour contrôler le mouvement communiste en Macédoine. Parmi les divers groupements politiques, seule l'ORIM-un, née en 1924-1925 de l'ancienne ORIMA, propose un nouveau programme basé sur l'idée de réunir les trois morceaux de la Macédoine au sein d'un seul et même État. Cependant, comme l'ORIM-un entretient des liens étroits avec la Fédération communiste des Balkans, ses ambitions territoriales exigeant une révision des frontières de la Macédoine demeurent en fait limitées. Durant cette période, le Komintern tranche en faveur du parti communiste yougoslave au détriment des ambitions des communistes bulgares. La ligne du parti vise à établir une république macédonienne au sein de la future fédération balkanique. Comme durant les années 1893-1903 et selon les sources actuellement disponibles, il semblerait que la délimitation des frontières de la future Macédoine ait moins fait l'objet de débats que le concept d'État macédonien lui-même (indépendant ou intégré dans le cadre d'une fédération balkanique). Ce qui montre que la notion de l'existence même d'État macédonien était loin de constituer un principe acquis.

En 1934, l'Union Soviétique reconnaît officiellement l'existence de la nationalité macédonienne. Le parti communiste yougoslave renforce son emprise sur les organisations qui lui sont favorables. L'ORIMA-un est alors dissoute car son principal dirigeant, Dimitar Vlahov qui avait établi le siège du mouvement à Vienne (1923), puis à Berlin (1928), s'enfuit en URSS pour échapper aux poursuites des autorités allemandes.¹⁶ Les dirigeants communistes évoquent alors l'idée de la création d'un parti communiste macédonien.¹⁷ En 1936-1937, lorsque Tito est nommé dirigeant du Parti communiste yougoslave, il suit la ligne du Komintern et soutient le projet de création d'un État macédonien dans le cadre de la future fédération communiste yougoslave.

Les années 1930-1940 voient s'effectuer de nouveaux découpages des territoires macédoniens pris dans un engrenage qui dépasse largement la question de l'identité nationale macédonienne. En 1931, le nouveau système administratif yougoslave mis en place par le gouvernement du roi Alexandre comprend neuf districts régionaux ou *banovine*. Les limites de ces districts oblitèrent volontairement les unités historiques ce qui correspond à la nouvelle politique du souverain qui espère ainsi mettre un terme aux problèmes de nationalités en Yougoslavie. La *banovina* du Vardar inclut la Serbie du Sud, une partie de la Macédoine du Vardar et la région du Kosovo.

Lors de la Seconde guerre mondiale, la Macédoine est à nouveau la victime



¹⁵ Créée en 1920, la Fédération communiste des Balkans est une émanation du Komintern, regroupant les partis communistes bulgare, grec et yougoslave

¹⁶ Par la suite, Vlahov retournera en Yougoslavie et rejoindra les rangs des partisans en 1941. Après la guerre, il devint le premier président du Parlement de la République populaire de Macédoine.

¹⁷ Shoup Paul, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question*, New York, 1968 p. 33. L'ORIMA était alors faible et divisée en factions rivales. En 1936, le parti communiste grec est contraint d'accepter le principe de l'existence d'une Macédoine séparée.

des appétits et des ambitions régionales. Le territoire est divisé en deux régions administratives (Skopje et Bitola) placées sous l'autorité des Bulgares, et un cinquième de la Macédoine tombe sous le contrôle des Albano-Italiens. La résistance communiste de Macédoine est organisée par un proche de Tito, Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo qui fonde le Parti communiste macédonien en 1943. L'année suivante, la date symbolique du 2 août 1944 est choisie pour proclamer la fondation de la république de Macédoine, un choix qui contribue à créer le mythe des "deux Ilinden".¹⁸ Tito avait besoin de l'existence de la république de Macédoine afin de neutraliser les ambitions et rivalités territoriales de la Grèce et de la Bulgarie. À partir de 1945, la reconnaissance de la Macédoine permet de différencier les populations slaves vivant dans la région des Serbes et des Bulgares. Après la fin de la guerre civile grecque, la Macédoine constitue une zone intermédiaire entre la Bulgarie, membre du pacte de Varsovie et la Grèce, membre de l'Otan. La Macédoine toute entière joue alors le rôle d'une zone frontière voire d'une frontière elle-même.

3. La persistance du mythe: l'unification des trois Macédoines

L'objectif d'unifier les trois territoires macédoniens persiste durant la guerre civile grecque entre 1944 et 1949. Puis l'idée disparaît au fur et mesure que les frontières de la république populaire de Macédoine deviennent une réalité et que l'État macédonien est pleinement reconnu au sein de la fédération yougoslave. La perception de l'identité nationale macédonienne évolue profondément. Avant 1945, les partis politiques ou même les églises orthodoxes se battent pour convaincre les habitants de se déclarer Serbes ou Bulgares voire Macédoniens. Après 1945, la Macédoine existe mais il lui faut se trouver ou retrouver un passé, une histoire acceptable pour les théoriciens du nouveau régime ainsi que pour le monde extérieur. L'Institut Historique de Skopje a ainsi publié de nombreux ouvrages, souvent en langue anglaise et destinés à un public étranger, qui présentent la Macédoine comme une nation historique aux contours définis.¹⁹

À partir de 1991, les limites administratives de la république de Macédoine deviennent des frontières internationales: le gouvernement de Skopje proclame l'indépendance du territoire à la suite du référendum du 8 septembre. Si la reconnaissance de l'intégrité territoriale et donc des frontières macédoniennes est accepté par les États de la région, il n'en est pas de même des frontières mentales et culturelles car ni le nom, ni la nation macédonienne ne sont reconnus de façon unanime. Le processus de reconnaissance s'avère long et entravé par plusieurs crises d'ordre diplomatique et économique.

La Macédoine quitte sans encombre le cadre fédéral yougoslave, une sortie généralement qualifiée de réussie car réalisée sans effusion de sang. Belgrade n'émet aucune revendication territoriale majeure et les idéologues grand-serbes ne

¹⁸ Ibid., p 52. La création d'un parti communiste macédonien est discutée lors de la 4ème conférence nationale du PCY où les Macédoniens sont vus comme un groupe national distinct.

¹⁹ Par exemple la *Macedonian Review* Krapfl James, "The ideals of Ilinden: Use of memory and nationalism in socialist Macedonia", Micgiel John (éd.), *State and Nation Building in East Central Europe*, New York, 1996, p. 297-316.

font pas de la Macédoine une terre serbe.²⁰ L'armée nationale yougoslave (*JNA*) évacue le territoire durant l'hiver 1991-1992. La Bulgarie, le principal antagoniste dans la question de l'identité nationale macédonienne est le premier pays de la région à reconnaître l'existence de l'État macédonien en janvier 1992 mais Sofia refuse catégoriquement de reconnaître la nation et la langue qui restent considérées comme bulgares. Si la reconnaissance des frontières ne soulève pas d'objection à Athènes, le nom du nouvel État déclenche une grave crise avec la Grèce. Des manifestations éclatent dans les deux capitales. La tension entre les deux pays culmine avec la fermeture de la frontière assortie d'un embargo économique imposé par Athènes. D'une façon générale, il semble que la Grèce et la Serbie-Yougoslavie aient préféré que le nouvel État macédonien ne voit jamais le jour.²¹

Finalement, le 8 avril 1993, la Macédoine est admise à l'ONU sous l'appellation, considérée provisoire par Skopje, de *Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia* ou FYROM et quelques jours plus tard l'Albanie reconnaît à son tour l'existence de l'État macédonien sous ce même nom.

Dès 1992, alors que la polémique sur le nom et la reconnaissance de l'État bat son plein, le Parlement macédonien adopte plusieurs amendements à la constitution dans le but de garantir le tracé des frontières existantes: la république de Macédoine n'a aucune prétention territoriale envers les États voisins. Ses frontières ne peuvent être modifiées qu'en accord avec la constitution ainsi qu'en accord avec les règles généralement acceptées sur le plan international.²²

L'unification des "trois Macédoines" a-t-elle été envisagée depuis 1991? Le problème de la révision des frontières dans l'objectif de l'union des trois territoires macédoniens demeure un sujet d'actualité mais il est principalement défendu à l'extérieur de la Macédoine par les membres de la diaspora installés au Canada, en Australie et aux États-Unis. Ces communautés sont extrêmement actives et organisent des conventions et des conférences où est évoquée la réunification des terres macédoniennes.

Aujourd'hui, le concept de frontières semble moins géographique ou politique qu'ethnographique. Dans le contexte de l'intégration européenne, la notion de frontière et son rôle de ligne de séparation entre deux États devrait perdre de son importance. Cependant la frontière en tant que ligne de démarcation culturelle et ethnique entre deux communautés vivant sur un même territoire comme c'est le cas des Albanais et des Macédoniens en Macédoine se renforce et s'intensifie avec les crises que connaît le gouvernement actuellement en place. Intégrer l'union européenne est l'un des objectifs majeurs des gouvernements de Skopje, Sofia, Belgrade et Tirana. On peut espérer que, dans ce cas, l'intégration européenne pourrait contribuer à résoudre les tensions liées aux frontières mentales puisque celles liées aux frontières politiques semblent, pour le moment du moins, avoir plus ou moins disparu.

²⁰ Il existe un contentieux relatif au monastère de Prohor Pciniski, où la République de Macédoine a été proclamée en 1944. En 1999-2000 un commission mixte n'avait pas conclu ses travaux. Stoilovski Dragan, *La République de Macédoine dans les relations internationales 1991-98*, Skopje, 1999 p. 45.

²¹ Pettifer James (éd.), *The New Macedonian Question*, Londres, 1999 p. 65.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 32.

Résumé

Entre 1878 et 1991 le nom même de Macédoine ne cesse d'apparaître et de disparaître de la carte des Balkans. Aucun autre État de la région n'a été aussi souvent divisé, morcelé, l'objet de rivalités territoriales ou tout simplement ignoré. Définir les contours de la Macédoine s'est révélé une tentative vouée à l'échec jusqu'en 1991. Pendant plus d'un siècle, la Macédoine demeure une région historique, une expression géographique vague, un concept politique mouvant dont les limites administratives sont constamment remaniées. Les frontières de la Macédoine demeurent un mythe dans la mesure où un État macédonien indépendant n'existe pas. Dans le même temps, ces frontières constituent aussi une réalité ne serait-ce que par leurs multiples aspects: politique, religieux ou culturel. En suivant le cours des événements majeurs, nous étudions comment la Macédoine n'a pas saisi plusieurs opportunités, pourtant décisives, autour de 1900, comment ces échecs ont conduit à la création de frontières mythiques et comment d'une façon quelque peu inattendue le XXe siècle s'est achevé avec la reconnaissance internationale d'un État macédonien aux frontières définies.

Rašid Durić

**SERBIAN'S LITERATURE IN THE FUNCTION OF
SERBIAN HEGEMONY ON BALKAN, TROUGH
CONTEMPORARY REZEPTION AND MISUSE IN
THE AGGRESSION IN BOSNIEN, KROATIEN UND
SLOVENIEN 1991-1995***

I.

Uredništvo portala Sistory nima soglasja avtorja za objavo članka

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Dimitar BECHEV

CONTESTED BORDERS, CONTESTED IDENTITY: THE CASE OF REGIONALISM IN SOUTH-EAST EUROPE*

Introduction

The very subject of my paper might require an unduly lengthy introductory part. This has to do with the need to clarify what is I mean by several things: South-East Europe, identity and regionalism are all far from being straightforward and unproblematic. As the paper itself grapples with the issue of regional identity, let me concentrate here on the last term in the list.

Similar to geopolitical and historical concepts like 'Balkans' and 'South-East Europe', not to mention the buzzword 'identity', the notion of regionalism is characterised by nearly unmatched vagueness. It is even amazing how many different, if not opposing, meanings region, hence regionalism, have both in scholarly and popular talk. Indeed, region can be anything ranging from an area within a single state to a whole continent. Both Europe and the Basque country are regions in their own right. This ambiguity is reflected in how we use terms like 'regionalism', 'regionalisation', 'region-building' and the like. In the EU context, regionalisation is often taken to denote a process whereby political and economic power is devolved from the centre to the local level. This is usually accompanied by the reemergence of various local – regional, ethnic and so forth – identities, previously suppressed within the nation-state. In many instances, these recalcitrant identities go beyond state borders linking neighbouring areas and populations. These developments, in turn, give rise to theoretical arguments that the old (Western) European territorial order is being overhauled (Jeffery, 1997). At the same time, the movement towards pooling – rather than decentralising – state power is labeled regionalisation too. regionalisation may be equal to integration. The EC/EU is a case in point. The buildup of common market underpinned by a web of supranational institutions and socio-economic links is interpreted by some as a movement towards building a regional polity in Europe. At present, one witnesses increased economic integration in many parts of the world, from Latin America to East Asia, giving rise to new debates in international relations and the subfield of international political economy (Hurrell and Fawcett, 1996). Arguably, in the EU, the move below and above the state are, almost invariably, intertwined. The supranational institutions are seen as strengthening localism and vice versa, in that both undermine the power of the state. Reminiscent of Russian dolls, present-day Europe can be pictured as a region containing states, but also smaller non-sovereign entities (e.g.

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Cataluna, Emilia-Romagna, Scotland etc), which are again referred to as regions. There are indications that similar processes are underway in the accession countries to the east where a number of so-called Euroregions, both within a single state or spanning across international borders, have emerged seeking a place in the political map and, importantly, representation in Brussels (Wolczuk and Batt, 2002).

The above excursion illustrates the need for greater conceptual clarity before approaching the broad themes of regionness, regional identity, region-building. My aim here is to discuss a third type of phenomenon, distinct from both supranational and substate regionalism.. Since the early 1990s, post-communist states in Eastern or, to abide by the already established conventions, Central and Eastern Europe and their neighbours have come together in a number of groupings aimed at fostering cooperation in the fields of politics, security and the economy. Acronyms like CEFTA, BSEC, CEI, to name a few, have become commonplace in the political and diplomatic jargon. The proliferation of such arrangements has prompted some observers to coin the term 'subregionalism' in order to distinguish it from larger integration projects, most notably the EU (Cotter, 1999; Dwan, 1999). This paper treats 'regionalism' and 'subregionalism' as synonyms. It explores the origins and dynamics of the cooperative processes and schemes in South-East Europe since the mid-1990s. Doing so, it develops the argument that regional identity and discursively constructed borders, although often overlooked by the analysts, have played a key role. The paper also presents the debates on Balkan identity and utilises the insights of critical historiographers like Maria Todorova as an analytical tool for studying regionalism. It concludes that, in South-East Europe, the absence of a clear-cut sense of belonging to a joint community has impeded the deepening of the existing cooperation initiatives. In the short term, however, the stigmatisation of the Balkans has proven to be an incentive for cooperative action on a regional scale.

Do identities matter?

Over the last couple of decades, culture and identity are gaining an ever growing importance in all social sciences, not least in the discipline of international relations and (Kratochwil and Lapid, 1996; Krauze and Renwick, 1996). There is a sufficient reason for that disciplines such as international relations have been dominated by a host of rationalist theories. Studying international politics, scholars have highlighted material capabilities and constraints as main variables accounting for the behaviour of states posited as rational actors. It has also been hypothesised that the prime motivation in the world politics arena is the maximisation of one's security and wealth. While material interest and gain-seeking are presumed to rule supreme, ideas are, at best, given a complementary place (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). Arguably, in the post-Cold War era, this tendency has been detrimental to the attempts to bring hugely important phenomena nationalism and, more broadly, nationhood on the research agenda. Turning to the Balkans, it is virtually impossible to look at interstate relations without taking into account the impact of the national idea in the course of the last two hundred years. The latter is constitutive of the local states, insofar as state legitimacy is derived

from the ethnic nation's right to self-determination and self-government. Second, identity has had behavioural effects too: ineditism stands out as a prime example for that. There is, furthermore, a fair number of international relations scholars studying the process whereby ideas and identities drive state action and configure interests (Chafetz, Spirtas and Frankel, 1999; Katzenstein, 1996).

There is much more at stake in the debates over how interest and identity relate to one another than just a theoretical issue. Undoubtedly, nationalist antagonisms, a specimen *par excellence* of identity politics, at the root of many evils in the Balkans today. In the 1990s, the wars of Yugoslav succession led to political fragmentation, economic decline, proliferation of weak states and rise of organised crime. One of the remedies prescribed by the outside powerbrokers is a shift towards pragmatism. Why not ditch the old ethno-national agenda and concentrate on democratisation, reconstruction and development, transition towards market economies? Why not transcend border-drawing and nation-building, inevitably tied with homogenisation and exclusion of ethnic minorities, in the name of rational action for all Balkan citizens' good based on the values of co-existence and material welfare? The appeal to common interests has underscored most regional cooperation schemes since the 1995 Dayton peace. Regional cooperation is, in a way, antithetical to 'Balkan identity', in that the latter is marked by strife and historical rivalries. Coupled with democratisation, the economic and social linkages resulting from working jointly are expected to bridge the entrenched divisions related to ethnonational identity. Indeed, the experience of the EC where functional cooperation in specific sectors has cemented the political rapprochement between old rivals is often quoted in the South-East European context as a model to emulate.

That policy approach is consistent with the rationalist thinking about regionalism (Hurrell: 1996). On one hand, it links the rise of interstate cooperation with the presence of a hegemonic power or alternatively the effects of institutions, existing interdependence or cooperation spillover across sectors (Krasner 1983; Keohane 1983; Keohane 1989; Haas, 1958). In other words, we-ness and shared notions of belonging have a secondary, if any, significance with regard to regionalisation. Geographical proximity accounts for more than regional identity. In the Balkans, what drives interstate cooperation is the pressure coming from the outside actors interested in promoting greater stability, notably EU and NATO, and the myriad of issues that can be addressed only on a regional basis. A rationalist version of the story is within sight.

What is Balkan identity?

While it is hard to disprove the role of material interdependence or the importance of powerful outsiders as promoters of cooperation at the regional level, I maintain that shared identity has played a crucial role in regionalisation projects in South-East Europe. This claim necessitates a more elaborate explanation of what is understood by regional identity.

As in the case of nationhood, the views on 'regionness' oscillate between the poles of primordialism and constructivism. There could, nevertheless, be multiple midpoints between the extreme views that regions are 'natural' communities

rooted in culture and shared past, conversely, they are malleable imagined communities. While overlaps are not rare, I define the three main positions in the debate: primordialist, historicist and constructivist.

1. *Primordialists*

According to the primordialists, regional identity reflects set of commonalities related to social psychology, prevailing familial structures, language, shared world-views etc. Whether one thinks about the substate units or the larger areas populated by states, regions are habitually thought of as more or less stable entities with clear-cut borders defined by specific cultural content. What is more, they are always 'there', ready to be discovered, studied and classified on the basis of their constitutive features. There is no shortage of such scholarship as far as the South-East Europe goes (Bracewell and Drace-Francis 1999:54-56). Thus, Fernand Braudel's disciple Trajan Stojanovich views the Balkan peninsula as a millennia-old cultural space, part of what he describes as 'the first Europe' of the classical antiquity (Stojanovich 1967, 1994). In a similar mode, antropogeographers as Jacques Ancel and Jovan Cvijic explore the commonality of dress, architecture, ideas of space and time (Ancel 1929, Cvijic 1918, Pippidi 1999:96). Cvijic even goes one step further elaborating the notion of *homo balcanicus* based on a distinctive Balkan *mentalite*. It is a small wonder that such strong claims have caused considerable controversy. Paschalis Kitromilides argues that Cvijic's Balkan *mentalite* must be placed in a temporal framework and projects it in the pre-national Orthodox oecumene of the 18th century. He maintains that the advent of nationalism ultimately dealt a deadly blow to all universalist worldviews, which, to him, were constitutive of Balkan *mentalite*. This is exemplified by the disintegration of the *Rum millet*, the community of Orthodox believers institutionalised within the Ottoman empire, swept away by the forces of national particularism (Kitromilides, 1996).

Whatever the benefits of each side of the dispute, it is clear that those invoking culture tend to conceive of identity in markedly essential terms, that is outside time and space. It does not take much insight to grasp that this position is akin to the claims about entrenched fault lines in South-East Europe. To cite one widely-publicised example, the Huntingtonian reading of the Balkans, as hopelessly divided by the impregnable borders of Islam, Orthodox and Catholic Christianity, is grounded on an analogous view of cultural and religious identity (Huntington, 1993, 1996). So is its cognate 'ancient hatreds' thesis gaining prominence with the war in Bosnia (Malcolm, 1996: xix-xxii). If one believes in some sort of deep-rooted Balkanness, why not stick a finger at it and blame it for the recurrent violence in the European southeast? Shared culture can explain why the Balkans lack a common political identity almost as easily as it can demonstrate that national divisions are not insurmountable. It is understandable that the most committed critics of the essentialist 'ethnic hatreds' myth are equally skeptical about the monolithic notion of *homo balcanicus*. What they see instead of the reified cultural identities is a multiplicity of ambiguous, overlapping and time- and space-contingent selfs. (Kiossev, 2002, Savic and Bjelic, 2002).

2. *Historians*

Unsurprisingly, the historians' arguments merit greater attention than the ones advanced by the culturalists of different colours. Similar to the culturalists, some historians dwell on the impact of *longue duree*, yet remain conscious about change. Nicolae Iorga's idea of *Byzance après Byzance* exemplifies that approach (Iorga, 1929, 1935). In a somewhat similar vein, Maria Todorova maintains that Balkan specificities are, by and large, a product of the Ottoman era. Not unlike Kitromilides, however, she believes that, on the whole, this imperial legacy is becoming extinct and is washed away by the waves of modernity. What used to be 'Turkey-in-Europe' is preserved in marginal spheres such as cuisine and popular culture, which is distinctive from dominant national cultures (Todorova, 1997:161-184). To a large degree, Todorova concurs with Alexandru Dutu that presently the region can be taken as a meaningful whole only in view of the common set of problems related to modernisation and political and socio-economic transition (Dutu, 1995).

More commonly, however, the Balkans are studied as something akin to what an international relations theorist might call a regional subsystem. Located in the same neighbourhood and emerging one after the other from the Ottoman domination, the Balkan states had a tradition of interacting, whether in cooperative or conflictual mode (Jelavich 1983; Hoesch, 1988; Glenny, 2000; Mazower, 2001). The paramount factor is certainly their geographical proximity translated into intertwined political and security interests. Yet, the picture becomes messier at closer glance. During the Cold War years, the Balkan states were for the most part oriented towards the outside, which meant that the region did not constitute a coherent unit. After 1944 Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania became part of the Soviet sphere of influence, while Turkey and Greece remained on the other side of the Iron Curtain. With the 1948 Cominform split between Tito and Stalin, Yugoslavia left the Soviet camp and started developing its own model of self-management socialism. For decades, it played the part of a balancer between the East and West and leader of the non-aligned movement. Romania, too, tried to escape from Moscow's fold and pursue a more independent course. Further south, Enver Hoxha's Albania aligned in the 1960s with China, but by the 1980s cut its ties with Beijing and sank in full isolation from the rest of the world (Crampton, 2001). The decades of division resulted in phenomena as diverse as the widespread parochialism characterising national historiographies or the negligible volumes of intraregional trade (Pavlowitch, 1999:336; Uvalic: 2001). It was not until the 1990s that the Balkans reappeared on the political landscape as a distinctive regional grouping (Mazower 2001:5).

Both primordialists and historians study the Balkans in terms of continuities, but one should nevertheless put the two schools in different baskets. Historians are by definition more sensitive to context. What both schools share, however, is the question what sets the Balkans apart from the neighbouring areas. In other words, what is the criterion that we should use to demarcate the Balkans? Furthermore, one must demonstrate that the region's outer limits are more important than the multiple dividing lines inside it. Indeed, the Balkans' ethnic, political and cultural heterogeneity present anyone willing to tread the shaky ground of commonalities, legacies and uniqueness with a daunting task.

Geography is one way to circumvent historical complexities. After all, it is easy to point the Balkan peninsula on the map. Yet geography is not immune to politics. Setting the region's northern border, for instance, is an overwhelmingly controversial issue (cf. Pawlowitch, 331). Is Slovenia a Balkan state? How about Croatia and Romania? Over time, all those countries have strived to renounce the idea of being part of the Balkans citing Catholicism, Austro-Hungarian past, Latin heritage in support of their case. Turkey represents yet another example of how malleable and ambiguous space classifications are, although the debate of its Europeaness largely obscures the question of whether it is a Balkan country or not. One thing is certain: cultural, political and geographical arguments are inextricably interlinked. What ultimately matters is how space and belonging is interpreted in the political process.

3. *Constructivists*

The above insight is useful for introducing the constructivist position. It is best synthesised by Iver Neumann, according to whom 'regions are invented by political actors as a political programme, they are not simply waiting to be discovered' (Neumann, 2001). Regional identity, therefore, is what people, politicians and states make out of it; it is how they interpret history and culture. Consider political constructs like 'Eastern Europe', for instance. For the historian Larry Wolff, it does not go further back in time than the 18th century. The east-west division was yet another brainchild of the Enlightenment thinkers, who underplayed earlier divisions in Europe between south and north (Wolff, 1994). In the twentieth century, Eastern Europe was solidified as a political reality with the Cold War only to be challenged in the 1980s by a group of Polish, Czech and Hungarian intellectuals. The latter argued for the distinctiveness of Central Europe as 'more European' in terms of values and history than what lay further east, namely Russia. They were the captured Europe, suffering in the clouts of a foreign power (Garton Ash, 1989; Schoepflin, 1989; Graubard, 1991; Todorova, 1997: Ch 6). What we learn from constructivists, therefore, is that defining others and drawing border between 'us' and 'them' is of immense importance for articulating self, be they national or regional.

South-East Europe has been a fertile ground for those arguing about the critical role of imagination and 'othering'. Building on the work of Edward Said, Milica Bakic Hayden and Robert Hayden explored how nationalists across Yugoslavia claimed cultural superiority over 'Balkan' contenders, raising the banner of their own imputed 'Europeaness' (Said, 1979; Hayden and Bakic Hayden, 1992; Bakic Hayden, 1995). The Balkans has been conceptualised in uniquely negative terms, while balkanness has been equated to backwardness and opposed to the democratic and enlightened West. Maria Todorova's seminal book *Imagining the Balkans* traced the emergence of what she characterises as the balkanist discourse distinguishable from Said's orientalism. She maintains that unlike the Orient the Balkans are geographically specific and that their ontological status is more ambiguous. Located both inside and outside what is thought as Europe, the Balkans' irrationality and unique proneness to violence makes them thoroughly un-European. (Todorova, 1997:17-18, Mazower, 2001: 5-11). Although John Allcock

should be credited for his pioneering analysis of balkanism, it was Todorova's work to launch a debate of major intellectual and political significance (Allcock, 1991, Goldsworthy, 1998, Bjelic and Savic, 2002). What makes Todorova relevant to the study of interstate politics, however, is her contention that negative Balkan identity is observed in the discourse of elites and populaces across South-East Europe (Todorova, 1997: Ch 2). They either accept the stigma of being Balkan or project it onto their neighbours in order to assert their own 'Europeanness.' As the significance of this shared conception of Balkanness is easy to grasp, it is safe to assume that it is present in the way interstate politics in the neighbourhood are thought of by the local policy-makers. I use his particular notion of negative regional identity to analyse the process of interstate cooperation.

The Invention of South-East Europe

The transition from a negative to a positive international identity for the Balkan countries has been part and parcel of regional cooperation. The reason for that is intimately related to the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia popularised as 'the wars in the Balkans' and giving new currency to terms as 'balkanisation.' The conflict in Bosnia, furthermore, gave credence to the assertions that a larger war encompassing all of the Balkans may follow suit (Larabee, 1994). Ignoring the purely Yugoslav dimensions of the Bosnian tragedy, a cohort of journalists-cum-historians and academics took up the ancient hatreds to revive the image of the Balkans eternal powder-keg in European, if not global, politics (Kaplan, 1993, Kennan, 1993). According to a doomsday plot, the 'Third Balkan War' would erupt by an explosion of hostilities in the Serb province of Kosovo and further south in the newly independent Republic of Macedonia. Macedonia's neighbouring states – harbouring as they were claims towards its territory and population – would not falter to become embroiled in a conflict between Slav Macedonians and the Albanian minority. With the simmering Greek-Turkish tensions re-inflamed, a new regional conflict would materialise – something of a local *bellum omnium contra omnes* or, according to others, a war along religious lines. The Balkans were, at most, a future battlefield or, at least, a gray zone where states and nations were desperately enmeshed in a never ending cycle of conflicts.

Although the Third Balkan War did not happen neither in 1991-95, nor in 1998-99 (Kosovo), nor indeed in 2001 (Macedonia), Balkan stereotypes did not relate solely to violence and disorder. States like Romania and Bulgaria, which stayed aside from the Yugoslav wars, were easily classifiable as Balkan based on the thorny progress of economic reforms after 1989. It was Balkan character provided a handy explanation:

'A new curtain is falling across eastern Europe, dividing north from south, west from east, rich from poor and the future from the past. As Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic sprint into the future of democracy and market economics, Romania and Bulgaria slide into Balkan backwardness and second-class citizenship in the new Europe.' (Longworth, 1994)

The Balkan stigma was not reserved exclusively for the warring parties around Sarajevo or in the mountains of Northern Dalmatia, but was applied to every state and society in the geographical perimeter. Even EU member Greece was not

spared in light of the confrontation with Skopje over the name and symbols of the 'former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.' Most importantly, in the West, the Balkanist discourse recommended a policy of non-engagement in the region. A common refrain in the days of the Bosnian war was, for example, minimal engagement and caution in order not to bog down in the cycle of ethnic warfare. The turbulent area, perennially plagued by ancient hatreds and backwardness had to be safely quarantined.

The image of essential un-Europeaness and the opening gap between the Balkans and Visegrad group prompted what Romanian politician Elena Zamfirescu described as 'the flight from the Balkans.' (Zamfirescu, 1995). Ironically, it was Croatia's President Dr Franjo Tudjman, one of the protagonists in the Yugoslav drama, who best illustrated that phenomenon. While thoroughly engaged in the Bosnian war, he was keenly asserting that in its struggle for independence Croatia was really choosing Europe and leaving the Balkans. Nationalists around Tudjman exploited the myth of Croatia as an ages-old *antemurale Christianitatis*, a bulwark against the barbarian invaders, to boost their European credentials (Lindstrom and Razsa, 1999). Official Romanian rhetoric followed a similar line singling out Latinness or Central European roots as bonds with Europe (Gallagher, 1997). Slovenia, following the brief war in 1991, staged the quickest escape from the Balkans fuelled by economic prosperity and rapid rapprochement with the West. Central Europe and its budding regional institutions was a magnet for the fugitives from the Balkans. For Croatia, Slovenia and Romania joining arrangements like the Central European Initiative and the Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA) became a priority. The political logic of that move was crystal-clear. While the Balkan states were certainly the left-outs in the eastern enlargement of EU and NATO, ineligible on both political and civilisational grounds, Central Europe was a springboard for 'joining Europe.'

Coupled with instability in former Yugoslavia, the tendency towards identification with Central Europe did not augur well for any form of multilateral cooperation in South-East Europe. That was partially offset by the international efforts to extinguish the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. In the wake of the Dayton peace, both the EU and the USA each launched their own initiatives aimed at fostering stability in the Balkans, convinced that a wider regional approach is a must. Thus, the EU's Royauumont scheme promoted political dialogue among the former Yugoslav republics and their neighbours, while the US-promoted South East European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) pushed for cooperation in the fields of trade, transport, and border controls (Lopandic, 2001:117-123, 125-136).

At the same time, in 1996-1997, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Macedonia, Romania and Yugoslavia restarted the process of ministerial meetings. Dating back to the conferences in Belgrade and Tirana in 1988 and 1990, it was halted by the breakup of Yugoslavia (Veremis, 1995). Once launched anew, the regional dialogue intensified leading in November 1997 to the first Crete Summit of heads of state and government, an unprecedented occurrence in Balkan history. The initiative featuring yearly conferences at both foreign minister and head of state level crystallised into the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECOP) (Alp, 2000; Tsardanides, 2001). Slovenia did not partake in SEECOP, while Croatia opted for an observer position. Tudjman, furthermore,

opposed the inclusion in SECI seeing it as a plot to recreate Yugoslavia and push Croatia back into the Balkans. In January 1998, the Croatian Parliament passed a constitutional amendment prohibiting membership in any regional association that could recreate in any form Yugoslavia (Simic, 2001). Interestingly, Hungary was prepared to be a part of SECI without much heated debates, while Slovenia stayed an observer. Military cooperation proceeded more smoothly. The Balkan countries' part of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program established a ministerial forum named the South-East European Defence Ministerial (SEDM). It did not include Croatia, Bosnia and Yugoslavia (all outside PfP at the time), while Italy became full-member, and Slovenia and USA observers.

All these initiatives differ pronouncedly, depending on whether they were conceived locally or from the outside. The outside-driven ones are typically wider in scope and more pragmatically oriented. Thus, the SEDM, boosted by US Secretary of Defence William Cohen's personal involvement, embarked on an ambitious project of building-up a Balkan peacekeeping unit under an international agreement signed in late 1998. Three years later, the Multinational Peace Force for South-East Europe was declared operational. The Royaumont and SECI aimed at concrete projects in the political and socio-economic sphere, yet lacked the needed funds of their own. After 1999, however, they were both subsumed in the Stability Pact for South-East Europe (SP) a comprehensive scheme launched in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict. The SP's First and Second Working Tables, dealing with democratisation and economic cooperation respectively, in effect re-duplicated the priorities of Royaumont and SECI. The Third Working Table focused on projects in the field of military security and justice and home affairs. Unlike SECI and Royaumont, the projects under the SP are backed from international donors like the EU, its member states, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), USA, Canada etc. What has also been distinctive about the Pact is that it targets the Balkan states on individual and group basis. Its regional cooperation agenda is, therefore, far-reaching particularly in the economic sphere where the bulk of the money is spent. Thus, following a memorandum of understanding initialed in 2001 by all South-East European states (Croatia included, but not Greece and Turkey), the Pact undertook to establish a free-trade zone in the region. Currently, it focuses on creating an integrated electricity market, while also channeling money into intra- and transregional infrastructure.

Clearly, the outside-promoted schemes have been premised on the idea that a number of the problems faced by the countries in South-East Europe can be solved only on a regional basis. They see the post-communist Balkan countries as either sharing a set of common problems related to transition and ethnic politics or as an interdependent complex. Those initiatives, therefore, have reflected a certain conception of regionness as interdependence. The great stake of outside actors and institutions, on the other hand, has been a guarantee that some 'Balkan fugitives' like Croatia and Romania are onboard. Overall, the levels of political support for SP and similar initiatives have largely been a function of the perceived utility in terms of EU and NATO accession. Money and political commitment have driven regional cooperation.

Negative regional identity has been much more consequential in the case of the SEECP. By the end of the 1990s, the only initiative launched by South-East

European states themselves emerged a high-level forum for discussing the pressing issues of the region. Although it undertook to develop common infrastructure and economic projects, SEECP busied itself mainly with changing the international perceptions of the Balkans. Despite the Greek proposals to that effect, SEECP failed to develop into an international organisation, mainly because EU-hopefuls like Romania and Bulgaria were not particularly enthusiastic about being packaged in a single group with their neighbours from former Yugoslavia (Stefanova, 2000). In addition, SEECP's efforts to influence Yugoslavia's intransigent position over Kosovo in 1998 ended with a failure. For the most part, the forum engaged in sort of declaratory diplomacy to reaffirm they subscribe to the principles of inviolability of existing borders, non-violence, observance of minority rights etc. Its highest achievement to date is the Bucharest Charter for Good-Neighbourliness, Stability, Security and Cooperation in South-East Europe codifying those principles. Importantly, the adherence to the norms of the Bucharest Charter as well as to the philosophy of regional cooperation was considered a proof of compatibility with the constitutive values of both NATO and the EU.

Like SEDM, SP and SECI, the SEECP also promoted South-East Europe as self-definition. Unlike the Balkans, it was taken to be geographically neutral and not loaded as with negative symbolism. There was, of course, much more than that. South-East Europe meant an openness towards the enlargement process and reflected the idea that regionalisation and accession are the two faces of the same coin. Among other things, this was intended as a politically correct appellation meant to appease states feeling uneasy about being qualified as Balkan. The choice for South-East Europe also pointed at an attempt to transcend the discursive divisions separating Balkans and Europe (cf. O Tuathail, 2000). The Crete Summit's final statement read the following:

'We believe that Europe cannot be complete without our countries and our peoples representing civilisations and historical traditions which are essential to the establishment of a contemporary European identity.' (Triantafyllou and Veremis, 1998: 485-494).

Accepting South-East Europe as a new political identity amounts to an endeavour to do away with the marginalisation of the Balkan countries vis-à-vis 'Europe.' This, in turn, has provided a rationale for a talk-shop like SEECP, which has produced few breaking news apart from the bilateral *tete-a-tetes* between foreign ministers or presidents.

The very name South-East Europe has nevertheless given rise to serious objections. Unsurprisingly, students of regional history figure prominently among the critical voices. The Turkish historian of the late Ottoman Empire İlber Ortaylı has pointed out that the substitution of Balkans with South-East Europe in fact seeks to downplay the heritage of 'Turkey-in-Europe.' "Why use three words when one will do?, he asks rhetorically (Ortaylı in Drace-Francis, 1999:118). Stevan Pavlowitch, on the other hand, finds South-East Europe geographically vague and notes that the Balkans, understood, however, as a neutral toponym, should not be imprudently sentenced to disuse (Pavlowitch, 2000). Other scholars, however, have pointed that the name itself is not a neologism and has been in use by German, Romanian and, to some extent, Anglo-American scholars at least since the late 1890s (Svob-Djokic, 2001; Drace-Francis, 1999). There is a potential debate

looming on the horizon, but it is unlikely to alter the new political vocabulary.

The European component in the newly coined South-East European identity, however, is a double-edged sword. The common orientation towards the EU has been instrumental for the advancement of regional cooperation, yet the race towards accession undermines any attempt to build robust multilateral institutions along regional lines. The heterogeneity of the links with the EU is a truly divisive factor as new South-East Europe is composed of a EU member state (Greece), two candidates negotiating accession (Bulgaria, Romania), one not negotiating as yet (Turkey) and five potential candidates (Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro), only two of which have a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (Macedonia and Croatia). The EU's has put forward regional cooperation as a condition only for the Western Balkans, but not for Bulgaria and Romania (Anastasakis and Bechev, 2003). The front-runners Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia consistently advocate bilateral and trilateral arrangements focused on concrete projects as opposed to grand schemes short of regional organisation (Hinkova, 2003). Apprehensions that regional cooperation is an obstacle rather than a stepping stone to European integration have been there since 1996. As the most visible cooperation initiative, the SP has been the common target of criticism because of its bureaucratic inflexibility, but also due to its unspecified relation vis-a-vis the process of EU enlargement. There is the fear that Pact-promoted regional integration is a hurdle for before the states eager and poised to join the EU as quick as possible. In new South-East Europe, the thin identification with one another does not easily translate into group solidarity (Vucetic, 2001:128-129).

Conclusion

The doubtful impact of the South-Eastern European rhetoric on the regionalisation process brings back the major question of whether and how ideas could be linked to political outcomes. I argue that using the notion of common (negative) identity as an analytical tool allows us to answer several key puzzles. On one hand, it explains why it was possible to include all post-communist South-East European countries, diverse as they were, in the Western-promoted schemes (SECI, Royaumont, later the SP). Actors like the EU ended up promoting regionalism while at the same time had already differentiated Romania and Bulgaria from 'the Western Balkans' by granting them associated status and promising membership in 1993. In the 1990s, South-East Europe was perceived to be a security-interdependent region. Any meaningful reconstruction and reconciliation effort had to go beyond the Yugoslav context and be carried out on a multilateral basis involving all Balkan states. On the other hand, the focus on identity casts light on why the countries in South-East Europe launched the SEECF, but failed to give it substance. Although the initiative did make a difference bringing more stability in Balkan interstate relations, its main role as a channel to project a new regional identity towards the West can be seen through the prism of the Balkan stigma and the threat of marginalisation in the 1990s. Finally, the 'the flight from the Balkans' behaviour, best illustrated by the excess of the Croatian constitution amendment of January 1998, can be understood from the viewpoint of identity politics.

If political identities are about drawing lines between ins and outs, self and other, it then becomes evident that South-East Europe suffers from a built-in shortcoming. First, its 'other' is not to be found beyond any newly constructed spatial boundary, but is rather the region's own 'Balkan' past and present understood as fragmentation, instability and isolation from 'Europe.' Second, regional cooperation in South-East Europe, in ideational terms, is really about undoing borders and inclusion in the enlarged EU and NATO and not about demarcating a new geopolitical unit. The success of schemes like the SEDM is largely a result of the close linkage with NATO and the direct US involvement, while the difficulties experienced by the SP are, among other things, related to its alleged irrelevance in terms of EU integration. Going back to Ortaylı's remark, it is evident that the three words in the name South-East Europe can ultimately be reduced to one.

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Abstract

Regionalism has become one of the prevailing trends in world politics nowadays. Regions are seen as proceeding from socio-economic linkages, but also from shared notions of belonging. There are two approaches to regional identity. The first one focuses on common culture, language, historical experience. The second approach views regions as a sort of 'imagined community' or political constructs. The paper takes up the latter view and ar-

gues that the redefinition of regional identity exemplified by the substitution of the term 'Balkans' with 'South-East Europe' played a crucial role in the cooperation initiatives since the mid-1990s. It explores schemes such as the South Eastern European Cooperation Process (SEEC) and the Stability Pact for South-East Europe to highlighting two important conclusions. First, the South-East European project has been an attempt to overcome the area's marginalisation vis-à-vis the West. Second, the emergence of a coherent regional identity was inhibited by the impossibility to draw clear-cut borders in order to demarcate South-East Europe.

Karl STUHLPFARRER

DIE WINDISCHEN – BEGRIFFE, EINBILDUNGEN, WIRKLICHKEITEN

Im Oktober 2002 begann die liberale Wiener Tageszeitung "Der Standard" eine Kampagne, die die österreichische Bevölkerung besser, als das bis dahin geschehen war, über die jüngsten Ereignisse in den Nachbarländern informieren sollte, die in nächster Zukunft der Europäischen Union beitreten würden. Und sie nannte diese Informationskampagne "crossover". "Wo früher Vorhänge und Grenzen waren, ergeben sich neue Nachbarschaften, kulturelle Entwicklungen und wirtschaftliche Chancen."¹ Das damit gemeinte Gebiet, das in einer großen ganzseitigen Landkarte als Werbemittel dargestellt wurde, reichte entsprechend dem Zeitungsformat von Prag bis Rijeka und von Linz bis Bratislava. Wien stand natürlich ganz im Zentrum. Auf der Landkarte gab es keine eingezeichneten Grenzen mehr, für eine nationale Orientierung standen daher nur mehr die lokalen Namen der Städte und Ortschaften zur Verfügung.

Sonderbarerweise waren diese Namen einmal nur in einer Sprache, das andere Mal auch zweisprachig eingezeichnet. Um nur ein paar Beispiele zu nennen: Laibach und Marburg, aber Ljubljana und Maribor in kleinerer Schrift in Klammern. Prag und Preßburg mit Praha und Bratislava in Klammern. Nur Bled – wer weiß warum? Vielleicht wegen Franc Rozman!? – steht an erster Stelle, gefolgt von Veldes, der deutschsprachigen Version. Und da gibt es noch eine andere charakteristische Ausnahme. Wien bleibt Wien, wie auch Klagenfurt, Villach und Graz nur in ihrer deutschsprachigen Variante erwähnt sind.

Um die Wahrheit zu sagen, "Der Standard" hat in der Zwischenzeit seine Haltung in dieser Frage geändert, und ich glaube auch nicht, daß in dieser ersten Version irgendeine böse Absicht dahinter gestanden ist. Aber gerade deshalb gibt uns diese Landkarte ein gutes Beispiel für das österreichische kollektiv Unbewußte – sogar in liberalen Kreisen – Erinnerungen an fast ein Jahrhundert historischer Entwicklung auszusperren. Die Macht der Benennung beruht eben auf realer, gegenwärtiger, nicht auf verlorener Macht. Wenn also nicht eine zukünftige gemeint und beansprucht sein sollte, dann sind die Grenzen dieser Macht zu respektieren, wenn schon nicht aus anderen Gründen, dann wenigstens aus Höflichkeit.

Möglicherweise wäre es die Geschichte gar nicht wert, besonders erwähnt zu werden, aber tatsächlich erkennen wir in ihr den gleichen Geist der Gleichgültigkeit, der Arroganz und der Aneignung, den wir auch in der Konstruktion, der Aufrechterhaltung und im politisch-ideologischen Gebrauch einer Personengruppe finden können, über die ich hier zu berichten beabsichtige: der Angelegenheit der Windischen.

Ich bin weder der erste und schon gar nicht der einzige, der die Geschichte des sogenannten windischen Volkes erzählt. Es gibt eine nicht geringe Zahl wissen-



¹ Der Standard, Wien, 19./20. 10. 2002. S. 10.

schaftlicher Publikationen und auch politisch-ideologischer Pamphlete, die die Existenz von Windischen bejahen oder leugnen, in beiden Fällen immer auch ein wenig erklären. Es ist sehr charakteristisch für die Situation von Windischen, dass wir keine wie immer geartete Publikationen über das Windische durch Windische in windisch finden können. Daher ist es eine eher schwierige Sache, sie überhaupt zu ermitteln. In Österreich beschäftigten sich mit dem Problem, um nur einige zu nennen, Theodor Weiter², Gero Fischer,³ Andreas Moritsch⁴ and zuletzt Rolf Wörsdörfer.⁵ Auch Hanns Haas and ich selbst haben in den siebziger Jahren des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts über sie geschrieben.⁶ In Slowenien müssen wir Lojze Ude⁷ und Janko Pleterški⁸ nennen, aber natürlich auch Dušan Nečak⁹ und, was die Periode der NS-Herrschaft betrifft, in jedem Falle Tone Ferenc.¹⁰ Die beiden berühmtesten Vertreter der Windischenideologie lebten aber in Kärnten: Martin Wutte und Valentin Einspieler, um nur an die wirkungsvollsten Konstrukteure des Windischen zu erinnern.¹¹

In der Hauptsache scheint es also so zu sein, dass man sich das Problem der Windischen also als ein spezifisch Kärntner Problem vorzustellen hat. Und es hat mit deutsch- und slowenischsprachigen Österreichern zu tun. Windische wurden in diesem Sinne als getrennte und eigene Gruppe angesehen, die im Alltagsleben nicht oder nicht mehr slowenisch, aber dennoch auch nicht deutsch sprachen. In einem ersten Versuch, eine solche Trennung zu visualisieren, könnten wir uns die vertikalen Linien der Volkszählungstabellen vorstellen, die künstliche Grenzen zwischen drei Gruppen aufbauten: deutschsprachige, slowenischsprachige und eben angeblich windischsprachige Personen, sowie deren Kombinationen oder Überleitungen.

Das Windische als Muttersprache und als Nationalität – das ist wichtig sich zu vergegenwärtigen – ist das erste Mal in Kärnten bei der nationalsozialistischen Volkszählung 1939 aufgetaucht. Damals standen 21.701 Personen, die slowenisch oder deutsch und slowenisch als Muttersprache angegeben hatten, 21.478 mit windisch oder deutsch und windisch gegenüber. Ihre Nationalität hatten aber bei dieser Gelegenheit 7.715 mit slowenisch und nur 106 mit windisch angegeben.¹²

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- ² Weiter, Theodor: Das Recht der Volksgruppen und Sprachminderheiten in Österreich. Wien, Stuttgart 1970 mit seinem eigenen Kapitel über die Windischen S. 284-300.
- ³ Fischer Gero: Das Slowenische in Kärnten. Eine Studie zur Sprachenpolitik. Klagenfurt 1980.
- ⁴ Moritsch, Andreas: Das Windische – eine nationale Hilfsideologie. In: Moritsch, andreas (Hg.): Problemfelder der Geschichte und Geschichtsschreibung der Kärntner Slowenen. Klagenfurt, Ljubljana, Wien 1995. S. 15-29.
- ⁵ Müller, M.G. u.a. (Hg.): Die Nationalisierung von Grenzen. Marburg 2002.
- ⁶ Haas, Hanns/Karl Stuhlpfarrer: Österreich und seine Slowenen. Wien 1977.
- ⁷ Ude, Lojze: Teorija o vidisarih "Windische". Celovec 1956.
- ⁸ Pleterški, Janko: Slowenisch oder deutsch? Nationale Differenzierungsprozesse in Kärnten (1848-1914). Klagenfurt/Celovec 1996.
- ⁹ Nečak, Dušan: Koroški Slovenci v drugi avstrijski republiki. Ljubljana 1985.
- ¹⁰ Ferenc, Tone (Bearb.): Quellen zur nationalsozialistischen Entnationalisierungspolitik in Slowenien 1941-1945. Maribor 1980.
- ¹¹ Wutte, Martin: Deutsch-windisch-slowenisch. Klagenfurt 1927. Einspieler, Valentin: Kärntner Weißbuch. -Wieviele Slowenen gibt es in Kärnten? Klagenfurt 1980.
- ¹² Weiter 1970, S. 345 und 352.

Obwohl diese Trennung zwischen slowenisch und windisch bei der Volkszählung also eine nationalsozialistische Einführung in Österreich war, blieb sie auch nach 1945 in Österreich bis heute, zumindest was die Angaben zur Umgangssprache betreffen, weiter bestehen. Zuletzt haben bei der Volkszählung im Jahre 2001 nur mehr 568 Personen in ganz Österreich windisch als ihre Umgangssprache angegeben, slowenisch aber 24.855, davon 6.902 Nichtösterreicher. Das bedeutet einen sehr, sehr radikaleren Rückgang der Zahl der Windischen im Vergleich mit dem nicht unwesentlichen Rückgang der Slowenischsprachigen. Was aber von noch größerer Bedeutung ist, dass von diesen sich selbst als windisch-sprechende Personen mit einer einzigen Ausnahme alle österreichische Staatsbürger sind, so dass wir annehmen können, dass es sich bei dieser einen Person um einen Ex-Österreicher oder eine Ex-Österreicherin handelt, oder sogar, dass diese Angabe durch Irrtum zustande gekommen ist.¹³

Um also Antworten auf die Fragen, was ist windisch, wer sind die Windischen, und wo lebten oder leben sie zu finden, ist es notwendig, eine rasche Übersicht über die unterschiedlichen Meinungen und die Entwicklung der Argumentationen während des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, oder besser gesagt, nach der Revolution von 1848 zu geben.

Deutschsprachige nannten seit alten Zeiten und auch bis heute noch ihre östlichen und südlichen Nachbarn "Wenden" oder Windische¹⁴ und beschränkten dann den Begriff auf das slowenische ethnische Territorium, so daß Windisch als erstes ein Synonym für slowenisch oder gar für slawisch als ganzes gewesen ist.¹⁵

Zweitens werden die slowenischen Dialekte in Kärnten und der Steiermark windisch genannt, ohne daß damit irgend eine nationale Sonderstellung zu bezeichnen beabsichtigt war. Aber aus diesem Sprachgebrauch entstand aus politisch-ideologischen Gründen in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhundert bei den Deutschnationalen die Gewohnheit, das heißt sie begannen, alle diese slowenischen Dialekt Sprechenden Windische zu nennen. Und sie setzten diesen Vorschlag auch in ihrer Agitation und ihrer Propaganda nach und nach durch. Von daher entstand die Idee, Windisch sei eine selbständige Sprache, die, wie später noch zu zeigen sein wird, vorgeblich von einem eigenständigen Volk oder einer eigenständigen Nation gesprochen wird.¹⁶

Martin Moll betont in seiner Habilitationsschrift, daß zumindest in der Steiermark die slowenische Nation von den Deutschnationalen zwar geschmäht und degradiert, aber prinzipiell anerkannt worden sei. Wenn auch die Slowenen als Führungsschicht und die Masse der slowenischsprechenden Bauern, die angeblich oder wirklich nicht slowenisch fühlten, als Windische wahrgenommen worden seien, so sei das Charakteristikum beider Gruppen, der deutschen und der slowe-

¹³ <http://www.statistik.at/cgi-bin/presseprint.pl?INDEX=2002209>; 20. 10. 2002.

¹⁴ Fischer 1980, S. 39.

¹⁵ Pleterski, Janko: Die Slowenen. In: Wandruszka, Adam/Peter Urbanitsch (Hg.): Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918. Bd III/2. Wien 1980, S. 801-838; S. 803.

¹⁶ Moritsch, Andreas: Nationale Differenzierungsprozesse bis in die neunziger Jahre des 19. Jahrhunderts. In: Krahwinkel, Harald (Hg.): Staat - Land - Nation - Region. Gesellschaftliches Bewußtsein in den österreichischen Ländern Kärnten, Krain, Steiermark und Küstenland 1740 bis 1918. Klagenfurt/Celovec, Ljubljana/Laibach, Wien/Dunaj 2002. S. 315-332. S. 332.

nischen, nicht ihre Durchlässigkeit zueinander, sondern beiderseitiges Bemühen zur Aufrichtung einer Trennmauer gewesen.¹⁷

Wir können also davon ausgehen, dass im slowenischen wie auch in jedem anderen Nationsbildungsprozess die Angehörigen der Nation erst langsam und in ungleichmäßigen Schüben ihr Selbstwertgefühl und ihr Selbstbewusstsein gewannen. Es bedarf ja auch einer nicht zu kurzen Periode, um jene Ereignisse festzumachen und jene Bilder im Denken zu stabilisieren, die den Stolz einer Nation ausmachen: wirtschaftliche oder militärische Erfolge – manchmal auch Niederlagen –, besondere kulturelle Leistungen, aber auch eine besondere Herkunft, die in einer nationalen Ursprungserzählung die Existenz der Nation legitimiert. Mit dieser die Einheit und Einigkeit der Nation festschreibenden Geschichtskultur durchdringen die Bildungseinrichtungen und öffentlichen Medien die Nation, die sich in diesem Prozeß konstituiert.

Dieser Prozeß der Aneignung der geschichtskulturellen Vorstellungen ist bei den Slowenen in Kärnten durch die deutschnationalen Aktivitäten erheblich und auch erfolgreich gestört worden. Das verdankt sich nicht zuletzt der Tatsache, dass zwischen dem deutschen und dem slowenischen Nationsbildungsprozess ein nicht unerheblicher Zeitunterschied bestand, so dass sich Slowenen zu einem steten Aufholprozess veranlasst fühlten. Zudem ist das Problem der Windischen sehr eng mit der Entwicklung des Wahlrechts verbunden, das in Österreich zuerst allgemein (1896), dann gleich (1907), aber bis zur Auflösung der Habsburgermonarchie nur für Männer bestand, und nie auf regionaler und lokaler Ebene verwirklicht wurde. Der slowenische Wunsch nach stärkerer politischer Partizipation und der deutsche Unwille, auf Macht zu verzichten, trafen so innerhalb dieser Grenzen aufeinander.

Nationalgefühl und nationale Parteilichkeit in der Suche nach eigenen Vorteilen als Hauptimpulse politischer Partizipation veranlaßten daher die politische Führungsschicht der dominierenden deutsche Gruppe in Kärnten sich mit dem Problem auseinanderzusetzen, daß die Slowenen im Verlauf ihrer nationalen Entwicklung, ja möglicherweise in ihrer Aufholjagd gegenüber den Deutschen die Grenzen ihrer bestehenden sozialen Stratifikationen überschreiten könnten, oder daß sogar im Falle der Ausdehnung des Wahlrechts auf eine gleiches Wahlrecht auf allen regionalen und lokalen Ebenen die politische Macht mit den Slowenen geteilt würde werden müssen. Und die Slowenen lebten hauptsächlich gerade in jenen Teilen des Landes, in dem die natürlichen Ressourcen und Reichtümer zu finden waren, besonders die Blei- und Zinkbergwerke.

Und dann haben wir die unterschiedlichen historischen Erfahrungen mit der Revolution von 1848 hinzuzufügen.

Slowenisch wurde ein Begriff der administrativen und politischen Sprache¹⁸ und die Bezeichnung Slowenien für das von Slowenen bewohnte Gebiet begann geschichtsmächtig zu werden, auch wenn sich vorerst keine Erfolge in den sporadi-

¹⁷ Moll, Martin: Kein Burgfrieden. Studien zum deutsch-slowenischen Nationalitätenkonflikt in der Steiermark vor dem und im Ersten Weltkrieg. Habilitationsschrift Graz 2002, S. 15f.

¹⁸ Pleterski 1996, S. 81.

schen Vereinigungsbestrebungen einstellten.¹⁹ Als Kärnten schließlich als eigenständiges Kronland wiederhergestellt worden war, können wir uns schwerlich jener Vorstellung als vielleicht nur unbewußter Triebkraft politischen Handelns verschließen, die als ältere und erste Kärntner *Urangst* den partiellen oder vollständigen Machtverlust der Deutschen annahm, falls zu einem Kärnten einschließenden Königreich Illyrien zurückgekehrt werden würde oder die slowenische Gesellschaft sich rascher modernisieren könnte als die deutsche in Kärnten dazu imstande sein sollte. Das mag die Ursache gewesen sein, daß das Ideal der Kärntner Einheit, allenfalls sogar als etwas Heiliges, auftauchte und die Notwendigkeit der dominierenden Deutschen im Lande als natürlich empfunden wurde, mit unterschiedlichen politischen Strategien die nationale Entwicklung der Slowenen in Kärnten zu blockieren, indem das Schulsystem sogar gegen die Entscheide der Obersten Gerichte in ihrem rechtswidrigen Zustand belassen wurden. Die Windischenideologie begann damit ihre wichtige Rolle zu spielen, die slowenische Gruppe in Kärnten zu spalten.

Die slowenische Sprache wäre nicht entwickelt genug, um für Verwaltungsangelegenheiten und vor den Gerichten verwendet werden zu können, weil ihr die notwendigen spezifischen Begriffe der Rechtssprache fehlten, das war die Meinung in den sechziger Jahren des 19. Jahrhunderts und dann – zwanzig Jahre später mit nunmehr schon geänderten Argumenten – anders herum: die slowenisch- oder windischsprachige Bevölkerung würde das *Neuslovenische*, dessen administrativer und gerichtlicher Gebrauchswert nun offensichtlich nicht mehr abzuleugnen war, nicht verstehen. Woher es aber käme, daß diese Bevölkerungsgruppe gerade die deutsche administrative und Gerichtssprache verstehen sollte, bleibt in solchen Gedankengängen ganz unberührt. Nicht alle folgten diesen Gedankengängen.

Im Jahre 1908 berichtete jedenfalls der Präsident des Oberlandesgerichtes in Graz, "die politische Agitation in Kärnten [stelle] als Axiom auf, daß die in Kärnten gesprochene sogenannte windische Mundart mit der slowenischen Sprache nicht identisch sei, ein Axiom [...], das ich von meinem Standpunkte aus als unhaltbar bezeichnen muß. Die slavische Mundart, die in Kärnten gesprochen wird, ist allerdings ein sehr schlechter slowenischer Dialekt, allein sie ist nur ein Dialekt, der sich von der Schriftsprache nicht mehr und nicht weniger unterscheidet als die Dialekte anderer Nationalitäten. Richtig ist nur so viel, daß die slowenische Schriftsprache, die in ihrer jetzigen Entwicklung ein Produkt der letzten Jahrzehnte ist, in Kärnten dem Volke vielfach unverständlich ist, weil die Schulbildung mindestens auf den höheren Stufen größtenteils eine deutsche ist und weil eine kompakte, die Schriftsprache auch im Verkehre gebrauchende slavische Intelligenz fehlt."²⁰

Moritsch hat darauf hingewiesen, wie im "Politischen Wörterbuch für die Deutschen in Österreich"²¹ schon Mitte der achtziger Jahre des 19. Jahrhunderts der Versuch unternommen wurde, Slowenen und Windische streng voneinander zu unterscheiden, dem Begriff Windische sozusagen als Volksbezeichnung einzuführen und den Begriff Slowenen als politisch-ideologische Kategorie zu etablieren

¹⁹ Pleterski 1996, S. 60-71.

²⁰ OstA, AVA, Justiz, III Stmk Sprache, K. 2942, Z. 25.998/1474/1908.

²¹ Moritsch 2002, S. 331f.

und damit auf die nationalpolitische Führungsschicht der Slowenen zu beschränken.

Dieser Kampf um das Geschichtsbild der Bevölkerung und um ihre nationale Zu- und Einordnung setzte sich bis zum Vorabend des ersten Weltkrieges fort. In einem im Jahre 1914 publizierten Pamphlet behauptete der unbekannt Autor,²² das neue Slowenisch, d.h. die slowenische Schriftsprache oder Standardsprache wäre eine aus serbo-kroatisch, tschechisch und russisch zusammengesetzte Sprache, während das kärntnerische Windische das Ergebnis einer tausendjährigen lebendigen Gemeinschaft der Slowenen und Deutschen sei und deshalb viel näher dem Deutschen als dem Slowenischen stünde. Für die Windischen in Kärnten gäbe es deshalb keine Notwendigkeit, das Slowenische zu gebrauchen, denn sie hätten als Schriftsprache das Deutsche, insbesondere weil keine getrennten slowenischen und deutschen Gemeinschaften in Kärnten existierten, wären doch alle gemeinsam Kärntner. Es ist für eine solche Argumentation typisch, dass sie nicht nur in einer schwankenden Begrifflichkeit vorgetragen wurde, sondern auch schließlich in der Behauptung der deutschen Überlegenheit endete: "Denn die Deutschen waren, wie wir gesehen haben, die Kulturträger in Kärnten, sie waren insbesondere die Schöpfer einer höheren staatlichen Ordnung."²³

Was wäre also in einer solchen Situation für die Windischen zu tun? Die Antwort lautet 1914 so: "Die Kärntner Windischen haben die Wahl, sich als Kärntner wie bisher ihren deutschen Landsleuten anzuschließen, mit denen sie tausend und tausendjährige Bande verknüpfen, oder im wesensfremden Kroaten- und Serbentum aufzugehen und so zu einer feindlichen Grenzwehr gegen die zu werden, mit denen sie durch Jahrhunderte in Frieden und Eintracht gelebt, die ihnen das Licht der Kultur und des Christentums gebracht haben. Sie haben sich zu entscheiden, ob sie fürderhin ihre windische Muttersprache in ihrer Eigenart weiter pflegen und daneben die deutsche Weltsprache erlernen wollen, die nahezu von 100 Millionen gesprochen und gekannt wird, oder ob sie sich eine slawische Kunstsprache von beschränktem Geltungsbereich aufdrängen lassen wollen, die nur da verstanden wird, wo sie wirtschaftlich nichts zu suchen haben."²⁴

Während des ersten Weltkrieges verschwand die Diskussion über die Windischen. Slowenisch war keine künstliche Sprache mehr, die Slowenen verhielten sich als tapfere Soldaten im Kriege oder sie wurden mit der serbischen Sache identifiziert und als Verräter verfolgt. Die Diskussion tauchte erst wieder nach dem Ende des Krieges und insbesondere nach der Kärntner Volksabstimmung auf, als wieder und immer wieder um zahlenmäßige Verhältnisse ging.

Zur Überraschung beider Länder entschieden sich während des Plebiszits von 1920 ein guter Teil der Slowenen und Sloweninnen – diese das erste Mal zu einer Wahl zugelassen – aus unterschiedlichen Gründen nicht für Jugoslawien sondern für Österreich. Wie war dieses Resultat zu erklären und wie war mit den Versprechungen umzugehen, die die Slowenen in Kärnten für den Fall ihres Verbleibs

²² Die Wahrheit über Kärnten. Eine Abwehrschrift gegen die Verunglimpfung unseres Heimatlandes durch die südslawischen Gegner. Herausgegeben vom Deutschen Volksverein für Kärnten. Klagenfurt 1914.

²³ Wahrheit 1914, S. 16.

²⁴ Wahrheit 1914, S. 64.

bei Österreich durch die Kärntner Landesregierung vor dem Plebiszit erhalten hatten?

Was Kärntner Deutschnationale dachten, ist nicht so schwer zu rekonstruieren, wir sind sogar recht imstande, uns ihre mentale Landkarte von Kärnten vorzustellen: Sie bestand aus einer Karawankenkette höher als hoch, ganz schwierig zu überwinden, kaum dass an den Durchgang von Tarvis und den Durchlass der Drau gedacht werden wollte. Im extremen Gegensatz zum Süden die Kärnten nördlich abschließenden Gebirge, die Zentralalpen. Wenn auch höher und nicht weniger schwierig zu überwinden, geradewegs offen und durchlässig. Und dazwischen das liebe Land, voll von kultivierten, hochgebildeten Deutschen, immer bereit, ihre geistigen und kulturellen Güter den armen Slowenen zu überlassen, die nicht einmal fertigbrachten, die slowenische Sprache zu sprechen und ohne ständige deutsche Unterstützung zu überleben und aus ihren erbarmenswürdigen Zustand sozialer und kultureller Entwicklung allein herauszukommen.

Martin Wutte wurde der führende Ideologe des Windischen. Historiker von Beruf und später auch Direktor des Kärntner Landesarchivs nutzte und missbrauchte er dafür auch Konzepte und Nationstheorien, z.B. führender österreichischer Sozialdemokraten, um die sprachliche Unterscheidung oder Bedeutung für die Formierung von Nationen zu minimieren und stärker und immer stärker geographische, historische (oder legendenhafte, was in der Wirkung dasselbe bedeutet) Elemente zu betonen, um davon zu überzeugen, dass die Windischen von den Slowenen unterschieden, ja getrennt werden müssen, wie das schon im Pamphlet von 1914 zu sehen war. Nur dass die administrative Grenze zwischen zwei Kronländern nunmehr durch die Auflösung der Habsburgermonarchie und die Bildung der neuen Staaten Staatsgrenze geworden war, so dass die nationalbewussten Slowenen den Spuren der deutschnationalen Agitation während des Weltkrieges folgend als Verräter denunziert werden konnten.

Es ist kein Zufall, dass die Hauptschrift Wuttes zur Windischenproblematik gerade im Zusammenhang mit den Verhandlungen um eine Kulturautonomie der Kärntner Slowenen zum ersten Mal 1927 und dann in einer zweiten erweiterten Ausgabe 1930 erschien.²⁵

Windische der eigenen Art wurden zu Kärntnern, und Kärntner als solche konnten wiederum in dieser Denkrichtung nichts anderes sein als Deutsche. Windische waren daher Deutsche (wahrscheinlich auch wenn sie es selbst noch nicht wussten).

Das wäre nicht so gefährlich für die Slowenen gewesen, wenn das nur von einem Historiker – wenn auch mit dem politischen Einfluß Wuttes – gekommen wäre. Aber diese Argumentation wurde zur allgemeinen Meinung der deutschen politischen Führungsgruppen in Kärnten. Und es blieb ein wichtiges Prinzip ihrer Politik.

Im Jahre 1932 zum Beispiel behauptete der später in der austrofaschistischen Periode einflussreich gewordene und auch in der Zeit nach 1945 in der Bekämpfung der jugoslawischen Gebietsansprüche nicht unwesentliche Bernhard Scheichelbauer unter dem Titel "Das windische Volk": "Eine objektive Betrachtung ergibt also, dass die Slowenen in Kärnten im Laufe einer jahrhundertlangen

²⁵ Wutte Martin: Deutsch-windisch-slowenisch. Klagenfurt 1927 und 1930.

Entwicklung dem Einflusse der höheren deutschen Kultur erlegen sind, dass die vielfachen kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen und die Durchsetzung des slowenischen Gebietes mit deutschen Kolonisten, die gegenseitigen Heiraten zu einer innigen Vermischung geführt haben, als deren Resultat heute eben das 'windische Volk' in den gemischtsprachigen Teilen Kärntens lebt, das sich mehr zu den Deutschen hingezogen fühlt, als zu den von ihm durch eine hohe und wenig gangbare Gebirgsgrenze getrennten Slowenen in Krain."²⁶

Noch im Juni 1934 berichtete der Chef der Kärntner Sicherheitsbehörden nach Wien, dass die Kärntner Bevölkerung politisch in drei Gruppen geteilt werden müsse, in den deutschen Teil, und dann – gleich an Zahl – in die deutschbewussten Windischen und die nationalen Slowenen, die als gefährliche Irredentisten betrachtet wurden. Während die Windischen als die Gruppe gesehen wurden, die 1920 bei der Volksabstimmung für Österreich gestimmt hätten, würden die nationalen Slowenen in Kärnten dazu tendieren, das Land zu teilen, um zuerst Minderheitenrechte zu erlangen und es dann abzutrennen und an Jugoslawien anzuschließen.²⁷

So konnten Freund und Feind nach klar erkennbaren Linien getrennt werden. Eine neue Grenze sollte folgen, aber sie folgte nicht den Auffassungen des österreichischen Sicherheitsdirektors. Nur die Konstruktionsprinzipien des Windischen blieben die gleichen auch in der nationalsozialistischen Periode. So erklärte der Kärntner Gauwirtschaftsberater Alois Winkler im Februar 1939: "Der Gau hat bei 436.000 Einwohnern ungefähr 26.800 Menschen, die sich zur slovenischen Sprache bekennen, eine weit größere Zahl aber spricht das sogenannte Windisch als Muttersprache, ein Halbding zwischen Slovenisch und Deutsch, das von den Slovenen ebenso schlecht verstanden wird, wie von den Deutschen. Zwar ist der Schulunterricht seit langem ultraquistisch, d.h. im ersten Schuljahr windisch und dann deutsch, aber dadurch, daß windisch in der Familie gesprochen wird, herrscht es immer vor und für alle Menschen, die die Heimat nicht verlassen, ergibt sich aus der schlechten Kenntnis der deutschen Sprache, und dadurch, daß sie mit ihrer Muttersprache keiner Kulturation angehören, eine kulturelle Rückständigkeit, die sich im Wirtschaftsleben besonders stark bemerkbar macht."²⁸

Die Asymmetrie der Argumentation Wutttes, Scheichelbauers und anderer ist offensichtlich. Während sie die Slowenen in einer mehr der weniger rationalen Weise teilen, um dann die Gruppengrenzen für politisch-ideologische Zwecke zu mißbrauchen, präsentieren sie den sogenannten deutschen Teil als homogen und ohne Trennungslinien in Raum, Zeit und sozialer Struktur. In beiden Fällen erzeugen sie so Gruppenbilder, die aber nicht ohne Wirkung blieben. Vor allem in den sieben Jahren nach der nationalsozialistischen Machtübernahme in Österreich im Jahre 1938 wurden sie für eben diese Zeit auch geschichtsmächtig.

²⁶ Scheichelbauer, Bernhard: Aufrichtigkeit, Klarheit, Verständigung. Zum Lagebericht der slowenischen Minderheit in Kärnten auf dem Europäischen Nationalitätenkongreß. Klagenfurt 1932. S.15f.

²⁷ Bundeskanzleramt, Inneres, 22 Kärnten, Karton 5055, Geschäftszahl St.B. 196.845 G.D./34 Information über die politischen Verhältnisse in den gemischtsprachigen Gebieten in Kärnten.

²⁸ Kärntens Wirtschaftslage. Vortrag gehalten vom Gauwirtschaftsberater Ing. Alois Winkler in der Wirtschaftssitzung im Parlament am 24. Feber 1939. AVA, Bürckel, 2205/20, Bd I, fol. 55-69, fol. 57.

Denn die Windischenideologie blieb nicht auf Kärnten für innerkärntner Zwecke beschränkt, sie wurde für die deutsche territoriale Expansion instrumentalisiert und bildete die Grundlage der nationalsozialistischen Bevölkerungspolitik in den eroberten Gebieten durch Umsiedlung, Deportation und Zwangsassimilation.

Es begann mit der Umsiedlung der Südtiroler Bevölkerung, die die Kanaltaler mit einschloß. Slowenen aus dem Kanaltal war die Option für Deutschland von den italienischen Behörden verboten worden. Die deutschen Behörden beanspruchten sie als Windische, aber sie trauten ihnen nicht. So sollte den übersiedelten Slowenen im Gegensatz zu den deutschen Kanaltälern die Niederlassung in Kärnten nicht erlaubt werden.²⁹

Die Windischenideologie rechtfertigte dann die deutsche Expansion und Besetzung der slowenischen Gebiete mit ihrer Angliederung an die Reichsgaue Steiermark und Kärnten. Die nationalsozialistische Germanisierungs-, Verfolgungs-, Vertreibungs- und Mordpolitik in diesen Gebieten ist wohl bekannt. Windisch und Slowenisch blieben vorerst deutlich abgegrenzte Bezeichnungen, die über Lebens- und Überlebenschancen entschieden. Das hieß in nationalsozialistischer Terminologie unmittelbar nach der Besetzung slowenischen Gebietes so: "Das wesentliche Merkmal der Bezeichnung des Windischen ist das ehrliche Bekenntnis zu Führer und Reich, sowie der Wille, [...] mit dem deutschen Volk gemeinsam zu leben. Nationalslowenen sind alle jene, denen ihr slowenisches Volkstum vor der Lebensgemeinschaft mit den Deutschen geht, die eine Eigenvölklichkeit anstreben[...]"³⁰

So oft auch der Begriff Windisch bis zu den Jahre 1941/1942 verwendet worden ist, nach dieser Periode verschwand er langsam als für die damalige politische Strategie nutzlos und wurde in der nationalsozialistischen Terminologie in den besetzten slowenischen Gebieten durch den Begriff *eindeutschungsfähig* ersetzt. Und nach dem Krieg kam der Begriff Windisch im wiedererstandenen Jugoslawien selbstverständlich nicht in Gebrauch.

Und sogar in Österreich - man könnte sagen, dem Mutterland des Begriffs Windische - wurde der Begriff 1947 im Behördengebrauch verboten.³¹ Die Grenze zwischen Jugoslawien und Österreich stand wieder zur Diskussion und die österreichische Bundesregierung wie auch die Kärntner Landesregierung hatten sich beeilt, den Slowenen in Kärnten wieder Minderheitenrecht zuzusagen. Da war die Erinnerung an die Funktion des "Windischen" in der Zwischenkriegszeit nicht angesagt. Aber der Begriff, der wohl im allgemeinen Sprachgebrauch nie verschwunden ist, tauchte auch in der politisch-ideologischen Debatte wieder auf, wenn es notwendig erschien. Und das war gerade dann, wenn es um die Durchführung von Artikel 7 des Österreichischen Staatsvertrags von 1955 ging. Wer sollte die slowenische Minderheit repräsentieren? Und in welchem Ausmaß und innerhalb welcher zahlenmäßiger und prozentueller Grenzen sollten diese Minderheitenrechte anerkannt werden? Und dazu kam eine neue tatsächliche oder

²⁹ Stuhlpfarrer, Karl: Umsiedlung Südtirol. Wien, München 1985. Bd 1. S. 165.

³⁰ Der Verbindungsmann des RmdI zum CdZ Untersteiermark, 30.5.1941, Laggner 1981, S. 60.

³¹ Laggner, Alfred: Zur Geschichte des Deutschnationalismus in der Kärntner Landespolitik 1945-1960. Diss.Wien 1981, S. 47.

virtuelle Grenze, jene zwischen den Slowenischsprachigen, die den Kontakt mit dem kommunistischen Slowenien ablehnten, vermieden oder gar als beängstigend empfanden und jenen, die ihre nationale Interessen durch die kommunistische Machtübernahme in Jugoslawien nicht gefährdet sahen.

Gleichwohl blieb es nicht lange bei dieser Haltung, nachdem Ende der vierziger Jahre klar geworden war, daß die jugoslawischen Gebietsansprüchen sich nicht würden durchsetzen können. Zur Diskussion der Schulfrage trafen am 16. Juli 1952 Vizekanzler Schärf, Hans Steinacher und der Kärntner Landesamtsdirektor Newole zusammen und kamen auch auf das Problem der Windischen zu sprechen:

„Herr Steinacher: Das Sprachbild ist nicht in slowenisch und deutsch zu teilen, denn es ist bei der Volkszählung auch Gemischtsprachigkeit zugelassen worden, und zwar deutsch-slowenisch, slowenisch-deutsch und windisch. Die Scheidung zwischen windisch und slowenisch ist am schärfsten. ‚Was slowenisch ist, das zieht hinunter, was windisch ist, zieht hinauf.‘ Windisch-deutsch und deutsch-windisch haben wir 2 1/2 mal so viel als slowenisch. Die Windischen wollen sich nicht zu den Slowenen rechnen. In der Hochsprache wollen sie die deutsche Erziehung, nicht die slowenische Sprache. Daher muss man die Windischen mit berücksichtigen. Das Windische wird von slowenischer Seite stärker bekämpft als das Deutsche. Daher müsste man auch die Schuleinteilung dementsprechend machen.

Vizekanzler: Das hieße die windische Nation gegen die Slowenen aufziehen. Das ist aber zu kostspielig.

Newole: Windisch ist ein Bekenntnis. Unter der Zahl der Slowenen sind 3000 fremde Staatsangehörige enthalten (Jugoslawen), nur 1800 [sic] österreichische Slowenen wohnen in dem Gebiet. Es ist sicher richtig, dass eine Agitation der Slowenen gegen die Windischen gemacht wurde. Bei Zugrundelegung der 20% kann man die Liste alle 10 Jahre revidieren. Die Slowenen in Kärnten sind auf die Dauer nicht zu retten.“³²

Aus allen diesen Gründen entstand eine neue Gruppe im Jahre 1957, der *Bund der Windischen* unter der Führung von Valentin Einspieler, der ein zuvor schon den Satz zum Programm erhoben hatte: „Die Frage der Windischen ist der archimedische Punkt der Kärntner Frage.“³³ Einspieler erneuerte die wohlbekannten Argumente seit den Tagen der Habsburgermonarchie, aber er beanspruchte nie, eine eigene windische Sprache zu schaffen. Ganz im Gegensatz dazu war er, wie ich vom ehemaligen Direktor des Slowenischen Gymnasiums in Klagenfurt erfahren habe, einer der von den dort Studierenden gefürchtetste Prüfer in slowenischer Sprache bei der Matura.

Wir verstehen daher, dass das Wiedererstehen des Windischen anderen, hauptsächlich politisch-ideologischen Gründen gehorchte, und eben mehr als es noch im der Zwischenkriegszeit gewesen sein konnte, den antikommunistischen Einstellungen ihrer Mitglieder. Wie Valentin Einspieler selbst noch im Jahre 1981 betonte, wurde der *Bund Kärntner Windischer* gegründet, „um dem von Theodor

³² Bundesministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Z. 155.084-Pol/52.

³³ Laggner 1981, S. 47.

Weiter unterstützten Anspruch der Slowenenführung als Sprecher auch für den windischen Bevölkerungsteil aufzutreten, entgegenzutreten.“³⁴

Der *Bund der Windischen* war also nach dieser Äußerung gar nicht gedacht, eine Sammlungsbewegung aller sich als Windische fühlenden Personen zu bilden. Das hätte ja auch die Gefahr mit sich gebracht, dass die Zahl der Windischen an der Zahl der Vereinsmitglieder gemessen worden wäre. Der *Bund* war nach eigener Auffassung Einspielers ein Agitationsmittel einiger weniger maßgeblicher Personen aus dem gemischtsprachigen Gebiet, also möglicherweise auch deutschsprachiger opinion leaders, mit der sozusagen fremdbestimmenden Absicht, „ausschließlich über die Eigenart und ihre Einstellung der Windischen aufzuklären.“³⁵

Was können wir also aus der Angelegenheit der Windischen lernen? Manche werden beanspruchen, Windisch können nur als Vorstellung, als Einbildung, als Aberglauben verstanden werden, wenngleich eingebunden in eine höhere Ebene aner kennenswerter Werte. Moritsch hat einmal betont, dass Windische, die sich als solche bei der Volkszählung 1939 bekannten, in einer gewissen Weise auch Resistenz gezeigt hätten, weil sie sich nicht in den nationalen Kampf eingegliedert wissen wollten, aber an anderer Stelle meinte er auch wieder, dass Windische möglicherweise gar nicht existierten.³⁶

Aber auf der anderen Seite müssen wir anerkennen, dass sich Windische als solche selbst bezeichnet haben, und dass sie vor allem diesen Begriff freiwillig während der Volkszählungen akzeptiert haben, wenn auch in abnehmender Zahl (888 in 1991; 555 in 2001) und Verhältniszahl (minus 37,5% 2001 verglichen mit 1991). Wir können also nicht sagen, dass Windische nicht existiert hätten, gerade wenn sie und weil sie erfunden oder in einem weiteren Sinn des Begriffs eingebildet sind. Sie akzeptierten – aber in welchem Ausmaß – nicht Slowenen genannt zu werden, aber gleichzeitig auch nicht Deutsche zu sein. (Was immer in diesem Sinne Deutschsein heißen mag). Und sie akzeptierten es nicht nur durch strukturelle Gewalt, sondern auch weil diese Zwischenstellung auf sie eine bestimmte Anziehungskraft ausübte.

Dagegen spricht wieder, dass in der empirischen Untersuchung von Reiterer und Flaschberger aus dem Jahre 1980 schließlich hervorging, dass es kein typisches Charakteristikum eines Windischen gebe. Die Windischen, so schrieben sie, könnten nur negativ definiert werden.³⁷

In sich wandelnden Gesellschaften wie unseren können Leute mit rasch wechselnden Einstellungen und Verhaltensweisen, die durch immer mehr globalisierten Medienkonsum und immer intensiveren Kommunikationsaustausch bestimmt sind, alle in einem gewissen Sinne „Windische“ genannt werden. Das wäre nicht so schlimm, wenn es bewusst und aktiv geschieht. Das heißt, dass wir immer mehr zu transitorischen Persönlichkeiten werden, deren nationale, regionale und kulturelle Lebensart weltweit beeinflusst wird und weltweiten Design-Netzen folgt. Wir machen alles ein wenig in unterschiedlicher Weise, aber

³⁴ Laggner 1981, S. 38.

³⁵ Einspieler an Laggner, 20. 7. 1981 in: Laggner 1981, S. 38f.

³⁶ Moritsch 1995, S. 15 und S. 28f.

³⁷ Flaschberger, Ludwig/ Albert F.Reiterer: Der tägliche Abwehrkampf. Erscheinungsformen und Strategien der ethnischen Assimilation bei den Kärntner Slowenen. Wien 1980. S. 70.

wir gebrauchen dieselben Medien, um sie zu vermitteln, ähnlich wie alle Nationalstaaten ihre eigenen Nationalflaggen und Nationalhymnen beanspruchen, und doch sind es immer weltweit Flaggen und Hymnen.

Windische könnten daher in einer solchen Denkweise und in multikulturellem Sinn weitere Phänomene beschreiben als dies bisher der Fall war. Auf der anderen Seite gibt es eine große Nachfrage nach Grenzen und Begrenzungen und Abgrenzungen, um unsere persönlichen und Gruppenidentitäten zu bewahren, vielleicht einfach nur, um in einer elektronisch praktisch grenzenlos gewordenen Welt, sich der Grenzen des eigenen Körpers bewusst zu werden und bewusst zu bleiben. Grenzen und Abgrenzungen solcher Art, die eine Form von Gruppenidentität und Gruppenintimität erlauben, sollten respektiert werden, aber gleichzeitig muss es bewusst bleiben, dass sie durchlässig, durchgängig, wechselhaft und an neue Notwendigkeiten und neuen Wünschen zu orientieren sein müssen.

Es nützt also nichts, wenn wir anstatt nationaler Begriffe oder anstatt von transformativen Begriffen, wie eben das Windische, den Begriff europäisch wählen, weil wir die gleiche Problematik nur jenseits neuer Grenzen mit unterschiedlichen Namen und Identitäten wiederfinden. Es geht also tatsächlich, wie das *Der Standard* richtig verstanden hat, um das *crossover*, aber mit verschiedenen, nicht nur einem Zentrum, im Aufbau eines offenen Netzwerkes, in dem Kontraste und Ähnlichkeiten akzeptiert und nicht sofort als feststehende Attribute und noch dazu in hierarchischer Abfolge abgehandelt werden.

In historischer Hinsicht ist das in Kärnten gescheitert, ja war, so viel auch vom friedlichen Zusammenleben in der Vergangenheit auch geplaudert wird, niemals beabsichtigt gewesen. Die Konstruktion des Windischen erfolgte daher nicht symmetrisch aus slowenischen und deutschen Elementen, um den einigen windischen Kämtner (und Kämtnerin) zu schaffen, sondern war nichts anderes als ein Herrschaftsmittel zur Erzeugung eines stabilen Grenzraums zwischen dem Deutschen und dem als minderwertig kategorisierten Slowenischen mit der Chance des Übergangs. Die gewöhnlichen, alltäglichen Vermischungsformen, wie Mehrsprachigkeit, soziokultureller Sprachwechsel, auch Sprachmischung, transkulturelle Lebensweisen und interkulturelle Sozialisationsformen werden dabei ignoriert, ja bekämpft und zugunsten der Idee homogener und gemeinschaftlicher Blöcke verlassen, die in ihrer Konstruktion die Images kultureller Überlegenheit des Deutschen ausbildeten, die sich in der Stabilisierung politischer Macht der "Deutschen" auch über sie selbst ausdrückt. Die wohlgesicherten Instrumente deutscher politischer Gestaltung im öffentlichen Raum und im Bildungssystem sperrten der slowenischsprachigen Bevölkerung gleichzeitig den Zugang zur eigenen Hochsprache ab, das hieß, sie – eben ganz im Gegensatz zu den vielfältigen sprachlichen Verkehrsformen in der deutschen Sprache – in ihren dialektalen Abgrenzungen einzusperren und auszuschließen. So viel man es dreht und wendet, windisch ist daher eine Residualkategorie, die, funktionslos geworden, schwinden muss. Das erklärt dann auch besser die Einschätzung Claus Gatterers, der Windisch als einen "vorwiegend psychologischen Zustand, nicht die Zugehörigkeit zu etwas"³⁸ bezeichnete.

³⁸ Gatterer, Claus: Österreich und seine Minderheiten. In: Arbeit und Wirtschaft 4, 1973, S.9-18, S.14.

Abstract

The German language does not distinguish between the two terms which in English with *limits* and *frontiers or borders* are used to describe and analyse different but similar phenomena explaining in which way or for what reasons people tend to include or exclude territories, persons and groups as well as ideas and proposals. German speakers always are forced to use the one and only term *Grenzen* which by the way even has been lent from the Slavic languages. This fact has been taken into consideration as a limit of perception's faculty but on the other hand it is probably true that is just why from time to time we pay more or more intense attention to events in which *limits* and *frontiers* has been coming together to tricky as well as inherent murderous politics. This is the case of the *Windischen* in Carinthia, and for a decisive period also in the other parts of the Slovenian territories.

I'd like to show in my contribution how the *Windischen* has been invented by the German nationalists in the process of competition for regional power between the Austrian Germans and the Austrian Slovenes starting in the nineties of the 19th century, that this concept has been coming to a full development since the twenties of the 20th century especially during the Nazi period in which the concept rather than used for excluding Slovenes as foreigners and enemies in Austria served to include Slovenians in a forced program of Germanization in the German occupied parts of Slovenia. The story will finally coming to an end in discussing the reasons why the *Windischen* concept was even useful after the reconstruction of Austrian democracy after the second World War and why recently this concept, already has been exhausted by lack of consensus, but probably could be re-integrated in a modernized way of dealing with minority rights.

In October 2002, when the liberal Viennese newspaper "Der Standard" started a campaign to inform Austrian people more on developments, facts and figures about the neighbouring countries which will participate on European Union next year calling "crossover" because, as they argued, "where formerly has been curtains and borders, there will be produced new neighbourhood, cultural developments and economic chances", they showed the mentioned territories from Prague to Rijeka and from Linz to Bratislava – of course with Vienna in the centre but extended even due to the format of the paper. National borders has been not any more drawn in the map, so for national orientation should be sufficient the use of local names. Those local names You could find sometimes monolingual, sometimes bilingual: For example Laibach and Marburg, showing Ljubljana and Maribor in brackets, but – who knows why – contrarily firstly Bled and only then Veldes in brackets. And of course even Prag and Preßburg is mentioned prior to Praha and Bratislava. But there is one exception – it will astonish You or not – the Austrian case: Wien is called only Wien as well as Klagenfurt, Villach and Graz are mentioned only in their German version.

It's only a year ago – and in the meantime, to tell the truth "Der Standard" has changed a little bit his policy in names – promising new developments in informing about these countries even in a liberal Viennese newspaper we can perceive the last resort of an attitude and of a past century's policy already regarded as vanished for ever. It seemed like the ongoing of an Austrian collective unconsciousness – probably only in part of the Austrians, which seems deeply rooted, the locked out memory on an apparently lost power, an unconscious collective desire to regain something like that at least in geography. For we cannot deny that from power you get the names, from time to time limited, yes, by courtesy.

Somebody will think that such a story is'nt worth while to mention. But in my opinion the case I told You is more than the trough of an long forgotten thunderstorm but even so neglectable as it is we can perceive in it the same spirit of indifference, of arrogance and of appropriation as we will find it in the construction, in the maintainence and political-ideological use of a group of whom I will deal with in the next few minutes at my disposal: The case of the Windischen.

I am not the first and neither the only in telling the story of the so called Windischen people. We can find a lot of literature on them, covering the scientific field as well as political-ideological pamphlets in sustaining, in denying as well as in explaining the problem of the Windischen in slovene and in German language. I could not find any publication or discussion of the problem in Windisch. And this is right the first problem we have to deal with. It is very often spoken about Windische, it is very often written about them, but they themselves are difficult to individuate because of their - I'd like to call it - covering behind the borders of national fights on both sides. In Austria dealt with the problem Haas/Stuhlpfarrer, Gero Fischer, Monitsch continuously in different occasions and publications; on the other side of the borders, meant as geographical: meant as political-ideological:

To pronounce it clear, Windische are counted first in Austria in 1939 when Nazi Germany including Austria had her general census, the Austrian Republic continued to do it after the second World War for appearant reasons as we will see later on and even during the last Austrian census of 2001 we can find a small number of persons in Carinthia who insisted to speak usually Windisch. So there is during this whole period one frontier not difficult to visualize but even not to cross: the vertical lines in the tabular forms of the census publications between German speaking, Slovene Speaking and Windisch speaking persons enriched by all possible combinations. On the other side there are no corresponding opinions since when Windisch do exist, where they are living, and even if they would really existing.

Nathalie CLAYER

FRONTIÈRE POLITIQUE, FRONTIÈRE ETHNIQUE ET ÉTAT-NATION L'EXEMPLE DE LA RÉGION-FRONTIÈRE ALBANO-GRECQUE DANS L'ENTRE-DEUX-GUERRES

De nombreuses analyses placent la situation de la minorité grecque, qui vit au sud de l'Albanie à la frontière avec la Grèce, au cœur des relations, souvent tendues, qui se sont développées entre les deux pays depuis la création de cette frontière au début du XX^e siècle. Les mauvais traitements infligés à la minorité auraient périodiquement entraîné des refroidissements entre les deux pays. Cette vision qui reproduit des discours diplomatiques pose problème. Car c'est généralement l'inverse qui se produit: la nature des relations entre les deux pays a une influence sur la situation de la minorité. Qui plus est, la situation des "membres de la minorité" est généralement beaucoup plus complexe que la rhétorique associée à la "question des minorités" ne le laisse penser. La frontière entre minorité et majorité se construit et n'est jamais stable. De plus, bien des facteurs autres que la politique étrangère des deux États entrent en jeu dans la situation et dans la position des membres de la minorité: des éléments de politique intérieure, de politique internationale, des facteurs économiques et sociaux ou encore des stratégies individuelles et de groupe. À ce sujet, il est intéressant de se pencher sur la période de l'entre-deux-guerres, lors de la fondation de l'État albanais et de l'établissement de la frontière albanais-grecque, qui donnent naissance à cette "minorité grecque". À cette époque, la politique de construction des États-nations devait conduire à l'homogénéisation ethno-nationale, tout en respectant de près ou de loin les droits des minorités reconnus devant la Société des Nations. Cette instance internationale avait elle-même avalisé des transferts de populations, comme le célèbre échange opéré entre la Turquie et la Grèce en 1923, et avait donc aussi contribué à des processus d'homogénéisation ethno-nationaux.

Située à la frontière grecque, la région de Gjirokastrër où s'est constituée la minorité s'est trouvée placée à la fois en marge et au cœur du processus de construction de l'État-nation albanais. Sur le plan économique, comme en ce qui concerne le développement des communications, elle est restée, tout au long de la période de l'entre-deux-guerres, relativement en marge de ce processus. Dans ces domaines, la priorité fut donnée à l'Albanie centrale, c'est-à-dire à la région de Tirana, la nouvelle capitale, et du port le plus proche, Durrës. Dans un contexte de crise économique, les moyens financiers de l'État albanais étaient extrêmement faibles pour développer d'autres régions. D'autre part, l'économie était gérée selon un mode semi-colonial, car elle était indirectement dirigée par le gouvernement italien, dont l'emprise sur l'Albanie du roi Zog s'accrut de jour en jour: l'accent était mis sur l'extraction de matières premières et à l'exploitation de grands domaines. Mais ceux-ci étaient pratiquement absents dans la région de Gjiro-

kastër.¹ Dans les années 1920-1930, la métropole régionale stagna, tant sur le plan économique que sur le plan démographique (autour de 8 à 10000 habitants), tandis que des villes, situées dans les plaines des provinces plus septentrionales connaissaient une expansion. Dans la région, seul le port de Sarandë – autrefois une petite échelle levantine – connut un certain développement. Toutefois, sa population ne dépassa jamais les deux mille habitants.² L'économie de la région reposait essentiellement sur l'élevage et sur l'émigration. Une grande partie de la population continuait en effet à aller chercher fortune loin de chez elle. Même si les liens avec la capitale du nouvel État se renforcèrent dans les années 1930, la province de Gjirokastër resta donc très tournée vers ces terres d'émigration, parmi lesquelles la Grèce, de l'autre côté de la frontière, où l'on allait commercer, travailler ou encore se faire soigner.³

Pourtant, si l'on considère la politique de "nationalisation de la société" sur la base d'un territoire,⁴ d'un ordre politique, d'une culture et d'une langue nationale, la région de Gjirokastër s'est trouvée, à la même époque, non plus à la marge, mais au cœur du processus de construction de l'État-nation albanais. Il s'agissait de déhelléniser et d'albaniser cette région où la culture grecque avait longtemps prédominé et où la frontière semblait menacée par la Grèce voisine. Car la nation sur son territoire était considérée comme un être vivant, menacé de maladie ou de mort par toute présence d'une autre langue ou d'une autre culture.⁵ L'éducation "nationale" fut un outil privilégié de cette politique de diffusion de la langue et de la culture albanaise. C'est à travers elle que nous allons examiner les rapports entre frontière étatique, frontière ethnique séparant une "minorité" grecque et une "majorité" albanaise, et construction de l'État-nation.

1. Trois phases dans la construction de la "minorité grecque"

Si l'on examine la construction de la "minorité grecque" à travers le prisme de la question de l'éducation, trois grandes phases apparaissent. La première va de 1913 à 1923-1924. Durant cette dizaine d'années la frontière oscille. Elle ne sera

¹ Voir Sjöberg Örjan, *Rural Change and Development in Albania*, Boulder, 1991 p. 22.

² Ibid., p. 28. Voir également Tirta Mark, *Migrime te Shqiptarëve* (Les migrations des Albanais), Etnografia Shqiptare 18, Tirana, 1999 p. 89.

³ En 1922, un peu plus de 5700 habitants de la préfecture de Gjirokastrë quittèrent le pays en l'espace de dix mois, dont près de la moitié pour la Grèce, un peu moins d'un tiers pour la Turquie et environ 15% pour les États-Unis. Lors de la crise mondiale, ces chiffres diminuèrent, tout en restant élevés: en 1929, la préfecture perd plus de 2600 de ses habitants et 1800 en 1930. Tirta, *op. cit.*, p. 135 et 150.

⁴ Noiriel Gérard, *État, nation et immigration. Vers une histoire du pouvoir*, Paris, 2001 p. 125ss.

⁵ Ainsi dans les années 1920-1930 il n'était pas rare de trouver chez des fonctionnaires albanais de divers rangs des exclamations du genre: "quel remède trouver à cette maladie?", à propos de l'usage courant du grec à Sarandë. Arkivi Qendror i Shtetit (Archives centrales de l'État) (AQSh), Tirana. F. 494, Prefektura e Gjirokastrës (La préfecture de Gjirokastrë), Viti 1927, dosja 215. Mais dans le même temps la nation pouvait aussi être envisagée en dehors de son territoire, lorsqu'il était question des Albanais de Grèce ou de Yougoslavie.

définitivement fixée qu'en 1923, et officiellement reconnue par la Grèce en 1925. La région connaît diverses occupations et administrations – occupation grecque à partir de mars 1913, autonomie vorio-épirote entre mars et octobre 1914, nouvelle occupation grecque jusqu'en 1916, occupation italienne de 1916 à 1920 – avant d'être définitivement rattachée à l'Albanie. La structure étatique albanaise ne se met donc en place qu'à partir de 1920, dans un contexte politique qui restera extrêmement instable jusqu'au "retour" d'Ahmed Zogu à la fin de l'année 1924. L'existence de "minorités" n'est reconnue par les dirigeants albanais, à la demande des représentants de la Grèce, qu'en 1921-22 devant la Société des Nations. Cet acte apparaît comme une condition à la reconnaissance de l'État albanais par la Société des Nations.⁶

Du point de vue de l'éducation, il s'agit d'une période de mise en place, de tâtonnement et de transition, héritée à la fois de l'époque ottomane et des changements qui s'étaient entre-temps produits, comme la suppression de l'enseignement grec par les Italiens entre 1916 et 1920. La frontière minorité/majorité, contestée par une partie de la population orthodoxe et par les autorités grecques, résulte de cet état de fait. L'État albanais commence une politique de nationalisation, mais de façon non systématique. Il instaure un contrôle partiel des écoles grecques à travers la nomination d'enseignants officiels, côtoyant des instituteurs payés par les villageois. La langue albanaise est introduite dans certains de ces établissements.⁷ Pour les différents acteurs, les frontières religieuses, régionales et sociales restent les frontières les plus importantes dans la société.

La seconde phase correspond à la décennie suivante (1925-1935). Le processus de construction étatique, désormais mené par le président puis roi Ahmet Zogu, devient plus ferme. Une politique de nationalisation est menée par les autorités albanaises, dorénavant de façon systématique. Ces autorités ont l'espoir de faire coïncider, à terme, la frontière ethnique avec la frontière étatique. Les membres de la minorité ne sont d'ailleurs que rarement désignés comme Grecs: ils sont "grécophones", leurs écoles sont "alloglotes".⁸ Des mesures concrètes sont prises, allant dans le sens de l'introduction de la langue albanaise, puis de l'albanisation progressive des écoles grecques jusqu'à leur nationalisation. L'État albanais n'aura cependant jamais les moyens financiers suffisants pour assurer une éducation de

⁶ Papadakis B. P., *Histoire diplomatique de la question nord-épirote (1912-1927)*, Athènes, 1958; Kondis Basil, *Greece and Albania 1908-1914*, Thessalonique, 1976; Kondis Basil-Manda Eleftheria, *The Greek Minority in Albania. A Documentary Record, (1921-1933)*, Thessalonique, 1994; Mema Bektash-Shahu Ajeta, *Prefektura e Gjirokastrës 1920-1944* (La préfecture de Gjirokastrë), Berat, 2001; Clewing Konrad, "Der Völkerbund und Albanien 1920-1923. Eine Genfer Quelle zu Südalbanien Regionalproblemen", *Münchener Zeitschrift für Balkankunde*, vol. 10 et 11, 1996 p. 259-318; Pitouli-Kitsou Kristina, *Oi Ellinoalvanikes Skeseis kai to Vorioepirotiko Zitima kata tin periodo 1907-1914* (Les relations gréco-albanaïses et la question vorio-épirote dans les années 1907-1914), Athènes, 1997.

⁷ AQSh, fonds 295, Ministri Arsimit (ministère de l'Éducation). L'existence d'instituteurs payés par les villageois était une survivance du système en vigueur à l'époque ottomane.

⁸ Ce terme était couramment utilisé dans la correspondance des fonctionnaires albanais. AQSh, fonds 295.

niveau équivalent à celle qui préexistait, tant en nombre d'écoles qu'en niveau d'enseignement. Si durant cette période, les autorités albanaises n'ont donc pas intérêt à définir clairement la frontière ethnique entre "minorité" grecque et "majorité" albanaise, les autorités grecques qui agissent également dans ce domaine ont, elles, pour but de maintenir la frontière au niveau de la frontière religieuse. Tout orthodoxe est, dans le fond, Grec. Des mesures visent donc à intégrer des orthodoxes venant d'Albanie dans le système éducatif grec mis en place de l'autre côté de la frontière. Naturellement, cette opposition ne va pas sans tensions et négociations permanentes, également en fonction de stratégies individuelles et familiales, dictées par des considérations non seulement idéologiques, mais aussi pratiques.

En 1935, du fait de l'avis de la Cour de Justice internationale de La Haye, faisant suite aux plaintes formulées par différentes parties contre l'interdiction des écoles privées en Albanie, la situation change radicalement et l'on entre dans la troisième phase. L'ouverture d'écoles minoritaires est à nouveau autorisée. Leur développement pousse dès lors les autorités albanaises, qui utilisent davantage qu'auparavant la notion de "minoritaire", à renforcer la frontière entre Albanais et Grecs au sein de la population chrétienne orthodoxe. C'est donc à cette époque seulement que les autorités albanaises, à la suite d'un arbitrage international, sont contraintes de marquer la frontière ethnique afin de ne pas permettre au "coté grec" d'amener celle-ci jusqu'à la frontière confessionnelle et/ou de remettre en question la frontière politique.⁹

Un rapport rédigé en 1937, par le chef, musulman, de la commune de Delvinë est très éclairant à ce sujet. Le fonctionnaire informait le sous-préfet et le ministre de l'Éducation que dans certains villages "grecophones" des jeunes orthodoxes de villages "albanais" et "de race et de sang albanais", qui avaient fréquenté des écoles grecques à l'étranger, avaient été engagés par des conseils de villages grecophones pour enseigner la langue grecque. Il dénonçait cette situation qui, pensait-il, allait à l'encontre des "intérêts de la politique nationale". Car, selon lui, même si leur nomination était entérinée par le ministère de l'Éducation, ils étaient payés par les consulats grecs, et ainsi se trouvaient indirectement sous leur influence voire leurs ordres, tels des agents d'une propagande "anti-nationale". Puisqu'ils étaient "de race et de sang albanais", ils allaient tout naturellement propager le sentiment grec parmi les "orthodoxes albanais", en particulier dans leurs propres villages. En tant qu'enseignants de la langue grecque, ils allaient semer la division au sein de l'élément "orthodoxe albanais". De cette façon, "l'étincelle de la propagande d'empoisonnement et de division de l'élément orthodoxe albanais, héritée des occupations étrangères", au lieu de s'éteindre, risquait d'être ravivée. Le fonctionnaire suggérait donc d'interdire les postes d'enseignants de langue grecque

⁹ Je ne traite pas ici la période de l'occupation italienne, à partir d'avril 1939, qui entraîna d'ailleurs la remise en cause de la frontière étatique à la suite de conflits armés. Notons en outre qu'il n'est toujours pas question de minorité valaque, ou aroumaine, alors qu'une partie des orthodoxes appartient à ce groupe socio-linguistique. Sur les quelques écoles "roumaines" en fonction, voir Kostelancik David. J., "Minority and Minority Language Education in Inter-War Albania", *East European Quarterly* XXXI, Printemps 1996 p. 75-96.

aux jeunes orthodoxes albanais, et de nommer ces derniers dans les écoles d'État à la place des "grécophones" qui occupaient de nombreux postes. Le chef de la commune de Delvinë faisait même appel à une rhétorique militaire pour construire l'opposition entre Albanais et Grecs. En organisant avec une grande énergie les écoles grécophones jusque dans les plus petits villages des districts de Gjirokastër et de Himarë, en nommant des instituteurs et en accordant sans parcimonie des bourses pour des écoles grecques à l'étranger, le but des autorités grecques aurait été selon lui, d'une part, de "renforcer et armer" l'élément grécophone et d'autre part de diviser l'élément orthodoxe albanais. Par conséquent, il fallait "séparer l'élément orthodoxe de toute influence grecque" et "l'armer" d'un sentiment national, le "transformer en une forteresse nationale" contre l'élément grécophone. Partant du principe que les "éléments alloglotes", parlant d'autres langues que l'albanais, ne pouvaient absolument pas être albanisés, il fallait "éliminer systématiquement toute propagande et influence grecque chez l'élément orthodoxe albanais".¹⁰

A priori, ce rapport ne dénote rien d'autre que le sentiment d'un fonctionnaire local. Il y en eut cependant d'autres du même type, qui font penser que cette volonté était alors assez répandue dans l'administration albanaise. Au reste, à la fin de l'année 1936, le ministre de l'Éducation avait demandé à la Présidence du Conseil de réagir étant donné les importantes sommes d'argent que déversait la Grèce dans le Sud du pays. Dans la région de Himarë notamment,¹¹ il fallait, selon lui, obliger le peuple à payer les taxes, accompagner les consuls grecs de Sarandë et Vlorë quand ils y venaient et les isoler, mettre un frein à la propagande étrangère "grécomane", contrôler les "agents des consulats grecs", surveiller les chauffeurs qui livraient le courrier et les journaux, obliger les enfants de six ans et plus à suivre l'enseignement obligatoire. Le ministre expliquait même que l'administration locale devait en outre favoriser "ceux qui suivent nos écoles" et les "fidèles" en leur donnant toute liberté, tandis que les "grécomanes" devaient se voir interdire de puiser de l'eau, de battre le blé au fléau, etc.¹² En réalité l'État albanais n'eut pas les moyens de mener une telle politique coercitive, qui venait d'ailleurs un peu sur le tard. D'autre part, en dehors de sa politique d'autres facteurs entraient en jeu dans ces évolutions.

Les évolutions que je viens de décrire très rapidement révèlent trois types de phénomènes qu'il convient de cerner afin de mieux comprendre la complexité des rapports entre frontière politique, frontière ethnique – voire frontière confessionnelle – et construction de l'État nation. Ces trois phénomènes sont: l'articulation dans le cas du Sud albanais de l'entre-deux-guerres entre les questions de minorité, de frontière étatique et de territoire; la transition, à la fois complexe et partielle, des communautés orthodoxes à la minorité grecque; et, enfin, la caractéristique mouvante de cette frontière ethnique en construction, liée à une définition collective, ainsi qu'à des parcours individuels.

¹⁰ AQS, fonds 295, v. 1937, d. 149, feuillets 1-3.

¹¹ Située le long de la côte adriatique, la région de Himarë est montagneuse. Elle avait joui à l'époque ottomane d'une autonomie et de privilèges qui lui ont donné une identité spécifique.

¹² AQS, fonds 295, v. 1936, d. 146, feuillets 21-23.

2. Les questions de minorité, de frontière étatique et de territoire

On a vu que d'un point de vue international, la souveraineté de l'Albanie, et par conséquent son territoire et ses frontières n'avaient été reconnus par la Société des Nations qu'à la condition que les droits des minorités soient respectés. Les liens qui unissent la question de la minorité à celles du territoire et de la frontière séparant les deux pays ne pouvaient donc qu'être très forts. Pour les autorités albanaises elles-mêmes, il a existé un rapport étroit entre la notion de minorité et la proximité de la frontière. Les grecophones du village de Nardë, près de Vlorë, situé plus loin de la frontière et ayant peu de rapport avec la Grèce, n'ont jamais été pris en compte dans la minorité.¹³ La région frontière était d'ailleurs considérée comme la seule zone où l'on pouvait être "contaminé" par des "sentiments grecs". Pour protéger les jeunes instituteurs "albanais orthodoxes" de toute "contamination", le chef de la commune de Delvinë suggérait, dans le rapport déjà mentionné, de les nommer d'abord en Albanie du Nord ou en Albanie centrale, c'est-à-dire de les éloigner de la région frontalière, jusqu'à ce qu'ils montrent un "bon comportement" et un "bon état d'esprit".¹⁴ D'autre part, l'intégrité territoriale semblait devoir entraîner la négation de tout caractère ethnique de la minorité. La grecité était d'ailleurs souvent considérée comme non-autochtone sur le territoire national, contrairement à l'albanité de la majorité. Soit les Grecs étaient venus s'installer relativement récemment dans cette région albanaise,¹⁵ soit il y avait eu hellénisation d'une partie de la population albanaise autochtone.¹⁶ D'où l'utilisation du terme de "grecophones", pour désigner les membres de la minorité.

Pour les autorités albanaises chargées de mettre en œuvre la politique de nationalisation de la société, le voisinage de la Grèce a également joué un rôle déterminant. Dans la région frontalière en particulier, la construction nationale s'est nécessairement faite par rapport à la Grèce, la frontière devenant même un miroir. Le principe de réciprocité était évoqué et éventuellement appliqué de part et d'autre. Les développements économiques et politiques se faisaient, ou étaient vus en miroir. La politique de nationalisation de la société menée par les administrateurs locaux, qui associaient celle-ci aux "intérêts d'État", était étroitement liée à la vision – réelle ou imaginaire – qu'ils avaient de l'activité de différents acteurs du côté albanais, mais aussi et surtout du côté grec de la frontière. Leur attitude était donc souvent guidée par les notions de danger, de suspicion et de réciprocité, qui semblaient propres à la région frontière.

¹³ Sur ce groupe, voir Clewing, art. cit., p. 285, note 656; Lotz Karl, "Die völkischen Minderheiten Albanien", *Petermanns Geographische Mitteilungen*, 3-4/1930 p. 72-78.

¹⁴ Voir note 10.

¹⁵ Au début des années 1930, un jeune enseignant originaire de Himarë expliquait aux paysans d'un village du Dropull que leurs ancêtres avaient été amenés là par des "féodaux" pour travailler leurs terres. Marko Petro, *Intervistë me vetveten (retë dhe guret)* (Interview avec soi-même. Aux jeunes et aux pierres), Tirana, 2000 p. 106.

¹⁶ Plusieurs expressions utilisées dans des rapports administratifs attestent cette vision. Certains affirmaient que la langue albanaise s'était éteinte dans les villages du Dropull. De même, trois villages de la région de Himarë n'avaient que récemment adopté le grec. AQSh, fonds 295, v. 1925, d. 12, feuillets 5-6, lettre de l'inspecteur au ministère du 21 janvier 1925; v. 1936, d. 146, feuillet 338, lettre du ministre de l'Éducation à la Présidence du conseil du 17 novembre 1936.

Prenons l'exemple d'un rapport rédigé en 1932 par Jani Minga, l'inspecteur de l'enseignement de la province, et adressé à son ministère à propos de la propagande grecque. Il comparait d'abord l'Épire du Nord, pour les Grecs, à ce qu'avait été l'Alsace-Lorraine pour les Français avant la Première guerre mondiale. Il voyait la propagande vorio-épirote comme reposant sur une forte organisation, avec un programme systématique, sous la direction du métropolite de Ioannina, Spiridon. Cette propagande s'appuyait sur un réseau d'écoles secondaires implantées sciemment le long de la frontière,¹⁷ dans le but de faire de garçons et de filles originaires d'un côté et de l'autre de la frontière "des soldats de l'esprit et de l'idéal grec" en Çamëri, là où l'albanais était parlé,¹⁸ et en Albanie, où le grec était en usage.¹⁹ Pour lui, les diplômés de l'École normale de Ioannina n'étaient rien d'autres que "des soldats actifs de l'esprit grec" remplissant une mission "apostolique" dans les écoles grecophones, en lien avec le centre de Ioannina qui leur allouait une pension. C'est pourquoi, d'après lui, ces écoles privées grecophones étaient dans tous les sens du terme "des casernes de militaires grecs sans uniforme". Après avoir décrit cette machine de guerre, l'auteur du rapport faisait appel à la notion de réciprocité. Puisque pour éradiquer la langue albanaise en Çamëri, la propagande grecque avait fait en sorte qu'il y ait un instituteur et une institutrice dans chaque village, que la langue albanaise y était strictement interdite non seulement à l'intérieur de l'école, mais aussi en dehors, jusque dans les foyers, il était temps de prendre des mesures de ce côté de la frontière, concernant l'organisation des écoles grecophones.²⁰ Même si cela coûtait de l'argent, il fallait ouvrir, dans les villages les plus importants, des écoles officielles avec des enseignants albanais capables, et faire un effort pour l'éducation des filles, comme le faisaient les Grecs en Çamëri.²¹ Même si cette description reposait en partie sur de la suspicion et des suppositions, il est vrai que, du côté grec, la question de la minorité restait liée à celle de l'existence de la frontière.

Lorsque la question des écoles fut portée devant la Cour Internationale de justice en 1935, le discours des autorités grecques fit apparaître ce lien fondamental. Pour le représentant du gouvernement hellénique, Nicolas Politis, la



- ¹⁷ Ce réseau, au sein duquel de jeunes orthodoxes venaient étudier - souvent avec des bourses - se composait du gymnase classique de Ioannina, une école normale hiératique avec internat à Vella, une école normale à Ioannina avec internat, une école normale de jeunes filles pour les écoles maternelles à Filat/Filiates, un gymnase de garçons avec internat également à Filiates ainsi qu'un gymnase avec internat à Voshtinë/Pogoniani. Corfou, Delvinaki, Vurbjan et Konitsa possédaient également de tels établissements. AQSh, fonds 295, v. 1928, d. 5, feuillets 1-4; v. 1929, d. 390, feuillets 8-12; v. 1932, d. 110, feuillets 61-65. Fonds 494, v. 1932, d. 580, lettre du préfet du 3 mai 1932.
- ¹⁸ Région de Grèce, au sud de la frontière avec l'Albanie, où vivaient de nombreux albanophones, chrétiens et musulmans.
- ¹⁹ L'auteur précisait que l'école normale de hiératique de Vella regroupait 89 boursiers de cette préfecture et de celle de Korça.
- ²⁰ Jani Minga en appelait là non aux "droits des minorités" mais aux "droits d'un État libre et indépendant".
- ²¹ AQSh, fonds 295, v. 1932, d. 110, feuillets 61-65, rapport de l'inspecteur Jani Minga au ministre de l'Éducation, 1er août 1932.

Grèce avait renoncé à la souveraineté sur l'Épire du Nord, à condition que des droits soient donnés à la minorité. Il ajoutait: "Les garanties recherchées obstinément par la Grèce au profit de la minorité grecque en Albanie, garanties qui ont pour but le maintien des droits traditionnels de la minorité grecque, étaient et continuent à être le moyen de faire oublier les déceptions qui ont pu être éprouvées au moment de la fixation des frontières".²² Le renoncement à la souveraineté n'était d'ailleurs pas si clair, puisque, dans le même discours, était souligné le fait que la minorité grecque était présente depuis des millénaires dans ce foyer de l'hellénisme qu'on appelait en Grèce, l'Épire du Nord, formant un ensemble historique et ethnographique avec l'Épire du Sud et sa capitale Ioannina.²³ La rhétorique irrédentiste était toutefois nettement plus prononcée dans les milieux vorio-épirotes, ainsi que dans les cercles ecclésiastiques. Vasilios, l'ancien métropolite de Gjirokastër, chassé d'Albanie, était devenu métropolite à Delvinaq/Delvinaki, de l'autre côté de la frontière. Sa juridiction était censée s'étendre sur les régions situées en territoire albanais: Drinopolos/Dropull, Gjirokastër, Delvinë, Himarë et Pogoniani/Pogon. En 1932, il lançait un appel de fonds auprès des chrétiens épirotes émigrés en Amérique, afin de construire une résidence qui serait pour les Épirotes irrédents "comme une forteresse et comme un coffre où seraient conservés les souvenirs ecclésiastico-nationaux de l'Épire non libérée".²⁴

Au reste, les autorités grecques mirent un certain temps à reconnaître concrètement la frontière. En 1921, elles ne donnaient pas encore de passeport aux citoyens grecs qui se rendaient dans les régions de Gjirokastër et de Korçë, ne considérant pas ces régions comme des provinces albanaises.²⁵ Par la suite, les autorités locales auraient eu des attitudes différenciées vis-à-vis des citoyens albanais qui franchissaient la frontière, selon qu'ils étaient musulmans ou chrétiens. À certaines époques, dans le cas où ils n'avaient pas de visa, par exemple, les musulmans auraient été refoulés, tandis que les chrétiens pouvaient passer moyennant le paiement d'une amende.²⁶

Au-delà de ces pratiques, la frontière n'avait pas la même signification pour tous. Les lois mises en place donnèrent des facilités de passage, avec simple laisser-passer, aux habitants des villages frontaliers, soit pour effectuer un travail agricole dans un rayon de deux kilomètres, soit pour rendre visite aux familles dans un rayon de quinze kilomètres. Mais, en dehors de cette législation qui touchait les frontaliers, de nombreux citoyens albanais ignoraient tout simplement la frontière ne demandant ni laisser-passer, ni passeport. D'après les données fournies par les autorités albanaises qui recensaient ces passages illégaux, la

²² Cité dans Papadakis, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 108-110.

²⁴ AQSh, fonds 494, v. 1932, d. 576, circulaire du préfet aux sous-préfets et copie au ministère, 5 juillet 1932

²⁵ AQSh, fonds 252, v. 1921, d. 742, feuillet 2, circulaire du ministre de l'Intérieur aux préfetures, 2 mars 1921.

²⁶ AQSh, fonds 494, v. 1928, d. 250, le préfet au bureau secret du ministère de l'Intérieur, 26 mai 1928

grande majorité des contrevenants étaient des chrétiens orthodoxes, originaires des villages grecophones situés non loin de la frontière. Les départs avaient été motivés, dans la plupart des cas, par la nécessité de trouver du travail en Grèce ou ailleurs. Une partie des jeunes qui quittaient ainsi illégalement le pays le faisaient pour échapper au service militaire, d'autres pour se rendre dans un établissement scolaire de l'autre côté de la frontière. Certains, mais ils étaient plus rares, étaient partis pour rendre visite à de la famille ou se faire soigner.²⁷ Il est difficile de savoir s'il ne s'agissait que de la rémanence d'une situation passée ou d'une volonté délibérée de ne pas s'intégrer à l'ordre étatique albanais, qui n'offrait pas les garanties attendues, ni dans le domaine de l'éducation ni sur le plan économique, et qui était par ailleurs perçu par certains comme un ordre "musulman". Cette population, dont la situation économique était souvent précaire, était en effet coutumière de l'émigration et disposait de réseaux qui la menait vers la Grèce. Elle avait aussi été habituée, jusqu'à la révolution jeune turque et même au-delà, à ne pas servir sous les armes. En outre, on peut se demander si cette négation de la frontière étatique était liée à une affirmation politique et identitaire ou à une simple proximité de la frontière. Car les liens avec la Grèce, l'émigration, la distanciation vis-à-vis du pouvoir étaient des phénomènes qui touchaient une grande partie de la population chrétienne de la province, grecophone ou non.

3. Des "communautés orthodoxes" à la "minorité grecque"

Pendant toute la période de l'entre-deux-guerres et même au-delà, la frontière confessionnelle entre chrétiens et musulmans est restée un facteur déterminant dans les rapports politiques et sociaux au sein de la société étudiée. De ce fait, les relations entre cette frontière confessionnelle et la frontière majorité/minorité en construction ont toujours été complexes.

Dans les discours officiels définissant les droits de la minorité, il faut remarquer que l'on est passé des "communautés orthodoxes" à la "minorité grecque", donnant à l'appartenance confessionnelle un poids important dans la définition de cette minorité. Dans le Protocole de Corfou, signé entre les représentants épirotes et la Commission internationale de contrôle qui administrait les territoires albanais en 1914, des garanties avaient été données aux communautés orthodoxes vivant dans les territoires évacués par les troupes helléniques, formant les provinces de Gjirokastër et de Korçë. Ces garanties concernaient notamment la représentation proportionnelle des diverses confessions dans la gendarmerie, l'organisation religieuse et l'enseignement en langue grecque.²⁸ Dans le protocole de Kapishtica signé en 1920, concernant uniquement la région de Korçë, la liberté des "Grecs", de leurs écoles et de leurs églises était reconnue, mais "grec" semble avoir eu dans ce document la signification d'orthodoxe ou de partisan de la Grèce.²⁹ Un an plus tard, le représentant de l'Albanie faisait une déclaration

²⁷ Voir les nombreux rapports dans le fonds de la préfecture de Gjirokastër (AQSh, fonds 494).

²⁸ Papadakis, *op. cit.*, p. 36-41.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 59-62.

devant la Société des Nations, concernant les droits des "minorités de religion, de race ou de langue", accordant à leurs membres "un droit égal à maintenir, diriger et contrôler à leurs frais ou à créer à l'avenir des institutions charitables, religieuses ou sociales, des écoles et autres établissements d'éducation, avec le droit d'y faire librement usage de leur propre langue et d'y exercer librement leur religion".³⁰ Plusieurs critères (confessionnel, linguistique et racial) étaient donc susceptibles de déterminer les minorités, y compris simultanément. Le rapport de la commission d'enquête envoyée en Albanie en 1922-1923 par la Société des Nations s'étendait d'ailleurs davantage sur la "minorité de religion", les chrétiens du Sud du pays face aux musulmans, que sur la "minorité de langue", les grecophones – c'est-à-dire les "Grecs de langue maternelle" – face aux albanophones.³¹

Dans l'entre-deux-guerres, l'État albanais lui-même a géré sa population d'abord en fonction du critère religieux. L'état civil, les recensements, les demandes de bourses, tenaient compte de la religion. En ce qui concerne la population de la province de Gjirokastrë, on trouve dans les Archives de l'État albanais des tableaux de la population, faisant apparaître aussi les identités linguistiques.³² Mais le premier critère reste toujours le critère confessionnel. En 1921, un tableau avait ainsi été dressé, qui faisait apparaître la division musulman/orthodoxe d'une part, et la division albanophone/bilingue de l'autre, ce qui était encore une façon d'albaniser les grecophones.³³ Une liste dressée en 1942 donnait le nombre d'habitants par commune (*bashkia*), classés en musulmans et orthodoxes, tandis qu'une colonne supplémentaire indiquait le nombre de minoritaires (*minoritar*) parmi les orthodoxes.³⁴ Par ailleurs, après 1925, la représentation verticale des citoyens se faisait également en fonction des appartenances confessionnelles. La proportion de députés musulmans, orthodoxes et catholiques reflétait l'importance relative des communautés religieuses dans chaque préfecture.³⁵ Il est vrai cependant que le pouvoir veilla toujours à ce que, au sein de la représentation orthodoxe de la préfecture de Gjirokastrë, se trouvent un, puis deux députés grecophones, reflétant l'existence de la minorité.³⁶ Les altérités religieuses intervenaient en outre dans les relations de pouvoir. Dans cette province frontalière, il ne fut pas rare que la nomination d'administrateurs catholiques, c'est-à-dire ni musulmans ni orthodoxes, soit suggérée ou décidée. En

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 95-96.

³¹ Clewing, art. cit., p. 288 ss.

³² Dans la publication *Shqipëria më 1927* (L'Albanie en 1927), les statistiques de population étaient présentées uniquement selon l'appartenance confessionnelle. L'existence d'une minorité grecque n'est pas mentionnée, sauf à propos des écoles privées de langue grecque dans la préfecture de Gjirokastrë. Selenica T., *Shqipëria më 1927*, Tirana 1928 p. 282

³³ Dans ces tableaux, on indiquait que dans les sous-préfectures de Gjirokastrë, Delvine et Libohovë, 30 866 parlaient "nikst" sur un total de 74 628. Dans les autres sous-préfectures, on n'aurait donc que des albanophones. AQSht, fonds 494, v. 1921, d. 882.

³⁴ AQSht, fonds 494, v. 1942, d. 1001.

³⁵ Cette disposition figurait dans la Constitution de 1925. Schmidt-Neke Michael, *Entstehung und Ausbau der Königsdiktatur in Albanien (1912-1939)*, Munich, 1987, p. 143

³⁶ En 1927, il y avait déjà un député grecophone en la personne de Sokrat Bozhori, *Demokratia*, n 107, 18 juin 1927 p. 1-2.

ce qui concerne les instituteurs, et en particulier ceux qui étaient envoyés dans les villages grecophones, on veilla de plus en plus à ce qu'ils ne soient pas locaux, "afin d'éviter la propagande anti-nationale soutenue par l'État grec".³⁷ Or, ces nouveaux instituteurs étaient la plupart du temps des musulmans. Puisque les orthodoxes – grecophones ou non – étaient considérés comme étant tous plus ou moins susceptibles d'être touchés par la propagande grecque et donc par être suspects, dans la région frontalière, le "bon Albanais" finissait en effet par être d'abord le musulman.³⁸ Une correspondance administrative rédigée en 1929 à propos de la population de Delvinë est très révélatrice à ce sujet: il y était écrit que la ville comptait 2 778 habitants "albanais, c'est-à-dire musulmans", 349 "orthodoxes albanais" et 550 "grecophones".³⁹

Réciproquement, pour une partie de la population orthodoxe, l'État et le pouvoir étaient considérés comme ayant un caractère musulman. Cette vision, liée à un certain sentiment minoritaire vis-à-vis d'une majorité musulmane, correspondait souvent à l'expression d'un mécontentement, nourri par la mémoire de l'ordre ottoman. Comme le montre l'analyse de l'envoyé de la Société des Nations en 1923, ce mécontentement pouvait provenir de différents facteurs: la difficile situation économique, la partialité de la justice, ou encore la relativement faible intégration des orthodoxes dans la nouvelle administration.⁴⁰ Avec les mesures prises dans le domaine de l'éducation, de l'organisation religieuse et des pratiques linguistiques, les orthodoxes pouvaient aussi avoir l'impression que les autorités albanaises voulaient les couper de leur culture, et de leurs réseaux de commerce et d'émigration, ou pour le moins leur imposer une culture d'un niveau inférieur. De fait, une partie de la population orthodoxe continua à demander l'enseignement de la langue de la religion, à se référer au Protocole de Corfou, donc aux garanties accordées aux communautés orthodoxes, à faire donner à leurs enfants des cours privés de langue grecque ou à envoyer ceux-ci en Grèce.⁴¹ Cette vision pouvait être suggérée, instrumentalisée, parfois même ethnicisée par différents acteurs et pour diverses raisons. Par exemple, les comités irrédentistes vorio-épirotes diffusaient une littérature qui entretenaient l'idée d'une oppression "turco-albanaise" exercée sur les "helléno-orthodoxes".⁴² Les autorités consulaires grecques avaient tendance à dénoncer l'oppression subie par les orthodoxes de la part des autorités albanaises et des musulmans.⁴³ Même de jeunes militants communistes expliquaient aux paysans que le chrétien, voir le Grec était exploité par les beys et agas (musulmans) albanais.⁴⁴

³⁷ AQSh, fonds 295, v. 1932, d. 110, feuillets 80-81.

³⁸ Les musulmans de la région gardaient la mémoire des massacres commis à l'époque de l'administration vorio-épirote. Le rapport de la commission d'enquête de la SDN est cité par Clewing, art. cit., p. 312.

³⁹ AQSh, fonds 295, v. 1929, d. 52, feuillet 54.

⁴⁰ Clewing, art. cit., p. 305-310.

⁴¹ Une polémique éclata au sujet de l'enseignement grec pour tous les orthodoxes du pays entre Vasil Dilo et Mehdi Frashëri, qui s'y opposait. Frashëri Mehdi, *Nje polemikë nbi kulturen greke në shqipërië* (Une polémique à propos de la culture grecque en Albanie), Tirana, 1924.

⁴² AQSh, fonds 252, v. 1921, d. 49, feuillets 9-10 et fonds 295, v. 1937, d. 22.

⁴³ AQSh, fonds 252, v. 1926, d. 106, feuillet 2.

⁴⁴ Marko, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

Beaucoup d'observateurs de l'époque et d'analystes ultérieurs ont eu aussi tendance à classer la population orthodoxe en fonction de son hellénophilie ou de son albanophilie. Au moment de la mise sur pied de l'État albanais, un orthodoxe de la région voyait en fait trois groupes parmi les chrétiens de la province: ceux qu'il appelait les "grécomanes", d'autre part des chrétiens "de conscience albanaise" qui, pour des raisons religieuses, ne voulaient pas être intégrés politiquement, désirant maintenir une forte frontière confessionnelle, et enfin les chrétiens de "conscience albanaise" qui souhaitaient une organisation étatique commune et des "relations fraternelles" entre chrétiens et musulmans.⁴⁵ Le délégué de la Société des Nations remettait en cause une telle catégorisation quand il parlait de ces hellénophiles acharnés qui s'étaient installés en Grèce et avaient combattu pour elle, tout en gardant un fort sentiment pour l'Épire du Nord et une fierté d'appartenir à la race des *Shqiptar*, ou encore lorsqu'il évoquait le cas de cet orthodoxe albanophone de Korçë qui avait été en faveur de la Grèce à l'époque de l'occupation grecque et qui, en 1923, affirmait que la plupart des gens comme lui étaient pour l'Albanie, mais "une bonne Albanie", sinon, ils préféraient la Grèce.⁴⁶

En réalité, les positionnements et identifications étaient fluctuants, sachant que le rattachement des individus à ces nouvelles nations en construction dépendait de leur réaction par rapport aux contraintes étatiques, mais était aussi une affaire d'intérêt.⁴⁷ Dans la région frontière, la frontière ethnique s'est dessinée le long d'une frontière confessionnelle et politique, en fonction de contraintes étatiques, qui avaient du mal à s'imposer et à être véritablement uniformes, et de stratégies individuelles et familiales adoptées en fonction d'intérêts.

4. Une frontière ethnique mouvante entre définition collective et stratégies individuelles

Lorsqu'on examine la question des écoles, on s'aperçoit que, du point de vue de l'État albanais, la minorité grecque était définie de façon collective, et non individuelle. L'appartenance à la minorité, essentiellement associée au droit d'avoir un enseignement primaire en langue maternelle, était liée à l'appartenance à une communauté villageoise. En 1931, si un jeune homme voyait sa grécophonie (puisque les autorités ne reconnaissaient pas la grécité) prise en compte pour l'attribution d'une bourse pour l'École normale d'Elbasan, c'est "parce qu'il venait d'un village grécophone", en l'occurrence de Hllomo (dans la région de Pogon), et non parce qu'il était lui, en tant qu'individu, grécophone.⁴⁸ Si l'on s'en tient au nombre des villages dans lesquels fonctionnaient des écoles avec un enseignement en grec, il est facile de constater que ce nombre a varié en fonction

⁴⁵ *Drita* (Gjirokastër), n 31, 16 janvier 1921, p. 2.

⁴⁶ Clewing, art. cit., p. 314-315.

⁴⁷ Noiriël, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

⁴⁸ AQS, fonds 494, v. 1931, d. 508, feuillet 3.

du temps.⁴⁹ C'est donc que la frontière, définie en premier lieu par la politique de l'État albanais, était mouvante. De fait, elle était sans cesse négociée. Des villages demandaient, de leur propre initiative ou poussés et aidés par leurs députés, par les consuls grecs ou des clubs vorio-épirotes, un enseignement en grec. Les autorités albanaïses acceptaient ou refusaient, en fonction d'une ligne de conduite adoptée à des niveaux variés – national, provincial ou local. Les lieux où la négociation était la plus apparente étaient les villes de la province (Gjirokastër, Delvinë et Sarandë),⁵⁰ deux villages mixtes situés dans la région du Dropull et la région très particulière de Himarë.

Dans son argumentaire, la population déclarait généralement vouloir pour ses enfants un enseignement dans "la langue de la religion" ou qu'elle avait pour langue maternelle le grec.⁵¹ Pour les autorités, les critères de négociation étaient les suivants. S'il n'y avait pas de communauté (des familles vivant en communauté), il n'y avait pas de minorité, comme dans le cas de Sarandë. Fréquemment, les demandes faites étaient considérées comme non légitimes, car elles avaient été suscitées par des acteurs extérieurs. Un autre type d'argument était que dans certains villages, les populations avaient adopté seulement récemment la langue grecque, leur langue originelle étant l'albanais. Mais, des exceptions pouvaient être faites pour des raisons politiques. Ce fut le cas à Himarë, où les villages étaient considérés comme albanaïses, mais où l'enseignement du grec fut autorisé pour contrebalancer l'abolition des privilèges dont avait joui la région jusque là. Après 1935 cependant, le ministre de l'Éducation, voulant revenir sur le fait que trois villages de la région avaient été reconnus comme appartenant à la minorité de langue, mais pas à la "minorité dans le plein sens du terme", utilisait l'argument de la volonté populaire pour refaire basculer les villages de l'autre côté de la frontière minoritaire: selon lui, une "partie considérable" de la population aurait souhaité des écoles albanaïses.⁵²

Plus généralement, la frontière de la minorité était aussi soumise aux divergences entre divers représentants de l'État ou entre d'autres types d'acteurs. Tout d'abord, au début des années 1920, les autorités locales semblent avoir été mal à l'aise avec la notion de "minorité de race, de langue ou de religion".⁵³ Pendant certaines périodes, notamment lorsque les relations entre la Grèce et l'Albanie étaient meilleures, les autorités de Tirana voyaient d'un mauvais œil les mesures coercitives prises par les autorités locales. Par exemple, en février 1926, le vice-ministre de l'Intérieur écrivait à la préfecture de Gjirokastër qu'il avait appris qu'un instituteur avait été emprisonné puis relâché, parce qu'il avait donné des

⁴⁹ Les chiffres donnés par le côté grec ne tiennent en général compte que des écoles privées avec leurs enseignants, alors qu'une partie d'entre elles furent remplacées par des établissements publics.

⁵⁰ Dans les villes, la contestation de la frontière était plus individuelle que collective. AQSh, fonds 295, v. 1922, d. 106, feuillets 6-7 et v. 1929, d. 52, feuillet 26

⁵¹ Clewing, art. cit., p. 298.

⁵² AQSh, fonds 295, v. 1936, d. 146, feuillet 22.

⁵³ AQSh, fonds 295, v. 1922, d. 106, feuillets 11-13, le ministre de l'Éducation au ministre des Affaires étrangères, 14 mars 1922.

leçons en grec, qu'une jeune fille n'avait pas été autorisée à aller en Grèce et que le consul de Grèce était suivi à Sarandë. Étant donné les bonnes relations avec la Grèce, il ordonnait de permettre à la jeune fille de se rendre dans ce pays.⁵⁴ En décembre 1927, le ministre de l'Éducation s'adressait au Bureau secret du ministère de l'Intérieur. Vu que le gouvernement grec prétendait qu'il allait ouvrir des écoles en Çamëri, il s'était entendu avec le ministre des Affaires étrangères sur un *statu-quo* en ce qui concerne les écoles alloglotes dans la préfecture de Gjirokastër. Il pria donc le ministère de l'Intérieur de donner les ordres nécessaires à l'administration et à la gendarmerie afin qu'il n'y ait aucune mesure d'interdiction prises envers les écoles jusqu'à nouvel ordre.⁵⁵

De la même façon du côté grec, il existait parfois des divergences entre les autorités d'Athènes, les autorités locales dans la région de Ioannina et les clubs vorio-épirotes. Même au niveau local, il n'y avait pas forcément unité de vue. D'après un journal de Ioannina, à l'époque du gouvernement de Pangalos, le gouverneur général d'Épire et le commandant de la 8ème division d'Épire étaient en désaccord sur la politique à mener vis-à-vis des Albanais de Çamëri. Le premier était en faveur de leur départ en Turquie, tandis que le second s'y opposait, arguant du principe de réciprocité, car la minorité d'Albanie pouvait être à son tour menacée.⁵⁶ Autre exemple: alors que le gouvernement grec avait décidé de dispenser des bourses pour l'éducation des jeunes orphelins et pauvres de Himarë, Spiro Milo, qui était chargé de la distribution, aurait privilégié ses amis et parents, afin de se créer un réseau d'influence.⁵⁷

Malgré la définition collective imposée d'en haut, l'existence de stratégies familiales et individuelles liées au contexte social et économique rendait également la frontière de la minorité difficilement définissable. Si beaucoup d'orthodoxes de la province, souffrant de la crise économique, habitués à l'émigration et déçus du nouveau système scolaire⁵⁸ n'attendaient rien de l'État albanais, certains orthodoxes – y compris grecophones – adoptaient des stratégies d'intégration à l'État ou trouvaient un intérêt à utiliser certains réseaux en Albanie. S'agissant de l'éducation, l'inspecteur de la province de Gjirokastër reçut ainsi en juillet 1926, une lettre (en grec) du représentant du club "philo-éducatif" des émigrés en Amérique de Sopik, un village du Pogon, demandant l'introduction de la langue albanaise dans l'école du village.⁵⁹ De jeunes grecophones, semble-t-il souvent poussés par des conditions économiques peu favorables, n'hésitaient pas à demander aux autorités albanaises des bourses pour aller étudier à l'étranger, et même pour entrer à l'École normale d'Elbasan, destinée à former les cadres de

⁵⁴ AQSh, fonds 252, v. 1926, d. 108, télégramme du 27 février 1926.

⁵⁵ AQSh, fonds 252, v. 1927, d. 159, feuillet 30, 18 décembre 1927; fonds 295, v. 1927, d. 97, feuillet 7, 18 décembre 1927.

⁵⁶ *Demokratia*, n 116, 20 août 1907, p. 2.

⁵⁷ AQSh, fonds 295, v. 1925, d. 12, feuillet 55, télégramme de Anagjir Nushi au Président de la république, Himare, 8 mai 1925.

⁵⁸ AQSh, fonds 295, v. 1923, d. 166, feuillet 162.

⁵⁹ AQSh, fonds 295, v. 1926, d. 26, feuillets 1-4.

l'Éducation nationale albanaise.⁶⁰ À Skore, un autre village du Pogon, les habitants, dont les réseaux migratoires vers Istanbul avaient été coupés, migrèrent dorénavant vers la Grèce. Mais une partie des villageois s'engagèrent comme ouvriers agricoles dans les pépinières de Tirana ou dans d'autres établissements agricoles en Albanie centrale, grâce à l'appui de l'un des leurs, devenu agronome au ministère de l'Agriculture.⁶¹ On aboutissait ainsi le plus souvent à des divisions en factions (*taraf*), les positionnements identitaires, idéologiques et politiques recoupant souvent des luttes d'intérêts et de pouvoir ou des divisions sociales. Le village grec de Hllomo, dans la région de Pogon fut ainsi divisé en deux factions, certains s'insurgeant notamment contre l'enseignement de la langue albanaise dans l'école du village.⁶² À Himarë, à l'époque du régime de Zog, il se forma aussi deux partis. D'après Petro Marko, celui des "plumes rouges" était pour l'Albanie et soutenait les écoles albanaises. Celui des "plumes blanches" était pour la Grèce et les écoles grecques.⁶³ En 1936, d'après le ministre de l'Éducation, le parti albanais, représentant une part "considérable" de la population, comprenait surtout des jeunes et des intellectuels, tandis que le parti grecophone était le parti des anciens et des prêtres. En réalité, d'après l'inspecteur de l'enseignement, le parti gouvernemental en faveur des écoles d'État était faible. Les élèves des écoles albanaises de Himarë, Palasë et Dhërmi étaient peu nombreux: il s'agissait principalement d'enfants de fonctionnaires ou d'enfants de ceux qui avaient voulu profiter des promesses des autorités locales, notamment de ceux qui avaient souhaité obtenir de l'aide en maïs, distribuée dans la région. En outre, c'est pour consolider son pouvoir, que le chef de commune aurait demandé que l'enseignement de la religion soit fait en grec, réintroduisant cette langue dans l'école albanaise.⁶⁴

Conclusion: minorité et construction de l'État-nation

L'étude de la question scolaire nous a montré que, dans cette région frontière, la question de la minorité s'est trouvée au cœur du processus de nationalisation de la société et de la défense des intérêts nationaux. Plus généralement, elle a été étroitement liée au processus de construction de l'État-nation et au renforcement des liens horizontaux qu'étaient les structures administratives censées créer un lien social national. Les représentants de l'État albanais furent en effet souvent convaincus que pour intégrer cette population frontalière particulière, il fallait nommer des administrateurs compétents et irréprochables. Un rapport du préfet Kol Rodhe rédigé en juillet 1930 est tout à fait caractéristique de cette vision.

⁶⁰ AQSh, fonds 494, v. 1929, d. 351.

⁶¹ Dhimitër Beduli, *Skoreja e Pogonit* (Le village de Skore dans le Pogon), Tirana, 2000.

⁶² AQSh, fonds 494, v. 1929, d. 313, feuillet 10; *Demokratia*, n°235, 7 décembre 1929 p. 4, et n 238, 11 janvier 1930 p. 4

⁶³ Marko, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

⁶⁴ AQSh, fonds 295, v. 1936, d. 147 et d. 146, feuillet 22 et feuillets 132-134.

D'après lui, la préfecture avait une importance particulière sur le plan politique et administratif. Elle était composée d'habitants qui, dans leur majorité, avaient eu des relations étroites avec les autorités grecques directement, ou indirectement à travers les organisations vorio-épirotes. Il fallait donc une administration impeccable afin que la population s'éloigne de la propagande étrangère. Pour cette raison, il suggérait le remplacement d'un certain nombre de sous-préfets – trop durs et assez fanatiques et donc rappelant l'ancienne administration ottomane, ou franchement incapables.⁶⁵ Plusieurs de ses collègues proposèrent quant à eux l'augmentation du nombre de bourses accordées aux élèves de la province et aux membres de la minorité en particulier. D'autres pensaient qu'il fallait fonder des écoles secondaires ou des écoles normales pour les grécophones. Certains encore étaient persuadés que l'Église – c'est-à-dire l'Église autocéphale albanaise⁶⁶ – devait être utilisée également comme lien horizontal, puisque elle était "un des facteurs principaux pour rapprocher le peuple du gouvernement".⁶⁷

De même lorsque, après 1935, il sera question de renforcer la frontière entre grécophones et albanais orthodoxes, on envisagera parallèlement de raffermir les liens horizontaux entre l'État et les orthodoxes albanais. L'idée était de bien organiser l'enseignement national dans les villages orthodoxes albanais, avec des instituteurs de "confession orthodoxe albanaise", ayant "une bonne attitude" et de préférence, au moins pour un certain temps, venant de l'extérieur de la préfecture de Gjirokastër; de donner à ceux-ci la tâche d'instituteur, mais aussi celle d'agent de la propagande nationale dans les villages "et surtout dans la partie ignorante et fanatisée ayant un sentiment grec"; de former et d'envoyer dans les villages orthodoxes albanais des prêtres ayant un sentiment national, et qui soient aussi des agents de la propagande nationale, "car la propagande anti-nationale qui veut que tout orthodoxe soit grec a souvent été développée par le clergé"; donner chaque année des bourses de dix ans à de nombreux garçons et filles orthodoxes albanais; prendre dans la gendarmerie et l'armée des fils des villages orthodoxes albanais et de familles choisies, "afin que de cette façon l'orthodoxe albanais s'élève aussi moralement". Il s'agit des suggestions faites par le chef de la commune de Delvinë en 1937 dans le rapport mentionné plus haut.⁶⁸ De même, le chef de la section de l'enseignement secondaire proposait au ministre, au début de l'année 1936, que, comme les écoles grécophones se multipliaient de jour en jour et que les villages orthodoxes albanais envoyaient aussi leurs enfants dans les internats en Grèce, toutes les écoles des villages chrétiens aient cinq classes, qu'il y

65 AQSh, fonds 294, v. 1930, d. 356, 11 juillet 1930.

66 L'église autocéphale albanaise ne sera reconnue officiellement qu'en 1937 par le patriarcat oecuménique d'Istanbul. Morozzo della Rocca Roberto, *Religione e Nazione in Albania (1920-1944)*, Bologne, 1990; Clewing, "Nationalität und Glaube. Stimmen für und wider die Autokephalie in Albanien 1922-1937", *Krishtërimi ndër Shqiptarë. Simpozium Nderkombetar*, Tiranë 16-19 Nëntor 1999 (Le christianisme chez les Albanais. Symposium international. Tirana, 16-19 novembre 1999), Shkodër, 2000 p. 303-315.

67 AQSh, fonds 252, v. 1933, d. 42, feuillets 14 ss, rapport de l'inspecteur général Xhafer Ypi, au roi, 24 juillet 1932.

68 Voir note 10.

ait aussi une enseignante pour les filles dans chaque établissement et qu'une école secondaire soit ouverte dans la ville de Delvinë, centre des grecophones.⁶⁹

Les communautés villageoises grecophones, et plus généralement orthodoxes, se sont donc retrouvées, d'un certain point de vue plus intégrées, ou plus concernées par l'intégration à l'État albanais que d'autres communautés villageoises. S'agissant des écoles ou des postes de gendarmerie, des régions musulmanes, comme la région de Kurvelesh dans la province, restaient beaucoup moins liées aux structures étatiques.⁷⁰ Cependant, la politique de construction de l'État-nation et de nationalisation de la société, comme je l'ai dit, n'a été que partielle, faute de moyens. C'est aussi une des raisons pour lesquelles la frontière minoritaire, que seul l'État albanais a vraiment cherché à renforcer après 1935, est restée floue et mouvante.

En fait, s'il y avait une frontière minoritaire à cette époque, elle est restée plus proche de la frontière confessionnelle chrétiens et musulmans, que de celle entre Albanais et Grecs. C'est ce que l'on peut constater également sur le plan politique, puisque l'intégration civique des populations orthodoxes restera relativement faible durant l'entre-deux-guerres. Lorsqu'il y aura intégration, ce sera sur un mode encore assez proche des relations politiques entre chrétiens et musulmans de l'époque ottomane. Les oppositions politiques ouvertes qui éclatèrent dans la région à l'époque de Zog n'engagèrent pratiquement que des musulmans.⁷¹ Le contexte économique et social a bien sûr pesé de tout son poids dans la position et les stratégies de ces populations chrétiennes, fortement liées à leur village et région d'origine, mais aussi à des réseaux migratoires qui les menaient par-delà la frontière, en Grèce ou ailleurs, pour survivre.

⁶⁹ AQSh, fonds 195, v. 1936, d. 147, feuillet 67, lettre du 10 février 1936.

⁷⁰ *Drita*, n 22, 1922, p. 3. *Demokratia*, n 263, 16 août 1930, p. 2 et n 310, 12 décembre 1931, p. 1.

⁷¹ Schmidt-Neke, *op. cit.*, p. 263 ss.

Résumé

Dans cet article sont analysés les rapports entre frontière étatique et frontière ethnique, dans le cadre du processus de construction d'un État-nation. Le cas étudié est celui de la minorité grecque d'Albanie du Sud dans l'entre-deux-guerres. L'angle d'approche utilisé est celui de la question de l'éducation, qui permet de distinguer trois phases dans les rapports de force entre acteurs albanais et grecs au sujet de la définition de la minorité. La politique de construction de l'État-nation et de nationalisation de la société n'a été que partielle, faute de moyens. C'est une des raisons pour lesquelles la frontière minoritaire, que seul l'État albanais a vraiment cherché à renforcer après 1935 est restée floue et mouvante. S'il y avait une frontière minoritaire à cette époque, elle est demeurée plus proche de la frontière confessionnelle entre chrétiens et musulmans, que de la frontière entre Albanais et Grecs. En outre, cette frontière entre minorité et majorité qui se était en train de se construire et n'était jamais stable, fut dès le départ étroitement liée aux notions de territoire et de frontière étatique.

Čedomir ANTIĆ

THE BORDERS OF MODERN SERBIA (1804-1999)

State borders played very important role during the period of establishment of modern states and nation-building process. The importance of state borders were being strengthened as internal border were being relaxed or abolished. Especially during the 19th century, when internal division of society was gradually abandoned, a new sense of unity was recognized in so called "national unity". The story about modern borders in Europe was thus mainly related with two basic principles: the national (ethnic) and historical. In the case of Western European states, which historical continuity had not been dramatically interrupted, it was basically the one way directed struggle. At first absolute monarchy abolished feudal decentralisation, but two centuries later the emancipated bourgeoisie and citizens transformed the absolute kingdom into parliamentary monarchy or republic. The state borders were the only framework that was left above the radical changes that Netherlands, France and England had passed through before 1815. Nevertheless, the examples of those three states became the model for states or ethnicities all over Europe. The pattern was the same even in case when newcomers actually had not passed the same process, and did not have the same unbroken continuity of state and social development. There were many such examples in Central and East Europe. Probably the model-one was the case of Germany which was united as modern and highly centralised state as late as in 1871. Until 1805 it was still lose and not much defined confederation known by its medieval name as *the Holy Roman Empire*.

In case of Serbs and Serbia the national and historical principles were probably confronted in more complex way than in the case of other neighbouring ethnicities or already developed European states. In 1804, when *the First Serbian upheaval*¹ commenced, Serbia had not actually existed as political entity for almost three and a half centuries.² The society developed in peripheral regions of the Ottoman Empire inhabited by local Serbs was very primitive. The only institution rooted from the Middle Ages was the Serbian Orthodox Church which hierarchy was highly Hellenised, and in lower levels virtually illiterate.³ Thus the continuity ought to be reconstruct and the new Serbian state, established after 1804, was mainly the mixture of intellectual and common perceptions of *ideal heritage* and known European models. As the state borders are one of the main features of state sovereignty, the struggle for national liberation early included the question of the state territory of the country.

¹ The first stage of the Serbian revolution from 1804 to 1815.

² Period from 1459 to 1804.

³ R. Radić, *Verska elita i modernizacija-teškoće pronalazaženja odgovora*, L. Perović, ured. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XIX i XX veka*, 3. Uloga elita, Beograd 2003, 159. /R. Radić, *Clerical Modernization in 19th and 20th century*, L. Perović, *Serbia in Processes of Modernisation in 19th and 19th century*, Belgrade 2003, p. 159/.

However, what were the ideas and perceptions of statehood in this early period?

Some scholars recently argued that the Serbian uprising of 1804 was nothing more than a rebellion against crumbling central Ottoman authorities, deprived of any defined ideology of statehood.⁴ However, those arguments lack the foundation in contemporary sources. The ideas and memories on the Middle ages were fundamental for the early stages of the Serbian state-building process.⁵ While the constitutional issue was raised by the official Russia, the question of statehood and state borders was playing very important role, although established on meagre and uncertain traditions and perceptions of history. The leader of the uprising Karađorđe Petrović (Black Georges) thus adopted the ancient title of *Vožd* (*the Leader*), while just as early as in 1805 he issued the first chart to the reverend Monastery of Chilandarios, styled after medieval charts. When in 1809 Serbian armies launched the largest scale offensive in direction of Montenegro and Niš, Karađorđe wrote to his Montenegrine allies presenting the 'restoration' of the Serbian Empire as its ultimate goal.⁶

Vuk Stefanović Karadžić argued that territory of Belgrade pashalik represented just about the half of the territory of Serbia. He considered Serbia as a geographic and historical region encircled with four big rivers (Danube, the Sava, The Timok and the Drina River) and the Mountain of Sara on the South.⁷ Region of the Belgrade pashalik was roughly the same region of the Habsburg short-lived dominion known as the Kingdom of Serbia (1718-1739).⁸ During the period of the First Serbian uprising the region of Belgrade pashalik, the heartland of the rebellion, was enlarged after six neighbouring south-eastern districts (*nahias*) had been absorbed in it. For the most part of the 19th century it was the territory of Principality of Serbia. The territorial settlement of 1833 came as a consequence of several different factors. At the first place it was the spoil of war, the revolutionary rebellion in which thirty thousand peasant soldiers had fought the Sultan's armies during nine years. As the communications through Serbia were in bad shape, and as region was covered with deep forests the journey between Belgrade and eastern border (the Timok River) required sometimes five days, while journey to Niš could last more than a week.⁹ Thus, although Serbian armies reached Leskovac and Lab

⁴ S. K. Pavlowitch, *Serbia the History behind the Name*, London 2002, pp. 30-33.

⁵ The period between 1804 and 1811

⁶ R. Ljušić, *Vožd Karađorđe II*, Beograd 2000, 264.

⁷ Karadžić and Filip Višnjić perceived new Serbia as mainly a historical region. They used terms 'Serbian Lends' and 'Serbia', understanding Serbia as successor of medieval Serbian state but including their native regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 'Serbian Lands' and future 'restored' Serbian state. R. Ljušić, *Istorija srpske državnosti-Srbija i Crna Gora*, Beograd 2001, 28

⁸ R. Veselinović, *Srbija pod Austrijskom vlašću 1718-1739, Istorija srpskog naroda IV, Srbi u XVIII veku*, Beograd 1994, 106-163 / *Serbs under Austrian rule 1718-1739, The History of Serbian People IV, Serbs in 18th century*, Belgrade 1994, pp. 106-163/.

⁹ E. Спенсер, *Путовање капетана Спенсера кроз Србију 1850. године, Британски путници о нашим крајевима у XIX веку*, Нови Сад 1993 / E. Spencer, *Captain Spencer's Journey through Serbia in 1850*, in B. Momčilović (ed.) *British travellers on our country in 19th century*, 'The War in the East', *The Illustrated London News*, 31. December 1853., p. 598 и 'The War on the Danube', *The Illustrated London news*, 14. January 1854, pp. 34-35.

region it did not happen that they established permanent state organization southward of the town of Niš, which had not been taken even after several years of the Serbian military presence in its outskirts. The ethnic factor was probably the least influential of two already mentioned. As contemporary scholarship was strictly limited on narrow circle of 1% of literate inhabitants of Serbia, the knowledge of common past was based on popular traditions and notions of common origin. Thus, while the Medieval Serbian state had extended its borders mainly southward, in its long combat with Byzantine Empire, new Serbian state remind indecisive in which direction to extend its borders. As almost 80% of its western regions were inhabited by the settlers from the regions of Montenegro, Herzegovina and Bosnia the western direction was probably the most desired. Nevertheless, in Bosnia the Muslim population was very numerous and concentrated in towns and strongholds almost impregnable for Serbian armies. 'Historical rights' that directed them to the South had been gradually weakened by the fact that ethnical structure of Kosovo region and Macedonia had been significantly altered since XVI century.

Thus two first semi-official plans for the establishment of independent state of Serbia were mainly based on ethnic principle. In 1808 Ivan Jugović, the lecturer at the Great School in Belgrade, presented his own plan according to which Serbian state should have included Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Dubrovnik and Kosovo-Metohija.¹⁰ Jugović's project by all means presents the exact perception of the territorial aims of the Serbian uprising due to the contemporary Serbian elite. On the other side there was the plan issued by Rodofinikin, the Russian representative in Belgrade. Rodofinikin's vision of future Serbia was much more modest: for obvious reasons he was not kin to establish Serbian supremacy over the Balkans. He did not dream about the Serbian Empire. Instead, the Russian diplomat recommended extension of Serbia southward and eastward. Nevertheless, he premeditated annexation of Skoplje and Vidin to Serbia, but did not include the regions of Kosovo and Metohija in those gains.

When in 1813 Serbia was re-conquered by the Ottomans, the 18th century local autonomy was preserved only in the region of the Belgrade pashalik. The period of the Second Serbian uprising of 1815 and later development of semi-autonomous state were centred in the region of Belgrade pashalik, with constant intention for territorial enlargement, but mainly up to the borders that had been reached in 1806.¹¹ This task was accomplished after the Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829 when four successive Firmans were being issued which defined and extended Serbian autonomy. In the Firman issued in 1833 the extension of the state territory to the old borders was consented.

Two decades of internal struggles followed. First semi-official, probably the most famous and by all means notorious project for creation of a larger Serbian state was known as *Načertanije (The Draft)*. It was written in 1844. by the Serbian



¹⁰ V. Stojančević, *Istorija srpskog naroda V/1, Od Prvog srpskog ustanka do Berlinskog kongresa 1804-1878*, Beograd 1994, 89-92.

¹¹ Already mentioned twelve nahias (districts), with additional six in direction of South and South-east.

Minister of Interior Ilija Garašanin. This plan was inspired and co-authored by several Polish political agents who were trying to prevent the Ottoman Empire to suffer the fate of Poland. They perceived the creation of strong and large Serbia as the best check to the Russia's imperial aspirations and a perfect outpost in struggle against it. The Garašanin's plan called for creation of common state which would unite the Principality of Serbia (extended on the regions of Kosovo and Macedonia) with Bulgaria, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The political constitution of the new state, the time or method of its unification were not specified. The plan remained limited on the narrow circle of Garašanin's associates and became known for some Serbian politicians only forty years later, while Austria-Hungary discovered it just in 1906.¹² Probably the most important new question that was raised by the *Našertanije* was the aspiration of Serbia for an outlet to the sea.¹³ Actually, Garašanin was the first champion of 'the economic reason' as the dominant force in policy of national liberation. The ethnic or historical principle could not have been applied in that case for the reason of small number of ethnic Serbs on the sea shores and insufficient traditions regarding the presence of Serbian Medieval state on the shores of three out of four Balkan seas.

When in 1848 *The spring of nations* commenced, the Principality of Serbia was in state of total tranquillity. Paradoxically, the revolutionary impulses reached Serbia only when Serbs in Austrian dominions entered the struggle with Hungarians. Serbian national movement there established its own claims for autonomy and political and civil rights on the bases of not so defined collective ethnic privileges established in 17th and 18th century. The principality of Serbia supported their struggle, but as the Hungarian revolution proclaimed separation from Austria and abolition of other ethnicities separate status as its goal, Serbs (as well as Croats) appeared as champions of legitimacy defending the unity of the Habsburg dominions.

On the other side, the period of instability in Europe inspired several Serbian politicians to write programs for reform of the Ottoman Empire and the elevation of Serbia in the status of a semi-independent state. The plan written by Konstantin Nikolajević, perceived the reform of the Ottoman Empire which would lead into its federalisation.¹⁴ The sole idea of federalisation of the Ottoman Empire, which would offer Serbia the same role which had already been played by Egypt in the Ottoman African and Near East dominions, was very important for the development of official Serbian territorial aspirations. During next two decades Serbian political elites mainly aspired the enlargement of state territory southward and establishment of new relations with the Ottoman Empire. The territorial domain of the Serbian Despots from the 15th century was probably the predominant historical pattern in this combinatorics. The outbreak of the Crimean war gave place for

12 R. Ljušić, *Knjiga o Našertaniju*, Beograd 1993, 5 /R. Ljusic, *The Book about Nacertanie*, Belgrade 1993, p 5./ A. Radenić, *Mit o Garašaninovom Načertaniju*, Počelo je u obaveštajnoj službi Austro-Ugarske', *Politika*, 30 decembar 2000 /A. Radenic, *The Myth of Garasanin's Nacertanie*, It all started in the Austrian Secret Service', *Politika*, 30 December 2000/.

13 D. Đorđević, *Izlazak Srbije na Jadransko more i Konferencija ambasadora u Londonu 1912*, Beograd 1956, 6-7 /D. Djordjevic, *Advance of Serbia to the Adriatic Sea and the London Ambassadorial Conference*, Belgrade 1956, pp. 6-7/.

14 R. Ljušić, *Knjiga o Načertaniju*, 102-108.

the development of two concepts which were to be present up to the end of 1870's. Serbia did not take part in the greatest war of the 19th century. Neither of sides was eager to offer to good bargain for timid Serbian Prince and ruling Constitutionalists, who knew that the Principality would become the battlefield in case they sided with any of belligerents. Until 1853 Russia was most ardent protector of status quo on the Balkans, its goal was to rule over the Ottoman Empire or to dissolve it, but the political and civil emancipation of the Balkan Christians was not the obvious part of the imperial agenda. This was the reason why Russia offered independence and territorial enlargement to the Principality of Serbia only in spring 1854, when the Russo-Turkish war on Danube was over, and Russian armies started to evacuate Walachia and Moldavia. It was only then that the Russian Foreign Office asked Stefan Stefanović-Tenka, one of Russian principle devotees in Serbia, to formulate Serbian territorial aspirations and political demands.¹⁵ Tenka formulated his ideas in a less known *Memoir*, in which he combined ethnic and historical principles. In case of Russian victory Tenka argued that dismemberment of the Turkey-in-Europe and creation of three independent states instead it would be the only recommendable solution. Nevertheless, while according to Tenka Bulgaria and Greece would be mainly limited on their ethnic boundaries, Serbia would comprise Bosnia, Herzegovina, Kosovo, Northern Albania, Macedonia, Western Bulgaria, and a strip of Aegean coast. The four southern regions of the Tenka's project and the proposed boundaries of that portion of the greater Serbian state, almost fully fit with the approximate frontiers of the Serbian Medieval Empire from the 14th century. Tenka even recognized that the Aegean coast should be included in Serbia just in order to provide the economic outlet to the sea. Interestingly enough, but six months before Tenka sent his *Memoir* to St. Petersburg, the British consul general T. G. de Fonblanque and Garašanin (then out of office) had issued the project which recommended the elevation of Serbia in rank of a Vice-Realm: the federal unit of the reformed Ottoman Empire. Its territory would be three times enlarged and would have the 50 miles wide outlet to the Adriatic Sea. Nevertheless, Garašanin obviously agreed to abandon unification of Serbia with Bosnia and Bulgaria, for federalisation of the Turkey-in-Europe would mean the creation of Bulgaria and Bosnia as federal states of the Ottoman Empire and potential rivals of the Serbian Vice-Realm.¹⁶

The Crimean war, although rather neglected in Serbian historiography, marked the cross-road in development of Serbian statehood and notion of borders. The Paris Peace congress was hailed as the triumph of national principle in Europe, and the changes that followed, especially considering the unification of Walachia and Moldavia and the foundation of unified Italy, became the established model for the national liberation and unification of oppressed European ethnicities.

In case of Serbia the internal reforms followed, and two major crises of 1862

¹⁵ Д. Странјаковић, "План Стефана Стефановића-Тенке о подели европске Турске из 1854. године", *Политика* 1-4 мај 1937. стр. 13-14 / D. Stranjakovic, 'The Stefan Stefanovics-Tenka's Plan on the division of the Turkey-in-Europe from 1854, *Politika*, 1-4 May 1937, pp. 13-14/

¹⁶ Č. Antić, *Srbija i Velika Britanija u doba Krimskog rata*, (neobjavljena magistarska teza), Beograd 2003, 87-95 i 174-176. / C. Antic, *Serbia and Great Britain during the Crimean War*, (unpublished MA thesis), Belgrade 2003, pp. 87-95 and 174-176/.

and 1875 were mainly externally provoked. Actually, Serbia entered the 1876 War with the Ottoman Empire which was to be the War for independence, without firmly established state aspirations. Led by the liberal bureaucrats who came on the power during final years of Prince Michael reign and whose zenith came during the period of the Second regency, the official Serbia put the emphasis on the ethnic principle employing all the military and diplomatic efforts in order to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the secret accordance between Russia and Austria-Hungary that had previously agreed the spheres of influence on the Balkans, forced them to abandon their plans. In the very last moment the military plans were changed and the main direction of the offensive was aimed southward. Even though in summer and autumn of 1876 Serbian armies were severely defeated, the same tactics was repeated in 1877, when alongside the Russian armies advance in Bulgaria Serbia managed to occupy regions of Niš, Leskovac, Vranje and Piro, but also the vicinities of Vidin, regions of Belgradchik and Vibol in Bulgaria and Upper Lab and Gračanica in Kosovo. Those accomplishments were significantly reduced latter on, but the Serbian aspirations expressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Jovan Ristić presented Serbia enlarged for the regions of Southern Serbia (four districts which were liberated first, and had been considered as the first and foremost Serbian demand since 1804), the region of Kosovo and Metohija and the Upper Vardar including Skoplje, Debar and Stip.¹⁷ The southern boundaries as proposed were mainly the same as had been the borders of the Medieval Serbia in 1320's, widely extended after King Milutin's (1282-1321) military accomplishments.

The Congress in Berlin elevated Serbia and Montenegro in status on the 13 July 1878. The two states became the 26th and 27th independent state in World. Serbia was enlarged, but only for already mentioned four counties.¹⁸ It was the first territorial enlargement in forty five years.

Next three decades passed in gradual entering of Serbia in Austria-Hungarian political orbit. When Prince Milan Obrenović decided to sign the Secret convention with Vienna in 1881 he deliberately sacrificed part of political independence of his Principality, but he got substantial support for his Macedonian policy in return.¹⁹ For the first time the official aims of Serbian state were strictly limited, but defined. As Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina, and expressed the special interest for the region of Sandžak, Serbia again was involved in Macedonian and Kosovo-Metohija affaires only. Before 1881 Serbia had a period of active national work in Macedonia. During the reign of Prince Michael and the Second regency significant sum of money was being invested in Serbian propaganda, education of local population and the Church activities. Nevertheless, the accordance between the Ottoman government and the Bulgarian national movement which was crowned in 1870 by creation of the Exarchate and supremacy of the Bulgarian national church organization in the Turkey-in-Europe virtually stopped all Serbian efforts. The turning point in Serbian policy towards Macedo-

¹⁷ Čedomir Popov, *Istorija Srpskog naroda V/1*, 413.

¹⁸ Niš, Piro, Vranje and Toplica were added to seventeen Serbian counties.

¹⁹ R. Ljušić, *Istorija srpske državnosti, Srbija i Crna gora*, Beograd 2001, 183-184.

nia came during 1890's, when Serbian Foreign Office showed some fresh interest for the region, while Bulgarian relations with the Ottoman Empire entered the first serious period of crisis over the Macedonian issue. Nevertheless, Bulgarian strategy of the national unification was mainly based on historical principle which in its case was compatible with ethnic. Thus, official Bulgaria was trying to apply the same political methodology during the entire period of the national unification.²⁰ So, from 1890's two concepts basically contested over Macedonia, while Bulgaria demanded the autonomy, Serbia for the first time sought for the establishment of the spheres of influence and division of an historical region.

The twenty years long struggle over Macedonia started with ecclesiastical contest and ended with a clandestine war between paramilitaries. In the eve of the First Balkan War Serbia managed to come closer to its political goal in the region. Even though ethnic-Serbs were less than one-third of total Christian population of Macedonia, the Porte allowed the elevation of Serbian bishops in two most important dioceses in Macedonia, while Serbian chetniks became dominant in entire region west of the river Vardar and the valley of Babuna. Between 1904 and 1912 the secret negotiations were assumed in several occasions. The outcome was the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement of February 1912 Serbia and Bulgaria agreed the military alliance and division of the Macedonia in case of the Ottoman Empire dismemberment. The division plans were not firm. The Serbian sphere covered the region west of the Vardar River, but was marked as *contested zone* while only the regions of south Macedonia and Kosovo and Metohija were fully recognized as undisputed territories of the sides.

Plans of official Serbia presented the aspirations of young Serbian bourgeoisie which political representatives had gotten the upper hand in Serbian foreign policy making. After the customs war (the Pigs' war) with Austria-Hungary Serbia desperately needed the outlet to the sea, thus the entire strategy of the national unification was concentrated on the winning of a territorial or even commercial outlet to the sea.²¹ The official Serbia desired to extend its territory to the West and to establish the corridor to the Adriatic Sea through Kosovo and Metohija and the valley of the river Drim with sea ports of Lješ and St. John of Medua.²² The sphere in Macedonia thus became just the territorial addition, some kind of the strategic defence barrier.

²⁰ Basically there were four regions: Bulgaria, Eastern Rumelia, Macedonia and Kavala. Since 1885 and the unification of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia the same pattern of unification with other regions had been employed until the outbreak of the First World War.

²¹ D. Đorđević, *Portreti iz novije srpske istorije, Milovan Milovanović*, Beograd 1997, 141-143 /D. Djorjević, *Portraits from the New Serbian History, Milovan Milovanović*, Belgrade 1997, pp. 141-143/

²² The years of official neglecting of the region of Kosovo and Northern Albania had long term consequences. New interest of Serbian policy-makers towards those regions looked somehow artificial and jingoist. The example of prompt evolution of the Cvijić's perception in period from 1906 to 1912 has been frequently taken as an example of it. P. J. Taylor, *Political geography, World-Economy, Nation-State and Locality*, London 1989, p. 186. On ethnic composure of Northern Albania see in Č. Antić, *Sir Ralph Paget and British policy towards Serbia from 1910 to 1913*, (unpublished MA thesis awarded with a degree at the University of Bristol), Bristol 2002, pp. 68-69 and 72.

The early outbreak of the First Balkan War and the Austro-Hungarian decision to launch a preventive war on Serbia in case that even a narrow strip of coast would be ceded to it, made Serbia to keep its acquisitions in southern Macedonia in order to preserve the direct traffic connection with Greece and its Aegean ports. The consequence was the Second Balkan War, and establishment of short-lived Serbian supremacy on the Balkans. After the Balkan wars Serbian territory was virtually doubled and almost a million people of different ethnic origins became the citizens of Serbia.

The First World War originated from the political and economic contest between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. In the 19th century Serbian aspirations towards Austria-Hungary were vague and undefined. Serbs from the South Hungary (Vojvodina, since 1848) sought the unification with Serbia, but priorities of Serbian political elites were firmly attached to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. First official calculations in direction of dismemberment and division of Austria-Hungary commenced just after the outbreak of the First World War. Already in December 1914 the National Assembly issued the Niš Declaration which called upon the unification of all South Slaves. The concept of national unity of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes thus replaced the idea of national unification and extension of Serbian state. Jovan Cvijić was employed to draw the maps of desired state which shapes, as presented, very much fitted with the borders of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes settled after 1923.²³

The switch from national unification to regional ethnocentric gathering of all South Slavs was a sudden and important crossroad for Serbian political elites. Already in 19th century the idea of unification of all South Slavs was present in national liberation plans. Nevertheless, until 1890's those were politically unrealistic ideas initiated mainly by Slavonic politicians from Austria-Hungary. Models of Italian and German unifications influenced Serbian plans significantly, but on the other hand while in the Ottoman Empire local Serbian and Slavonic population was not much politically emancipated, in Austria-Hungary the historical regions had more firm foundations, based not only on ethnical or national, but also on historical rights. The establishment of ethnic borders between Serbs and Croats was considered not only as unwise, but above all as not necessary. On the other side the Entente was not willing to place unconditional support on those grandiose plans of Serbia and Montenegro. Even though Serbian armies defeated Austria-Hungarian invaders in two occasions during 1914 managing to resist until 1916, allies were ready to consider Serbian aspirations only in order to win some new allies for the war. In 1915 Great Britain and France offered division of Austria-Hungary after the War in exchange for war alliance with Italy and Bulgaria. Almost entire eastern coast of the Adriatic was offered to Italy then, while the eastern part of Macedonia was negotiated as possible compensation for Bul-

²³ Lj. Dimić, *Istorija srpske državnosti, Srbija u Jugoslaviji*, Beograd 2001, 24, 39. / Lj. Dimić, *The History of Serbian Statehood, Serbia in Yugoslavia III*, Belgrade 2001, pp. 24, 39./

garia.²⁴ Entente policy-makers still wanted to preserve Austria-Hungary as independent and strong regional power, but they were ready to support its federalisation and on the other side territorial aggrandisement of Serbia.

One of the earliest plans for the reorganisation of Europe and the Balkans after the First World War was the Paget-Tyrell memorandum, the wide plan produced in April 1916.²⁵ It presents the confidential shortlist of the British Foreign Office ideas and aspirations. The Memorandum made significant impact on the final territorial settlement of the Paris Peace Congress of 1919. Paget-Tyrell's Memorandum was a master-peace effort for the reconciliation of the Great Powers aspirations. In the case of the Balkans the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary and establishment of national states was recommended, while the Ottoman Empire would be replaced on the Bosphorus with establishment of Russian occupation. On the other side Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece would be enlarged, while Albania would be preserved as a small and dependent state in Drač littoral. For Serbia two solutions were recommended: unification with Bosnia Herzegovina, Montenegro, South Hungary, Slavonia, Croatia, Dubrovnik, part of Dalmatia and Slovenia (even the unification with Bohemia and Slovakia was considered), or the extension of Serbia on the regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dubrovnik, South-Hungary, Slavonia, and parts of Dalmatia. The unification with Montenegro was perceived as natural and desirable, especially because of the unreliable policy of King Nicholas, while in case of its continual existence as sovereign state Serbia would be provided with two outlets to the Adriatic Sea.²⁶

1917 and the Russian Revolution caused significant change in Allies' policy towards Serbia and Yugoslav unification. The enlarged Serbia was perceived as some kind of compromise between Russian demands, always suspected of having the Pan-Slavist aspirations, and the interests of Britain and France in the region. After the fall of Russian Empire, newly established Soviet state early became the source of revolutionary propaganda, thus the idea of establishment of large, but conservative Yugoslav monarchy got the primacy over all other designs in London and Paris. However, when established, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (after 1929 Yugoslavia), although introduced parliamentary government in Austria-Hungarian South Slavonic provinces, was in fact a conservative French-type state, modelled after the patterns of late 19th century democracies. The federal concept was not introduced, because Serbian political elites were not ready to abandon old-style system, and were much more willing to govern the country on the basis of parliamentary agreement with Slovenian and Croatian parties than to adopt constitutional federalism. Nevertheless, the informal limitations enforced by the victorious Great Powers should not be underestimated at all. France, the main pillar of the newly established system in Europe, instigated and supported just foundation of strong and unitary states bordering with Germany and Austria.

New borders established in period between 1918 and 1923 were mainly ethnic. However, the fact that South Slavonic population had been much assimilated in

²⁴ *London treaty.*

²⁵ Č. Antić, *Sir Ralph Paget...*, pp. 23-24.

²⁶ In the region of Skadar and in Dobrovnik.

urban regions of Austria-Hungary, made the final settlement in certain degree unfavourable for the new state. Large commercial and industrial urban centres Trieste, Rijeka (Fiume), Klagenfurt, Szeged, Pecuj, Temisora, Arad, Skadar and even Zadar on Dalmatian coast, remained outside the new state. Ethnic relations in Yugoslavia continued to be aggravated especially as the consequence of very complex and ill-fated contest between Serbs and Croats, its two largest nations. The internal constitutional struggle passed three important phases which resulted in gradual federalisation of the state. In the first stage the traditional regions lost their importance and powers. After the period of renouncement of the Vidovdan constitution of 1921, Croatian political elite finally entered the Parliament, but the parliamentary struggle ended with the assassination crisis of 1928 and four year long royal dictatorship. For several times in the period the question of division of the state was considered. The main idea was dismemberment of Yugoslavia on three separate states, but the issue of borders happened to be to complex obstacle which suited to all proponents of Yugoslav unity.²⁷ The reaction was the introduction of so called Yugoslav unity and abolishment of all historic or ethnic regions in country. After 1934 and death of King Alexander I the parliamentarianism was gradually reintroduced, and alongside with it the ideas of constitutional reform and federalisation appeared again. When in 1939 the Cvetković-Maček agreement was concluded Serbian political elite was not able to raise the question of establishment of Serbian unit (so called 'Serbian banovina').²⁸ However, even though the distinguished Serbian Cultural Club proposed its own project of establishment of large Serbian federal unit which would assemble already existing Vardarska, Moravska, Dunavska, Drinska, Zetska and Vrbaska banovina, the proposed process of federalization was not completed.

The Second World War commenced in moment of gradual and limited political transition of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In the period of occupation and civil war the ideas of restoration of Yugoslav state were far predominant among Serbian politicians. While royalist resistance (*četniks' movement or the Yugoslav Homeland army*) supported the preservation of Yugoslav state and monarchical constitution with same vague federalisation and creation of Greater Serbia as its hegemon, the German sponsored government of Serbia under the presidency of retired general Milan Nedić preached the foundation of Serbian state under German protection. On the third side Communist movement agitated in favour of renewal of Yugoslavia as a socialist federation. Royalist movement got its national and constitutional ideologist in persons of Dragiša Vasić and Stevan Moljević.²⁹ Moljević even presented the map of Serbian aspirations after the victory, by which the borders suggested by the London treaty and Paget-Tyrell's memorandum were

²⁷ The 'amputation' of Croatia was considered even by the King himself in the eve of proclamation of the Royal dictatorship

²⁸ Ij. Dimić, 197-200; M. Stanišić, *Projekti 'Velika Srbija'*, Beograd 2000, 23-24 /M. Stanisic, *Projects 'Greater Serbia'*, Belgrade 2000, 23-24/

²⁹ Vasić was member of the SCC.

revived and extended. According to Moljević Serbia should annex Dalmatia, parts of central Croatia including Lika, Bania and Kordun, and central part of Slavonia (around the Papuk mountain). Entire concept of the Greater Serbia, as known today, was finally formulated and became widely widespread as ideological basics of the četniks' movement. Nevertheless, as the četniks' movement was basically a military organization, established as monarchical conservative force of restoration, the Moljević's project was not the only and dominant part of its ideology. Mainly, especially after 1944 and the Ba Congress, četniks' movement renounced in some degree the plans for creation of the Greater Serbia in revived Greater Yugoslavia, accepting the Yugoslav idea again and compromise with loyalist Croatian and Slovenian civil, anti-fascist parties.

Nedić's government did not have effective control even over central Serbia, the area slightly larger than the territory of the first Serbian state in 1809.³⁰ Although himself was being controlled by German command for Serbia, Nedić harboured bold hopes that after the total bancruptcy of Ustaša's power in Bosnia-Herzegovina German command would allow creation of the Greater Serbia, which would include regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo. Nevertheless, even after withdrawal of main body of Partisan (communist) forces from Serbia in 1941-1942, such solution was not adopted by Germans. Serbia remained the only region in Balkans under direct German occupation.

Communist movement adopted the principles of national emancipation which already existed in the Soviet Union. So, the position of Serbia in future Yugoslav federation was modelled after status of Russia (the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic) in SSSR. After the victory of communism in Yugoslavia, Serbia was established as a federal unit of new state. Undisputed territory of new unit was equal as territory of the Kingdom of Serbia before 1912 – Vojvodina, Sandžak and Kosovo-Metohija were planned to be the autonomous regions of Serbia.³¹ In process of constitutional definition autonomous region of Sandžak was abolished while Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija became autonomous regions of Peoples Republic of Serbia. In first period internal relations were in certain degree asymmetrical for Vojvodina enjoyed more independent status than Kosovo-Metohija, but after constitutional reforms of 1960's and especially after the promulgation of the 1974 Constitution position of autonomous regions became equal, they got the status of 'subjects of Federation', while the Serbia proper lost the state subjectivity. Until 1989 it was some kind of sub-federation which depended only on compromise of Vojvodina, Kosovo,³² Serbia proper and Yugoslav communist elites.

Borders of the Socialist Serbia were mainly historically determined. At the North, East and South-West its borders were the state border fitted with the borders of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Borders which separated Vojvodina and Croatia were arbitrary, and they became source of dispute already when they were established. There were many practical problems, especially as Danube had not

³⁰ In addition Nedić's Government controlled Sandžak, part of northern Kosovo and enjoyed formal sovereignty over Banat.

³¹ Lj. Dimić, 287, 291.

³² After 1974 its official name was changed in *the Socialist Autonomous Region of Kosovo /or Kossova/*.

been adopted as absolute border. With Bosnia- Herzegovina the common border was completely the same as before the Annexation of 1908. Thus, even the tiny strip of land in the geographic centre of the municipality of Priboj in Serbia, remained under the control of Bosnia-Herzegovina, even though it was inhabited only by Serbs and had been a part of Austria-Hungary only during ten year period. Border with Montenegro remained the same as after the First Balkan War, while Kosovo region was extended even on the region of upper Ibar thus reaching the mountain of Kopaonik. In 1945 Kosovo also got the part of Montenegro, known as Metohija, with Djakovica, Peć and Istok.³³ In case of Serbo-Macedonian border (the F.Y.R.M.) the demarcation line was also placed very arbitrary and some of disputes were to be settled just over fifty years latter.

On the other side, the Socialist Yugoslavia had its most devoted proponents among Serbian communist, especially among the communist political elites of Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. After had been faced with genocide in so called the Independent State of Croatia, local Serbs became main pillars of new system. Political elites in Serbia, on the other side suffered the same fate as the elites of Soviet Russia. Their ambitions ceased to be national and became mainly the synonymous for Yugoslav nationalism, thus turning to be rather imperial than national. The reason for this was obvious and had its roots in inter-war period.³⁴ Dissatisfaction in Serbia was very strong, but in the critical situations in 1968, 1972 and 1974, it lacked international support, the energy derived from public discontent and able leadership. Even after Josip Broz Tito's death and Albanian silent uprising of 1981, democratic and civil forces in Serbia were not sufficiently strong to play any significant role.

When nationalism rose in Serbia during late 1980's it was mainly the outbreak of genuine public discontent and expression of democratic sentiment. The problem of Serbian borders was than one of the main obstacles for democratic transition of the society. The border issue was used and abused by the communist government, but newly created oppositional parties were not able to perceive it in broader European context as well. At the beginning of 1990's it seemed that Serbian opposition, both nationalistic and democratic, felt as the 1918 revived. With small exceptions all of them argued that the borders, especially in case of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia should be renegotiated. Some of them as the Serbian Movement of Renewal and the Serbian četniks Movement (a.k.a the Serbian Radical Party) adopted maximalist programme of Stevan Moljević, demanding annexation of entire Bosnia- Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and parts of Croatia in reformed Serbia.³⁵ Serbian regime tried to use the national issue as part of its



³³ Montenegrin communist government decided to renounce that territory for they wanted to preserve the ethnic balance in their state.

³⁴ In the First World War 26% of total population of Serbia perished, almost 56% of total male population died during the period. In the Second World War Serbs in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Srem, Croatia and Kosovo suffered the same fate, while in Serbia proper almost 100.000 were killed by Communist in 1944.

³⁵ The most immoderate was the project of the Serbian National Renewal and the National Party which even claimed that western border of Serbia should be placed in north outskirts of the city of Rijeka, thus denying Croatia even the outlet to the sea.

strategy for the preservation of highly centralised and unreformed Socialist Yugoslav federation. Democratic reforms were avoided or postponed while uprisings of Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia were supported. Official Serbia sought for good bargain for its own designs in order to preserve some smaller federation, or statehood continuity.³⁶ On the other side Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia managed with help of dying Yugoslav Peoples Army and resources of Serbia and Montenegro to establish their own states. In their zenith the Republic of Serbian Krajina covered almost 25% of territory of Republic of Croatia, predominantly inhabited by Serbs (20 municipalities in two regions from Zadar in Dalmatia up to Pakrac in Slavonia including the Vukovar region in Eastern Slavonia), while Republic Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina covered 72% of its total territory. Nevertheless, official Serbia never accepted their demands for the official unification and abandoned them as early as in 1992 when the Peace plan for Croatia was concluded.

Official Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed state continuity with Socialist Yugoslavia by establishing two-member Yugoslav federation (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). Finally, even after the successful secession of Kosovo and Metohija region which was placed under the USA protection in 1999 and democratic changes in Serbia in 2000, Serbia remained the only European state which was independent at the beginning of the 20th century, but one century latter is still just a part of a complex state. In 2003 the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro was proclaimed on the entire territory of Serbia and Montenegro, but the region under the USA and OUN control is still just the formal part of the newly proclaimed State union. Practically, the informal southern borders of Serbia since 1999 have been almost identical with borders of Nedić's Serbia. Only Vojvodina continued to be its integral part in the status of an autonomous region. In future further constitutional reformers are likely. Serbia will be probably regionalized or even federalized and the independence will be probably denied to it for the sake of stability of unstable and petty entities such are Kosovo, Montenegro, the Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia.

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³⁶ Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia actually were deprived of some of their political rights after 1990-s, but the interest of official Serbia for them had been significantly changed since the 1914. At the beginning of the 20th century in Kingdom of Serbia (or Serbia proper) lived just about 30% of all Balkan Serbs, at the end of the century in Republic of Serbia lived about 70% of all Yugoslav Serbs. The issue was mainly sentimental for millions of Serbians had their relatives in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Croatia. Because of that the problem was so much abused by socialist Serbian regime.)

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The Borders of Modern Serbia (1804-1999)

Abstract

In the Modern History of Serbia the border-question was main factor of progress and the most formidable limitation at the same time. From the early days of the First Serbian Uprising of 1804 to the NATO-Serbian War of 1999 the state borders were central and common place in foreign policy making. The following article deals with role of border-question in Serbian internal and foreign policy during 19th and 20th century and its impact on generations of Serbian politicians. The questions of origins, development and transformations of ideas of Serbia-proper, historical Serbia, Greater Serbia, Yugoslavia and Greater Yugoslavia are also presented and discussed here.

Karin TAYLOR

AT THE SOCIALIST FRONTIER: THE 1968 SOFIA FESTIVAL OF YOUTH AND STUDENTS

At the Socialist Frontier: the 1968 Sofia Festival of Youth and Students

For young Bulgarians in the summer of 1968, the communist East bloc seemed to turn inside out, bringing the capital Sofia closer to Central and Western Europe than at any time since the establishment of socialist rule in 1944. The event that worked this magic was the Ninth World Festival of Youth and Students. Under the motto 'Peace, Friendship, Solidarity', the Festival invited thousands of young people from all continents to the Bulgarian capital and ostensibly gave them a stage on which to articulate their hopes for the future, to compete in sport and the arts, to exchange ideas and to enjoy music. In short: to have fun. For ten days, the iron curtain retreated from consciousness and young Bulgarians – most of whom had never travelled outside the country or seen Westerners of their age before – were intrigued by the opportunity to catch a glimpse of, or even meet, a foreigner from the West.

Despite the apparent dissolution of borders right in the centre of Sofia, the Festival functioned to reinforce existing borders in the mind. During the Cold War, the iron curtain represented more than a physical wall of containment, it was also a cognitive wall that divided the meaning systems of the capitalist and socialist worlds.¹ From their initiation after the Second World War, the international youth festivals had the political purpose of demonstrating that division. The festivals were organised under the auspices of the socialist umbrella organisation, the 'World Federation of Democratic Youth' (WFDY),² and were designed to showcase the achievements of socialism in the socialist or socialist-friendly countries. The first World Festival of Youth and Students was held in Prague in 1947.³ The kind of total presentation displayed by these events was premised on a disjunction of interests, ideals and values – in fact, of the whole way of life – of the allegedly 'passive' majority of young people in the West and the 'active' youth of the socialist camp.

The Ninth World Festival of Youth and Students was the only one to take place directly on the Balkan peninsular. At the height of the Cold War and in the wake of the Prague Spring, the Bulgarian regime attempted to use the event to fix the terms of the relationship of young Bulgarians to the Party and state, as well as re-

¹ In the context of borders in Central and Eastern Europe, Peter Haslinger advocated treating the 'border' as a distinct cognitive category (Haslinger 1999: 7). In a similar vein, John Borneman pointed out that "(...) during the Cold War it was generally assumed that social and cultural formations were coterminous with or existed within states, and that states determined the boundaries of meaning systems" (Borneman 1992: 4).

² Although the WFDY was created as an independent organisation for anti-fascist youth agitation, it soon came under Soviet influence (Rossow 1999: 17).

³ The World Festivals of Youth and Students were held at intervals of between two and six years, including in Vienna in 1959 and in Helsinki in 1962.

lations between young people on both sides of the iron curtain. This article will investigate the Sofia Festival as a political staging of borders – the mise en scène of the frontier between two conflicting political systems – and as a performance of cultural boundaries, again dictated by the exigencies of politics. The first section focuses on symbolic politics: the reading of the Festival meta-text. In the second section, an anthropological approach allows a quite different view of the boundaries set by the Party, suggesting a degree of permeability. The second reading of the Festival – based on biographical narrative I recorded in 2002 – traces the experience of Festival participants and onlookers for whom the Festival disturbed familiar limits and created unexpected confrontations.

As suggested by Stephen Kotkin in his book 'Stalinism as Civilization', socialist regimes and Party programmes not only *prevented action* but also *made things possible*, sometimes with unintentional or unexpected results (1995: 22) This understanding of the unpredictable effects of building and sustaining 'real-existing' socialism has in recent years dominated the historical and anthropological study of socialism and contributed to disassembling the totalitarian model popular with many scholars into the 1970s and 80s.

1. The Construction and Performance of Boundaries

For the communist regimes, youth was a powerful symbol of the promised 'golden future'. The youth festival in Sofia offered a highly valuable arena for presenting the model 'new men and women' imagined by communist theorists. At the opening mass pageant in Sofia's main Vasil Levski stadium on July 28, Bulgarian Party leader Todor Živkov greeted the international youth delegations as the '*heralds of tomorrow's humanity*'.⁴ In the thinking of Party leaders, the young generation in the socialist countries formed a community that transcended national borders and shared a single vision: that of constructing socialism. Moreover, theorists assumed that the goals of the young generation were 'naturally' in line with the socialist drive to overcome tradition and 'backwardness' and to establish a progressive and more just society. This view correlated with the internationalist idea upheld by socialist leaders across Eastern Europe, despite the fact that national youth organisations increasingly propagated national culture and patriotism. On the world stage, however, socialist youth – including delegates from Western Europe and North America – was to stand firm and united against the larger enemy: the forces of capitalism and imperialism. For ten days, the Festival spectacle appeared to defuse tensions within the socialist world while shifting antagonisms to the perimeter of the socialist camp.

The meta-text of the Festival pitted the East bloc together with the aspiring socialist third world nations against the imperialist West. This was the era of the Vietnam War, a conflict that extensively defined the Festival's political agenda. The first full day of the Festival programme was dedicated to solidarity with the people of Vietnam and was marked by a night-time rally calling for an end to U.S. aggression.

⁴ *Rabotničesko delo*, 29.07.68. According to *Rabotničesko delo* (28. 07. 68) and the WFDY, between 20,000 and 25,000 participants from 142 countries took part in the 1968 Sofia Festival.

But even as the Festival spoke of peace, official rhetoric used the language of war. Speeches and newspaper texts hailed the Festival delegates as “bold fighters”⁵ and “revolutionaries”, evoking bellicose imagery of “fronts” and “united forces”. “During the days of the Festival the young generation will show its will to fight boldly and valiantly to live in a world without war...” wrote the daily *Rabotničesko delo* applying a stock metaphor of youth as soldiers ready to sacrifice themselves for the socialist cause.⁶ Similarly, youth newspaper *Nardona mladež* summoned youth to the ‘front’: “Youth at the front lines for the victory of the new world”⁷. On the other hand, the young generation also figured as an innocent and essentialised messenger of peace confronted by the threat of atomic war: “Youth is the negation of war”⁸. In sum, the texts produced by the Festival transformed the border between two political systems into a frontier: a dangerous borderland between hostile powers.

The Festival programme

28.07.	Opening Ceremony
29.07.	Day of Solidarity with Vietnam
30.07.	Solidarity with Peoples Fighting for National Independence
31.07.	In Pursuit of Peace, Democracy and Social Progress
01.08.	Celebration of Friendship with the Youth and People of Bulgaria
02.08.	Celebration of Girls
03.08.	National, Patriotic and Revolutionary Traditions
04.08.	Protection of Human Rights
05.08.	The Maintenance of Peace – Anxiety and Concern of Youth
06.08.	Closing Ceremony

Source: Newspaper *Otečestvenijat front*, 09.-19.07.68.

The use of the metaphor of struggle, as well as of antonyms implying irreconcilable oppositions, was typical of Soviet and Bulgarian official language in the 1950s and 60s (Vodeničarov 2002: 162). János Kornai commented that communist ideology embraced a kind of military spirit and maintained a “war consciousness” suggesting a society constantly under threat from internal and external foes (Kornai 1992: 59). In the framework of the Festival, public articulation was hardly possible without reference to the rivalry of socialism and capitalism/imperialism and young people were mobilised to give physical form to official protest. At a number of organised rallies, Festival participants marched against the Vietnam War, colonialism and the atomic bomb, as mentioned above. Although young people certainly participated with enthusiasm and conviction, these demonstrations were orchestrated by the Festival organising committee and did not include any spontaneously formed or informal groups.

⁵ *Otečestvenijat front*, 22. 07. 68.

⁶ *Rabotničesko delo*, 28. 07. 68.

⁷ *Nardona mladež*, 06. 08. 68.

⁸ *Nardona kultura*, 27. 07. 68.



The Bulgarian team marches at the opening ceremony in Vasil Levski Stadium.

The Festival also applied the script of a polarised East and West in the intellectual arena. Sofia University offered a platform for the discussion of topics that moved society in the late 1960s. Specially selected and trained student teams debated issues within the cognitive frame of dual systems, such as 'Trends in the development of science', or 'The non-capitalist road to progress'. The Bulgarian students were backed by a special publication explaining so-called "*ideological diversions*" and criticising 'bourgeois' categories of thinking. The booklet also included facts and figures on the development of socialism in Bulgaria.⁹

With its multiple techniques of directing the thought and action of the young generation, the Festival event can be understood as part of a wider social technology of managing youth. This operated with quite undisguised instruments – basically the categorisations of socialist bureaucracy – to define limits, discipline young people and obtain their acquiescence.¹⁰

Part of the process of maintaining the consent of youth was to offer possibilities for positive identification. In contrast to the construction of the capitalist world as loaded with conflict, the Festival represented the socialist universe as a neatly contained harmonious society. Thousands of young performers enacted this image with their bodies in carefully co-ordinated mass displays of gymnastics and folklore. For the opening and closing celebrations in Vasil Levski stadium, entire school classes from Sofia's schools were recruited to form symbols of peace and solidarity by raising coloured cards in a mass choreography. Through the symbolically arranged activities of young citizens the spectacle reflected the composition its designers – the Party-led Festival organising committee – desired for society as a whole. According to anthropologist Don Handelman, the Soviet-style public event worked like a mirror held up to social order, magnifying and displaying it with greater precision than that actually shown by society itself (1998: 19).¹¹

⁹ *"Materiali za podgotvката na mladežta za IX svetoven festival"*, 1968.

¹⁰ Handelman 1998: preface. See also Rumen Daskalov's discussion of Foucault's concept of disciplinary power in the context of state socialism (1998: 7-30).

¹¹ Handelman termed this kind of spectacle an "*event-that-presents*" the lived-in world (1998: 48).

Casting back a more perfect picture, the mirror served to inscribe the superiority of socialism into the consciousness of young people.

In order to look more closely at the 'correct' performance of the socialist world and how this was locked in a permanent referential opposition to capitalism, I have selected two themes. (Others could include the anti-war rallies and contest of minds mentioned above, as well as art and sports contests). However, I have chosen **clothing** and **music** for the simple reasons that they were and are issues strongly related to the identity of young people. In addition, they tend to overcome boundaries and were subject to debate on both sides of the iron curtain during the late 1960s.

How did Festival participants perform socialist identity? The official delegates from the socialist countries were carefully selected by their respective national youth organisations. As exemplary young socialists, they were willing to conform to official requirements, and consequently also to rules of physical appearance and behaviour.

1.1. Hairstyles and Clothing

The most striking thing about photographs of the arrival of the international delegates in Bulgaria either at Sofia airport or central train station is that some are in uniform, while others sport denim and longish, shaggy hair.¹² Who is who? The answer is easy: delegates from the East bloc countries came in uniform, while those from Western Europe, Africa, Asia and the Americas arrived in casual clothes. Uniform clothing underlined the orderly image of young socialist men and women and linked them to their representative function as messengers of their countries and youth organisations. Furthermore, uniform gave substance to their roles as soldiers of the socialist idea.¹³ Uniform varied in style: girls from the GDR sported military-like shirts with the emblem of the 'Freie Deutsche Jugend' youth organisation on one shirt sleeve. Other female delegates from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union wore uniforms that integrated elements of traditional costume such as embroidered scarves or handkerchiefs. The Bulgarian women's dress was composed of a knee-length white skirt and a short bodice-like jacket over a loose, coloured blouse. A decorative silver chain across the chest displayed a reference to national costume. In contrast, elegant white pumps propelled the young women along the road to socialism, all in all giving the impression of a strange sartorial hybrid between traditional and modern codes of femininity.

Young men from the East bloc countries wore ties and light blazers, while the Polish delegation arrived in suits topped with Homburg hats, looking more like their own fathers than late 1960s youth. All the male delegates were clean-shaven and had tidy haircuts, in keeping with the neat appearance demanded by communist

¹² The Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (BTA) archive has several hundred black-and-white press photos of the 1968 Festival. However, relatively few were published in the press. In addition, newspapers and magazines selected photographs of the more conformist-looking foreign visitors for print. The following observations are based on the BTA material.

¹³ Compare the use of uniform in fascism, e.g. youth as *"political soldier"* in Italy and the Third Reich (Malvano and Michaud in Levi/Schmitt 1997).

authorities across Eastern Europe. The late 1960s saw a struggle over men's hair and clothes as hippie-style fashions invaded the socialist countries, throwing up a rift between young people and Party officials. In Bulgaria, police or militia frequently apprehended male teenagers with longish hair and shorn their heads.¹⁴ For the duration of the Festival, however, officials neglected to harass youths for their hair-styles. Press photos show bearded French delegates, one or two smoking pipes – a provocation if these had been Bulgarian youths. But shortly after the Festival the battle over hair continued, culminating in a controversial incident in which a prominent professor from Sofia University had his beard forcibly shaved.¹⁵

At the opening Festival parade, a constructed cultural divide pushed through central Sofia to the Levski stadium. Next to the socialist delegates in uniform, official guests from the West wore denim or sported a stylish Beatnik look. The Brazilian group wore T-shirts with 'Brazil' printed on the front. In the stadium, even the manner in which the delegations made their ceremonial round offered a contradictory picture. While the numerous Bulgarian and Soviet delegates – as well as those from other East bloc and some Asian countries – marched in ordered formation, the West European, Australian and South American contingents walked loosely gathered around their national flag.

The sartorial and behavioural separation also marked other programme events. Performers from the East bloc were clothed in socialist interpretations of national costume at presentations of folklore, or smart identical dress for presentations of classical or pop music. Whether as violinists or pop vocalists, the Bulgarian female performers wore a modern knee-length white dress, stressing collective rather than individual performance. The close imitation of the style presented by the Soviet delegates suggests that the Bulgarian teams were dressed primarily for the Soviet gaze. Of the pop and rock groups from South East Europe, only the Yugoslav band members presented a different picture, dressed casually just like their Western peers.

Outside the official events, the Soviet delegates were expected to remain in uniform, as well as to display model behaviour. Similarly, the Komsomol youth organisation advised Bulgarian representatives not to smoke or drink alcohol in public. In archive photographs, Western young men and women are seen smoking, whereas delegates in uniform do not appear with cigarettes. The assumption that physical appearance stood for personal conduct, and further as an emblem of moral quality, is obviously not unique to socialism. What I want to point out here is that just at a time when young people in the West were radically questioning such commonly held beliefs, the socialist states triumphantly held up the image of a highly disciplined body of youth.

1.2. Music and Dance

From the establishment of communist rule in Bulgaria in 1944, music constituted a disputed sphere of youth activity. The imagination of a distinct socialist cul-



¹⁴ Compare Daskalov 1998: 35.

¹⁵ In the 1970s, the regime relaxed its clamp on youth styles and international fashion trends became a cautiously accepted topic in the media.

tural world went back to early Soviet art and the later establishment of socialist realism in the Soviet Union of the 1930s. However, Western popular culture inevitably found its way through the iron curtain. In the 1960s, socialist leaders were deeply concerned about the impact of Western rock music on young people in their countries. Despite the regular moral panics launched by socialist propaganda, in 1968 young people in Bulgaria were crazy for the 'Beatles' and shared many of the icons of pop and rock followed by the same generation in the West. Since the Festival constituted a global meeting place, the organising committee was under pressure to make room for Western-style contemporary music. In the words of a Bulgarian music expert, "It was the entry of rock into Bulgaria and nobody could stop it".¹⁶

Just like at the 1950s Festivals in Warsaw and Moscow,¹⁷ the Sofia Festival brought jazz and rock onto the streets of the city. Bands played on open-air stages in several parks. At the same time, officials tried to bridle popular music and transform it into a product compatible with socialist ideals.¹⁸ For the Festival music contests, categories were created for the evaluation of 'light' music. These included the genres 'jazz', 'pop music', 'beat music' and 'jazz improvisation'. However, performers were carefully chosen from the approved world of socialist entertainment in which musicians were organised into composers and musicians unions. Among the Bulgarian prize-winners was the still popular vocalist Lili Ivanova and the jazz band of Milčo Leviev, a jazz pianist already known from Bulgarian radio and TV. (Leviev defected to the West shortly after the Festival and became a noted musician in the United States).

Political songs, along the lines of the protest ballads popular in both Eastern and Western Europe, had recently found favour with Bulgarian authorities as long as the texts conformed to Party politics. A piece by a Bulgarian songwriter expressing solidarity with the struggle of the Vietnamese people was promoted as an official Festival song: *Vietnam, ne si sam'* ('Vietnam, you are not alone').¹⁹ But despite its moderately accommodating stance on popular music, the regime persisted in favouring presentations of folk music and dance as the desired expression of youth artistic prowess. For a socialist state increasingly centred on national identification, folk traditions and were useful in creating a unified national culture that children could learn in an organised way: via the state youth organisations. A purified folk culture and aesthetic could present 'authentic' values in opposition to the 'false' ones lurking in Western pop culture.²⁰

However, given teenager's enthusiasm for Western music and dance styles – e.g.

¹⁶ Interview June 2003.

¹⁷ Compare Starr 1990.

¹⁸ In 1965, Bulgaria launched a festival of popular (*estrada*) music, *Zlaten Orfei*, which became firmly established in 1967. The festival focused on solo singers and a number of Western stars performed there in the 1970s.

¹⁹ *Otečesvenijat front*, 25. 07. 68.

²⁰ An evening gala performance of Bulgarian folk music and dance was held in Vasil Levski stadium on the Day of the Celebration of Friendship with the Youth and People of Bulgaria. According to ethnomusicologist Timothy Rice, the creation of professional folk ensembles to present decorative, 'clean' and disciplined performances of folk culture was an important part of the Bulgarian Communist Party programme (Rice 1994: 180-183).

for the 'Twist', which was banned in Bulgaria in the early 1960s – contemporary dance could not be ignored. As with music, the Festival made dance the object of efforts to constrain Western influence and channel it productively into an expression of the socialist way of life. In the months running up to the event, officials demanded the creation of modern dance styles that should be "rhythmic" and "lively" and have mass appeal for the young generation.²¹ Dance schools practised the 'Lipnik' and the 'Dili-Dili', based on choreography already developed in the Soviet Union.²² Men led their female partners by the hand and the dance steps avoided uncontrolled movement. As late as 1975, Bulgarian youth magazine *Mladež* condemned the chaotic dancing observed in Western discos.²³ A Festival choreography competition also produced the dance styles 'Dunav' and 'Albena', which newspapers praised as "beautiful, interesting and Bulgarian", stressing that they expressed the joy and euphoria of traditional dance.²⁴ Needless to say, the new dances did not catch on with young visitors.

2. Permeable Borders – Experience of the Festival

Performance at the Festival was a process through which political and cultural boundaries were constructed and represented. Thousands participated in the carefully orchestrated presentations: the Bulgarian delegation was the largest, with some 4,240 members. Yet many young people perceived the boundaries plotted around them by the regime as artificial. The limits intended to shield young people from 'corrupting influences' were not natural in any sense, as they were evidently determined by the politics of two conflicting systems.

Biographical narrative gives an insight into how young people who experienced the Festival reacted to the construction and imposition of limits, and how subjectivities may have been conditioned by the socialist state. The Festival permitted a provisional paradox: at the same time as it emphasised dividing lines, the event rendered the iron curtain unusually porous.

In 1968, young citizens of Sofia were familiar with foreign visitors from other Eastern bloc countries and a small number of students from outside Europe. But at the Festival, many saw young Westerners for the first time. "It was like seeing people from another planet", said a woman informant. "(...) What could you learn from people in other socialist countries? Life was almost the same".

According to Handelman, declarative public events validate a specific social order, banning doubt or alternative images (Handelman 1998: 79). Yet the composers of such spectacles have little control over what happens at the interface where the enactment of an event merges with the society it is embedded in. The interface is variable: although it may effect either affirmative or unpredictable responses,



²¹ *Studentska tribuna*, 09 05 068.

²² In the early 1960s Soviet Union, leading choreographer Igor Moiseev applied himself to the task of developing acceptable alternatives to the Twist. Steps were to be modern and exciting but rooted in Soviet traditions. However, by the mid-1960s it was clear that the invented dances would not supplant Western ones (Ryback 1990: 53-55).

²³ *Mladež* 1975, 7. 39-40

²⁴ *Narodna mladež*, 02. 08. 68.

causal effects cannot be found in the internal logic of the spectacle itself (ibid.: 44). At the fringes of the Sofia Festival, the involvement of young people varied greatly. My analysis focuses on teenage spectators and participants in the stadium mass displays. It shows that the perceptions and reactions of young onlookers divide into those who cautiously enjoyed the spectacle from a distance, and those who actively sought to cross dividing lines. A third group – the official participants – will also be dealt with in brief, since their role in the Festival activities highlighted the boundaries between those inside and outside the event.

2.1. *On the Sidelines*

In the memories of informants, a carnival parade along Sofia's main boulevards was one of the Festival highlights. Around 5,000 young people carrying flares took part in the evening procession. Some wore masks or carnival hats.²⁵ One informant recalled seeing young people in colourful, hippie-style clothing: a remarkable sight on the streets of Sofia. Although rain dampened the final firework display, young onlookers enjoyed the carefree, exuberant atmosphere. *"For the first time, young people saw themselves together in a community with others,"* an informant described the Festival feeling. She remembered the mood as *"bright"* and *"happy"*. Young people were out on the streets and gathered in the city parks where exotic folk groups as well as pop bands performed music and dance. Many young people saw contemporary rock played live for the first time. An informant recollected the experience: *"For the first time we listened to them play modern music, rock 'n' roll of course, sitting on the ground at the concerts"*.

Several informants said they were struck by the unusually colourful and vivid clothing of foreign visitors, and by the sheer variety of seeing so many people from all parts of the world. *"It was really nice to walk down the street and to see people wearing yellow and white... (...) we were just fascinated by the idea of seeing so many different people"*, a woman said. On the Festival sidelines, young people eagerly followed Festival activities. But some sensed Festival spaces as divided. The rock fan said she did not mix with Festival delegates or visit pop concerts at the House of Students or National Theatre venues due to her family history of political repression, which had made her cautious of involvement in public activities. In fact, many people appear to have practised self-restraint even as they enjoyed the Festival show. *"My feeling is that we were not so much involved in this, I mean spontaneous involvement. Yes we looked, we had the feeling it was great fun (...) there were processions on the streets, we were watching, and... I don't have the feeling that we Bulgarians were very much involved with this"*, said an informant.

Another woman who performed as a schoolgirl in the mass choreography of a stadium event said it was clear that meeting foreign participants was reserved for privileged activists of the Komsomol youth organisation: *"Those who wouldn't be 'corrupted' by the West"*. Regarding contact with Western visitors, the pupils of Sofia's foreign-language schools received special instructions from the authorities. Due to the lack of officials competent in Western languages, the schoolchildren

²⁵ *Rabotničesko delo*, 04. 08. 68.



were relied on to help direct guests around the city. One 14-year-old pupil of the German-language school was assigned to a militiaman as translator: *"I was told to be polite to foreigners but not to get involved in discussions"*, he said. Rules along political dividing lines were especially strict for the pupils of the elite English-language school who might mix with American visitors. In the memory of a woman who attended the school, teachers warned the class: *"Be nice, be polite, use your language in order to be helpful but don't get involved in any political discussions"*, echoing the warning above. The informant said that although sanctions were not threatened, she applied a kind of auto-censorship, preferring to keep to herself and avoid communication with Westerners at all. She recounted an incident at school a year or two earlier that may have influenced her restraint: two or three older pupils were expelled after visiting the library at the American embassy in the company of a British teacher.

It seems that young people internalised and sustained boundaries by recalling former episodes, warnings, or the experiences of relatives, although at the same time many were attracted by what they saw as the Festival spectacle unfolded. Often factual limits merged with imaginations of boundaries, so that many young people did not even think to cross the invisible lines separating them from official participants or foreign guests.

2.2. Inside the Event

For young people assigned with an official task, the Festival was an open space that encouraged communication with foreign participants. A 19-year-old student who had completed a German-language school worked as a translator for a group of Pioneers from the GDR. He remembered the last evening, when he and a group of translators toured the streets of Sofia. Some Italians stopped in a cabriolet, and all piled into the car. In the new *'Studentski grad'* student district, the revellers met up with students from Lebanon and Latin American. They drank and chatted together. *"It was one big party in Sofia"*, he said. In retrospect, he wondered whether they had been followed (presumably by state security).



Members of the French delegation arrive at Sofia railway station.

Analysing biographical narrative about socialism confronts the researcher with the problem of when and how people construct a past better suited to the needs and approved interpretations of the present. Studies of memories of East Germany show that there is a tendency for people to portray themselves as having resisted the system or been a victim, although most people in fact quietly acquiesced with the state order, which they regarded with varying degrees of criticism (Andrews 2000: 183-84).

This informant, a journalist, became a Komsomol secretary at his place of work. Aside from his positive memories of an exciting ten days at the Festival, he recounted an experience that he said had disturbed him at the time. When the Czech delegation passed his group at a stadium event, instead of applause they met with a negative response. The anecdote was told in a jumbled manner and in hushed tones, suggesting that the informant was uncomfortable with what had happened, and leaving it unclear whether he had participated in the action or had simply observed it. Whatever the case, it seems that the Festival dissolved limits for those on the inside, actually reinforcing the periphery to the outside 'passive' on-lookers. Evidently, the Czechs provided an irritation in this comfortable socialist microcosm, paralleling the irritation provoked by the Dubček government on the highest levels of international politics.

2.3. *Crossing Dividing Lines*

As the Festival got underway, young people sensed a time shift in the city. While cinemas, restaurants and pubs normally closed down between 10 and 11p.m., pop and rock bands played late into the night, keeping teenagers out on the streets. Here, the Festival flowed into the lives of young people thirsty for new experience.²⁶ The narrative of my interviews suggests that boys tested the relative freedom of the Festival more extensively than girls, and some communicated directly with foreign visitors of their age. Men recollected that they swapped badges and souvenirs with teenagers from the socialist countries and the West. One youngster collected a series of Hungarian badges marked with numbers, but the real trophies were the badges that sported hippie emblems ("Make Love Not War", etc.). These were officially banned and dealt on a spontaneous black market. Another teenager approached French students who exchanged souvenir models of the Eiffel tower for small personal items, such as sunglasses. Russians handed out Matryoshki dolls. If young people didn't speak a common language, they communicated with gestures.

An informant from a 'bourgeois' family and his 18-year-old friends were thrilled by the prospects of the Festival. Strumming a guitar on the periphery of the Festival, they were able to attract Western visitors to their group. They pooled their language resources to communicate: one spoke fluent English, another some French, and the informant knew a little German. "*Those people above all liked our*

²⁶ Compare the story 'Germany - A Dirty Story' by Viktor Paskov in the anthology *'Aliluja'* (2001). Here, Paskov writes about the musical and sexual yearnings of Bulgarian youths in Sofia in the summer of 1968.

openness, because when we met up guitars were brought along, a little alcohol and we began to sing hits. And they asked 'Who are they?'. 'Bulgarians'... They smoked a little cannabis, and also started to sing, some of them also played (guitar) and that's how contacts came about. And I said to one of them that we would be continuing at home and asked him 'Do you want to come along?', and he (said), 'Yes, OK'. And as long as they were here we had a couple of parties together. They already knew where we were meeting and they came", the informant said. During the parties, he had his first taste of cannabis provided by young Scandinavians. He also saw people use L.S.D. tablets for the first time.

The informant and his friends considered themselves 'non-organised' or '*neformaly*'. This designation was applied to young people who disassociated themselves from official norms and were adherents of Western youth trends, especially in rock music. But in the 1960s, a political category created in the early years of communism was also still in force: youths of a bourgeois background and who were perceived to display non-conformist behaviour were labelled '*neblagonadeždni*' (unreliable, not trustworthy). The informant, whose family suffered repression after the communist takeover, used this term to describe his position. Several other interviewees reported that potential troublemakers and '*neblagonadeždni*' were removed from the capital around the time of the Festival but I was unable to verify this. However, a 1989 cinema film, '*Az, grafinjata*', deals with such a scenario.²⁷

Visitors to the Festival from the West were sent by socialist organisations, but for Bulgarian youths making contact with them opened the one-time opportunity to exchange information and elaborate a personal picture of the world on the other side of the iron curtain. Together with young Westerners and Serb students from Yugoslavia, the informant and his friends discussed and compared politics, music, fashion trends, travel and lifestyle on both sides of the divide. '*It was an absolute party for me – as information, to see, to touch... a Westerner, because here they [the authorities] constantly spewed propaganda – "they are like this, they are like that". They didn't leave you to decide, you couldn't see it [for yourself]*', he said.

With their sophisticated knowledge of Western style, the group of friends was able to penetrate the heart of formal Festival activities. Hot spots were the Czech and the French Clubs in central Sofia that were associated with the foreign diplomatic missions. The clubs staged concerts, served drinks and were open into the early hours of the morning. Entrance to the prestigious venues was limited to the holders of special permits. According to the informant, '*You had to be especially resourceful (to get in)*'. Getting into the Czech club without a pass proved not such a great obstacle, and the informant remembered joining in with calls of '*No to the USSR!*' once inside. Gaining access to the French club, however, was the real measure of success. '*Since our clothes were distinguishable from those of the 'grey mass' they thought we belonged to the guests of the Festival and we were able to get in. We kept quiet, so that they wouldn't realise we were not French*', he said.

These accounts show that some youths were bold or curious enough to cross the invisible borders that held others back from approaching foreign guests and kept them watching on the sidelines. The unrestricted communication practised by

²⁷ Directed by Petăr Popzlatev.

the informant above was certainly unusual but possible, showing that the boundaries set by the Festival meta-text could be individually navigated and explored. Young people communicated spontaneously outside the authorised language of the event, usurping its taxonomic power. For these youths, the language of the official enactment did not represent any relevant reality but lost itself in the redundant phrases recalled by the informant: "(...) *those stupid slogans, 'Youth means peace' or 'Peace means youth'...*". Instead, the teenagers swapped information on topics that reflected their own individual perceptions of life.

3. "For Ten Days We Saw the World" – Conclusions

By using the word 'frontier' in the main title, I mean to suggest that the Festival temporarily shifted the boundary line between Eastern and Western Europe closer to Bulgaria, enabling young people in the capital to take a look across what was usually a quite distant and sealed border. What they caught sight of – actual visitors from the West – appeared to counter much of the official symbolism of the Festival. *"It was a kind of an opening of the iron curtain (...), of raising a bit of the iron curtain and seeing the world outside us as not as hostile as the news usually showed it"*, said a woman informant. The Festival worked like an unexpected window: *"For ten days we saw the world"*, she added.

In the state media, the Bulgarian regime constructed a world organised into two incompatible blocs, permitting a little leeway for countries with strong socialist movements such as France and Italy. However, for young Bulgarians this rigorous delineation lacked plausibility. They wanted to 'see for themselves'. Given this attitudinal background, the staging of the Festival created a volatile interface between the official display of how socialist youth should be and the everyday problems, expectations and values of young people.

Analysis of the official discourse and structuring of the Festival event shows that the organisers imposed an agenda strongly determined by Cold War politics. On the Festival stage, young people were directed to act out the ideology of opposed systems, mainly through a version of socialist culture based on a contrived aesthetic intended to demonstrate precisely this polarisation. Music and dance were subject to preventive endeavours to control young people's enthusiasm for Western popular culture and channel music into 'socialist' forms. Another important mechanism designed to ensure the 'proper' performance of young Festival delegates was obligatory uniform and attendance to neat personal appearance. Visually, these exemplary young people stood apart, but according to the memories of Bulgarian onlookers, the unregimented, long-haired and simply more colourful visitors from outside the East bloc drew the gaze of spectators.

In the programmatic display of the socialist vision for youth, young Bulgarians dutifully performed their socialist identity. Indeed, the global message of world peace and the appeal for an end to the war in Vietnam was a popular banner that found mass support and gave legitimacy to the Festival as a whole. However, on the fringes of the Festival theatre, young people explored what the regime allowed them to see as well as what it attempted to conceal. Watching the spectacle, they seized on any scrap of non-official information to compose their own collage of life beyond the iron curtain. Visual impressions and the experience of live music

contributed to fire individual imaginings. Yet for many, the implied warnings of teachers or parents reinforced the 'borders in the mind' and restrained them from direct contact with Western peers. On the other hand, some young people actively crossed boundaries and communicated with visitors on their own terms, initiating a unique exchange of information on the Festival's periphery.

Information was a rare commodity in 1960s Bulgaria, and the events of Spring 1968 in Europe and the United States were reported by the media in a heavily censored form and within a single framework of interpretation: the revolt of exploited youth in the West, and 'counter-revolution' in Czechoslovakia. Several informants said they only heard about political unrest in Czechoslovakia long after the Prague Spring had come to an end and had been unaware of any tensions between the socialist countries around the time of the Festival. It seems that the more informed young people were about the events of Spring 1968 – usually through listening to foreign radio broadcasts – the greater their motivation to cross dividing lines and communicate with visitors from Central or Western Europe. However, the Sofia Festival did not produce any movement in analogy to the reform demands of Czech, or for that matter, Yugoslav, students.²⁸ The Bulgarian regime rather used the Festival to transmit veiled threats to the Czech government, formulated in the voice of an invented collective of youth. One day after the closing of the event on August 6, the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency issued an 'official' Festival appeal: *"The solidarity and friendship of the youthful planet once again unites our will for peace, against imperialism and reactionary (forces)"*.²⁹ Only three weeks later, Warsaw Pact troops entered Czechoslovakia to crush the 'counter-revolution' aided by the Bulgarian Army.

In the weeks following the Festival, the East-West frontier was firmly restored. The Festival *"...appeared and it somehow... faded away,"* said a woman informant. In Sofia, things went on *"the same old way as before"*. However, the event had demonstrated that the iron curtain was a permeable border. The pre-emptive strategies of Bulgarian youth policy at the end of the 1960s were neither able to hold back international rock and pop culture, nor the sexual revolution, from entering Bulgaria.

4.1. Chronology of World Festivals

I. WF of Youth	Prague	1947
II. WF of Youth	Budapest	1949
III. WF of Youth and Students	Berlin	1951
IV. WF of Youth and Students	Bucharest	1953
V. WF of Youth and Students	Warsaw	1955
VI. WF of Youth and Students	Moscow	1957
VII. WF of Youth and Students	Vienna	1959

²⁸ In May and June 1968, students in Yugoslavia demonstrated against the socialist establishment, social inequality and corruption, and for more freedom of speech. The biggest protests were centred at Belgrade University. See Radoslav Pavlovic (1998).

²⁹ *Rabotničeski delo; Narodna mladež*, 07.08.68.

VIII. WF of Youth and Students	Helsinki	1962
IX. WF of Youth and Students	Sofia	1968
X. WF of Youth and Students	Berlin	1973
XI. WF of Youth and Students	Havana	1978
XII. WF of Youth and Students	Moscow	1985
XIII. WF of Youth and Students	Pyongyang	1989
XIV. WF of Youth and Students	Havana	1997
XV. WF of Youth and Students	Algiers	2001

4.2. Press Sources

Mladež
Narodna mladež
Nardona kultura
Otečestvenijat front
Pogled
Paraleli
Rabotničesko delo
Studentska tribuna

4.3. Memories

I recorded the memories of the Festival in five semi-structured interviews conducted in 2002 and 2003 with three men (born in 1948, 1950 and 1958) and two women (born in 1949 and 1952). All were teenagers in 1968. Several other men and women contributed statements informally, and some of these are included in the text.

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Zusammenfassung

Im August 1968 fanden die IX. Weltfestspiele der Jugend und Studenten in der bulgarischen Hauptstadt Sofia statt. Die Kommunistische Partei benützte die Festspiele als eine Bühne, um der Welt die Leistungen der sozialistischen Jugend zu präsentieren. Im Rahmen der Festspiele, die zur Konstruktion einer polarisierten Welt beitrugen, sollten junge Bulgaren und Bulgarinnen eine stimmige sozialistische Identität verkörpern.

Gleichzeitig verwandelten die Festspiele die Trennlinie zwischen Ost und West in eine vorübergehend durchlässige Grenze. Viele bulgarische Jugendliche sahen junge Menschen aus dem Westen zum ersten Mal. Besonders motivierte Jugendliche suchten den Kontakt mit den Gästen. Sie nutzten die einmalige Gelegenheit Informationen und Ansichten auszutauschen, nur wenige Wochen bevor die Truppen des Warschauer Pakts den Prager Frühling niederschlugen.

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